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International competitive effects of harmonization
Alison J. Kirby*
School ofManagement, Boston University, 595 Commonwealth Avenue, Boston, MA 02215, USA
Abstract
The objective of this research is to theoretically examine international competitive consequences
surrounding harmonization of international accounting standards. Using a stochastic oligopoly model
of two firms in each of two countries, it is shown that when firms only operate domestically,
harmonization of accounting standards may not be beneficial for both countries. If it is beneficial for
both, then it is also a dominant strategy equilibrium and will be voluntarily implemented by the
individual country's standard setting boards. Thus, a meta-FASB can play no value-adding role.
Conversely, when firms operate both domestically and intemationally, a variety of equilibria may
emerge. In general, we observe the result that harmonizing on full disclosure may be detrimental to
developing countries, while strictly benefiting developed countries. Also, the benefits to disclosing
cost information far exceed the costs of disclosing demand information. Finally, the lASC may in some
circumstances add value as a norm setter, not only as a designer/enforcer of more elaborate accounting
rules. © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Competitive effects; Harmonization of accounting standards; Developing countries
1. Introduction
Just as doctors prescribe medications mindful of the side effects that they might induce,
accounting standard setters, in seeking to change disclosure levels to even the playing field
between investors in the financial markets, need also to consider the side effects that such
changes in disclosure levels might cause. Some standards have generated discussion about the
competitive consequences or side effects of altemative disclosure levels, most notably
standards relating to segment (or line-of-business, LOB) reporting. However, there seems
to be a general feeling that these side effects are so difficult to understand, that they are
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +1-617-353-2029; fax: +1-617-353-6667.
E-mail address: kirbyfebu.edu (A.J. Kirby).
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simply best ignored/ By way of example, the desirability of a harmonized set of international
accounting standards is often seemingly taken for granted. However, what are the competitive
side effects for a less developed country (such as Romania, Macedonia, or Trinidad and
Tobago) when it harmonizes and adopts IAS as its own?"^
The discussion over the side effects of harmonizing to international accounting standards
is essentially a discussion over the welfare effects of changing levels and international
differences in levels of accounting measurement and disclosure.^ In this paper, we examine
the product market or competitive side effects of disclosure choices independent of
securities' markets effects and labor market effects.'^ Prior research in an international
setting by Gigler, Hughes, and Raybum (1994) (hereafter GH&R) examined the combined
effect on producers and consumers of a setting in which disclosure was made by one firm to
another (but not vice versa). They showed that if two countries are left to themselves,
national governments would each domestically mandate less disclosure, but that the national
welfare of both countries would be improved were an international accounting standard to
require (and enforce) fiall disclosure.
The current paper addresses a number of questions: for which countries does harmoniza-
tion on higher levels of disclosure produce beneficial or detrimental side effects for
producers? Does the answer depend on the degree of development of the countries under
consideration? What role can an international group such as the International Accounting
Standards Committee (lASC) play in mitigating detrimental effects? How do these answers
change as firms become more global and economies become more independent? These are
examined in the context of mandated disclosure being reciprocal in nature and therefore
applying to all firms, not just incumbents as in the above-mentioned paper.
The analysis shows that if there is no international trade, whether an individual country
benefits or is harmed by mandated disclosure over no disclosure is solely a function of its
own degree of development. Thus, harmonized full disclosure will harm those countries
which individually had not selected ftill disclosure. This setting also reveals the tradeoff
' The FASB's Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, No. 2 "Qualitative Characteristics of Accounting
Information" contains a section describing "Costs and Benefits". Paragraph 139 states that "From the point of
view of society, the loss of competitive advantage that is said to result from some disclosure requirements is
clearly in a different category from the other costs involved. Although the loss to one business enterprise may be a
gain to another, the Board is aware of and concerned about the economic effects of the possible discouragement of
initiative, innovation and willingness to take risks if a reward to risk taking is denied. That is another cost that is
impossible to begin to quantify".
^ Romania, Macedonia, and Trinidad and Tobago have all recently harmonized to International Accounting
Standards.
^ Disclosure typically refers to whether an item is mentioned in the financial statements and accounting
measurement refers to standards affecting how an item is recognized in the accounts. While the current model has
both measurement and disclosure features, the focus is on analyzing the changing disclosure level, taking the
accounting measurement level as a parameter.
'* Barth, Clinch, and Shibano (1999) have recently addressed the effects of accounting harmonization in the
global equity markets. The effect of disclosure on the labor markets in terms of affecting equilibrium contracting
choices between principals and agents is also not considered here. We make the assumption that the firms'
decision-makers are personally indifferent between decision alternatives and make profit maximizing choices for
their firms.
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between the benefits of resolving cost uncertainty, vs. the detriment to firms of resolving
demand uncertainty through mutual disclosure. The former are seen to significantly outweigh
the latter given similar levels of uncertainty.
The results are more complex when the firms from both countries operate globally. If both
countries are relatively developed, then each country will independently select fiill disclosure
as a national standard irrespective of the other country's disclosure choice. Furthermore, full
disclosure by both countries is not Pareto dominated by any other information regime. Thus,
harmonization is spontaneously achieved, and there is no potential value to the lASC
promoting harmonized full disclosure. Conversely, if both countries are developing, then each
will independently select no disclosure regardless of the other country's disclosure choice,
and again this is not Pareto dominated by any other information regime, and therefore cannot
be improved upon by the lASC setting an international standard. In this case, harmonized full
disclosure is detrimental in its side effects for both countries.
However, if one country is developed and the other is not, several situations might arise.
First, as in GH&R, both countries might be made better off by an enforceable, mandated
intemational accounting standard forcing both countries away from nondisclosure. Second,
both countries might be made better off relative to mutual nondisclosure by being directed
toward an unenforceable/voluntary intemational accounting standard for full disclosure. This
latter possibility is particularly interesting in light of the real lASC not having the ability to
enforce its standards. Third, if one country is already ftilly disclosing, a second country,
which is required to harmonize to full disclosure, would be detrimentally affected if it is not
sufficiently developed.
The paper is organized with a literature review followed by a description of the model.
Subsequent sections contain the analyses for the Separate Economies and Global Firms
Scenarios, each scenario concluding with a summary of results. Finally, there is a comparative
statistics analysis across the two scenarios and a section containing conclusions.
2. Literature review
This paper follows research in the economics literature utilizing stochastic oligopoly
models to describe product market effects, while investigating the incentives of firms to share
information (see Gal-Or, 1985; Novshek & Sonnenschein, 1982; Shapiro, 1986; Vives,
1984). The general nature of the results is that Coumot competitors find it in their interest to
exchange marginal cost information (or more generally, firm-specific information), while
Bertrand competitors find it in their interest to exchange information about market demand
(or more generally, common uncertainty information). Consumers' interests are, in general,
diametrically opposed to those of producers.
Such models have also been adopted in the accounting literature to examine the
consequences of changes in levels of mandated accounting disclosures. Feltham, Gigler,
and Hughes (1992) (hereafter FG&H) in a single country (A) setting with demand
uncertainty, consider a monopolist operating in two market segments. First period operations
enable the monopolist to become perfectly informed. If the monopolist subsequently
discloses its results of operations under Line-of-Business (LOB) reporting, then its disclosure
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is completely informative of underlying market demand to the certain entrant, so that
competition in the second period takes place under certainty for both firms. However, if the
monopolist discloses in aggregate across the two segments, then the entrant in the second
period operates at an information disadvantage with respect to the monopolist. FG&H show
that while the monopolist prefers aggregate reporting over LOB, domestic welfare is greater
under LOB due to the consumers' and entrants' welfare being higher under LOB than under
aggregate reporting.
Gigler, Hughes and Raybum (1994; hereafter GH&R) extend FG&R's domestic model to
an international setting. They introduce a symmetric second country (B), such that the entrant
in each country is always foreign, i.e., from the other country. Consequently, the domestic
welfare for Country A equals the profits of the monopolist in A plus the consumer surplus in
A (which are both functions of A's disclosure level) plus the profits of the A-based firm
entering B (which is a function of only B's disclosure level). Since the entrant's profits to B
are now unaffected by A's disclosure rules, the result observed in FG&H flips so that
regardless of the other country's disclosure choice, A's domestic welfare is now greater under
aggregate reporting than under LOB. Thus, aggregate reporting by both countries is a
dominant strategy equilibrium. However, it is also shown to be Pareto dominated by bilateral
LOB reporting, implying that LOB needs to be enforced by an lASC if it is to be
implemented. This Pareto dominance by LOB is due to consideration of consumers' welfare,
and disappears if only producers' welfare is considered. Thus, in GH&R's model, LOB
reporting by A has beneficial side effects for consumers in A, detrimental effects for
incumbent producers in A and no effect on A's entrant into B's market.
It is notable that FG&H and GH&R consider a choice between a symmetric (LOB) and an
asymmetric (aggregate) information regime. Consequently, one of the key effects of
mandated disclosure, the fact that firms not only reveal but also receive information, is
absent from their model. Second, although GH&R also consider how their results are
sensitive to consideration of firm-specific cost uncertainty as opposed to market demand
uncertainty, there is no joint consideration of both types of uncertainty, and therefore of the
tradeoff between the two sets of effects. Third, through consideration of a two-period setting,
FG&H and GH&R are able to capture the ex post nature of accounting reports being used to
refine later production decisions. Others (as in this paper) have chosen the alternative
modeling route of a single period in which forward-looking accounting infonnation is
available even without prior operations. Results do not appear to be sensitive to this
difference in modeling assumption.
3. Model
The international economy consists of two countries, A and B, and four finns. All firms
produce the same single good.'' Firms 1 and 2 (3 and 4) are listed on the stock exchange in
Country A (B), its home country. Each country, /, has its own disclosure mandating
This single good can be thought of as a basket of goods and services.
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Table 1
Likelihoods of re\'enues conditional on demand levels
p{y,W) a'=n^,-- a,,i a' = l_L„/ + a«/
v,/=H 1-n
1-11
1]
organization or Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB-I), promulgating accounting
standards applicable to a firm listed on the stock exchange of that country.^ Thus, Firms 1 and
2, whose home country is A, adhere to the mandatory disclosure requirements promulgated
by FASB-A, even though they may be competing in both Countries A and B. Similarly, Firms
3 and 4, whose home country is B, abide by the requirements of FASB-B.
3.1. Production and competitive environment
Each country, /G{A,B}, is characterized by its inverse demand fiinction: P'=a^ — '^ie/xf,
where x/ is firm /'s chosen output in country /, and a^ is a random variable:
a^^{\ia/ — Oa!,^iai + Oa/} with cqual probability, where [1^/, Oai are known, but the realization
is not. The total cost fiinction for firm / in country / is C{x/) = Cj/x/. Unit cost is either high or
low; C//€{iic/ — cr<./,^Xc/ + (Tc/} with equal probability, where [1^1 — 0^' are known, but the
realization may or may not be. We further assume that c,/ and Cjj are distributed
independently, for all iJJJ. Firms interact in each market as Coumot competitors, selecting
output to maximize their expected profits anticipating that their competitors do the same.^ All
production is local, i.e., occurs in the country in which the product is then sold.
3.2. Private information environment
Firms' accounting systems produce perfect private informadon about their own marginal
cost, C//. Firms' accounting systems also produce imperfect private signals, v,/, about the overall
market demand parameter a^ in the countries where that firm is operating (i.e., potentially in
both A and B). The degree of imperfecdon in producing the market demand signal is described
by the parameter i]G[l/2, 1 ]. This imperfect signal about total country / demand takes one oftwo
values: V//G {H,L}, with the chance of the high demand signal given a low demand realization
also being r|. Thus, if r| = 1/2, then the imperfect signal given a high demand realization being r|,
and symmetrically, the chance of the low demand signal about demand is completely random,
and uninformative to competitors if revealed. If i] = 1, then the demand signal perfectly reveals
the true value of the market demand parameter and again is uninformative if revealed to
competitors, since they too have r\=\. These likelihoods are summarized in Table 1
.
This is more correctly described in the US as a mechanism incorporating both the SEC and the FASB. For
convenience, we use the shorthand FASB to capture the entire regulatory infrastructure composed of an FASB
designing accounting measurement and disclosure standards, an accounting profession implementing and proofing
them and an SEC enforcing them.
Assuming that firms costlessly are able to motivate implementation to profit maximizing actions is
tantamount to assuming that no agency problems exist between the managers and the owners of the firm.
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FASBs select Firms observe Firms Firms
own disclosure own costs disclose select
regime, DaDb and revenues publicly outputs
Fig. 1. Time line.
The signals produced by different firms about country / are independent of one another,
conditional on the true value of a^, i.e., the errors are independent. Similarly, the signals
produced by firm i are independent across the different countries. We interpret these demand
signals as accounting revenues and ri as the reliability of individual firm revenues as an
indicator of overall market demand.^ That r\ may be less than one, captures the effect of an
imperfect accounting measurement process regarding revenues (e.g., due to less than perfect
estimates of uncollectible accounts). We assume t\ is exogenous, and identical for all
companies in all countries.
3.3. Public disclosure environment
Within this market setting we consider a variety of mandated accounting disclosure
settings. FASB-I independently sets the mandated accounting disclosure level for firms with
home country /, with the objective of maximizing the combined expected producer surplus of
the firms in its jurisdiction.^ This disclosure level for country /,£)/, is either fiiU disclosure (F)
10
or no disclosure (N) and relates to worldwide operations for all firms listed in country /. No
In this private information environment, the type of information being generated (and later possibly
disclosed) is predictive or ex ante in nature. In reality, of course, the financial information which is disclosed via
annual reports is historical or ex post in nature: it reports on actual costs and revenues which have been generated.
However, one can also readily interpret these historical accounting disclosures as simultaneously being predictive
disclosures about the firm's future costs and revenues.
First, as noted in GH&R, maximization of competitive effects of disclosure is clearly not the stated goal
of an FASB. However, if the financial market decision-making effects of a disclosure standard under
consideration are positive, then an FASB seeking to set standards based on the joint consideration of financial
and product market effects, will modify its choice based on the direction and magnitude of the competitive
product market effects. Given the binary nature of the model, selecting fiill disclosure is logically equivalent to
saying that the competitive effects are beneficial for firms (or at least only insignificantly detrimental).
Similarly, selecting no disclosure is logically equivalent to the statement that compefifive effects are
significantly detrimental to firms' welfare. Second, limiting consideration to producer surplus represents a
departure from GH&R. Not considering consumer surplus is however consistent with consumers not being
mentioned as a category of intended user in Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts, No. 1 . Had GH&R
considered producer surplus only, they would have predicted aggregate reporting not only as a dominant
strategy equilibrium but also as Pareto preferred over LOB.
'" This too marks a departure from the GH&R setting. All firms in this model potentially disclose private
information, whereas in their model, only the incumbent potentially discloses. Second, for ease of computation,
only the extremes of full and no disclosure are analyzed as a way to address the more general issues of higher and
lower levels of disclosure. As in GH&R, we could interpret the higher level of disclosure as LOB or segment
reporting and the lower level of disclosure as aggregate reporting.
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disclosure mandated by FASB-I means that each firm under that jurisdiction does not pubHcly
disclose any information. Full disclosure means that the firms must publicly disclosure cost
and revenue information by country to all other firms. We denote the worldwide public
disclosure environment by D^D^, and is an element of the set: {FF,FN,NF,NN}. The
sequencing of events is depicted in Fig. 1
.
3.4. International trade environment
Under consideration are two international trade environment scenarios:
1. The Separate Economics scenario in which firms operate only in their own home
country. Thus, Firms 1 and 2 compete only in Country A and Firms 3 and 4 compete
only in Country B. The international economy consists of two economically
independent duopolies.
2. The Global Firms scenario in which all four operate in both countries.
For both international trade scenarios, the prediction of producer surplus involves working
backwards through the timeline. First, given the FASB disclosure regime choices and a
particular realization of firm /'s information set, solutions for firm z's optimal output choices
are generated. Second, squaring individual firm output and weighting by all possible
realizations of firm fs information set generates ex ante expected profits. Aggregating
profits over firms and countries generates global producer surplus (GPS) for a given
disclosure choice.
3.5. Research questions
We use the derived levels of GPS to address a number of questions:
1
.
Are the competitive side effects of fiill disclosure harmful or beneficial? How do they
change as a fiinction of the exogenous uncertainty parameters?
2. Characterizing developing and developed countries in terms of differing uncertainty
parameters, how do the predicted competitive effects vary with the degree of
development of the countries?
3. What is the implied role for a meta-FASB, such as the lASC, and how does this
differ depending on the degree of development of the constituent countries and the
degree of globalization?
4. What is the predicted impact of intemadonal harmonization to full disclosure?
4. Separate economies scenario
Under the separate economies scenario, only Firms 1 and 2 compete with each other in
Country A and only Firms 3 and 4 compete with each other in Country B. Furthermore,
disclosures by Firms 1 and 2 have no impact on the welfare of Firms 3 and 4 since the
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market demand and costs are independent. Disclosure choices by country / are therefore
made without consideration of country .Ts choice. Below we consider Country A, Firms 1
and 2, and the disclosure choice by FASB-A. The results are symmetric for Country B,
Firms 3 and 4, and the disclosure choice by FASB-B.
4.1. No disclosure in Country A
If FASB-A mandates no disclosure, then Firm I's relevant information set is {ci,^!} and
Firm 2's is {c2,V2}-'' Using its information, Firm 1 selects output to maximize expected
profits, assuming that Firm 2 does the same (Eq. (1)):
max£'ni(xi(-)) = maxE[a — x\{-) — xji-) — c\]x\{-) (1)
.v,(-) .v,(-)
The corresponding first-order condition is (Eq. (2)):
dEYli
dx]
= E{a\yi) - ci -2xi(-) - £[x2(-)bi,Ci] = (2)
which must hold for all four realizations of Firm 1 's information set. Conjecture that Firm 1 's
output choice under no disclosure depends on its information set in the following way (Eq. (3)):
x^(-) = ao + a? + a+ (3)
where ao" is included only if j^i=vi" and ao^ is included only if ci =|_VA + acA. Firm 2 is
conjectured to have an identical strategy. Appendix A derives equilibrium values for the
coefficients in the output strategy. Appendix B shows that ex ante expected profits for Firm 1
equal the expectation of the squared outputs. Thus (Eq. (4)):
£nr = i!^2i^^ +^ + al.K„ (4)
where (Eq. (5))
(211-1
Km —
2 + (2ti - 1
,1 (5)
This expression is unaffected by the disclosure choice of FASB-B, as indicated by the
single N superscript. The expression for Firm 2's expected profits is identical.
" If FASB-B simultaneously mandates full disclosure, then strictly speaking. Firm I's information set also
includes the disclosures by Firms 3 and 4. However, these additional disclosure are irrelevant for Finns 1 and 2 in
making their output choices in this environment of separate economies. Thus, only the relevant infomiation set is
described. Separately, since each firm operates only in its own home country in this scenario of separate
economies, the country subscript has been dropped when not misleading.
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Since Firms 1 and 2 have zero expected profits in Country B under this scenario, the GPS
for Firms 1 and 2 when FASB-A mandates no disclosure is the domestic producer surplus in
Country A (Eq. (6)):
DPS^ = 2£n^ (6)
Symmetrically, the producer surplus in Country B is (Eq. (7)):
DPS^ = 2£'n^ = 2
^2 _2
H — + cr,,BAN
9 4
(7)
4.2. Full disclosure in Country A
If FASB-A instead mandates ftill disclosure, then Firms 1 and 2 have the identical relevant
information set, namely: {c\,y\,C2,y2]- Both firms select output levels to maximize their
expected profits assuming the other firm does the same. The first order condidon differs
slightly from Eq. (2), since now each firm knows the output of the other firm due to their
common information set (Eq. (8)):
1^ ^ E{a\y,) - ci - 2X1 (•) - x.^-) = (8)
Correspondingly, conjecture Finn 1 's output to be (Eq. (9)):
x^(-) = ao + a" + a^ + a(J^ + af (9)
where ai " is included only ifthere is at least one high demand signal,a2" is included only ifboth
demand signals are high, where glq^ is included only if Firm I's own cost signal is high (i.e.,
[i^A + a^.rx), and cti ^ is included only ifFirm 2 's cost is high. Firm 2 's output is symmetric.
Appendix C states the 1 6 first-order conditions and derives the equilibrium coefficients in
the optimal output strategy for both firms. By the results in Appendix B, taking the
expectation of all 1 6 potential output levels squared gives ex ante expected profits for Firm
1 under full disclosure (Eqs. (10) and (11)):
En\ = ^^^^^^^^+^-^ + al.K, (10)
where
^=
.. r':^
.2. 01)
(2T1-1
9[ti2 + (1-ti)^]
When FASB-A mandates full disclosure, domestic producer surplus in Country A is (Eq. (12)):
DPS^ = 2£'n^ (12)
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Symmetrically, the producer surplus in Country B under full disclosure is (Eq. (13)):
DPS^ = lEUl = 2 - H h cr bAf
9
(13;
4.3. Choice of disclosure regime in Country A
Stepping back to the first move in the sequence of events, we consider the choice of
disclosure regime made by FASB-A. The impact of mandating full disclosure over no
disclosure is captured by the difference in domestic producer surplus under the two regimes
(Eq. (14)):
DPS^ - dps;:; = ^ol, - lol^K^ - K,) (14)
where K^—Kp> 0. Thus, disclosure when there is only cost (demand) uncertainty is
beneficial (detrimental) to producer surplus.'" Further, if both forms of uncertainty are
present, and if r|= 1/2 or 1, then K^ = Ky: and disclosure is unambiguously desirable, because
there is de facto no disclosure of demand "information".'^ However, for interior values of t],
K^ — Ky is strictly positive, and whether disclosure is beneficial or detrimental (i.e., whether
full or no disclosure maximizes producer surplus) depends on the relative values ofK^ — K^,
CT^A and cTflA .
Proposition 1: Under separate economies, mandating of full disclosure by FASB-I for
home country I firms, has beneficial effects on the producer surplus of country I if and
only if, (CTc'/c^a^)^ > 36(Kn — Kf)/11. Otherwise mandated disclosure has detrimental
effects.
In the context of real FASBs with a primary objective of better informing investors, this
result indicates that consideration of the side effects (or competitive effects) of prescribing
disclosure will move the FASB's disclosure requirements down from the shareholder-
decision-making-maximizing level only when the level of demand uncertainty sufficiently
dominates the level of cost uncertainty. Furthermore, this critical level is a function of the
accuracy of each firm's revenue signal as an indicator of total market demand, and is highest
for intermediate levels of this accuracy parameter. This nonmonotonicity in i] is intuitive
since for intermediate values of t|'^ and high levels of demand uncertainty revenues are most
' This result is consistent with prior results in the Hterature in which only a single fomi of uncertainty is
modeled.
' If T)=l/2, then privately observed individual firm revenues are completely uninformative about market
demand, implying that no demand infonnation is disclosed even under full disclosure, and there are no detrimental
effects of disclosing demand "information." Also, if ii= 1, each tmn's privately observed revenue signal is
completely informative about market demand, implying that no new demand information is revealed through
mutual disclosure of revenue information.
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revealing about total market demand, and therefore the sharing of such information is most
detrimental. The value from sharing cost information on the other hand is more beneficial the
higher is the level of cost uncertainty.
We can relate this result to an institutional setting through consideration of developed vs.
developing countries. If developing countries tend to have political settings and economies
that are less robust to external shocks, one might expect that overall there is greater variability
in market demand (higher cr,,) than in developed countries. Conversely, if developed countries
tend to adopt production technologies, which incorporate higher levels of fixed costs (i.e.,
they have higher levels of operating leverage), one would expect to observe higher
fluctuations (higher cr,.) in fiill production operation costs per unit as production volumes
vary than operation would be present for a low-tech production in a developing country.
Combining these two factors, we classify developing countries as having relatively low
values of the parameter oj^a, and developed countries as having higher values. Further,
define (Eq. (15)):
Ui
0(J
(15:
Thus, Proposition 1 predicts that under separate economies, developing countries will tend
to experience detrimental side effects from mandating full disclosure, and developed
countries beneficial side effects. This result is depicted in Fig. 2. Combining these side
effects with the unmodeled primary financial market effects (which are presumed to be
positive), implies that developing countries will select lower levels of disclosure than they
would if they ignored competitive side effects.
Side Effects are Beneficial:
Country / prefers Full Disclosure
0.02
Uj
0.015
0.01
0.005
0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
Fig. 2. Equilibrium disclosure regimes under separate economies.
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A further interesting observation from Fig. 2 relates to the degree of tradeoff among the
side effects, namely between the benefits of disclosing cost information vs. the damage
caused by disclosing demand information. Note that the critical Ui level such that there is a
switch in preferences varies around 0.01. Since a and c, are likely to be of the same order of
magnitude, if cr„ is on the order of 10 times ct^? then the benefits from resolving the cost
uncertainty approximately equal the cost of resolving the demand uncertainty, or in other
words, the country would be indifferent between mandated frill disclosure and mandated
nondisclosure. Thus, the benefits from disclosing cost information significantly outweigh the
detrimental effects of disclosing demand information.
4.4. Disclosure regime choice under separate economies scenario
Finally, consider a setting in which both FASB-A and FASB-B make simultaneous
mandated disclosure choices. In equilibrium, under separate economies, each FASB's
independent choice will constitute a dominant sfrategy, because of the independence between
the disclosure requirements in country J and the welfare consequences in country /. Thus, it
follows that:
Proposition 2: The equilibrium international portfolio of disclosure regimes is FF, NN,
NF or FN, and results from each country selecting its disclosure level based solely on its
uncertainty parameter, Ui and the reliability of revenue information, {r\).
Consequently, if both countries are developed (developing), then an implicitly hanno-
nized portfolio of disclosure regimes of FF (NN) emerges as the equilibrium even without
the intermediation of a meta-FASB such as the lASC. However, if A is a developing
country and B is a developed country, then the predicted equilibrium portfolio of
disclosure regimes is NF, where F should be interpreted as more disclosure and N as
less disclosure.''*
In all these cases, international harmonization on frill disclosure would be harmful to
developing countries, and would need to be enforced. It would have no impact on the welfare
of the developed countries, which had already independently selected frill disclosure.
4.5. Summary of results from separate economies
These results imply that when economies are separate: (a) having nonharmonized
standards across countries may Pareto dominate identical (hannonized) accounting
standards, (b) each country's own degree of development (and the reliability of revenue
infonnation) determines whether its producer welfare is maximized under higher or
lower levels of mandated disclosure, (c) harmonization on full disclosure has detrimental
side effects for any sufficiently less developed country, which would othci'wise not
disclose, (d) since each country's producer welfare is unaffected by the disclosure
''* For example, suppose i| = 0.75 in both countries, L'a = 0.01 and t/n = 0.02, then A'n - A.V = 0.004 and
"idiK^ - K\:)l\ 1 =0.0I309>0 and the international disclosure equilibrium will be NF.
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mandates of the other country, there is no opportunity for a meta-FASB, such as the
lASC, to bilaterally enhance producer welfare through hamionization, and (e) the
benefits from disclosing cost information significantly outweigh the detrimental effects
of disclosing demand information. Finally, (f) forced harmonization never improves
producer surplus in this scenario.
5. Global firms scenario
Under the Global Firms scenario, all four firms compete with each other in both countries.
Consequently, the strategic output choices for all firnis depend not only on the disclosure
regime mandated in their own home country, but also on the disclosure regime mandated in
the other country as well.
5.1. Both FASBs mandate no disclosure
Under the Global Firms scenario, if both FASB-A and FASB-B mandate no disclosure
(i.e., Da^b^NN), then Firm I's information set is {ciavVia^cib,;^^}. since it is now
operating in both countries. The other firms have symmetric information sets. Using this
information. Firm 1 makes output choices for each country so as to maximize its own
expected profits from operating in each country, assuming that Firms 2, 3, and 4 do the same.
Thus, in Country A (Eq. (16)):
max ^TIiaIxiaI-)) = max £"[« - xia(-) -^2a(-) -^3a(-) - ^4a(-) - <^ia]^ia(-) (16)
x\a(-) .via(-)
The corresponding first-order condidon is (Eq. (17)):
riFW
— = E{a\yi^)
-ciA -2xia(-) - £'[x2A(-)biA,ciA] - ^[^3A(-)blA,ClA]
-4^4a(-)1via,cia]=0 (17)
which must hold for all four realizations of Firm 1 's Country A information set. Conjecture
that Firm 1 's output choice in Country A depends on its information set in the following way
(Eq. (18)):
where ao" is included only if Via'^Via" and ao^ is included only if ciA = [i<:A + crcA.
Appendix D presents the first-order conditions and derives the equilibrium coefficients
for the output strategy. Squaring the optimal output levels and weighting by the
appropriate probabilities give ex ante expected profits for Firm 1 in Country A (Eqs.
(19) and (20)):
'^
-
—
Ys
^^ + f^«AANN (lyj
14
where
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A^NN —
(271 - 1
2 + 3(21] - 1
(20)
This expression is affected by the disclosure choice of FASB-B of no disclosure, as
indicated by the NN superscript. The expression for Firm I 's expected profits in Country B is
symmetric (Eq. (21)):
^j-jNN ^ (M^«b - I^I^b)" ^ CJ-B , _2
MB 25
+ ^- + C^^B-^NN (21)
Expected profits for Firms 2, 3, and 4 in both countries are identical to those for Firm 1.
Finally, since Firms 1 and 2 are identical, the GPS for Firms 1 and 2 listed in Country A is
(Eqs. (22) and (23)):
NNiGPsr = 2[£'n^^+£'n^B] (22)
= 2
(^i^A - ^i^a)^ + (^i^B -^icB)"
^ ^
25
+ (f^'A+^aB)A:]NN
Under this disclosure regime, the GPS for Firms 3 and 4 listed in Country B is also (Eq. (24)):
rNN NNiGps^^ = 2[£n37 + ^n^B ] = GPS.NN (24)
5.2. Both FASBs mandate full disclosure
If both FASB-A and FASB-B mandate full disclosure, then Dp^D^ = FF, and all four firms
have the identical information set: {{c,a}, {j,a}, {Qb}» {.V/bIIV/gI 1,2,3,4}, since all firms
are now operating in both countries. As in the mutual no disclosure case in Section 5.1, all
firms select output levels to maximize their expected profits assuming the other firms do the
same. The first-order condition, however, differs slightly from Eq. ( 1 7), since now each firm
knows the output that the others will produce due to their common information set (Eq. (25)):
^(«|Via) - CiA - 2xia(-) - X2A - X3A - X4A = (25)
Consequently, conjecture that Firm I's output choice in Country A depends on its
information set in the following way (Eq. (26)):
4a(-) = ao + (^'1' + ^^2 + ^^3 + <^4 + f\l +(^t +^2 + a-, (26)
where a," is included only if there are at leasty high demand signals (including its own), olq'^
is included only if Firm 1 's own coast signal is high (i.e., jl,., + a(.i). and cvyr/ is included only
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if at least k other firms' cost signals are high. Treating the other firms symmetrically, we solve
for the Bayesian Nash equilibrium output levels conditional on the information set available
to Firm 1. Appendix E presents the relevant first-order conditions and the resulting
equilibrium coefficients for the output strategy. The resulting ex ante expected profits for
Firm 1 in Country A are (Eqs. (27) and (28)):
F\f^ — r CT A ApF
25 25
(27)
where
Kyy —
(2T1-1 \2i2[ti' + (1-ii)T
,
[4ti(1-ti)
hf + (1-^1)1 [^^ + (1-11)1
(28)
This expression is affected by the disclosure choice of FASB-B of flill disclosure, as
indicated by the FF superscript. Symmetrically, Firm 1 's expected profits in Country B are
(Eq. (29)):
iillin = r^ 1 T^ h a^BApF
'IB 25 25
'29]
Expected profits for Firms 2, 3, and 4 in Country A (B) are identical to those for Firm 1 in A
(B) under this information setting of bilateral full disclosure.
Finally, the GPS for Firms 1 and 2 listed in Country A is (Eqs. (30) and (31)):
GPs^^ = 2[£n^J + £n^^]
= 2
25 25
(30)
(31)
Under this fiill disclosure regime, the GPS for Firms 3 and 4 listed in Country B is also
(Eq. (32)):
GPS^F = 2[£n^^ + £n3^^]=GPS^^ (32)
5.3. Different disclosure mandates across countries
Under the global firms scenario, ifFASB-A mandates no disclosure and FASB-B mandates
full disclosure, (i.e., £)a^b = NF), Firm I's information set is: {c/A,>^/AAB»JF/fi}V/G{ 1,3,4},
and Firm 2's information set is: {c/a,>'/aAbJ'/b} V/G {2,3,4}, while Firm 3's (and Firm 4's)
information set is: {c,a,J/a,C/b,>',b}V/G{3,4}.
Conjecture that Firm 1 's output choice in Country A depends on its information set in the
following way (Eq. (33)):
xf (•) = oo + a" + aj- + a" + a2 + a" + aj + af + af + a^ + aj (33)
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where oc/^ is included if at leasty other firms have high demand signals regarding Country A,
where a," is included only if there are at least J other high demand signals and Firm 1 's
demand signal is high. Furthermore, cx^ ~ is included if at least k other firms' cost signals are
high (i.e., [i^A + a^.A), and cvyt^ is included only if at least k other firms' cost signals are high
and Firm 1 's own cost signal is high. Firm 2 is treated symmetrically. Firms 3 and 4 are,
however, conjectured to have a different optimal output choice in Country A based on the
information they observe (Eq. (34)):
-^(/3 + K :34:
where 3 1 is included ifV3 or3'4 is H, and [32 is included only ifboth are H. Also, 3o ^ is included if
Firm 3 's own cost signal is high (i.e., [i^a + cTca), (3i ^ is included ifthe other firm's cost signal is
high, and 02 ^ is included only ifboth firms' cost signals are high. We solve for the BayesianNash
equilibrium output levels conditional on the information set available to each firm. The necessary
first-order conditions and the resulting output strategy coefficients are given in Appendix F.
Finally, the GPS for Country A's Firms 1 and 2 when no disclosure is mandated by
Country A, and fiill disclosure is mandated by FASB-B is (Eqs. (35)-(37)):
GPSNF rNF NFi2[£n-+£n,3
= 2
(|i^A - [i^a]^ + (|i^B - [i^b)- 33(a^A + a^B
25
+
100
<^'b)^1NFA
(35)
(36)
where
^NFA —
(2ti-i; 2t|(1 — Ti)(2ir| — 1)'
25[,f + {\-^f] [2 + (2ti-1)Y
4Ti3(l-^)3(2Ti-l)-[if + (1-1^)^]
+
[tI^ + (1 - ii)2][2(ii3 + (1 _ ^)3) + ^^(1 _ t^)(2ti - 1)-]
(37)
By contrast, the GPS for Firms 3 and 4 listed in Country B is (Eqs. (38) and (39)):
GPSf = 2[£n^X+£n?B'l
= 2
(^^A - |1,.a)^ + (l^gB -|1,.b)' }]{^Ia
25 25
-^
^ (c^flA + cr;B)ArNFB
where
^NFB =
(2ti-1)^
25[,P + (1-T,)-]
(38)
(39)
Thus, it is readily seen that K^pa >^nff3 foi" all i]e[l/2,l].
Alternatively, if FASB-A mandates full disclosure and FASB-B no disclosure, (i.e.,
DjkDq = FN), the GPS ofthe two countries is reversed from theNF disclosure scenario (Eq. (40)):
.FNGPS^'" = GPSbNF GPSFN GPSNF (40)
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Table 2
GPS for A and B under global firms scenario
GPSa^'Db. GPSb^^Z^b ^b = Full Dg = No
Da=Fu11 (38/25C/+2/rFF, 38/25^7+ 2^ff) (34/25(7+ 2/:nfb, 33/50t/+2/:NFA)
= ($FF, $FF) = ($NFB, $NFA)
Da = No (33/50t/+2/:NFA, 34/25 t/+2^NFB) (1/2(/+2/:nn, l/2t/+2/:NN)
= ($NFA, $NFB) = ($NN, $NN)
5.4. Disclosure regime choice under global firms scenario
Since GPS/^^ ^ GPS/^^ and GPS ™ ^ GPS/^ the welfare of each country is affected by
the disclosure regimes in both countries. Thus, the disclosure choice by each FASB-I in the
absence of an lASC harmonizing disclosure choices, should be modeled as a noncooperative
game in which each FASB simultaneously selects between two disclosure levels (no
disclosure and full disclosure), knowing that its counterpart FASB in the other country is
doing the same and with the objective of maximizing the producer welfare of the firms listed
in its jurisdiction.'^
Rescaling the payoffs to remove the common term of [2(p^A — ^1^^)^ + 2(p,^B — ^x<.b)^]/25 and
defining U={{OcAf+{o^.B)~)/((OaAf+(aaBf'), gives the payoffs in Table 2. Note also the
simplification in notation
16
GPS^^ --=:$FF
GPSf = $NFA
GPS™ = $NFB
GPSf = $NN
where, for example, $FF = 38/25f/+2A^FF is the global payoff to country Fs listed firms
under bilaterally mandated full disclosure. Depending on the ranking of the four different
payoff levels ($FF, $NFA, $NFB, $NN), different equilibria of international disclosure
choices may emerge. As in the previous scenario, these payoffs represent only the
competitive side effects from disclosure on producer profits. Our interest is in gaining a sense
of when these effects are most severely detrimental and therefore, most likely to conflict with
objectives of increasing disclosure to the financial markets.
'^ Again as indicated in footnote 9, this is really shorthand for saying that the FASB optimally trades off the
financial market effects of disclosure with its competitive side effects.
'^ For clarification, FF denotes the international disclosure setting of bilateral fiiU disclosure, while $FF
denotes the payoffs to a given country under bilateral fiill disclosure.
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Table 3
Region I ordinally ranked GPS
\
Payoffs Db = Full Db = No
Da = Full
Da = No
(4.4)
(2,3)
(3,2)
(1,1)
Note that U can be restated as a weighted average of the two countries' degrees of
development (i.e., Ua and ^b)^ where the weights reflect each country's relative share in
global market demand uncertainty.
U =
{o,.a)- + (a^B)'
(cT^a)^ + (cTflB)^ (-^a+-^b)
= Ua
CT-A + cr-
+ ^]
Thus, if both countries are developing then U is low; if one is developing and one is
developed then U takes an intermediate value, and if both are developed then U is high.
Proposition 3: Firms in country I are always made better off if country J mandates flill
disclosure for firms listed in country J.
Proof: True since $FF > $NFB and $NFA > $NN. D
This proposition indicates that even though there are 4 x 3 x 2 x 1 = 24 potential orderings
of the four payoff levels, only 6 ( = 24/2/2) of these are actually feasible, and correspond to 6
regions in U-^ space. For each region, a different equilibrium portfolio of international
disclosure regimes emerges, in the absence of harmonization.
5.4. J. Region I: {(^,U): $FF> $NFB>$NFA>$NN}
For this region, the four payoff levels are ordinally numbered in Table 3 with $FF having
the highest value (and therefore denoted by "4"), $NFB having the second highest value (and
therefore denoted by ^'3"), $NFA denoted by "2," and $NN by "1."
Given these payoffs, D^Dq = FF is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Regardless of the
other country's choice of disclosure regime, each country's listed firms are best off in total
when that country selects mandated full disclosure. Each FASB will independently be
motivated to select full disclosure. Harmonized accounting standards emerge spontaneously
without intervention from a meta-FASB, because competitive side effects for both countries
are beneficial.
Tabic 4
Region II ordinally ranked GPS
Payoffs Du = Full Da = No
Da=Fu1I
Da = No
(4,4)
(3,2)
(2.3)
(1.1)
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Table 5
Region IIIA ordinally ranked GPS
Payoffs Db = Fu11 Db = No
Da = Full
Da = No
(4,4)
(3,1)
(1,3)
(2.2)
5.4.2. Region II: {(^,U): $FF> $NFA> $NFB> $NN}
The GPS payoffs in Region II are given in Table 4.
Dj!^Db = ¥¥ is again a dominant strategy equilibrium. Each FASB will independently be
motivated to select ftiU disclosure. Again, there is no role for a meta-FASB: harmonization
occurs spontaneously.
5.4.3. Region IIIA: {(^,U): $FF>$NFA>$NN>$NFB}
The GPS payoffs in Region IIIA are given in Table 5.
D/J)b = {NN,FF} are both Nash equilibria, but there are beneficial side effects to both
countries if they harmonize on fiill disclosure, i.e., bilateral fiall disclosure Pareto dominates
bilateral nondisclosure. However, there is no guarantee that the fiill disclosure Nash
equilibrium will be reached if each country selects its disclosure regime independently.
However, such coordination might be achieved through a meta-FASB, such as the lASC,
focusing FASBs on harmonized full disclosure. The role of the lASC, however, would not
include disclosure enforcement, since in this region, full disclosure is self-enforcing once it
is reached.
5.4.4. Region IIIB: {(^U): $NFA> $FF> $NFB> $NN}
The GPS payoffs in Region IIIB are given in Table 6.
DaDb= {NF,FN} are both Nash equilibria. Considering either of these Nash equilibria,
any move on the part of lASC towards harmonizing on full disclosure will reduce the welfare
of the country newly required to disclose, but have a beneficial side effect on the country
already disclosing. Since bilateral full disclosure is not a Nash equilibrium in this parameter
region, its implementation would need to be enforced by the lASC.
5.4.5. Region IV: {(^U): $NFA>$FF>$NN>$NFB}
The GPS payoffs in Region FV are given in Table 7.
^A^B =NN is a dominant strategy equilibrium, but both countries would experience
beneficial side effects under harmonized full disclosure. However again, since such
harmonization would not be a Nash equilibrium, it would again require enforcing to be
Table 6
Region IIIB ordinally ranked GPS
Payoffs Db = Fu11 Db = No
Da = Full
Da = No
(3,3)
(4,2)
(2,4)
(1,1)
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Table 7
Region IV ordinally ranked GPS
1
Payoffs Db = Fu11 Db = No
Da = Full
D^ = No
(3,3)
(4,1)
(1,4)
(2,2)
Table 8
Region V ordinally ranked GPS
Payoffs Db = Fu11 Db = No
Da = Full
Da = No
(2,2)
(4,1)
(1,4)
(3,3)
implemented. Thus, an lASC could only add value to both member countries if it could
enforce harmonization on full disclosure.
5.4.6. Region V: {(^U): $NFA>$NN>$FF>$NFB}
The GPS payoffs in Region V are given in Table 8.
D/^Db =NN is a dominant strategy equilibrium. Furthermore, there is no part of Region V
for which harmonization (enforced or not) on full disclosure could improve both countries'
welfare. In this region, harmonizing on fiill disclosure has detrimental side effects for both
U''(ri) i
0.07
Region I
/
Region II
U'''(TJ) \
u
0.06
0.05
Region IIIAV U''(7])^ \ 0.04. 0.03
J:
/
^ Region V
rv N\ \
0.02
~ Region IIIB\\
M
0.01
0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
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Fig. 3. Equilibrium disclosure regimes under global firms.
A.J. Kirby / The International Journal oj Accounting 36 (2001) 1-32 21
countries, and therefore, there is no potential value-adding role for an lASC seeking
harmonization on flill disclosure.
These six regions depicted in Fig. 3 are bounded by four U{r\) fiinctions:
1. jf\T\)= {{^^,U)
2. t/-(i^)={(ii,LO
3. lf\ii)={{^.U)
4. f/\ii)={(Ti,LO
$NFA=$NFB} = 100/35[^NFA -^nfb]
$NN=$NFB} = 1 00/43 [y^NN -^nfb]
$NFA = $ FF} = 1 00/43 [^NFA - ^ff]
$NN=$FF} = 100/51[^NN -^ff]
where, for example, if^ is defined such that $NFA=$NFB, or equivalently:
33 34
— t/ + IK-^YK — —U + lA^NFB
Comparing the results across these regions, gives the following results in the absence of a
meta-FASB imposing harmonization:'''
Proposition 4: (a) At the extreme values of 1^=1/2,1 bilateral full disclosure is the
Pareto optimal dominant strategy equilibrium, for all U. (b) For t|G( 1/2,1), if U is
sufficiently high, (Regions I and II), then bilateral full disclosure is a dominant strategy
equilibrium and Pareto dominates bilateral nondisclosure, (c) For r|G(l/2,l), if U is
sufficiently low, (Region V), then bilateral non-disclosure is a dominant strategy
equilibrium and Pareto dominates bilateral fiill disclosure, (d) For tiG(1/2,1), (Regions
III and IV), if U takes an intermediate value, then bilateral full disclosure is never a
dominant strategy equilibrium, although it may be a Nash equilibrium (Region IIIA).
These results describing the equilibrium emergence of various disclosure regime combina-
tions in the absence of a meta-FASB translate into results regarding the desirability of
instituting an lASC demanding harmonized fiill disclosure, as indicated below.
5.5. Summary of results under global firms scenario
First, if both countries are sufficiently developed, then both FASBs would select full
disclosure and harmonized fiill disclosure emerges spontaneously without the intervention of
an lASC. Second, if both countries are sufficiently less developed, then each FASB will
independently select nondisclosure. In this setting, harmonized full disclosure is detrimental
to both countries' firms. Finally, if the average degree of development across both countries is
at an intermediate level, then harmonized full disclosure will have one of two effects, (a) If
'^
It is questionable whether the different regions that have been identified actually correspond to plausible
combinations of parameter values. Simple examples suggest that they do. Suppose that t| = 0.75, and |j,„ = 2^i<, for
both countries implying a margin of 50%. Further, if the coefficient of variation in cost per unit (i.e., Ocl\i.c) is 10%,
then a coefficient of variation in market demand (i.e., aj\ia) of 30%), implies Uj={gJoJ~ = Uis 1/36, which would
lie in Region IV. Alternatively, a coefficient of variation in market demand (i.e., a„/p,„) of 10%), for both countries,
implies U/= (Oc/OaT^ ^ is 0.25, which would lie in Region I.
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both FASBs had noncooperatively selected nondisclosure, then lASC harmonized full
disclosure will benefit both countries' firms. However, this may need external enforcement
to guarantee implementation, (b) If one FASB selected full disclosure and the other
nondisclosure, then lASC harmonized full disclosure detrimentally affects the nondiscloser
of the two countries, while strictly benefiting the already disclosing country. Harmonization
in this case would require enforcement to guarantee implementation. If there has been
evolution from separate economics to global firms, then this latter situation is most likely to
arise with the developing country's FASB selecting non-disclosure and the developed
country's FASB selecting full disclosure. Thus, again, harmonized full disclosure may harm
the firms in developing countries.
These results, however, also imply that when firms operate globally, there is a value-
adding role for a meta-FASB harmonizing full disclosure, but only if there is an intermediate
level of average development across countries. In some instances, as in GH&R, a meta-FASB
can only improve both constituent countries' welfare, if the meta-FASB has the power to
mandate and enforce an international accounting standard. In our results, we see that a meta-
FASB may also add value simply by coordinating countries' disclosure regimes without the
need for enforcement.
6. Comparative statics: the effect of globalization
Comparing the results from both international trade scenarios, one can predict how the side
effects of harmonizing on full disclosure (relative to no harmonization) are likely to change as
international trade increases and firms becomes more global. Comparing Figs. 2 and 3, it is
notable that the critical t/ values lie in the 0.01-0.07 range for both. A number of interesfing
observations also emerge.
The move toward global firms is likely accompanied by a situation of one developed
country (A) and one developing country (B). Prior to globalization, under separate
economies, the developed country would have mandated flill disclosure and the developing
country not: thus they would be in the regime FN. From this setting, as the firms globalize, a
simultaneous move toward harmonized fiill disclosure will always have beneficial side effects
for the developed country (since $FF>$NFA for all regions). However, harmonized fiill
disclosure has detrimental side effects for the developing country (B) if the average U level is
not sufficiently high (i.e., falls in Regions IIIB, IV, or V). This is of relevance and possibly
concern for understanding the side effects on countries such as Macedonia and Albania,
which have recently harmonized their standards to International Accounting Standards. It is
also worth noting however, that unlike in the separate economies case, for a given level of
development of Country B, the more developed is Country A the more likely that the average
level of uncertainty, V, lies in Regions I, II, or IIIA and therefore, the less likely that B
actually experiences detrimental competitive side effects from harmonized fiill disclosure.
Second, in the scenario where countries are more homogeneous in their degrees of
development (either both developed or both developing) prior to globalization, then
"* This arises due to the reciprocal nature of international trade in this setting.
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harmonization on full disclosure will have identical effects on both countries (both beneficial
or both detrimental) as in the separate economies case.
7. Conclusion
In this paper, we have examined the international competitive effects ofharmonization on fiill
disclosure levels. In contrast to results in GH&R applauding the lASB's move toward
harmonization on LOB reporting, it has been shown here that the effects in particular on producer
welfare require more extensive consideration. Countries are not unambiguously better off ifthey
join a move toward full disclosure. The analysis here has weighed the tradeoffs in simultaneously
disclosing cost and market demand information by all firms in a country— including foreign
competitors— to all other firms, and shows that the equilibrium international disclosure outcome
is a fiinction ofthe degree ofdevelopment. In particular, developing countries harmonizing on full
disclosure are at greatest risk of experiencing detrimental side effects, especially if the other
country although developed is not significantly so.
The model used here also shows promise for analyzing further interesting scenarios related
to setting of international accounting standards. For example, the model could be extended to
incorporate a scenario in which firms of one country operate in both countries, but the firms
in the second country only operate at home. This might in a different way capture the
distinction between developing and developed nations. A second extension would be to allow
the disclosure alternatives to capture the idea that harmonization is only feasible at a less than
maximal level of disclosure, i.e., the notion that one harmonizes to an average level of
disclosure rather than harmonizing to the maximal level of disclosure.
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Appendix A. Output strategy: separate economies: N
Since Firms 1 and 2 operate only in Country A, the subscript A is dropped in the following
derivation. Ifyi=H and Ci = |ic — cr^, then from Eq. (2), Xi^(-) = ao + oto". Substituting into
the first-order condifion in Eq. (3) gives (Eqs. (41)-(44)):
E{a\^) - (ii,, - a,) - 2(ao + o^) - [ao + o^p{)^\^) + Oi^p{c2 = \ic + ^c)]
= (41)
where
E{a\y^) = Tl(^L, + Oa) + (1 - Tl)(pL, - Oa) = \i, + a,(2Ti - 1) (42)
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j^(y?l>^r) = T + (i-ii)' ^ (43)
p{c2 = [i, + o,) = \/2 (44)
Thus, the first-order condition for Firm 1 for this information reaUzation is (Eq. (45)):
[i^ + a«(2Ti - \) - {[i^ - Gc) - 2(ao + a?)
-[ao + a?(Ti2 + (l-r))^) + a+/2l
= (45)
Similarly, if j^i =Vi" and C\ ^[1^ + 0^, the first-order condition is (Eq. (46)):
^L^ + ct«(2t] - 1) - ([jl^ + cTe) - 2(ao + a" + a^)
-[ao + a»(Ti2 + (l-Ti)2) + a+/2]
= (46)
Furthermore, ifj^i =yi^ and Ci = |ic — 0^,., the first-order condition is (Eq. (47)):
[I, - a,(2Ti -\)-{[i^-Gc)- 2(ao) - [oo + aJ'2Ti(l - j]) + a+/2] = (47)
Furthermore, if j'l ^Vi'^ and Ci ^[Xc + Oc, the first-order condition is (Eq. (48)):
^1, - a^(2T] - 1) - (^i, + a,) - 2(ao + aj) - [ao + 0.^^211(1 - r|) + a+/2] = (48)
Solving these four equations simultaneously for olq, oq", and ao^ yields (Eqs. (49)-(51)):
00^^^^^^ +^- (2^-lK (49)
3 2 2 + (2ti-1)'
H (2ti- l)2g^
OLr. = J (5Uj
' 2 + (2ti-1)2
(4 = -CT, (51)
In the case of no disclosure, each of the four possible information realizations occurs with
equal probability. These probabilities are used in weighting the squared output levels to
compute the ex ante expected profits, as explained in Appendix B.
Appendix B Ex post expected profits
By definition, ex post expected profits for Firm 1 are:
TTl(-)=^ «-^X, Lvi -ri.ri
and since the optimal output strategy is implicitly defined as:
xi{-} e arg max 'rTi(-)
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we have:
dx\
a-Y^x, A'l - C\ = 0.
Thus:
x,(-)=£ a - ^A7 -C]
It follows that:
Consequently, ex ante expected profits are:
Ei^.)) = E{[x,{-f)
Appendix C. Output strategy: separate economies: F
Since Firms 1 and 2 operate only in Country A, the subscript A is dropped in the
following derivation. Designating the information set as follows: {y\,y2,C\,C2), the 16
potential realizations can be reduced to the following five realizations and their correspond-
ing first-order conditions. The 1 1 other realizations are each equivalent to one of the five
relevant realizations in terms of their impact on the first-order condition.
{L,L, -, -} \i^ - kiOa - 2[ao] - [ao] - (^x^ - a^) =
{H, L, -, -} \i^-2[<dLQ + a"] - [ao + ot"] - (^l^ - aj =
{H, H, -, -} |i^ + kxOa - 2[ao + a" + a^] - [ao + af + a^] - (^x^ - aJ =
{L, L, +, -} ^x^ - kiOa - 2[ao + aj] - [ao + (x^] - (ji^ + cTc) =
{L,L, -, +} |i^ - kxGa - 2[ao + aj^] - [ao + a^] - ((i^, - a^) =
where:
(2ti-1:
Tl2 + (1-Tl)-
Solving these five equafions simultaneously for ao, ai", Oi^^, olq^ and ai "^ yields (Eqs.
(52)-(55)):
Oo
^^A -\i,A
,
a,
A
(2ti- 1)ct^.
a, = an
3 ?>W + {\-T^f]
{2^- i)ct^a
3[Tl2 + (l-Tlf]
(52)
(53)
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_i_ 2a,.A
^t=-r- (55)
The probabilities of the different information reaHzations (and consequently different output
levels) are as follows:
/7(L,L,*.*) ] ,
= o(T + (l-^l)')
/7(H,H,*,*)J ^
where * , * represents any combination of cost disclosures. By contrast:
/?(H,L,*,*)1
J
U-2ti(1-ii)
;?(L,H,*,*)J ^
These probabilities are used in weighting the squared output levels to compute the ex ante
expected profits.
Appendix D. Output strategy: global firms: NN
Since firms operate symmetrically in both countries, the country subscript is dropped in the
following derivation. Designating the information set as follows: {vi,C]}, the four potential
realizations and their corresponding first-order conditions are:
{L.
-} ^i, - CT^(2ii - 1) - 2[ao] - 3[ao + 2vi{\ - r])(y^ + a+/2] - (^i, - a,) =
{H.
-} [i^, + a,(2ii - 1) - 2[ao + a?] - 3[ao + (if + (1 - ^?H + </2]
{L, +} |i, - a,(2Ti - 1) - 2[ao + a+] - 3[ao + 2i^(l - ii)aj + a+/2] - (^i, + a,)
= 0)
{H. +} [I, + ct,(2ti - 1) - 2[ao + a^ + a+] - 3[ao + (t + (I - ^f)^o + 0.+/2]
-(m,, + (t,)=0
Solving these four equations simultaneously for cvo, ao^, and (\o^ yields (Eqs. (56)-(58)):
[i,,A -\i,A G,A (2ti- 1)ct«a
^
5 2 2 + 3(211-1)-
H 2(2ti- l)a,,A
' 2 + 3(2ti-1)"
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aQ = —o^A (58)
The probabilities of the four different information realizations are all 1/4.
Appendix E. Output strategy: global firms: FF
Since firms operate symmetrically in both countries, the country subscript is dropped
in the following derivation. Designating the information set as follows:
{ v'i,y2,V3,.V4,Ci,C2,C3,C4}, thc 256 potential realizations can be reduced to the following
nine realizations and their corresponding first-order conditions. The other realizations are
each equivalent to one of the nine relevant realizations in terms of their impact on the
first-order conditions.
L,L,L,L, -,-,-,-} |i^ -A'2CT« -5[ao] - {[i^ - a^) =
H, L, L, L, -, -, -,
-} [i^ - kiGa - 5[ao + a"] - {\-^c - ^c) =
H,H,L,L, -,-,-,-} |_L,, -5[ao + a" + ctJ] - [v-c-^c] =0
H,H, H,L, -,-, -, -} ^L^ + A'lCTfl - 5[ao + a^ + a" + a^] - (^i^ - ct^) =
H, H, H, H, -, -, -,
-} ^1^ + ^2CTfl - 5[ao + af + a^^ + a^ + ^\ - (p.^ - aJ =
L, L, L, L, +, -, -, -} \i^ - k2(Ja - 2[ao + olq] - 3[ao + Oi\\ - {\ic + ^c) =
L,L,L, L, -,+,-,
-} \ia - kjOa - 2[ao + ctj^] - [3ao + aj + laj^] - (|i,. - ct^)
=
[L, L, L, L, +,+,-, -} |i^ - k20a - 2[ao + aJ + a|] - [3ao + aJ + 3a+ + 2aJ]
X, L, L, L, +, +, +, -} \i^ - k20a - 2[ao + a(J" + a]^ + aj]
— [3ao + 2a(j" + 3aj^ + 3aJ + aj] — (|j,^ + CTc) =
where (Eqs. (59) and (60))
M= /^"^
,
(59)
il' + (l-il)
)i2 = ^ 'Ty^' 7^ ~ '^^ (60)
(2ll -l)(Tf + (1- Tl)0
(V + (1-Tl)
Solving these equations simultaneously for olq, aj", a2", as", a4", ao ^ , cti "^ , a2 ^ and a^
^
yields (Eqs. (61)-(65)):
a„ =^^ +—
-^ (61,
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af = a4 —
-8(T,.4
Git — Oit = Oit
2a,
(62)
(63)
(64)
(65)
The probabilities of the different information realizations (and consequently different
output levels) are as follows (Eq. (66)):
/7(L,L, L, L, *
;?(H,H,H,H,*
j[7(H,L,L,L, *
;?(L,H,L,L, *
/7(L,L,H,L, *
/7(L,L,L,H,*
p(L,H,H,H,*
p(H,L,H,H,*
;7(H,H,L,H,*
p(H,H,H,L,*
;7(H,H,L,L,*
;?(H,L,H,L,*
/7(H,L,L,H,*
/?(L,H,H,L,*
/7(L,H,L,H,*
/;(LX, H,H,*
*, *. *
= ^(V + (i-^)':
*, *
*, *
*, *
*, *
*, *
*. *
*. *
}=^(ti'(1-ti) + (1-7i)^ti)
H^if(l-^1)'
(66)
where *, *, *, *, represents any combination of cost disclosures. These probabilities are used
in weighting the squared output levels to compute the ex ante expected profits.
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Appendix F. Output strategy: global firms: NF
The first-order conditions under this information scenario differ for the disclosing
and nondisclosing firms, given their asymmetric information sets and output strategies.
However, since firms operate symmetrically in both countries, the country subscript is
dropped in the following derivation. Designating the information set for the nondi-
sclosing Firm 1 as follows: { Vi,V3,V4,Ci,C3,C4}, the 64 potential realizations can be
reduced to the following 11 realizations and their corresponding first-order conditions.
The other realizations are each equivalent to one of the 11 relevant realizations in
terms of their impact on the first-order conditions.
L, L, L, -,-,-} |_i^ - k^Oa - 2[ao] - 23o - (m^c - ^c) - [ao + ^4^0 + ^o /^] = ^
H,L,L, -,-,-} |i^ - (2ti- 1)ct^ -2[ao + ao] - 2(3o - {[^c - ^c)
-[00+^5^0+0.^/2] =0
L, H, L, -, -, -} [I, - (2ti - l)a, - 2[ao + a^] - 2(3o + 3i) - (|i, - a,)
-[ao + aj' + ^5(0^0 + af ) + aJ/2] =
H,H,L,-,-,-} n, + (2ti- l)a«-2[ao + a^ + aJ' + af] -2((3o + 3i)
-(|i, - Gc) - [ao + a^ + (1 - k5){a^ + af ) + a+/2] =
L, H, H, -, -,
-} [I, + (2ti - l)a, - 2[ao + a^ + a^] - 2([3o + (3i + ^2)
-(l^c - ^c) - ho + a\ + a\ + {\ - ^5)(ao + ^f + a") + a+/2] =
H, H, H, -,-,-} \ia + k30a - 2[ao + aj^ + 03 + ^t" + af + a"]
-2([3o + [3l+(32)-(^l,-ae)
-[oo + aj- + a^ + (1 - ^4)(a5^ + aj^ + a^) + ol^ /2] =
L, L, L, +,-,-} ^L^ - k^Ga - 2[ao + aj] - 23o - (^^c + ^c)
-[ao + k40LQ + a(j"/2] =
L, L, L, -, +, -} ^L^ - k^Ga - 2[ao + af] - (2[3o + Po + K) " (l^c - ^c)
-[ao + ^4aJ + af + (aj + af )/2] =
L, L, L, +, +, -} ^L^ - k^Ga - 2[ao + a7 + aj + a+] - (2[3o + (3J + 3^)
-{\i^ + Gc) - [ao + ^4aQ + aj" + (a,]" + ai^)/2] =
L, L, L, -, +, +} ^L, - k3Ga - 2[ao + af + a^] - 2(3o + P^ + (3^ + P2)
- ((1^ - Gc) - [ao + A:4aQ + aj" + 03 + (aj + a| + ct2")/2] =
L, L, L, +, +, +} \i^ - k^Ga - 2[ao + af + 03" + a(]" + aj^ + aj]
-2(3o + 3S + (3^ + 35)-(^^c + ^c)
-[oo + ^4ao + a7 + a2 + (aj + a,^ + aJ)/2] =
^' + (1-Tl)
2
(2T1-
-l)(lf + (1-'i')
if + (1
-^r
(2ii--1)(1-- T| + Tf)
1f + (l--^?
Tl(l--Tl)(r|2 + (1-Tl)')
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where (Eqs. (67)-(72))
^1 = ^ 7. ^ (67)
h = ^^'' ^^^'' ^^\ ''^ (68)
ll-l l Tl 1^)
^3 = 71 (69)
h = -— '' ' \3 '' ' (70)
Ti3 + (i-n)'
^5=2ll(l-7l) (71)
h= ,^^^-^^2 (72)
Tl2 + (1-Tl)'
Designating the information set for the disclosing Firm 3 as follows: {y3,y4,C2,C4}, the 16
potential realizations can be reduced to the following six realizations and their corresponding
first-order conditions. The other realizations are each equivalent to one of the six relevant
realizations in terms of their impact on the first-order conditions.
{L, L, -,
-} [i^ - kiGa - 23o + 3o - (M'c - ^c) - 2[ao + keo^ + a(j"/2] =
{H, L, -,
-} ^i, - 2po + M - [3o + 3i] - {\^c - ^c)
-2[ao + a^ + (aj + a^)/2 + a^ /2] =
{H,H, -,
-} [i, + k.Oa - 2[[3o + Pi + M - [3o + 3i + 32) - (^^c - ^c)
-2[oiQ + a\-\-a\ + {l- ^6)(a? + a" + a") + aJ/2] =
{L, L, +, -} [i^ -kioa- 2[[3o + Pi] - [3o + (33 - (^^c + cr,)
-2[ao + /re^o + a? + (c^o" + c^i^)/2l =
{L,L, -, +} ^x, - k,a, - 2[3o + 3^] - [Po + PSl - i\^c ' <^c)
-2[ao + kecx^ + af + (aj + a+)/2] =
{L, L, +, +} ^i, - ^, a, - 2[(3o + PS + 3^ + pg - [Po + PJ + P', + P3 - (^^c + ^.)
-2[(\o + /TftttQ + a7 + 0^2" + {ci.Q + ct,^ + aJ)/2] =
Simultaneously solving these first-order conditions generates the following values for the
output coefficients for operations in country /. For convenience, the superscript I has been
dropped from m„ \i,., a,j, and a^.:
(^x, - K.) , a, a,(2Ti - 1)[1 + (1)2 + (1 - i^)^)(ir^ + (1 - 11)^)]
Oio = h
5 10 5(1,2 + (l-Ti)^)[2(Ti3 + (l- 11)^) + n(l-n)(2Ti-l)']
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H CT«2r|(l -Ti)(2i-|- 1)
Ot, =
[2(ti3 + (1-ti)^) + ti(1-ti)(2ti-1)2]
a^2(2ii - l)[-2 + 1 1ti - 7ti^ - 40ti^ + IOOt]^ - 96t|^ + 32ti^]
501^ + (1 - Tl)-)[2 + (2T1 - 1)^][2(ti3 + (1 - n)^) + Ti(l - ti)(2ti - 1)^]
H a,4(2Ti-l)^
a, =
a^
Otn
[2 + (2t^ - iriplV + (1 - n)^) + Ti(l - ti)(2ti - 1)^]
-a«2(2ii - l)[-8 + 49ii - 1331)2 + 200^ - 180^ + 96ti^ - 32x1^]
5{jf + (1 - Tif )[2 + (2ti - if ][2(ti3 + (1 - ^)') + Ti(l - Ti)(2i^ - if]
cr.4(2Ti-lf
[2 + (2T1 - if 1[2(ti3 + (1 - nf ) + Ti(l - ti)(2ti - if]
aj =
-Gc
2oc
a, = a-, =
aj^ = a^ =
and
PO — ^ T ~7 TT^^ .2
5 5 5(Ti2 + (l-Tif)
5(Tl2 + (l-Tlf)
^0 - 5
^' ~ 5
3j = o
The probabilities of the different information realizations (and consequently different
output levels) from firm 1 's (a nondisclosing firm's) perspective are as follows:
p(L,L,L, *,*,*) ^
/7(H,H,H, *,*,*) I
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/7(H, L,L, *, *, *]
/7(L,H, L. *, *, *)
/((LX.H, *, *, *)
/?(L, H,H, *, *, *^
/7(H,L,H, *,*,*;
) =Y^[^r(i -^i) + (i -^^)~4
where *, *, * represents any combination of cost disclosures. These probabiHties are
used in weighting the squared output levels to compute the ex ante expected profits for
Firm 1 (and 2).
The probabilities of the different information realizations (and consequently different
output levels) from Firm 3's (a disclosing firm's) perspective are as follows:
p(L,L,*,*)
1
p(H,H,*,*)
/7(H,L,*,*)
/?(L,H,*,*)
(T + (1-Ti)')
Ti(l -r|)
where *,* represents any combination of cost disclosures. These probabilities are used in
weighting the squared output levels to compute the ex ante expected profits for Firm 3 (and 4).
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Abstract
In order to test for hypothesized effects of national culture on management control systems with a
cost-effective sample size, most cross-cultural studies rely on large differences in culture in their
experimental design. However, much of the world's cross-border investment takes place between
nations that are culturally close, for example, the USA, Canada and the UK. Case evidence indicates
that even apparently small cultural differences, such as that between the USA and Canada, can be
particularly troublesome since it is widely assumed that small differences do not matter, when, in fact,
they do. This study explores the effect of an apparently small difference in national culture on the
ability of agency theory to explain escalation of commitment to failing projects in two countries with
significant cross-border investment, i.e., USA and Canada. We found that the effect of adverse
selection conditions was significantly stronger among managers from the more individualist USA. We
also found that more experienced managers were less likely to escalate commitment. We discuss the
implications of this finding for the design of control systems in US-Canada cross-border subsidiaries.
© 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keyn'ords: Agency; National culture; Escalation of commitment
1. Introduction
Most cross-cultural studies of management control rely on large differences in culture in
their experimental design. However, much of the world's cross-border investment takes place
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between nations that are culturally close, for example, the USA, Canada and the UK. In 1995,
US foreign direct investment (FDI) in Canada was approximately US$130 billion (approxi-
mately 65% of total FDI in Canada), making Canada the second largest recipient of US
investment. In the same year, some US$100 billion of Canadian FDI (over 50% of Canadian
foreign investment) was located in the US. As Evans, Lane, O'Grady, and Hildebrand (1992)
found, even small differences in culture, such as that between the USA and Canada, can be
particularly troublesome for managerial decision-making, since it is widely assumed that
small differences do not matter. Their study found a very high failure rate among US-Canada
cross-border retailing ventures.
Accordingly, we report the results of a test of the effect of a small, but significant,
difference in culture on the effect of management controls on an important managerial
decision, namely, the escalation of commitment to a losing course of action. Previous cross-
cultural escalation studies have compared North America (usually, the USA) with countries at
opposite extremes of most national culture measures countries (e.g.. Hong Kong, Singapore
and Taiwan). While these countries are attractive for experimental design purposes, they play
a relatively small part in the global pattern of FDI. Thus, it is desirable to calibrate these
findings against countries that are culturally less dissimilar, and whose cross-border invest-
ments are economically significant.
2. Literature review
2.1. The escalation phenomenon
Brockner (1992), in a synthesis of previous literature, points out that "escalating
commitment appears to be the result of numerous factors and processes." One theoretical
framework that has received considerable recent attention is agency theory. Agency theory
builds on classical expected utility economics models by relaxing the assumption that the
manager's and the firm's interests are identical. While in classical expected utility theory,
managers always make decisions that attempt to maximize the profits of the firm, agency
theory, in contrast, assumes that managerial and owner interests can diverge. Therefore,
managers, despite being agents of shareholders, will, under certain conditions, make
decisions that maximize their personal utility, not that of the firm's shareholders (Jensen &
Meckling, 1976). The conditions that are necessary for this divergence (known as adverse
selection) in an escalation context are:
1. Information asymmetry, where the agent (manager) has more information than the
principal (firm owner), so that the principal is not fully aware of the state of the project,
and
2. Incentive to shirk, i.e., the manager's reward for continuing (escalating) the project is
greater than that for discontinuing it.
Applying agency theory to the escalation decision, Kanodia, Bushman, and Dickhaut
(1989) proposed an equilibrium model in which rafional managers would escalate a project if
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its abandonment would adversely affect their (valuable) reputations as competent managers,
and the managers possess private information regarding the state of the project. Abandoning
the failing project reveals this state, while escalating it protects their reputation. Harrell and
Harrison (1994) and Harrison and Harrell (1993) tested this model in experiments involving
MBA students in an American university, and found support for the agency explanation, in
that the interaction of information asymmetry and incentive to shirk was positively associated
with willingness to continue a losing project.
2.2. The role of national culture
Many studies have demonstrated the strong explanatory power of national culture
differences in patterns of decision-making and control systems (e.g., Boyacigiller & Adler,
1991; Harrison, 1993; Harrison, McKinnon, Panchapakesan, & Leung, 1994; Merchant,
Chow, & Wu, 1995). In the area of escalation of commitment, the theoretical effects of
culture are unclear. Drawing on the work of Hofstede (1980, 1991), Chow, Harrison,
Lindquist, and Wu (1997, p. 351) suggest that, "as a result of a collective culture's need
for group affiliation, its members are very concerned with maintaining 'face' . . .," and
predicted that relative to their US counterparts, Chinese nationals would be more likely to
invest additional resources (escalate) in an unprofitable project. Sharp and Salter (1997)
suggest that individualism interacts with the effect of agency. They argued that since adverse
selection is driven by self-interest, agency effects should be weaker in coUectivist societies in
which overt self-interest is disdained.
Chow et al. (1997), using a single decision case and American and Taiwanese subjects,
found that managers in Taiwan were indeed more likely to escalate (a main effect). However,
Sharp and Salter (1997), using Asian (Hong Kong and Singapore) and North American (US
and Canada) managers, found conflicting evidence. Using three decision cases, they found a
significant culture main effect (where culture was operationalized as Asian or North
American), but its direction depended on the decision being made. They also confirmed
the universality of a fi"aming effect, and found evidence that culture affects agency in that the
agency effect was insignificant in all three cases for their Asian sample yet highly significant
in North America.
Both Chow et al. (1997) and Sharp and Salter (1997) compared subjects from countries
at cultural extremes. Thus, they demonstrate that culture differences affect escalation
decisions, but it is not possible to discern from their findings whether the smaller
differences that exist between the major international investing countries are large enough
to matter. In the case of Hofstede's culture dimensions, for example, Hofstede and
Schreuder (1987, p. 30) state that "in view of the large number of respondents, differences
of two or three points on the scales are already stadstically significant." However, it is not
known whether this statistical significance translates to practical significance for manage-
rial decision-making. Abramson, Keating, and Lane (1996) note that failure to understand
cultural subtlety may lead to false generalizations about regional blocs, and Abramson et al.
(1996) and Evans et al. (1992) found significant differences in the work values and attitudes
of Canadian and US managers, two groups often treated as culturally similar (Sharp &
Salter, 1997).
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2.3. Other variables '
A number of escalation studies have invoiced prospect theory (Bazerman, 1984; Kahne-
man & Tversky, 1979; Whyte, 1986), which centers its analysis on the presentation of
information and its cognitive processing. The consequence of this framing is that risky
choices result in risk-seeking behavior for outcomes framed as losses, and risk-averse
behavior for gain outcomes. Whyte (1993), using Canadian undergraduate students, showed
that the presence of a sunk cost increased the likelihood of escalation, and Rutledge and
Harrell (1993), using professional MBA students, and Rutledge (1995), using MBA students,
also showed that the negative framing of decision outcomes increased escalation, consistent
with prospect theory.
The effect of work experience on escalation of commitment is unclear. Some audit
judgement studies have reported that the work experience of the decision-maker affects
decision-making. Smith and Kida's (1991) review of the audit judgement literature concluded
that experience mitigates judgement bias in job-specific decisions, and Davis (1996)
presented evidence that work experience is positively related to the ability of subjects to
focus on relevant information. In contrast, Kennedy (1995) found (also in an audit judgement
decision) no evidence that experience reduces cognitive bias. In the escalation literature,
Arkes and Blumer (1985), Harrell and Harrison (1994) and Whyte (1993) used inexperienced
students, while others (Harrison & Harrell, 1993; Sharp & Salter, 1997), recognizing possible
problems with this approach, have used experienced managers. The latter studies, to the
extent that they tested for experience effects, reported conflicting results. Harrison and
Harrell (1993) found no effect, but Sharp and Salter (1997) found that more experienced
managers were less willing to escalate. We therefore control for the possible effects of
experience in the regression.
3. Hypothesis
Sharp and Salter (1997) found that the self-interest motivation behind adverse selection
does not operate in collectivist countries. We extend this finding to hypothesize a directional
interaction between individualism and agency.
Hypothesis 1: A small but statistically significant increase in individualism increases the
effect of adverse selection conditions (information asymmetry and incendve to shirk).
4. Method
4.1. Sample
In order to achieve external validity and managerial relevance, we chose subjects who
are familiar with the subject material, who had wide diversity of managerial experience
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(undergraduate students were excluded), and we used realistic decisions. The questionnaire
was therefore administered to managers participating in MBA, executive MBA and
executive development programs in business schools. Subjects were chosen from countries
in which managers in one country are likely to make decisions on behalf of investors in the
others, i.e., the countries had significant cross-border investment and movement of
managers. Finally, we considered the guidelines suggested by Harrison and McKinnon
(1999) for cross-cultural studies, i.e., that countries should be different on the culture
measure of interest, but also matched on other confounding culture dimensions that might
affect results. Since our purpose was to test the effect of a relatively subtle individualism
difference while holding other dimensions constant, we chose the US and Canada. These
countries show a modest but statistically significant difference on the culture dimension of
interest, i.e., individualism, (the US has a score of 91, Canada 80) while being similar in
almost all other respects.' They also have the highest level of cross-border investment in
the world.
4.2. Instrument
Each subject was presented with four different one-page escalation decision cases
(following Sharp & Salter 1997). Subjects were asked to indicate their preference for making
a fiirther investment on a 10-point scale. Following Harrison and Harrell (1993), the scale was
anchored at one end by definitely preferred [not to make the investment (score = 1 )] and the
other end by definitely preferred [to make the investment (score = 10)]. As a manipulation
check and to enhance the realism of the case situation, subjects were also asked to express
their choice as a go/no-go decision.
In all cases, the activities (projects) to date had incurred nonrecoverable losses, and their
future outcome was in some doubt. In all cases, the additional investment was break-even
(the expected value of its outcomes exactly equaled the incremental amount to be invested),
and, if successful, the net proceeds would exactly recover the previously invested (sunk)
cost.^ Two cases were operating decisions (market research and software development
projects), which potentially included long-run intangible benefits, and two were short-term
financial decisions with no possible long-term consequences for the firm (currency spec-
ulation and a risky bank loan)."^ As part of a larger program of research, this study also
included tests of the main effects of agency, framing and work experience. These are
' For uncertainty avoidance, the USA and Canada scores are 46 and 48, and for power distance, 40 and 39,
respectively. The USA is 10 points higher than Canada on the masculinity dimension. However, we are aware of
no evidence of the effect of masculinity on escalation. To the extent that masculinity captures a drive to
achievement orientation, the effect of masculinity would strengthen the predicted effects of individualism.
" The outcomes described in the instrument were described as occurring shortly after the decision, thereby
keeping the stage of escalation constant (Brockner, 1992), and avoiding complications associated with the time
value of money.
The theory of capital budgeting suggests that the expected value of escalating the two operating investments
is positive, if the real options, or side bets (Staw & Ross, 1987), embedded in them are also valued. In contrast, the
two financial decisions have no such options.
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included in the regression for completeness and to avoid omitted variables problems, but are
not the focus of this paper.
Agency was manipulated by including, in two of the four cases, a description of the
decision-making situation in which both conditions for adverse selection (information
asymmetry and a personal incentive to take the risk) were present, and in the other
two, a description in which they were absent. Framing (the prospect theory effect) was
manipulated by describing the outcome of not taking the decision in either neutral or
negative. Four versions of each case were created (for each agency and framing
manipulation). (Appendix A provides an illustrative example of the manipulation of the
bank loan case.) Each participant received the four different cases, each with a
different combination of the agency and framing manipulation. The cases were
reviewed for external validity and pretested in classes in both countries. To control
for possible order or fatigue effects, two orders of cases were used (the second being
the reverse of the first). However, in spite of pretesting, initial analysis identified a
significant order-of-cases effect in the software development case. Consequently,
findings from this case were not included."^ The monetary amounts in the decision
were realistic amounts for which respondents would likely be responsible in the course
of their own work.
Subjects were also asked to report a variety of demographic data. Subjects whose
manipulation check responses did not match their scalar response^ or who were not country
natives were eliminated from the sample.
4.3. Measurement of variables
The dependent variable was the score on the 1-10 willingness to escalate scale. The
agency manipulation was a binary variable, coded 1 for the presence of information
symmetry and incentive to shirk, and otherwise. Similarly, negative framing of the
outcomes of escalating was coded 1, and the neufral framing was coded 0. Work experience
was measured as the square root of number of years of work experience (since saturation
effects may eventually set in), and culture was measured as a binary variable, coded 1 for
Canada and for USA. We also included dummy variables for the currency trader and bank
loan cases.
4.4. Statistical method
All hypotheses were tested with OLS regression. When testing for significance of an
interaction term using OLS, a multicollinearity problem arises, since the interaction term
'* The software case was placed either second (following the market research case) or third (following the
currency trader) in sequence. The order was coded as a binary variable, which was found to be a statistically
significant explanator of the escalation intention in the software case. This effect may have arisen from an
unforeseen interaction effect with previous cases, in which the decision in the previous cases may have affected
the decision in the software case.
Approximately 2% were eliminated because they failed this manipulation check.
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is correlated with the two main effects. If the main effects are themselves important
explanatory variables, care must be taken that this correlation does not affect results. We
therefore ran two regressions, the first including only main effects, and the second
including the interaction. In order to be confident that the interaction term is significant,
the coefficients and significance of the main effects found in the first regression should
remain essentially unchanged when the interaction term is added, and the interaction term
should be statistically significant in their presence. The first regression therefore included
the main effects of agency, framing, experience and culture. All three cases were
included, requiring two dummy variables to control for case differences. The regression
was as follows:
Decision = aQ + b\ (agency effect) + b2 (framing effect) + b^, (culture)
+ b^ (work experience) + b^ (bank loan dummy)
+ b(, (currency trader dummy) + e. (1)
The second regression included the interaction term:
Decision = qq^ b\ (agency effect) + ^2 (framing effect) + ^3 (culture)
+ b^ (work experience) + bs (agency effect x culture)
+ b(, (currency trader dummy) + b-] (bank loan dummy) + e. (2)
5. Results
Of the 299 respondents, 201 were American and 98 Canadian. The mean (standard
deviation) of the number of years of work experience was 4.9 (5.0) years in the USA and 9.6
(7.5) in Canada, confirming that both samples had extensive work experience.
The mean responses of the three cases for each country are shown in Table 1
.
It is interesting to note that subjects in both countries were willing to take more risk
in both the currency trader and marketing research situations than they were in the
bank loan.
Results of the multiple regression analysis of the main effects (Eq. (1)) are shown in
Table 2.
Table 1
Mean (S.D.) of escalation scores for each of the cases
Case USA Canada
Bank loan 4.63 (2.7)
Currency trader 6.67 (2.5)
Market research 5.83 (2.8)
4.02 (2.4)
5.73 (2.8)
5.72 (2.6)
Higher score = greater willingness to escalate. Scale anchors are: 1= Definitely preferred not to make the
investment; 1 = Definitely preferred to make the investment.
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Table 2
Main effects regression results
Variable Coefficient /-statistic P VIF
Agency conditions 0.75 4.37 .000 1.0
Negative framing 0.81 4.68 .000 1.0
Bank loan dummy -1.35 -6.42 .000 1.3
Currency trader dummy 0.50 2.37 .018 1.3
Work experience -0.27 -3.55 .000 1.2
Country (Canada = 1) -0.28 -1.43 .154 1.2
Adjusted /?-=. 138 .000
Table 3
Main effects plus interaction
Variable Coefficient r-statistic VIF
Agency x Country
Agency conditions
Negative framing
Country
Work experience
Bank loan dummy
Currency trader dummy
Adjusted ^-^=.145
1.11
0.80
0.27
-0.28
-1.35
0.50
-2.95 .003 2.5
5.28 .000 1.5
4.67 .000 1.0
0.99 .321 2.2
-3.63 .000 1.2
-6.44 .000 1.3
2.38 .018
.000
1.3
We then ran the second regression (Eq. (2)) with the hypothesized interaction term
included. Results are shown in Table 3. The previously significant coefficients of the
main effects remain essentially unchanged, while the coefficient of the interaction of
agency and national culture was highly significant (P<.01), and in the hypothesized
direction. Thus, the hypothesis was supported. The inclusion of the interaction terms
increases the adjusted R^ from .138 to .145. As expected, introducing the interaction
term also increased the VIFs, but all are well below the cutoff value of 10
suggested by Neter, Wasserman, and Whitmore (1993). Further, as expected, the
propensity to escalate was higher in the presence of adverse selection conditions,
negative framing and lower experience.^ However, we found no significant culture
main effect.^
Finally, to further confirm the significance and explanatory power of the interaction term,
we performed a stepwise regression, as shown in Table 4. As expected, the three main effects
^ For completeness, we also tested for, and failed to find, interactions between experience and framing,
experience and agency, and culture and framing.
Since the Canadian sample was considerably more experienced than the US sample, it is possible that the
lack of significance of the culture variable could be attributable to its correlation with experience. However, in
separate regressions omitting the experience variable and the agency -country interaction, the country variable
remained nonsignificant.
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Table 4
Stepwise regression results
Significance of
Model Variables included R- R change Adjus ted/?- F change F change
I BL .078 .078 .077 75.7 .000
2 BL. NF .100 .022 .098 21.4 .000
3 BL, NF, Exp .117 .018 .114 18.1 .000
4 BL, NF, Exp, AG .136 .018 .132 19.1 .000
5 BL, NF, Exp, AG, AG xC .145 .009 .140 9.7 .002
6 BL. NF. Exp. AG. AG xC, CT .151 .005 .145 5.7 .018
Variables included in models are as follows: BL — bank loan case dummy, NF — presence of negative
framing, Exp — square root of number of years of work experience, AG — presence of adverse selection
conditions. AG x C — interaction of adverse selection conditions and country (Canada = 1 ). CT — currency
add the most explanatory power, but the interaction of agency and country also significantly
(P=.002) added i?-.
6. Discussion and conclusions
The strong effect of a relatively small culture difference on managers' response to agency
manipulations suggests that Canadians, who are less individualistic than Americans by 1
1
points on Hofstede's scale, are less susceptible to agency stimuli. It would appear that in the
presence of information asymmetry and incentive to shirk, American managers are more
likely than Canadians to escalate commitment. This finding, for the relatively small
differences in individualism, suggests that the effect of adverse selection conditions in an
escalation of commitment situation may be highly country-specific. It ftirther suggests that
moderate differences in individualism matter.
The absence of a main culture effect in this study does not refute Chow et al.'s (1997)
findings of a main effect for culture, since their main effect was hypothesized to be driven by
Confucian values rather than individualism. However, more work needs to be done to
explore more carefiilly the effect of culture on willingness to escalate commitment and to
take risks generally.
Our confirmation of the effect of experience suggests that the use of inexperienced student
subjects in escalation of commitment research as proxies for managers may overestimate the
willingness of managers to escalate. Therefore, the findings of studies in the psychology
literature (e.g., Whyte, 1993) using undergraduate student subjects may not be generalizable
to manager populations.
The limitations of this study are those common to all pencil-and-paper instruments
conducted in a class environment, specifically external validity. The extent to which
responses stated are a true reflection of the actions the respondent would have taken in a
similar real-world situation is not known, even though in this study, this issue was mitigated
because respondents were familiar with the use of cases for teaching. Our sample comprised
MBA and executive MBA students, most of whom had several years of management
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experience or were currently holding management positions. To the extent that they are not
representative of managers in general, the generalizability of our sample to a manager
population may be limited. A fiirther limitation may be the consequences of the order effect
that we found in the software decision case, in spite of careftil pretesting. It is possible that the
other cases also interacted in unforeseen ways.
Our findings suggest that the design of a management control and decision support
system for project evaluation should carefully address the incentive to shirk and ability to
hide infonnation. In addition, the relative emphasis that should be placed on agency
theory in the design of this system needs to be adjusted for each culture. This is
particularly relevant to US multinationals, because the US has the highest individualism
score. Finally, our finding that experience is negatively related to propensity to escalate
suggests that it may be possible, and even desirable, to match the experience of
employees with the organization's desired task risk profile. For example, junior employ-
ees might be more suitable for high-risk decisions such as those involved in venture
capital financing. Alternatively, control systems may have to reflect the demographic
profile of employees.
Our study suggests a number of avenues for future research into agency effects and
escalation of commitment. First, we did not include personality variables, such as self-
efficacy (Whyte, Saks, & Hook, 1997), or locus of control (Brownell, 1981), which might
have accounted for part of the very large unexplained variation in risk preferences
between individuals in this context. Second, although respondents should have been
approximately indifferent between escalation and abandonment (by virtue of the experi-
mental design), there were notable differences between the three cases in terms of
willingness to escalate commitment. We have a very limited understanding of the case-
specific factors that make economically similar escalation decisions so much more
attractive than others. Third, while we hypothesized that individualism was the cultural
basis for the culture-agency interaction, it may be attributable to some other cultural
factor not included in the Hofstede taxonomy. This could be more rigorously tested in a
multicountry study.
We have demonstrated that a test of the effect of a small difference in individualism is not
only possible but also useful. Since most cross-cultural investments are made between
culturally similar countries, our findings suggest that careful testing for the effects of culture
between economically significant countries (such as those within the Anglo or Nordic
clusters) could be worthwhile.
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APPENDIX
The Bank Loan.
Background
You are a senior corporate loan officer in the London. England. subsidiar\ of an international bank. It is 7 August 1995. and it
looks like toda\ will be interesting.
(\o adverse selection conditionjYou have to reach a decision on a $500,000 loan to The Industrial Fastenings Company, a
medium-sized company listed on the local stock exchange which manufactures nuts and bolts for a variety of industrial and
domestic applications. You have full authority to make the loan, but like ail loans, a copy will be included in the dail> loan
report to head ofTice. Details of the loan are in the briefing note below.
(Adverse selection condition) First, you have to reach a decision on a $500,000 loan to The Industrial Fastenings Company, a
medium-sized company listed on the local stock exchange which manufactures nuts and bolts for a variety of industrial and
domestic applications. You have full authority to make the loan, but like all loans, a copy will be included in the daily loan
report to head office. Details of the loan are in the briefing note below.
Second, you have just received a phone call from a director of a private, very prestigious successful but conservative Swiss
bank. He has indicated that he is ver>' impressed with your record as a profitable but prudent banker with no client bankruptcies,
and would like \ou to be a candidate for their Managing Director and CEO position when the current CEO retires on December
3 1 1995. The prestige, location and opportunity are all very attractive to you.
Briefing Note on Industrial Fastenings Company
Some years ago, you approved a loan to The Industrial Fastenings Company. $1 million of which is still outstanding and
overdue. However, in accordance with bank's conservative accounting policy, all of this amount has already been written off
internally over the last three years, and had no significant impact on the bank's profitability. Because of various tax credits, the
bank pays no income taxes at the present time, so loan write-offs have no tax effect.
The Industrial Fastenings Company is now in a ven. precarious financial position and if you do not make the loan will cease
trading before the year-end. The company's present precarious financial position is caused by a lack of up-to-date machinery in
one important process, which has caused the company to become uncompetitive. If you lend the $500,000 to purchase the new
machine, provided that the economy does not decline. The Industrial Fastenings Company will very quickly generate cash flow
in excess of $1.5 million, allowing the repayment of both of the loans and interest in full. If however, the economy declines, the
company will likely survive into 1996. but will inevitably be bankrupt and unable to repay any loans, and since the machine is
highly customized, the bank will recover nothing. The bank's economic forecasting section estimates a 2/3 probability of
economic decline.
Alternatives
Based on the above, you summarize your choices as follows:
(Neutral Framing)
1. If you do not grant the loan, you will save $500,000.
2. If you grant the loan, there is a 2/3 probability that no money will be saved (recovered) and a 1/3 probability that $1.5 million
will be saved (recovered).
(Negative Framing)
1. Ifyou do not grant the loan, the loss will definitely be $1 million.
2. If you grant the loan, there is a 2/3 probability that the loss will be $1.5 million, and a 1/3 probability that the loss will be
zero.
Decision:
Please choose one of the following: 1. Do not grant the loan
2. Grant the loan
Please indicate the strength of your of your preference for the choice you made by marking an 'X' at the appropriate
point on the scale:
I definitely I definitely
preferred 1 l_l_l_l_l_l_l_l_l_l_l preferred 2
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Abstract
An important task of the sell-side financial analyst is to provide investors with estimates of
corporate earnings per share (EPS). In this study, we examine if analysts from countries with
comparable equities markets, regulatory requirements, accounting standards, and disclosure policies
are influenced by similar factors in revising an earnings estimate. The results of a survey sent to UK
and US financial analysts indicate that in general the two groups do consider the same factors to be
important. However, there are significant differences in the relative importance of some of the factors
examined. These differences are most likely attributable to the more international focus of the UK
analyst and the greater reliance of the US analyst on guidance from management. © 2001 University
of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
With increased globalization, investors are seeking opportunities in nondomestic equity
markets. For example, by the year 2000, it is expected that US institutional and individual
investors will have between 15% and 20% of their assets in non-US markets (Coyle, 1995).
At the end of December 1 999, UK institutional investors had approximately 24% of their
investments in non-UK securities (Riley, 2000). Since the quality of corporate information
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and level of disclosure can vary significantly from country to country, the role of the local
financial analyst is becoming increasingly important. A primary function of the analyst is to
serve as information intermediary between management and the investment community.
Investors rely on the analyst's research, recommendations, and earnings forecasts in buying
and selling securities. Since analysts are assumed to be expert users of financial information,
it is useful to understand what information they find most relevant in forecasting the financial
performance of a firm.
The accuracy of an analyst's recommendations and estimates is related to many elements.
These elements include, among others, the experience, preparation, and educational back-
ground of the analyst. Analyst performance is also influenced by country-specific factors such
as the size and activity of the country's equities market, national professional requirements,
and the presence or absence of large international brokerage and investment firms. The main
objective of this study is to examine whether analysts in two countries with developed equity
markets, the UK and US, consider comparable factors and weight them similarly in
forecasting firm performance.
To compare the two groups of analysts, we examine a common task performed by
financial analysts, forecasts of corporate earnings per share (EPS). A survey research design
is used to determine the importance of factors used by US and UK analysts in revising an
eamings forecast. In general, we anticipate that the selection of factors between the two
groups will be similar. Both countries have highly developed security markets. In addition,
many of the large international investment/brokerage firms (e.g., Merrill Lynch) have a
presence in both countries. Furthermore, the training and certificadon process of the UK and
US analyst is similar. Finally, reporting requirements and accounting standards in the two
countries are comparable. Nonetheless, we expect the relative importance of certain factors in
revising an eamings forecast to differ. Cultural and country-specific differences between the
two groups should impact the level of importance of certain factors. For example, the more
international focus of the London Stock Exchange (LSE) should increase the importance of
international events for the UK analyst. On the other hand, the proliferation of new economy
companies on US stock exchanges, in particular the NASDAQ, creates a particular challenge
to the US analyst. With fewer years of company-specific financial data available, analysts in
the US place greater reliance on guidance by management' and conversations with customers
and suppliers.
The results of the study will contribute to a better understanding of the factors used by the
two groups of analysts in revising an eamings forecast. This understanding can be used to
develop country-specific models that better predict consensus analyst forecasts. In addition,
the results will provide some testable hypotheses in future studies examining forecast
accuracy between the two groups of analysts.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Background on the securities market
and the financial analyst profession in the US and UK as well as a review of the related
Anecdotal and survey data (e.g.. Lees, 1981) provide evidence that selective disclosure by management is
fairly common in the US. Frequently, financial information released by management is not issued to the general
public but rather to selected individuals. In general, financial analysts have been the primary beneficiaries of these
disclosures.
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literature are presented in the second section. The third section describes the research design.
Test results are reported in the fourth section. The fifth section presents the conclusions of the
study and recommendations for further research.
2. Background
Although differences are expected in the level of importance of factors involved in
forecast revisions of US and UK analysts, little difference is expected in the actual factors
selected as important by the two groups. There is a great deal of similarity in the securities
markets, regulatory process, reporting requirements, and the professional preparation and
evaluation of analysts in the two countries. These similarities are discussed in the
following sections.
2.1. Securities market
The US and the UK have highly developed securities markets with similar listing
requirements. As Table 1 illustrates, the major stock exchanges in each country, the LSE
and the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), are similar in terms of the number of companies
listed at the end of 1997. Although the LSE has a higher percentage of foreign listings
(17.6%) than the NYSE (11.7%), the number of companies listed on each exchange is
approximately 3000. The daily volume of shares traded during 1997 is substantially greater
on the LSE than the NYSE. However, total market capitalization of companies listed is over
three times greater on the NYSE. Institutional investors have a greater percentage of share
ownership at the end of the third quarter of 1996 on the LSE (58.3%) than the NYSE (45.6%).
Not surprisingly, overseas holders also represent a larger percentage of share ownership on
the LSE (15.9%) than the NYSE (6.8%).
Table 1
General information on the LSE and NYSE^
LSE NYSE
Listed companies at 12/31/1997
Domestic 2465 (82.4%) 2691 (88.3%)
Foreign 526(17.6%) 356(11.7%)
Total 2991 (100.0%) 3047 (100.0%)
Market capitalization at 12/31/1997 in 2,049,459 6,595,209
millions of 1997 US$
Daily average no. of shares trades in 2281.84 526.93
1997 ('000,000)
Percentage share ownership (third quarter 1996)
Pension, insurance, and mutual funds 58.3% 45.6
Households and nonprofit organizations 20.8% 47.5
Overseas holders 15.9% 6.8
Other 5m OA
^ Information from World Stock Exchange Fact Book.
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2.2. Regulator}' agencies '
British company law is based on two Companies Acts, the Companies Acts of 1985 and
1989. These two Acts consolidate the prior Acts of 1947, 1948, 1987, 1980, and 1981.
Directors of companies must send a copy of their company's annual accounts to the Registrar
of Companies. Public companies have 7 months from their financial year-end to deliver their
audited financial accounts. Companies whose shares are traded on the LSE are required to
issue their annual report within 8 months of their financial year-end. However, the
expectation is that the report will be issued within 2-4 months. Any changes in a company's
structure, management or assets must also be promptly reported to the Registrar of
Companies and the LSE. For example. Section 288 of the Companies Act of 1985 requires
that notification of any changes among directors and secretaries be made within 14 days.
Heavy penalties are levied against directors and others responsible for issuing financial
reports that misstate items or knowingly omit the disclosure of material events.
In the US, the Securides and Exchange Commission (SEC) plays a role similar to that of
the Registrar of Companies. The SEC is a federal agency created to administer the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and several other acts. The agency exercises oversight for companies
listed on the major US stock exchanges. Similar to its UK counterpart, the SEC requires
companies within its jurisdiction to file audited financial statements. Updates are also
required (Form 8-K) following any event having a potentially material effect on the company.
The SEC has the authority to prescribe accounting practices and standards for companies
within its jurisdiction. It is charged with protecting the interest of investors through the
release of accurate and timely financial reports and disclosures. However, in practice,
accounting standard setting has been delegated, for the most part, to professional groups
such as the Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB).
2.3. Accounting principles and standards
The UK and the US have developed a comparable set of generally accepted accounting
principles for financial reporting purposes. In both countries, this set of standards is distinct
from those used for tax reporting. The framework of financial reporting is similar in the two
countries. In the UK the Financial Reporting Council provides guidance on priorities and
broad policy issues to the Accounting Standards Board (ASB) and the Financial Reporting
Review Panel. The ASB is responsible for issuing accounting standards. It operates under a
due process system. The Board issues exposure drafts and discussion papers and invites
comments from interested parties as part of the standard-setting process.
Authorized under the Companies Act of 1 985, the Financial Reporting Review Panel has the
power to apply to the courts for orders to review the reporting practices of public companies.
An Urgent Issues Task Force (UITF) and an Auditing Practices Board complete the list of
parties involved in the standard-setting process. The UITF is a committee of the ASB. The
ASB advises on areas of unsatisfactory or conflicting interpretations of accounting standards.
Standard setting in the US involves a similar organizational arrangement. Since 1973, a
structure composed of three organizations has assumed the primary responsibility for the
establishment of financial accounting standards. The three organizations are the Financial
G.D. Moves et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 47-63 51
Accounting Foundation (FAF), the FASB and the Financial Accounting Standards Advisory
Council (FASAC). The FAF oversees the activities of the other two organizations. In addition,
it selects the members of the FASB and FASAC and funds their activities. The FASAC
consults with the FASB on major policy and technical issues. The seven members of the
FASB have the responsibility for developing accounting standards through a system of due
process, similar to that described above for the UK. The Emerging Issues Task Force, a
committee of the FASB, is similar in purpose to the UITF.
There is a great deal of similarity between the standard-setting structure and process in the
UK and US. As previously noted, both countries have highly developed and active equity
markets. Listed companies are subject to considerable regulation and oversight by federal
agencies. A primary objective of these agencies is to protect market participants by requiring
prompt and complete reporting and disclosure by companies within their jurisdiction. In both
the US and the UK, sell-side analysts provide a valuable service to investors by using
financial reports as well as information from management and other sources to evaluate firm
performance and forecast future earnings.
2.4. Sell-side analysts
Financial analysts are usually classified as either buy-side or sell-side. The buy-side analyst
is a buyer and seller of equities. Generally, he or she works as a portfolio manager for a mutual
fund, pension fund, bank, or insurance company. The sell-side analyst typically works in a
brokerage/investment firm and serves as information intermediary between corporate manage-
ment and the investment community. The buy-side analyst looks to the sell-side analyst for
recommendations and earnings estimates. In general, the sell-side analyst does not actively
trade securities on behalf of his or her employer. However, in smaller investment firms, the
analyst might perform both buy-side and sell-side ftinctions. Arnold and Moizer (1984)
describe buy-side analysts as investor analysts and sell-side analysts as advisor analysts.
Both the UK and the US have financial analyst organizations that provide standards and
requirements for professional certification. In the UK, the regulatory authorities have
approved the Institute of Investment Management Research (IIMR) to perform these
functions. Formed in 1955, the IIMR is the provider of the Investment Management
Certificate, the benchmark examination for individuals in the profession. Some of the IIMR's
stated objectives are the following (IIMR, 1996):
• to foster and maintain high standards of professional ability and practice in investment
analysis, portfolio management and related disciplines;
• to encourage the creation and interchange of ideas and information among those
engaged in these activities;
• to improve the standards of corporate information; and
• to support and promote the interests of the investment community.
In the US, the Association for Investment Management and Research (AIMR) plays a
similar role to that of the IIMR. In its Mission Statement, the AIMR states that its objective
is to establish and maintain the highest standards of professional excellence and integrity.
52 G.D. Moves et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 47-63
To achieve this objective, the AIMR administers the Chartered Financial Analyst (CFA)
exam. In addition, the organization establishes and maintains performance presentation
standards for the industry. These standards extend beyond CFA members to the general
financial community.
In both the UK and the US there are annual polls designed to identify the best analysts.
Each October, the US journal. Institutional Investor, publishes its "All-American Research
Teams." To determine first, second, and third Ail-American team members, the journal polls
approximately 2000 money managers. Selection to a team is based on overall rankings in four
areas: (1) accuracy of EPS estimates, (2) stock recommendations, (3) written reports, and (4)
overall service. Selection to one of the teams is important recognition for an analyst. Stickel
( 1 992, p. 1811) finds that "a position on the All-American Research Team can be viewed as a
proxy for reladve reputation."
Since 1974, Extel Financial, a member of the United Newspapers group, has provided a
ranking of UK analysts. Several US-based brokerage firms (e.g., Merrill Lynch, Goldman
Sachs, Morgan Stanley Dean Witter) placed among the top 10 firms on the 1998 annual
survey. Many of the large UK brokerage houses have been taken over by American or
European companies (e.g., Merrill Lynch's acquisition of Smith New Court). The presence of
large US brokerage firms in the UK is expected to contribute to similarities among analysts in
the two countries.
2. 5. Comparative analyst forecast accuracy and appraisal methods
In a comparative study of the UK and US analysts, Cho (1994) reports that analyst forecast
errors are much higher for US analysts. Cho and Pitcher (1995) examine the accuracy of
analyst earnings forecasts in 1 1 countries. Their findings indicate a tendency toward
overoptimism in the forecasts of all countries included in the study. In a similar study of
13 European countries, Capstaff, Paudyal, and Rees (1995) examine the accuracy and
rationality of analyst earnings forecasts. They consider whether the forecasting environment
in each country can explain the differences identified. Their results suggest that some
differences are country-related.
The empirical research on security appraisal methods adopted by financial analysts in
evaluating securities and sources of information used is very limited. Belkaoui, Kahl, and
Peyrard (1977) examine the relative importance of 29 items of information to US, Canadian,
and European analysts. Their results indicate significant differences between European and
North American analysts concerning the relative importance of the various items of
information. Chang and Most (1981) find that the most important sources of information
for both UK and US analysts are corporate annual reports and communications with
management. However, their findings indicate that communications with management are
more important to UK than US analysts. This result is inconsistent with the findings of
Arnold, Moizer, and Noreen ( 1 984) who report no significant difference between UK and US
analysts as to the importance of management communications. Chang and Most also find that
the statement of cash flows, the auditor's report, and advisory services are more important to
US analysts. On the other hand, the Chairman's statement is perceived to be a more valuable
source of information by UK analysts.
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In a comparative study on the appraisal of ordinary shares by investment analysts in the UK
and Germany, Pike, Meerjanssen, and Chadwick (1993) find a definite shift in attitude towards
personal company contacts and meetings as the most important sources of information for UK
analysts. In addition, fiindamental analysis, using a P/E multiple, remains the dominant
valuation method. They also report that in spite of their theoretical superiority, discounted cash
flow and beta analysis enjoy little support in practice. In contrast, German analysts attach
greater importance to technical analysis and place slightly more importance on new
nonfinancial company information, particularly information regarding research and develop-
ment and product quality. In another comparafive study of the procedures used by UK and US
financial analysts in evaluating equities, Arnold et al. (1984) report that fiandamental analysis
is the most fi^equently used technique. Technical analysis, beta analysis, and modem portfolio
theory lag well behind fundamental analysis in terms of relative importance and usefulness.
The primary objective of this study is to examine and compare the relative importance of
factors affecting analyst forecast revisions in the UK and US. The rationale for the study
stems from the scarcity of evidence of the type of information that analysts use to revise their
earnings forecasts. A deeper understanding of factors influencing EPS revisions by analysts is
important since there is overwhelming evidence of a significant correlation between analyst
earnings estimates and securities prices. (See Brown, Foster, & Noreen, 1985 for a review of
this literature.)
3. Research design
3.1. The survey
A questionnaire is used to idenfify the relative importance of 38 factors in revising an
earnings estimate for UK and US analysts. The factors include economic and company-
specific considerations. The factors were determined based on interviews with financial
analysts and related studies (e.g.. Lees, 1981) in the literature.
The questionnaire consists of three sections. The first secfion includes 17 quesfions on the
respondent's background including age, experience, and job requirements. The second
section presents 38 factors involved in analyst forecast revisions.^ The respondent is asked
to indicate the level of importance of each factor on a 5-point Likert scale. Responses range
fi-om extremely important (5) to not important (1). The final section asks the respondent to
rank the five most influential factors in order of decreasing importance. This section is used
to assess the internal validity of the instrument. Responses to section three should be
correlated with those in the second section. The ranking of factors by both UK and US
respondents are consistent with the relative importance attributed to the 38 factors in the
second section of the questionnaire.
The US questionnaire includes 43 factors. However, four of these were eHminated from the UK survey for
being too US-specific. In addition two factors in the US survey were combined for the UK questionnaire.
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The questionnaire was pilot tested at an investment firm in New York City. A Senior Vice
President at the firm administered the test. Additional adjustments were made to the
questionnaire based on the comments of participants in the pilot test. Although the US and
UK questionnaires are essentially identical, some modification was necessary due to cultural
and institutional differences. For example, one factor listed on the US survey is the following:
Changes in the discount rate by the Federal Reserve. On the UK survey, "Bank of England"
replaces "Federal Reserve." In addition, there are slight differences due to language. On the
US questionnaire, survey participants are requested to "check" the level of importance of
each factor in revising EPS. On the UK questionnaire, participants are instructed to "tick" the
appropriate level.
The US survey was sent to 2000 practicing financial analysts. The participants were
randomly selected from 22,000 members based on a list provided by a major professional
organization of investment practitioners. A first mailing generated 287 responses (14%). A
second mailing resulted in an additional 83 responses. In all, 370 responses were received for
an 18.5% response ratio. Of the respondents, 132 identified themselves as sell-side analysts.
The UK survey was sent to all UK financial analysts at firms registered with IBES. Of the
804 questionnaires mailed, 104 analysts responded (12.94% response rate) to the first
mailing. A second mailing to the 700 nonrespondents resulted in 47 additional completed
questionnaires. The total response rate from the two UK mailings is 18.8%. Of the 151
questionnaires returned, 1 6 were from buy-side analysts. The elimination of these resulted in
135 questionnaires from sell-side analysts used in testing.
Tests were performed for nonresponse bias. To assure that the US sample was randomly
selected, chi-square tests were made on the set of available demographic characteristics (e.g.,
industry specialty, occupation classification). Results indicated no significant differences. A
second test based on the return dates of the questionnaires was made on both samples. In this
test, late respondents proxy for nonrespondents (Oppenheim, 1966, pp. 34-35). Hotelling's
T' was used to test the equality of the multivariate means of the two groups for both the UK
and US samples. There was no significant difference between early and late respondents.
3.2. Tests
A model is developed to test for differences between UK and US analysts in the relative
importance of various factors in revising an EPS estimate. Principal components analysis with
a Varimax rotation (see Kaiser, 1960) is used as a variable-reducing mechanism to develop a
more parsimonious model. This procedure reduces the 38 factors to eight variables based on
criterion developed by Cattell (1966).^ A two-group multivariate analysis of variance
(MANOVA) with country (US, UK) as the grouping variable and the eight factors as
criterion variables is used to test the model.
Cattell (1966) uses a graphical method called the scree test as a criterion for determining the number of
components to retain. Typically, the magnitude of the eigenvalues of the principal components drops otT sharply in
a steep descent and then tends to level off. Cattell provides evidence that retaining all components before the
leveling off point is an appropriate criterion for deciding the number of components to consider.
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4. Results
4.1. Descriptive statistics
Table 2 presents a background comparison between the 132 US and the 135 UK
respondents identified as sell-side analysts. The two groups are similar in the number of
male and female respondents. Approximately 19% of the US analysts are female. The
percentage is slightly lower (16%) for the UK group. However, the difference between the
two groups is not considered significant at conventional levels.
There is a significant difference in the age, education, and experience of the two groups.
On average, the US respondent is 49 years old, has an MBA or equivalent, and has 14.6 years
of experience. On the other hand, the average UK respondent is 37 years old, has an
undergraduate degree, and 8.9 years of experience. This profile of the UK analyst is similar to
that found in other studies. For example, in a study by Pike et al. (1993) involving 92 UK
respondents, the average age of the analyst is 34.2 years and the average work experience is
8.7 years.
There are several explanations for the significant difference in age between the average US
and UK respondent in this study. First, during the latter half of the 1980s, the LSE underwent
substantial technological changes. These changes resulted in increased efficiency and
liquidity for the LSE. During this period, according to Pike et al. (1993), there was the
introduction of a large number of new analysts as a result of the reforms at the LSE. Second,
some of the largest UK brokerage/investment firms are subsidiaries of such US firms as
Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch, and Morgan Stanley Dean Witter. These firms have not had a
long presence in the UK. Therefore, the average tenure per employee is most likely lower
than for their US counterpart.
The difference in age is reflected in the lower level of education and experience
between the two groups. Of the 132 US analysts, 99 (75%) have an MBA or equivalent
Table 2
Descriptive statistics: mean (median) of background information on US and UK analysts
US UK
Number of sell-side analysts 132 135
Gender:
Female 25 21
Male 107 114
Age 49 37***
Year of birth 1951(1953) 1963*** (1964)
Education^ 3.8 3.4***
Years of experience 14.8(12.0) 8.9*** (8.0)
Number of companies followed 58(17) 41(18)
Number of industries monitored 3 (2) 3 (2)
Number of forecast revisions 1.7 (3) 1.6 (3)
per firm, per year
^ 3 = undergraduate degree; 4= MBA or equivalent.
*** Significant at the .001 level.
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degree, and 2 (1.5%) have doctorates. The figures for the UK group are 36 (27%) and 11
(8%), respectively.
Although the number of companies followed by US and UK analysts is significant, the
reported numbers (55 and 40, respectively) are skewed to some degree by outliers. Some
analysts indicated they followed more than 200 companies. The median figures (17 and 18,
respectively) are probably a better indicator. Nonetheless, in their survey of UK investment
analysts, Arnold and Moizer (1984) report that the average number of companies analyzed
regularly by the 202 analysts in their sample is 40.9. However, analysts surveyed in the Pike
et al. (1993) study monitored an average of 28 companies in 3.5 industry sectors.
Both the US and UK respondents follow an average of three industries. There is no
significant concentration by either group in a particular industry. There are between 30 and 35
industries represented by the respondents. For the US sample, the highest single concentration
of analysts is in banking (seven analysts or 5% of the sample). Each of the following
industries is followed by three US analysts (2% of the sample for each group): restaurants,
retailing, telecommunications, energy, and furniture. For the UK sample, the greatest
concentration of analysts are in the following industries: 1 1 (8%) of the analysts follow
engineering firms, 7 (5%) pharmaceutical firms, 6 (4%) electric utility companies, 5 (3.7%)
telecommunication companies, 5 (3.7%) banks, and 5 (3.7%) media companies. The number
of analysts using models to forecast earnings is 1 10 (83.3%) and 105 (77.7%) for the US and
UK, respectively.
4.2. Principal components
The results of principal components analysis with a Varimax rotation are presented in
Table 3. The procedure reduces the 38 factors from the questionnaire to eight criterion
variables (principal components) with eigenvalues ranging from 1.3 to 6.5. Each of the
components is described below.
Table 3
Principal components, variable name, Eigenvalues, percent of total variance, and cumulative percentage
Cumulative
Principal component Percent of variance
(sample question) Variable name Eigenvalue variance percentage
1. Other analysts' recommendations.
2. Stock market activity.
3. Management conference calls.
4. Regulatory changes by
government agencies.
5. Meetings with suppliers.
6. Management's downward
revision of EPS.
7. Change in discount rate.
8. Change in economic/political
environment.
OTHERAN 6.51255 16.7 16.7
STOCK 4.63281 11.9 28.6
MANAGEMT 2.90922 7.5 36.0
REGS 2.41561 6.2 42.2
EXTRINFO 2.07232 5.3 47.5
MGMTFCST 1.59136 4.1 51.6
COSTCAP 1.52062 3.9 55.5
MACRO 1.29606 3.3 58.8
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4.2.1. Other analysts' recommendations (OTHERAN)
The first component incorporates other analysts' recommendations and EPS forecasts and
has the largest factor loading (i.e., the component accounts for the greatest amount of the
variance). The component includes questions from the survey regarding other analysts'
upward and downward revisions of EPS, forecasts issued by a leading analyst in the
industry, informal conversations with other analysts, and the importance of other analysts'
buy and sell recommendations.
4.2.2. Stock market activity (STOCK)
The component with the second largest factor loading involves stock market activity
related to the company. Questions from the survey include those associated with significant
(5% or greater) changes in share price, significant (10% or greater) changes in volume, and
significant buying and selling by insiders.
4.2.3. Formal and informal information from management (MANAGEMT)
The component with the third largest factor loading incorporates questions related to
information provided by management. These include information released through formal
channels, such as corporate conference calls, analyst meetings, and press releases. However,
the component also includes information provided by management in informal settings, such
as on-site visits to the company by the analyst and informal meetings between the analyst and
one or more officers of the company.
4.2.4. Regulatory' environment (REGS)
The fourth principal component involves factors related to the regulatory environment. It
includes questions involving changes in regulations by the federal government as well as
financial accounting changes mandated by UK or US GAAP.
4.2.5. External information sources (EXTRINFO)
The fifth principal component involves information about the company provided by
external sources. These sources include suppliers and customers of the company. In addition
to conversations the analyst has with these two groups, the component also incorporates
information obtained informally about the company at trade shows.
4.2.6. Management's forecast ofEPS (MGMTFCST)
The sixth principal component reflects earnings projections by management. It includes
both upward and downward revisions of EPS.
4.2.7. Cost of capital (COSTCAP)
The seventh principal component consists of factors affecting a company's cost of capital.
These include federal changes in monetary policy and the discount rate. The component also
considers changes in the commercial paper and bond ratings of the company by rating
agencies such as Standard and Poor's. Such changes reflect the risk to investors and creditors
of providing fiinds to the company. If a rating agency downgrades a company's debt
securities, the company's cost of capital is higher reflecting the increased level of risk.
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4.2.8. Macweconomic environment (MACRO)
The eighth principal component includes factors related to the macroeconomic environ-
ment. These include changes in the international or political environment as well as industry
data and reports.
4.3. Tests of the model
A MANOVA procedure is used to compare differences in the relative importance of factors
to US and UK analysts in revising an EPS forecast for a company. For this test, Country (US/
UK) is the grouping variable. The eight principal components described above are the
criterion variables. Results of the testing appear in Table 4.
Based on several tests (Wilks' lambda, Pillai's trace, and Hotelling-Lawley trace), the
overall model proves highly significant at the .001 level (see Table 5, panel A). In order
to determine on which factors UK and US analysts differed, univariate F tests are made
on the eight criterion variables. The results are reported in Table 4, panel B. Five of the
criterion variables are significant: OTHERAN, MANAGEMT, EXTRINFO,
MGMTFCST, and MACRO. US analysts tend to consider OTHERAN and EXTRINFO
more important in revising an earnings estimate; UK analysts place greater emphasis on
MGMTFCST and MACRO. Both consider information from management important
(MANAGEMT). However, in an analysis of the factors comprising this variable, UK
Table 4
MANOVA and univariate F tests
Panel A: Two-way MANOVA testing overall significance of the model with country (US/UK) as the grouping
variable and the eight factors as the dependent (criterion) variables
Test name
Number of
respondents Value F statistic
Significance
ofF
Pillai's trace 265
Hotelling-Lawley trace 265
Wilks' Lambda 265
.48612 23.53115 .000
.94598 23.53115 .000
.51388 23.53115 .000
Panel B: Univariate F tests
Variable Hypothesis SS F Statistic
Significance
ofF
OTHERAN 8.95267 9.31217 .003
STOCK 1.39417 1.39685 .239
MANAGEMT 20.05246 22.09607 .000
REGS .49388 .49267 .484
EXTRINFO 5.14297 5.24852 .023
MGMTFCST 21.52522 23.90727 .000
COSTCAP 1.87519 1.88319 .17!
MACRO 41.19008 51.17399 .000
Grouping variable: country. Criterion variables: OTHERAN, STOCK, MANAGEMT REGS. EXTRINFO,
MGMTFCST COSTCAP, and MACRO.
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Table 5
MANOVA and univariate F tests for subsample of analysts with 1 years or less of experience
Panel A: Two-way MANOVA testing overall significance of the model with country (US/UK) as the grouping
variable and the eight factors as the dependent (criterion) variables
Test name
Number of
respondents Value F statistic
Significance
ofF
Pillai's trace 135
Hotelling-Lawley trace 135
Wilks' Lambda 135
.47759 10.62758 .000
.91420 10.62758 .000
.52241 10.62758 .000
Panel B: Univariate F tests
Variable Hypothesis SS F statistic
Significance
ofF
OTHERAN 1.98465 2.50816 .116
STOCK 2.19603 2.43081 .122
MANAGEMT 10.78656 12.39143 .001
REGS 3.94294 4.36428 .039
EXTRINFO 2.08010 2.14219 .146
MGMTFCST 12.55438 13.99507 .000
COSTCAP 3.61990 3.27067 .074
MACRO 14.84816 19.02447 .000
Grouping variable: Country. Criterion variables: OTHERAN, STOCK, MANAGEMT, REGS, EXTRINFO,
MGMTFCST, COSTCAP, and MACRO.
analysts find formal announcements more important. US analysts tend to regard informal
information as more significant.'*
Although both groups consider other analysts' recommendations and estimates only
slightly to moderately important, US analysts place significantly greater importance on
forecasts and recommendations issued by their colleagues. This result might reflect the level
of experience between the UK and US analysts in the sample rather than the countries
involved. In their study, Williams and Moyes (1997) find that the greater the level of
experience, the higher the likelihood that the analyst will consider other analysts' forecasts
and recommendations in revising an EPS forecast. They conclude that the more experienced
the analyst, the less stigma attached to considering other analysts' reports. In addition,
experienced analysts are better able to determine which of their colleagues' EPS forecasts are
likely to be more accurate. This finding is supported by another study (Clement, 1999) that
shows that forecast accuracy is positively associated with analyst experience.
Similarly, although both groups consider comments from suppliers and customers of
firms only slightly to moderately important, the US analyst places greater weight on these
I
This finding provides a possible explanation for the inconsistency found in prior studies. Recall that Chang
and Most (1981) provide evidence that UK analysts rely more heavily than US analysts on information from
management, whereas Arnold et al. (1984) report no difference between US and UK analysts in this regard. In this
study, we distinguish between the types of information provided by management (formal or informal). In studies
that did not make this distinction, test results might be more difficult to interpret.
60 G.D. Moves et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 47-63
outside sources when revising an earnings estimate. Williams and Moyes (1997) also find
that more experienced analysts consider more rather than fewer factors in EPS revisions.
This finding is consistent with results reported in studies (e.g., Chiesi, Spillich, & Voss,
1979) involving unprogrammed situations, such as EPS forecasts. In such situations,
experienced individuals are more likely to use a quantity' strategy regarding the number
of factors considered. That is, they consider more factors than their less experienced
colleagues in reaching a decision. However, they are able to appropriately weigh the most
relevant data. On the other hand, less experienced individuals restrict the number of factors
considered in unprogrammed situations.
Both groups indicate that management earnings forecasts (MGMTFCST) are extremely
important. However, while UK analysts consider such forecasts as the most important of all
factors listed, other factors, such as informal meetings with management, are ranked higher
for US analysts.
International, political, economic, and industry events (MACRO) range fi"om moderately
important to important for both groups. Nonetheless, the relative difference in importance is
highly significant with the UK analyst placing greater weight on such events. One
explanation for the difference in importance is that UK analysts have a more international
focus. The LSE has a greater number of foreign companies listed than US exchanges. In
addition, as previously noted, the number of international investors is higher in the UK than
in the US.
There is a significant difference in the level of importance of information fi*om firm
management (MANAGEMT). However, in examining the factors included in the variable,
there are two areas affecting the difference: formal and informal information. UK analysts
consider formal information (e.g., conference calls, analysts' meetings with management)
more important, while US analysts place greater emphasis on informal information (e.g., one-
on-one discussions with management during on-site visits). This difference might be
refiective of the relationship between management and the analyst in the two countries.
Lees (1981) suggests the possibility of selective disclosure in the US whereby certain
analysts are privy to forward-looking information from management that is not made
available to the general public. In an interview for this study, an analyst likened the
information-gathering process in the US to constructing a "mosaic." The analyst must look
beyond official pronouncements from the company. To complete the mosaic depicting the
company's fiiture financial situation, the analyst relies on informal conversations with
management and others. Williams, Moyes, and Park (1996, p. 115) report that, according
to one Senior Analyst interviewed, "traditional forms of analysis are being replaced. . .by a
more 'action oriented' approach involving 'gossip' and 'rumors'. The process involves the
gathering of 'soft' or informal information from a variety of sources in order to construct a
picture of fiiture firm performance."
Recently, the SEC has expressed concern about the disclosure of material firm-specific
information by management to selected analysts and investors. The Commission views such
disclosures as a threat to the integrity of the securities market. In October 2000, the
Commission issued Regulation FD (or "Fair Disclosure"). In the regulation, effective
October 23, 2000, the SEC cited (Securities and Exchange Commission, 2000, p. 3) "the
potential for corporate management to treat material infonnation as a commodity to be used
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to gain or maintain favor with particular analysts or investors." Regulation FD requires
management to simultaneously disclose to analysts and the general public in broad,
nonexclusionary distribution all material corporate information.
4.4. Additional tests
Since experience has been shown to influence the selection of factors by a US analyst in
revising an EPS forecast (Williams & Moyes, 1997), additional testing was performed
controlling for this variable. The UK and US samples were subdivided into two groups based
on years of experience. Analysts with 10 years or less of industry experience are classified as
low experience; those with more than 10 years represent high experience. The 10-year
division is based on a study by Chase and Simon (1973). They find that it takes
approximately 10 years for an expert to master a domain. Using the 10-year criteria, 54
UK analysts were placed in the high-experience group while 8 1 were in the low-experience
group. The US had considerably more in the high (77) than in the low (54) experience group.
A MANOVA test was made on both the high- and low-experience groups using the same
model as for the prior test. The grouping variable was Country. Results of the test for the low-
experience group are presented in Table 5. Results for the high-experience group (not shown)
are similar to those for the full sample.
Three of the variables for the full sample continue to be significant when comparing UK
and US analysts with 10 years or less experience, MANAGEMT, MGMTFCST, and
MACRO. In addition, REGS is moderately significant with a P value of .039. Recall that
this variable indicates the level of importance of regulatory changes by government agencies
as well as accounting changes to UK or US GAAR Although both groups of analysts with
experience of 1 years or less consider the components of this variable to be moderately
important, UK analysts tend to place greater weight on government changes while US
analysts consider changes to GAAP more important. The findings of the additional tests
indicate that differences between UK and US analysts should not be attributed to differences
in the experience level of the two groups.
5. Conclusion
This study examines the difference in the relative importance of factors considered in a
common task performed by UK and US analysts, an EPS forecast revision. There is a great
deal of similarity between the two countries in regard to the size and importance of equity
markets, regulatory procedures, government oversight, the financial accounting standard-
setting process, and professional certification of analysts. This paper examines whether sell-
side analysts in the UK and US are also similar in their consideration of factors leading to an
earnings forecast revision.
An examination of the importance of factors used in revising an EPS estimate indicates a
great deal of similarity between US and UK analysts. However, the weighting (i.e., the
relative importance) of these factors differ between the two countries. UK analysts place
somewhat more importance on macroeconomic factors, such as international economic and
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political events. This finding is not unexpected given the greater international focus of the UK
and the larger number of foreign companies listed on the LSE. Although considered
extremely important by both groups, UK analysts place greater weight on management's
forecast of EPS. They also attach more importance to formal releases of information (e.g.,
corporate press releases) by management.
For their part, US analysts consider forecasts and recommendations by other analysts to be
more important than UK analysts. In addition, US analysts attach greater importance to
comments from suppliers and customers and informal conversations (e.g., during on-site
visits) with management.
Since there is a significant difference in the number of years of industry experience
between the two groups, we repeat tests of the model controlling for experience. As the
results are similar to those of the initial test, we conclude that country-specific issues rather
than experience are responsible for the significant differences in the level of importance of
certain factors considered in revising an earnings forecast.
5.7. Suggestions for future research
The results of this study indicate several areas for ftiture research. First, this paper
examines only one task performed by UK and US sell-side analysts — earnings forecast
revisions. Future studies could examine other tasks, such as buy and sell recommendations,
issued by these two groups. Second, there are few empirical studies comparing the
forecasting ability of these two groups of analysts. Data availability has now made such
comparisons possible. Finally, there have been a limited number of studies comparing
analysts from different countries. Pike et al. (1993) compare the appraisal of equities by UK
and German analysts. Moyes, Park, Wang and Williams (1997) compare US analysts to
those of an emerging economy, Taiwan. Studies comparing financial analysts in different
global settings are needed to determine the relative reliability of information provided by
these analysts.
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Abstract
This paper investigates logistic (or supply-chain management) differences between large hospitals
in the U.S. and France. Given that logistics and supply-chain management have been considered
important aspects in hospital management, this paper explores the possible reasons for differences
among hospitals in the U.S. and France. The differences are drawn from variables, such as (1) the
extent of responsibility given to the logistics department with respect to items, such as purchasing,
physical supplying, receiving, inventory management, internal distribution to medical departments,
and management information systems; (2) the manner of distribution of supplies (such as central
warehouse vs. direct vendor distribution); (3) the amount or the volume of medicine distributed; (4)
the degree of partnerships between the hospitals and their vendors and other hospitals; and (5) the
past efforts of logistics departments in improving the supply-chain management and ftiture plans for
improving the logistic functions. The results provide evidence that U.S. hospitals have been able to
reduce the supplies inventory level to a larger extent than their counterparts in France; the French
hospitals, however, have a higher level of intention to do so. Both groups support current and future
partnerships with other hospitals and suppliers of goods and services. The ability of logistic
management to reduce costs associated with medical supplies signals that supplies inventory
reduction is possible in even very critical industries (such as medicine). Consequently, the resuhs of
this study are relevant to the management of hospitals (and companies), which intend to improve
their logistic functions and accounting information systems to decrease the costs associated with
inventory. In this paper, we have advocated that Just-in-Time (JIT) philosophy to be applied to
hospitals in inventory cost reduction. Contemporary management methods continue to emerge and
the healthcare industry needs to continue incorporating these new developments in its operations so
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it can compete in a market that is more competitive than ever. © 2001 University of lUinois. All
rights reserved.
Keywords: Hospital supply management in France and the U.S.; Hospital logistics; Just-in-Time; Activity-based
management for healthcare providers; Hospital cost reduction; Hospitals partnerships with medical suppliers;
Hospital partnerships with other hospitals
1. Introduction
Costing of services provided by the healthcare industry has become more significant in
current years. Most U.S. hospitals used to maximize the reported costs to increase revenue
(revenue was cost based). The current movement in revenue reimbursement, however, is
away from cost-based numbers, and hospitals have become more involved in cost reduction
to improve profitability (Orloff, Littell, Clune, Klingman, & Preston, 1990). Although this
new movement in revenue reimbursement has been subject of dissatisfaction and complaint
(e.g., DeBakey, 1998; Waite, 1998), there is no disagreement on the need for reducing cost by
improving process and eliminating unneeded activities.'
As a result, we have observed that cost accounting in hospitals has improved. New costing
methods that provide both better costing information and also possible savings opportunities
have been implemented (e.g., Carr, 1993). To continue reducing costs, hospitals need to
review their activities, find the costs associated with the activities, classify the activities as
value- and nonvalue-added, reduce the cost of all activities, and decrease or eliminate
nonvalue-added activities.
The logistics department is a vital part of a hospital because this department may have
responsibilities (activities) for purchasing, receiving, inventory management, management
information systems, telemedicine, food services, transportation, and home care services.
Consequently, it is important to examine the functions (activities) of this department to
improve services and cut costs.
The objective of this paper is to provide insight into the logistic flinctions of hospitals in
two different countries and how these hospitals have improved and/or intend to improve their
logistic activities and decrease costs. We chose the U.S. and France for our study. The U.S.
and France have different social and economic systems and, as we will describe, different
healthcare and hospital systems. A priori, we expected that U.S. hospitals, being financed by
private sources in most cases, used more cost-effective management information systems,
while French hospitals, having a socialist economic background and mostly public sources
for financing, used less advanced management (and accounting) information systems. Stated
differently, we expected that because of differences in management and accounting informa-
tion systems and the environment, the U.S. hospitals are more efficient in logistics than their
French counterparts.
' For example. President of Jamaica Ho.spital in Queens in New York suggested that "... It was only through
creative and risk-taking strategies that the hospital came-out ahead." (mentioned in Lagnado, 1999).
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In Section 2, we discuss contemporary activity and costing issues that are relevant to
the heahhcare industry, especially cost reduction of medical inventory via logistics.
Section 3 provides a comparison of the healthcare industry in the U.S. and France as
we develop expectations for the results of our survey. In Section 4, we report the results
of the survey and compare inventory management in the two countries. This comparison
also provides some insights into how managers in the two environments approach the
responsibility of the logistics departments and how they intend to improve the services of
these departments and reduce the associated costs. This research concludes with our
summary and conclusions.
2. Contemporary cost accounting issues
Among contemporary cost management issues, two aspects are most relevant to the
healthcare industry: activity-based management (ABM) and inventory management [e.g.,
Just-in-Time (JIT)]." ABM is a system-wide approach that considers the activities of the
organization with the intention of improving the efficiency of activities and reducing (or
eliminating) nonvalue-added activities. Inventory management, part of an organization's total
activities, has represented considerable savings opportunities in many industries. For
example, Eaton was able to improve its production and reduce its financial difficulties during
the 1980s by implementing a demand-pull, JIT inventory system (Houston, 1992).
As mentioned previously, an ABM system should distinguish between value-added and
nonvalue-added activities. The distinction is necessary so that management can focus on
reducing and eventually eliminating nonvalue-added activities and their related costs. High-
lighting nonvalue-added activities also reveals the magnitude of the waste the organization is
experiencing. Reporting nonvalue-added activities and their costs separately encourages
managers to place more emphasis on controlling these types of activities. Furthermore,
tracking these costs over time permits managers to assess the effectiveness of their activity-
management programs. One possible way to reduce the cost of nonvalue-added activities in
hospitals (as well as other organizations) is to develop partnerships^ with other entities that
use or provide those activities. For example, to reduce the cost associated with inventory,
organizations can develop long-term partnerships with suppliers. Or, to reduce the cost
associated with services, such as food preparation and laundry, hospitals may choose to
develop long-term partnerships with other hospitals. This way, the hospital may reduce costs
by using the economies of scale and/or obtaining new resources (such as staff and
technology) through partnerships.
" While JIT can be considered part of ABM, we chose to present it as a separate item to emphasize the
importance of this issue.
^ The term "partnership" is used to represent strategic alliances between the organization and others in a cost-
savings effort. Partnerships can be developed both horizontally (e.g., laundry, food service, and warehouse
sharing) and vertically (e.g., JIT and EDI programs). The ability to share quality management, input, and outcome
data with other organizations is critical as healthcare organizations continue to evolve (Gagen & Holsclaw, 1995).
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2.1. Jiist-in-Time
Among the nonvalue-added activities are procurement and storing and inventory manage-
ment. These activities are considered nonvalue-added since they do not add any positive
value to services provided by the healthcare organization. A JIT delivery system can help to
reduce these nonvalue-added activities. The objective of JIT is to minimize inventory
(medical supplies) to levels that satisfy customer demand. A key element of JIT is choosing
the suppliers very carefiilly so the organization can expect a fast (and high quality) delivery of
supplies when they are needed. JIT purchasing requires that suppliers deliver materials just in
time to be used. Thus, supplier linkages are vital (Hansen & Mowen, 1997). In a JIT
environment, the number of suppliers is limited and the purchase contracts are long-term.
With a long-term contract, the supplier's uncertainty as to demand is reduced, and the mutual
confidence between supplier and purchaser can increase.
Management of medical supplies is one of the most important managerial aspects of
the healthcare industry. Inventory management in most industries has improved (e.g.,
Baker, Fry, & Karwan, 1996), and the level of inventory has been reduced by
implementing methods, such as JIT. Nevertheless, some healthcare organizations still
hesitate to reduce the level of inventory because the costs of lack of inventory (such as
loss of lives) are much higher than the costs of keeping additional inventory. However,
current trends and market pressure on the healthcare industry are making healthcare
providers seek ways to reduce operating costs. Reducing the cost of carrying medical
inventory is such an item.
2.2. The current view of medical supplies
Three models of drug distribution are found in practice."^
2.2.1. Model 1: traditional method — delivery to medical departments via a
central warehouse
In the traditional method, a standard stock of frequently prescribed drugs is available on a
ward. Medications not available in ward stock are requested from the central distribution
source (sometimes called a pharmacy). This model represents a system in which large
amounts of inventory are kept and the hospital incurs material inventory costs.
2.2.2. Model 2: semidirect delivery via medical department warehouses
In this model, the supplier provides the necessary supplies to a medical department
directly. The medical department recognizes the need and contacts the suppliers. This method
reduces the level of inventory for two reasons. First, the amount of inventory kept in the
departments is normally lower than that in the central distributor, and second, it is less time
consuming for medicine to be delivered directly to the medical department without the
intervention of the central warehouse.
Based on an interview with Queens' Medieal Center in Hawaii and Benimel and Musen (1997).
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2.2.3. Model 3: direct delivery via daily replenishment of small medical department
storage facilities
In this model, the suppHer has a very close relationship with the hospital and takes over the
task of identifying medical needs and filling the supplies. A representative of the supplier
reviews the needs on a daily basis and makes the necessary arrangements (such as placing the
order and verifying delivery of the medicine). This method is the closest to JIT. The supplier
must keep an appropriate type and ample amount of inventory since the hospital keeps the
minimum amount within its system.
As mentioned in Section 1, the primary objective of this paper is to provide insights into
logistic fijnctions of hospitals in two countries. Furthermore, we intend to find how hospitals
have improved and/or intend to improve their logistic activities and decrease costs. Section 3
provides a comparison of healthcare systems in the U.S. and France, followed by the results
obtained from our recent survey.
3. International comparison: French and U.S. healthcare industry
Three main factors differentiate the healthcare environment in the U.S. and France. These
factors, in turn, may set different priorities for healthcare providers in these two countries. We
have defined these main differences as the cost of the service, how the service is funded, and
innovations in healthcare delivery and finance. A brief discussion of each of these aspects is
provided here.
3.1. The cost of the service
There is no doubt that healthcare expenditures have increased more rapidly in the U.S. than
in other countries, so much more that the U.S. has become one of the most expensive
healthcare providers in the industrialized world. Fig. 1 provides a comparison of the total
expenditure on health per capita based on Purchasing Power Parities ($PPP) for several
countries including France and the U.S. As shown in Fig. 1, the U.S. cost per capita is the
highest among the countries included.^ In addition, only 45% of the U.S. population carried
publicly funded healthcare coverage, while this number was 99.5% for the French population
in 1995 (OECD Stadsfics, 1995).^ The cost of this public coverage in the U.S. is 6.3% of
US's Gross Domestic Product. This cost is 7.3% of French Gross Domestic Product in
France. To determine whether the difference in cost between the countries resulted from the
degree of services provided, we compared the number of practicing physicians per 1000
population, inpatient care beds per 1 000 population, and inpatient care average length of stay
(days) for the two countries in 1996. The results indicate that the French have more practicing
^ The OECD statistics suggest that in 1 996 the total expenditure on health care per capita in $PPP is about
US$2000 in France, while it is about US$3900 in the U.S. (Printed in the OECD Statistics, published in 1998).
Despite the prosperity of the U.S. economy, the uninsured population increased 4% from 1996 to 1997
(Newcomer, 1999).
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The Association Between Health Spending and income per Capita, 1996
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Fig. 1 . Note: AUS = Australia, AUT = Austria, BEL = Belgium, CAN = Canada, CZ = Czech Republic, DNK = Den-
mark, FIN = Finland, FRA = France, GER = Germany, GRC = Greece, HUN = Hungary, IRL = Ireland, ITA= Italy,
JAP = Japan, KOR = Korea, LUX = Luxembourg, MEX = Mexico, NLD = Netherlands, NEZ = New Zealand,
NOR = Norway, PRT = Portugal, SUE = Sweden, GBR = United Kingdom, US = United States, TUR = Turkey.
physicians (2.9 vs. 2.6 per 1000 population), more inpatient care beds (8.7 vs. 4 per 1000
population), and a longer inpatient care average length of stay (11.2 vs. 7.8 days).^(OECD
Statistics, 1998).
3.2. How the service is funded
The sources of fijnding for healthcare services are also different in the U.S. and France.
The OECD statistics show that since 1960, the French government has spent more on
healthcare than its U.S. counterpart. For example, of all expenditures on healthcare, the
French government financed 63% in 1980, 75% in 1995, and about 80% in 1996. The
public share of healthcare expenditures for the U.S. was 62% in 1980, 46% in 1995, and
47% in 1996. In France, the departement, which is the second level of the local
'^ OECD Statistics, 1998.
O. Aptel. H. Pourjalali / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 65-90 71
government, has authority over social assistance for the elderly and other service recipients
of healthcare. However, in the U.S., the administrative arrangements are made at multiple
levels of state and local government along with the federal government. Given these facts
and that different parties (such as federal and local governments, the private sector, and
citizens) finance the cost of healthcare, significant variations in healthcare services exist
across states and local governments. Stated differently, healthcare services are not as
extensively and/or evenly distributed among the users of these services in the U.S. as they
are in France.
Different sources of funding may impose different market pressures. For example, a
hospital may sense no market pressure if its functions are entirely funded by public funds
regardless of level of service provided. Furthermore, market pressure is reduced when
patients are limited to services provided by only a few healthcare providers. For example.
West (1998) suggests that Veterans Administration hospitals in the U.S. have very low market
pressure, as they remain isolated from market forces. These hospitals do not share the urgency
necessary to trigger important operational (and cost saving) changes (West, 1998). In the
context of this study, we expected that French hospitals have lower market pressure than do
their U.S. counterparts and have less incentive for their logistics departments to take cost-
saving measures.
3.3. Innovations in healthcare deliveiy and finance
Innovations in the delivery and finance of healthcare in the U.S. have been reshaping the
healthcare system. Such innovations include the rise ofmanaged care policies, the move away
from fee-for-service reimbursement to capitation reimbursement, and the move toward
increasing outpatient services relative to inpatient services (Parsons, Woller, Neubauer,
Rothaemel, & Zelle, 1998). However, these innovations have not been deemed as necessary
in France^ and have not been implemented as they have in the U.S. As a result, the way that
the French hospitals are reimbursed is different from most of their counterparts in the U.S.
The French government directly or indirectly reimburses all hospitals, although about half of
the French hospitals (about 2000) are private.^ Hospitals in the U.S. receive only a portion of
their fees through the government (see statistics provided in earlier parts of this section). This
situation may contribute to the urgency felt by the U.S. hospitals to improve and/or develop
their logistics departments to accommodate the changes and/or the cost savings that became
necessary as a result of the changes. A priori, we expect to find that the logistic funcdons in
U.S. hospitals are more efficient than those in French hospitals. In Section 4, the information
regarding the sample and the results of the survey are provided.
OECD 1990's statistics indicate that only 10% of U.S. population were satisfied with the U.S. healthcare
system, whereas over 40% of the French indicated they were satisfied with their healthcare system. Over 29% of
the U.S. public (vs. 10% in France) indicated that the healthcare system must be completely rebuilt (Jee & Or,
1999).
This is not to say that the French hospitals do not have incentives to reduce costs; the existence of the private
hospitals and the availability of choice between the hospitals result in competition, which in turn should result in
actions that produce cost reductions.
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4. Survey sample and results
4.1. Sample
The sample hospitals were from two countries: the U.S. and France. We sent surveys to
600 hospitals located in California (the list was obtained from the American Hospital
Association Annual Directory). We used California since it contains one of the largest
number of hospitals in the U.S., and colleagues considered California as one of the most
advanced locations in North America in providing healthcare services. Our expectation was to
find current advances in hospital logistics in California hospitals. The number of French
hospitals that received our survey questionnaire was 2000. These hospitals were chosen from
the Health and Social Affairs Ministry databases. Tables 1 and 2 provide descriptive
information of the sample organizations compared to their home country's overall population
of hospitals. Notice that U.S. sample hospitals resemble the U.S. general population;
however, in France, the sample is skewed toward larger hospitals.
We received 75 responses (12.5% response rate) from the U.S. hospitals and 126 (6.3%
response rate) from the French hospitals. ^*^ While we have enough observations to make
statistical inferences, the generalization of the results must be done cautiously. For example,
there is an overrepresentation of the public sector in French hospitals, which may bias the
results for the French hospital sample, since the public sector hospitals may not have as much
incentive to control costs as private hospitals may have.''
4.2. Results
In this part, the survey results for each country are reported separately, and a comparison of
the important issues is provided at the end. A copy of the survey questionnaire is provided in
Appendix A. As can be observed, most questions are related to four topics:
1. How medical supplies activities are currently handled (e.g.. Questions 2 and 3).
2. How the management of medical supplies has improved during the last 3 years (e.g.,
Questions 7 and 8).
3. If any strategic alliances exist (or existed) with other hospitals to reduce the costs of
medical supplies (e.g.. Questions 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, and 17).
4. If the hospital is planning to implement additional contemporary management systems
in the near future (e.g.. Question 16).
4.2.1. U.S. results
The number of respondents for the U.S. sample was 75 hospitals (12.5%). The average
number ofbeds in these hospitals is 250. Most ofthe respondents were either material managers
'" As of 9/1/98.
'
' Similar to any other industries, private hospitals should be more eoncemed with their profitability than the
public hospitals.
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Table 1
The size of sample hospitals in the U.S. and France
Number of beds 6-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 500 + Total
U.S. sample 2 7 12 19
French sample 4 21 30
19
22
7
8
7
8
3
33
75
126
(79%) or purchasing managers (15%). ~ In most cases (71%), a specific department was in
charge of logistics. The number of cases increases (to 98.6%) when we consider "material
management department" as a substitute for "logistics department." Put differently, the vast
majority of Califomian (U.S.) hospitals have created a separate department to deal with their
logistic needs. The logistic jurisdiction, however, is not the same in all hospitals. For example,
the food service function is not part of the logistics department in 86% of the cases.
4.2.1.1. How (medical) supplies activities are currently handled. The logistic process for
medical supplies for the respondents takes two forms. Either "Delivery to medical depart-
ments via a central warehouse" or "Semidirect delivery via medical department warehouse."
There is no indication that one method is preferred over another and some of the respondents
mentioned that both methods have been used in their hospitals. Only in rare instances (in
eight cases and only for a part of their medical supplies) did the respondents mention that the
suppliers directly delivered inventory when needed. This system is the closest system to
stockless inventory and JIT.'^
With regard to food services, most hospitals provide this service internally. Some suggest
that they can control the quality of food and avoid possible negative effects on the institution
this way. When food services are provided externally, the logistics departments become very
concerned with the quality and efficiency of food suppliers (requiring supplier certification,
for example).
4.2.1.2. How the management of medical supplies has improved during the last 3
years. While they mention the need to further improve their current level of partnership
(80%), they also provide information that shows improvement in their relationships with
suppliers during the last 3 years. For example, 85% say that the level of medical supplies
inventory and 69% say that the number of suppliers have been considerably reduced in the
past 3 years.
Reasons mentioned for this improvement are implementing Electronic Data Interchange
(EDI; 48% ofrespondents) and setting up JIT programs (26% ofrespondents). On average, the
respondents indicated that they have saved over US$350,000 (about 36% of total inventory) in
the amount ofinventory held in the hospitals (the average amount ofmedical supplies inventory
was about US$ 1 million). Still, they found that the current savings could be increased.
Some hospitals keep "unofficial stock" in substantial quantities. We were unable to collect
the dollar value ofthis "unofficial stock" category, but it is mostly held in medical departments.
' The survey was sent to the attention of "material" or "purchasing" managers.
13 We did not find a significant correlation between the size and the method of medical supplies delivery. It is
possible that geographic position of hospitals and their suppliers played a role in the method used by hospitals.
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Table 2
Part 1: The size of the U.S. sample hospitals compared to the general hospital population in the U.S.
Number
of beds 6-24 25-49 50-99 100-199 200-299 300-399 400-499 500+ Total
Population (%) 4 1
1
Sample (%) 3 10
26 26 14 9 5 5 100
16 25 25 9 9 4 100
Part 2: The size of the French sample hospitals compared to the general hospital population in France
Very large
Size hospitals
; Large
hospitals
Small
hospitals
Private
hospitals
Population (%) 1-5
Sample (%) ^-
28.1
41.6
15.9
20.0
54.5
31.2
Note: We were unable to find similar groupings of U.S. and French hospitals.
On average, 52% of total medical supplies are held in medical departments. Some respondents
suggest that they underestimate the value of the inventory to avoid unwanted attention to their
level of inventory. As mentioned previously, the average level of stock is about US$ 1 million or
US$4000 per bed for a hospital that has an average of 250 beds.'"^
4.2.1.3. Ifany strategic alliances exist (or existed) with other hospitals to reduce the costs of
medical supplies. The respondents suggest that they have less than 25% partnership with
other hospitals. Any current partnerships are deemed weak and are concentrated in the
purchasing, medical personnel, and medical departments (in order of level of partnership).
One possible aspect for future improvement for the U.S. hospitals could be to improve their
strategic alliances with other hospitals.
4.2.1.4. If the hospital is planning to implement more contemporary management systems in
the nearfuture. Logistics and material managers agree that the degree of partnership should
increase within the next 3 years. According to their responses, the partnerships should
develop (in order of importance) in EDI, purchasing, supplier certification, medical staffs and
departments, JIT programs, and stockless programs.
Over 90% of the respondents agree that they need to reduce the number of suppliers, which
requires further improvement in the relationships with the suppliers. Sharing food services
and laundry functions with other hospitals (typically subcontracted to outside parties) was not
reported among anticipated changes.
4.2. 1.5. Further analysis. To find the correlation among respondents' answers, we generated
Pearson correlation coefficients and found that some of the answers to questions concerning
future partnerships with hospitals and or suppliers are statistically correlated. Table 3 provides
the related information for those variables that show significant correlation with others.
"'^ Notice that the cost of necessary capital for the medical supplies per bed would be about US$400 per year
(10% interest rate is assumed).
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Table 3
Pearson correlation coefficients for significant variables on expected "fiiture partnership" between the hospital
and other parties involved in using and/or providing the reported items for the U.S. hospitals
Pearson Significance
Variable 1 Variable 2 coefficient n degree
Medical staff EDI .5068 49 .000
Medical staff Supplier certification .3551 41 .023
Stockless management JIT programs .4513 69 .000
Purchasing Medical staff .4304 55 .001
Purchasing Laundry sharing .3875 60 .002
Purchasing Food services sharing .3852 59 .003
Purchasing Medical departments .3769 56 .004
Medical departments Supplier certification .3567 43 .019
Food services sharing Supplier certification .3488 45 .019
Medical service JIT programs .3158 54 .020
Question 16 mentioned the following partnership possibilities: Medical Departments, Medical staff
Telemedicine, Purchasing, Laundry sharing, Food services sharing. Warehouse sharing, JIT programs, Stockless
programs, EDI, and Supplier certification.
Three partnership variables are significantly correlated with others: "Medical staff,"
"Purchasing," and "Supplier certification." Most of the significant relationships could be
expected. For example, "Medical staff" and "EDI" are significantly correlated, suggesting
that hospitals that implement EDI have already established collaboration with "Medical staff"
Otherwise, they cannot apply EDI. Put differently, these two variables are affected by the same
underlying issue: the need for collaboration with other hospitals have already been recognized
and established. Implementation of EDI also contributes to fiarther development in partner-
ships in the Medical staff Partnership in "Purchasing" must affect other types of partnerships
(such as Medical staff. Laundry, and Food services) since each one of these partnerships is
involved in purchasing of services and goods. As Table 3 indicates, those hospitals that want to
develop partnerships in "Purchasing," intend to develop partnerships in the medical fields,
such as "Medical departments," and "Medical staff" The significant association between the
"stockless programs" and "JIT programs" is another example. The management must accept
the idea of stockless programs to be able to implement JIT programs. The implementation of
JIT programs implies reshaping of procedures and a reorganization of the logistic process.
Information in Table 3 suggests that in general, hospitals have found that partnership will
improve their activities and will reduce costs. As a result, they are planning to improve
partnerships with both suppliers and other hospitals. Among the variables that hospitals
considered as determinants for partnership are "Supplier certification" and a well-developed
information system, such as "EDI."^^
4.2.2. French results
The number of respondents for the French sample was 126 hospitals (representing a 6.3%
response rate). The average number ofbeds in these hospitals is 443. Consequently, compared
to the U.S. hospitals (the average number of beds for U.S. respondents was 250 beds), French
Table 5 provides a summary of survey results for the U.S. and France.
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respondents represented larger hospitals. Over 50% of the responses were provided by
"services economiques" managers or directors. This "service" combines all the activities
linked to infrastructure, purchasing, and supplying. It is therefore logical that this "service"
could be considered part of the logistics department. Only 31.4% of respondents mentioned a
specific department for logistics. They ranked the fiinction of the logistics department (in
order of priority) food and laundry services, supply of medical needs, reception, stock
management, purchasing, service distribution, and transportation. About 59%o of respondents
included maintenance and 50% included information systems management as part of the
logistics department.
4.2.2.1. How (medical) supplies activities are currently handled. The logistic process for
medical supplies in France takes two forms. The majority of hospitals follow the "Delivery to
medical departments via a central warehouse" system. Respondents of 73 (58%) hospitals
mentioned that they used this method very extensively. Some of the respondents (3 1 cases or
25%) also mentioned direct delivery of medical supplies to medical departments for small
portions (less than 25%) of their inventory. It is possible that managers of the medical
department would like to have control of specific medical inventory items, and for this
reason, some of the inventories are delivered directly to these departments. Evaluating the
responses, one can conclude that while the inventory reduction possibilities have become
more and more known by French hospitals, they are not used and/or developed as much as
they are in California (semidirect delivery via medical department warehouse is not as widely
used in France as it is in the U.S.).
With regard to food services, most hospitals provide this service internally. This way, they
can control the quality of food and avoid a possible negative image of the institution. Thus,
the logistics departments have become very concerned with the quality and efficiency of food
suppliers (requiring supplier certification, for example).
4. 2. 2. 2. How the management ofmedical supplies has improved during the last 3 years. One
of the findings is that in 79.1% of the cases, the respondents mendoned that they have been
improving the logistic function by improving relationships with suppliers. They (67.2%) also
mention that creation of new partnerships would improve their logistics. As a result of these
initiations, within the last 3 years, medical stocks have been reduced in 45.5%) of cases. JIT
programs and supplier certification programs have been implemented in 44.7%) of cases;
however, they have not resulted in material savings. In 40.5% of the cases, the supplies level
has remained almost constant. The respondents' answers also indicate that the number of
suppliers did not materially change during the past 3 years. The average stock is 14,239,244
Francs (about US$2,478, 1 00) in each hospital or 32,855 Francs (about US$5720) per bed. The
inventory, as stated previously, is held mainly in warehouses and distribution centers. About
30% of medical inventory, on average, are stored in the medical departments.'^'
Telemedicine is widespread only in large hospitals (about 1 1.7% of total respondents who
are also larger hospitals).
No significant relationship between the size of the hospital and the amount of medical inventory was found.
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Table 4
Pearson correlation coefficients for significant variables on expected "fiature partnership" between the hospital
and other parties involved in using and/or providing the reported items for French hospitals
Pearson Significance
Variable 1 Variable 2 coefficient n degree
Medical staff Supplier certification - .2496 92 .016
Medical staff Laundry sharing .2248 108 .019
Stockless management Supplier certification .2888 90 .006
Stockless management JIT programs .2815 97 .005
Purchasing Medical staff .2647 110 .005
Purchasing Medical departments .3261 116 .000
Purchasing Laundry sharing .2200 99 .029
Question 16 mentioned the following partnership possibilities: Medical Departments, Medical staff,
Telemedicine, Purchasing, Laundry sharing. Food services sharing. Warehouse sharing, JIT programs, Stockless
programs, EDI, and Supplier certification.
4.2.2.3. Ifany strategic alliances exist (or existed) with other hospitals to reduce the costs of
medical supplies. The only departments that have alhances among or between hospitals are
purchasing and laundry (about 50% of respondents mentioned these partnerships). Partner-
ship in medical departments and medical personnel is almost nonexistent.'^ Some hospitals
subcontract the laundry service, food service, and transportation.
4.2.2.4. If the hospital is planning to implement more contemporary management systems
in the near future. About 73% of respondents are considering improving their logistic
and medical functions through initiating/extending partnership projects in the near future.
Partnership priorities are purchasing, medical staff, medical departments, supplier certifica-
tion, EDI, and telemedicine. Interestingly, EDI and telemedicine, which seem to be the
most important issues for the development of partnerships, are mentioned last. It is
possible that the lack of prior partnership experience has contributed to the low ranking of
EDI and Telemedicine. While 47.8% of respondents favor reducing the number of
suppliers, in general, they do not find the reduction in number of suppliers as a measure
of future cost savings. However, medical stock reduction is mentioned as a priority for a
vast majority of hospitals.
4.2.2.5. Further analysis. As with the U.S. sample, we ran Pearson correlation coefficients
analysis and found that some of the answers to "fiiture partnerships" are statistically
correlated. Table 4 provides the details for those variables that show significant correlation
with others.
Again, most of these significant relationships could be expected. For example, "Stockless
management," "Supplier certification," and "JIT programs" are all related to savings
resulting from reducing total inventory. Stockless management is not possible if JIT is not
implemented and if suppliers do not have total quality supplies (as measured by the supplier's
Please note footnote 1 8 also.
78 O. Aptel, H. Pourjalali / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 65-90
.in ^ O
S ^ 8 .Si•^
"ra
'Oo (U
'5b
.'S(U
'><
« <L>
V-
^
a: o
>.
^—
'
t/2
^4—
"><
(U
UJJ
<u k. ^C
.Si
c
—
5
c c5
IE
C/5
3
C/5
C3 c
p "O
s
(U
X)
£
3
C
o
3
•5 C3 u aj r -5
n,
(U
-a
c
c
c/5
'a.
O E
E
2
o
n.
£
c
a.
n.
<u
c
o
2
O
C3
oi)
2
Oh
<u S o r
03
o. ^ (U 3
^
n
^ 5 H oo eci
IJ rt (u
E -c >,
c?3 13 '-t
•£ ?5 or
^.
C3 « <=
<N o Oh
_
^3 ^ <1>
^ n -P
"3 T3 p a.
_o
E o S"3 in
E
•T3
P "C^ P
cd c« X!!,
00 ^ P
E
03
c«
^p
"7i
"o;
03 P
o
C/3
O
s- ^ O-
^
3 <u (U
O. a. -o
o b
oj
.S c
a.
2 :3 0)
oo 03
p O>
CO
V5
OO
OJ O
00 in
03 r^
&0S !/5
> D
3 ^ 00 ^
§ S
c £
in ^
o
.
H E
' o
aj 1^
o <"
c E (u 00
OJ ^ GO o
•[•^
>
o
03
ITj
u TD
• ""
_aj
Q.
a.
a
CA w
<S
_>.
^
•5 c
1) ji^
fc
^ CJ
o <u
X rt
1/i
r^
• S ?:.
c3
a Oo
3 u
.3 P ,-r
> S <u >
"aj
-o
3
03
O
-5
p 2 3
OJ
> p
E
c
03
(U
c
p
C/3
"^
'>
C
E
O "O t H o <u
'>
5
o J3
03
C3
rt
u
(/i
a
o
oa> >
C/0
"5
_>.
.2i
o
s Q
t:
ex
2
'-5 O "5. p
U.
2 . OJ-a OJ . p . 3lyj 3
,
&
B c5 -Ei ="
o- ?5 '?S|^
s
.2 <u r:
I- 3 ^
Oh G S
^ ' ^&< 00 iJ
E« « -3
rt 3 S
. 0- n. p
«'
•
H
^ E
-£ T3 Di
, 03 <U
^ '5. ^
0.0*5
.£: o
.2 2?
^ o
ca 03
_>, o
o p X)3
oo
o «
p (73 T3 171
o
E ^
P
03 ^
13
CS '5. 00 ^
'5,
IZI o _P O IZlo
o J3 03
in
-3
p ^ <U
^ 3 Eo
< .§ & --1 00
i= 3
p
-o _o
o o
o "S^ c
^ o
C/3
f 1 Cu
b
-p <1J
C/3
_Q. . 13 ^ ii
g a- ii S^ -P
•2 ^ ^ ^ p
.2 "^
T3
.•a
53 c 2 t1
^.2 2
C3 00
^-^ -^ C
^ 2 "
2 '0.-0
3 00
?5 ^ =
3 u >.
c/5 X! :3
p ^
03 P
(U
Oo
p _ lU£ •£ Qi
-3 =« 5
H
T3(^ (U
w E
c« ii
O- ID
(U H
^ 00
« o
^ I ^
'o, ?? o
O S, 03
T3 M
P "5P 03
_2 o
O. \0
1=; t;
2 -S fS
3: • ,1; • o
(U <u
3 '^
"1> 3
X5 -3
O. Aptel, H. Powjalali / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 65-90 79
certification). Similar to their U.S. counterparts, the management of French hospitals must
accept the idea of stockless programs to be able to implement JIT programs. The
implementation of JIT programs implies reshaping of procedures and a reorganization of
the logistic process.
Also, Table 4 indicates that those hospitals that intend to develop partnerships in
"Purchasing" also intend to develop partnerships in other areas, such as "Medical depart-
ments" and "Medical staff." Similar to the U.S. sample, French hospitals found that
partnerships will improve their activities and will reduce costs. As a result, they are planning
to improve partnerships with both suppliers and other hospitals. EDI is not well developed in
France, and most respondents did not find it necessary to develop EDI for their hospital
functions. There is one unexpected observation in Table 4. While significant, the coefficient of
correlation of "Medical staff" and "Supplier certification" is negative, as if those who find
partnerships in Medical staff important do not find Supplier certification important or
managers do not value supplier certification as much when they have developed medical
staff collaboration. It is possible that that the lack of prior partnership experience has
contributed to the answers provided by the managers or that management perception is that
the supplier certification would be developed internally by the collaborative bodies (e.g., word
of mouth) and no need will exist for external evaluators for suppliers. ' ^ Table 5 provides a
summary of survey results for the U.S. and France.
4.3. Comparative analysis
4.3.1. The logistic function
As mentioned previously, the logistic departments are present in most of the U.S. sample
through the "material management" fiinction. As we expected, logisdcs departments are less
present in France, and its related functions are performed mostly through "services
economiques" departments. Table 6 provides the comparative information.
The responsibilities of logistics departments are also different between the two countries.
While receiving is considered the most important function of logistics in the U.S., food
service is considered the most important fianction in France.'^ It should be noted that the U.S.
logistics departments are more concerned with activities linked to physical flow (receiving,
distribution, purchasing, and inventory management), while French logistics departments are
mainly responsible for food services and laundry. In both countries, the telemedicine function
was considered the least important responsibility of the logistics department. Table 7 reflects
this issue.
Another important difference between the two countries is related to how supplies
inventory is purchased and distributed. On average, hospitals in California have imple-
mented more developed inventory systems and hence reduced their inventory level more
As one of the reviewers commented, another possibihty for the differences in results for partnership
observed in France and the U.S. is related to accepted methods of medical practices. While in general, doctors in
the U.S. can choose different healthcare organizations to practice, in France, most doctors work within only one
healthcare organization. So, the need for partnership is perceived differently between the two countries.
'^ This may have resulted from cultural differences between the two countries.
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Table 6
A comparison of questions regarding the existence of logistic function
There is a logistics department There is no logistics department
U.S. (%) 98.6
France (%) 31.4
1.4
68.6
than their French counterparts. In response to ''how to improve your distribution system,"
respondents to our questionnaire provided the answers in Table 8. The French respondents
have reahzed the problem of additional medical supplies and want to reduce the level more
often than do the U.S. respondents. This behavior is expected, as the U.S. respondents
have already reduced their level of supplies inventory to some extent. On average, the
amount of medical inventory per bed kept for U.S. hospitals is about US$4000 (24,000
Francs), whereas this amount is US$5720 (33,000 Francs) in France. These findings are
what we expected when we were comparing the French healthcare environment with that
of the U.S.
French respondents, however, continue to believe that a reduction in the number of
suppliers is irrelevant to inventory cost savings (in contrast to U.S. respondents). While the
respondents in both countries want to improve relationships and partnerships with suppliers,
this need is more recognized by the French hospitals. Another noteworthy comparison is
related to current (the last 3 years) developments in medical supplies management. As Table 9
shows, both the amount of supplies and the number of suppliers have been reduced more
often in the U.S. than in France. As noted in Table 8, even though French hospitals realize the
importance of reducing stock and the number of suppliers (in some cases), they are at the
beginning of a proactive logistic process.
4.3.2. Strategic alliances
Our survey shows that French respondents realize the need to improve their logistic
activity through strategic alliances with their suppliers or other hospitals. French hospitals
Table 7
A comparison of responsibilities given to logistic services in the U.S. and France
Responsibility U.S. France
+ (High) Receiving Food services
Internal distribution to medical departments Laundry
Purchasing Physical supplying
Inventory management Receiving
Physical supplying Inventory management
Laundry Purchasing
Management Information system Internal distribution to medical departments
Transportation Transportation
Maintenance/environmental services Maintenance/environmental services
Home care services Management Information systems
Food services Home care services
(Low) Telemedicine Telemedicine
I
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Table 8
A comparison of perceived ways to improve medical supplies distribution system
U.S. France U.S. -France
Stocks must be reduced (%) 47 61 - 14
The number of suppliers must be reduced (%) 63 48 +15
Relationships with suppliers should be improved (%) 57 80 — 23
New partnerships should be created with suppliers (%) 49 68 - 19
plan to collaborate with others on purchasing, medical staff and department, supplier
certification, and (to a lower degree) EDI. French hospitals have recognized the importance
of logistic improvements.
On the other hand, American hospitals (more developed in their logistics) seem to want to
reinforce and extend their partnerships in EDI, purchasing, supplier certification, medical
departments, JIT programs, medical staff, and stockless programs. The following paragraphs
provide a more complete comparison with regard to strategic alliances (partnerships) and the
maturity of the logistics departments.
4.4. Aggregated comparison using indices
To make the above comparison more manageable using the available data, we developed
three aggregate data items. We labeled these "Maturity of Logistics," "Current Partnership
Index," and "Anticipated Partnership Index." We chose the first two data items to measure
the current state and possible reasons for the current state (i.e., degree of partnership) of
logistics for each respondent."^ The last index provides information on expected future
partnerships between the hospital and other parties (e.g., suppliers).
The "Maturity of Logistics" was defined as the total value for the following elements:
Extent of logistic department responsibility. Answers to Question 2 on the questionnaire
(that is related to the logistic department responsibility) are aggregated and averaged."^
The perception of logistics managers on how to improve distribution systems. Answers to
Question 4 on the questionnaire are aggregated and averaged.
The extent of logistics department improvement during the last 3 years by reduction of
medical supplies and number of suppliers. Answers to Questions 7 and 8 are aggregated
and averaged.
For example, a respondent, who averaged 2.5 in answers to the 12 parts of Question 2, 4 in
answers to the four parts of Question 4, and 2 for Questions 7 and 8, is assigned a "Maturity
of Logistics" of 8.5.
Our method of creating these measures is not free of criticism. First, we are converting the Likert system
into a continuous measurement system. Second, we are giving the same weight for answers to each question. Both
of these aspects are subject to criticism.
^' A copy of the questionnaire is provided in Appendix A of this paper.
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Table 9
A comparison of trend in amount of supplies/number of suppliers during the last 3 years
U.S. France U.S. -France
Stocks have been reduced (%) 83 46 +37
The number of suppliers has been reduced (%) 68 18 +50
The "Partnership Index" was defined as the total value for the following elements:
Medical Collaboration. An aggregate measure of collaboration in medical departments,
medical staff, and telemedicine (the first three parts of Question 12).
Collaboration on Infrastructures. An aggregate measure of collaboration in laundry
sharing, food services, and warehouse sharing (the last three parts of Question 12).
Logistic Collaboration. An aggregate measure of collaboration in purchasing (part four
of Question 12), JIT programs, stockless programs, EDI, and supplier certification
(Question 13).
The "Anticipated Partnership Index" was defined in a way very similar to the "Partnership
Index." For this index, however, answers to Question 16 (which are related to the hospital
plans for the next 3 years) were used to derive the related values.
Table 10 provides the averages for the above measures for respondents of both the U.S.
and French respondents. The U.S. is more mature in logistics and partnership functions.
On the other hand, French respondents expect to have a higher degree of partnership in
the future.
The most obvious difference between the U.S. and French numbers is related to the
extent of logistic department responsibility, 3.34 for the U.S. respondents and 1.43 for the
French respondents. This suggests that logistics departments and functions are more
centralized in the U.S. Stated differently, the functions are more fragmented in France,
and logistics departments barely appear in the organization chart as a separate entity.
Another interesting finding in Table 10 is related to values drawn for Question 4 of the
questionnaire (logistics managers' perception of how to improve the distribution system).
French respondents are more concerned with improving their distribution system than
their U.S. counterparts, possibly because they realize that their levels of inventory should
be lower.
Another difference between the U.S. and French respondents is that of collaboration in
infrastructures (at both partnership index and anticipated partnership index), which appears
more developed in France than in the U.S. One possible explanation could be that the French
hospital system is more able to obtain resources necessary for infrastructure investments than
the U.S. hospital system. Most of these resources are provided by public fiinds in France,
whereas most of these resources are provided by private funds in the U.S.
Since the information provided in Table 10 is an aggregate measure for all of the
respondents, we decided to plot the observed values of "Maturity of Logistics" and current
"Partnership Index." Fig. 2 provides these results. There is a definite positive relationship
between the current level of the partnership index and the maturity of the logistics
1.43 3.34
2.44 2.26
2.06 2.67
5.93 8.27
1.56 1.72
1.55 1.26
2.14 2.43
5.25 5.40
2.21 1.45
1.53 1.39
2.21 1.98
5.95 4.82
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Table 10
Comparison of the aggregate values for "Maturity of Logistics," current "Partnership Index," and "Anticipated
Partnership Index" for U.S. and French respondents
France U.S.
Extent of logistics department responsibility
Logistics managers' perception of on how to improve distribution system
The extent of logistics department improvement
Maturity- of Logistics
Medical Collaboration
Collaboration on Infrastructures
Logistic Collaboration
Partnership Index
Medical Collaboration
Collaboration on Infrastructures
Logistic Collaboration
Anticipated Partnership Index
Extent of logistic department responsibility. Answers to Question 2 on the questionnaire (that is related to the
logistic department responsibility) are aggregated and averaged.
The perception of logistics managers on how to improve distribution systems. Answers to Question 4 on the
questionnaire are aggregated and averaged.
The extent of logistics department improvement during the last 3 years by reduction of medical supplies and
number of suppliers. Answers to Questions 7 and 8 are aggregated and averaged.
Medical Collaboration for Partnership Index. An aggregate measure of collaboration in medical departments,
medical staff, and telemedicine (the first three parts of Question 12).
Collaboration on Infrastructures for Partnership Index. An aggregate measure of collaboration in laundry sharing,
food services, and warehouse sharing (the last three parts of Question 12).
Logistic Collaboration for Partnership Index. An aggregate measure of collaboration in purchasing (part four of
Question 12), JIT programs, stockless programs, EDI, and supplier certification (Question 13).
Medical Collaboration for Anticipated Partnership Index. An aggregate measure of collaboration in medical
departments, medical staff, and telemedicine (Question 16).
Collaboration on Infrastnictures for Anticipated Partnership Index. An aggregate measure of collaboration in
laundry sharing, food services, and warehouse sharing (Question 16).
Logistic Collaboration for Anticipated Partnership Index. An aggregate measure of collaboration in purchasing,
JIT programs, stockless programs, EDI, and supplier certification (Question 16).
department."^ Fig. 2 suggests that only with high levels of mature logistics departments it is
possible to develop high levels of partnerships. This suggests that French hospitals need to
reevaluate their logistic functions before expanding their partnership programs.
5. Summan' and conclusion
Because of the critical role played by the healthcare industry, this industry and its related
costs continue to be the center of attention in most industrialized countries. As a result, cost
Correlation analysis also indicated a significant positive relationship between the "Maturity of Logistics"
and "Partnership Index" at .001 level.
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Maturity of Logistics and Current
Partnership Index
15
• France
n United States
5 10
Maturity of Logistics
15
Fig. 2. Plot of Maturity of Logistics and (current) Partnership Index. See notes in Table 10 for definition of
Maturity of Logistics and Partnership Index.
control in healthcare has been the subject of many studies, and different methods have been
suggested in the literature for reducing the cost of healthcare. We have suggested that the cost
could be reduced when activities are closely evaluated and nonvalue-added activities are
eliminated or minimized. One of these nonvalue-added activities is related to the cost of
carrying inventory, which can be reduced by using the JIT inventory system. Our survey of
201 hospitals in the U.S. and France provides evidence that hospital managers also believe
that improvement in the activities of logistics departments (including supplies management)
could result in better service and cost reduction.
We found important differences in logistic operations between the U.S. and French
samples. For example, there are substantial differences in the degree of collaboration
between the hospitals and other organizations (such as other hospitals and suppliers). These
collaborations are more in place and viewed more favorably in the U.S. than in France.
The results also suggest that hospitals located in the U.S. (California) are more developed
in logistics and in the level of partnerships with suppliers. The U.S. hospitals intend to
continue their efforts in cost reduction by improving their current and ftiture partnerships
and by further inventory reduction. French participants mention the same desires and
needs; meanwhile, they show a higher motivation in inventory reduction than their U.S.
counterparts. This need has also been strongly acknowledged by French hospitals
administrative management.
The survey results confirm the idea that logistics is considered a significant factor for the
development of interorganizational collaboration. The logistics department is strengthened by
improving or implementing "partnership in medical departments" and "JIT programs," as
well as partnership with suppliers and other hospitals. Indeed, the use of collaboration
between healthcare providers seems to be one of the most important ways for saving scarce
resources. Management of logistics in the U.S. could be considered centralized, since the
logistics function is formally written into the organizational chart of hospitals through
"materials management." In France, the logistics functions are movQ fragmented, since they
seldom exist as an integrated fiinction and the logistics functions differ from one hospital to
another. French hospitals may need to consider redesigning the fijnctions of their logistics
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departments if they intend to improve their services and consequently reduce medical
supplies inventory costs.
As a result of this study, we suggest that the healthcare industry examine several of the
newer management methods. For those hospitals that intend to improve their operations, we
also support the use of benchmarking. Benchmarking could be used to facilitate evaluation of
activities and their necessity to the organization. For example, if the level of inventory in a
similar size (and operation) hospital is less than the one under study, then there is enough
evidence to reevaluate the current inventory management programs and if possible reduce the
level of inventory. The healthcare industry needs to continue to incorporate these new
developments into its operations so it can continue to compete in a market that is more
competitive than ever.
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Appendix A. Questionnaire
A.l. Questionnaire for hospital's purchasing managers and materials managers
Please complete this questionnaire as it relates to your hospital.
1. Does your hospital have a materials management department or a logistics department?
O Yes O No (go to Question 3)
2. Approximately, whaX portion ofthe responsibility for each of the following is handled by
this department!
0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99% 100% do not know
Purchasing O O O O O O O
Physical supplying O O O O O O O
Receiving O O O O O O O
Inventory management O O O O O O O
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do not
0% 1-25% 26--50% 51-75% 76-99% 100% know
Internal distribution to O o o O o o o
medical departments
Management information o o o O o o o
systems
Telemedicine o o o o o o o
Food services o o o o o o o
Linen services o o o o o o o
Transportation o o o o o o o
Home care services o o o o o o o
Maintenance/environmental o o o o o o o
services
3. In percentage terms, indicate the maimer that medical supplies are distributed to the
medical departments of your hospital:
Do not
0% 1--25% 26--50% 51--75% 76--99% 100% know
o o O O O o OSupplies are directly delivered
to our medical departments by
vendors as needed
Supplies are inventoried first O O O O O O O
in our medical department
storages then used as needed
Supplies are inventoried first O O O O O O O
in our central warehouse,
then delivered by our
distribution center directly to
medical departments
Supplies are inventoried first O O O O O O O
in our central warehouse,
then delivered by our
distribution center to medical
department storages and
finally used as needed
4. In my opinion, to improve our distribution system:
Neither
Strongly agree nor Strongly Do not
disagree Disagree disagree Agree agree know
We need to decrease inventories O O O O O O
We need to reduce the number O O O O O O
of our suppliers
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Neither
Strongly agree nor Strongly Do not
disagree Disagree disagree Agree agree know
We need to improve O O O O O O
relationships
with our suppliers
We need to create new O O O O O O
partnerships with
other hospitals
5. Please estimate the total dollar value of the inventory kept in your hospital:
US$
6. In percentage terms, how is that amount allocated among the following categories?
% in a central warehouse
% in a distribution center
% in medical departments
% in other locations (please explain: )
100%
7. Compared to 3 years ago, the inventory kept in our hospital has:
O greatly O stayed about O greatly
decreased O decreased the same O increased increased O do not know
8. Compared to 3 years ago, the number of our vendors has:
O greatly O stayed about O greatly
decreased O decreased the same O increased increased O do not know
9. Does your hospital use telemedicinel
O Yes O No (go to Question 12)
10. Has your department been integrated in telemedicine programs?
O Yes O No (go to Question 12)
11. In percentage terms, indicate the degree of integration between your department and
telemedicine:
do not
0% 1-25% 26-50% 51-75% 76-99% 100% know
o o O o O o O
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12. In percentage terms, please indicate the degree oi strategic alliances between your
hospital and other hospitals in the following:
do not
0% 1-25% 26--50% 51--75% 76--99% 100% know
Medical departments o o O O O o O
Medical staff o o o O O o o
Telemedicine o o o O O o o
Purchasing o o o O O o o
Laundry sharing o o o O O o o
Food services sharing o o o O O o o
Warehouse sharing o o o o o o o
13. In percentage terms, please indicate the degree ofpartnerships between jowr hospital
and your vendors in the following:
do not
0% 1-25% 26--50% 51--75% 76--99% 100% know
JIT programs o o O O O o O
Stockless programs o o o O O o o
EDI o o o O O o o
Supplier certification o o o o o o o
14. Compared to i years ago, would you say that your hospital saved money because of its
partnerships with your vendors'?
O Yes O No (go to Question 16)
15. During the last year, these ,
how likely
savings
is your
were approximately:
hospital to implement
US$
16. In your opinion, during the next 3
_
years each
of the following partnership projects?
Neither
Very likely nor Very Do not
unlikely Unlikely unlikely Likely Likely know
Medical departments O O O O O O
Medical staff o o o o o o
Telemedicine o o o o o o
Purchasing o o o o o o
Laundry sharing o o o o o o
Food services sharing o o o o o o
Warehouse sharing o o o o o o
JIT programs o o o o o o
Stockless programs o o o o o o
EDI o o o o o o
Supplier certification o o o o o o
O. Aptel. H. Pourjalali / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 65-90 89
17. In percentage terms, what part of the following your hospital activities are outsourcedl
A few questions about your hospital:
do not
0% 1- 25% 26--50% 51--75% 76--99% 100% know
Linen O o o O O o o
Food o o o O O o o
Warehousing o o o O O o o
Transportation o o o o O o o
Information system o o o o O o o
18. Number oi beds:
19. Sales amount (last year): us$_
20. Which of the following describes your position most accurately? (Check one
category only)
O Materials Manager O Logistics Manager
O Purchasing Manager O Other:
Please place the questionnaire in the enclosed envelope and return it by March 6, 1998.
Thank you very much for your cooperation.
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Abstract
The purpose of this study is to examine whether differences in the corporate environments of
Japanese and U.S. companies are associated with differences in the extent to which Japanese and U.S.
managers engage in corporate myopic behavior. This paper empirically examines the management
myopia issue by comparing the level of income smoothing that occurs between U.S. and Japanese
companies. A system of simultaneous equations is employed to measure the extent that management
uses discretionary accruals and research and development (R&D) investments to smooth income. Our
results suggest that while both Japanese and U.S. managers engage in some amount of myopic
behavior (i.e., smooth income), Japanese managers do so at a significantly higher level. © 2001
University of Illinois. All rights reserved. Published by Elsevier Science Ltd.
Key^vords: Management myopia; Income smoothing; International accounting; Discretionary accruals; Eamings
management; Cross-cultural
1. Introduction
During the 1970s and 1980s, many U.S. manufacturing companies received a 'wake-up'
call from Japanese competitors who were suddenly producing higher quality products at a
lower cost. This prompted many researchers to examine how the Japanese achieved such
success at the expense of their U.S. competitors. One line of research examines the
underlying corporate environment in which these companies operate. An effective corporate
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environment should promote management behavior that improves the value of the firm. The
existent literature provides differing views as to which country's corporate environment
(Japan or U.S.) better promotes value-maximizing behavior by management. The literature
supporting the Japanese corporate environment suggests that the stable shareholders found
in Japan are not overly concerned with short-term results and allow management to
concentrate on the long-term value of the firm (Darrough, Pourjalali, & Saudagaran,
1998; Jacobson & Aaker, 1993). The same research typically suggests that an active U.S.
stock market is overly concerned with short-term results, and influences U.S. managers to
engage in myopic behavior.
An alternative view, which has recently received attention in the financial literature,
implies that the U.S. corporate environment better promotes value-maximizing behavior by
management. This view suggests that the Japanese environment promotes management
behavior that is most beneficial to the numerous stakeholders of the firm, even though such
behavior may be detrimental to the value of the firm (Kester, 1991). Additionally, the U.S.
stock market is viewed as nonmyopic, which implies that it is a positive influence on value-
enhancing behavior of U.S. managers (Abarbanell & Bernard, 1995). Given the opposing
viewpoints and extant research, the question as to which corporate environment better
promotes management behavior that maximizes firm value remains unanswered. In this study,
we add to the evidence as to which corporate environment (U.S. or Japan) contributes to
management behavior consistent with shareholder wealth maximization. The specific type of
behavior examined is income "smoothing" or "earnings management."
We contend that the act of manipulating long-term investment projects [e.g., research and
development (R&D)], and to a lesser extent accounting accruals, to achieve targeted current
period earnings reflects myopic management behavior. Specifically, this study examines for
differences in the level of income smoothing that occurs between a sample of manufacturing
companies incorporated in Japan and the U.S. We examine two vehicles used to smooth
income: discretionary accruals and R&D investments. These two vehicles coincide with the
two levels of earnings management discussed by Schipper (1989). The first level is the act
of choosing appropriate accounting methods to reach desired levels of earnings, and the
second level involves changing the timing and/or magnitude of strategic decisions to reach
desired earnings. Discretionary accruals relate to the less costly level of earnings manage-
ment (Level 1), and R&D expenditures relate to the more costly level of earnings
management (Level 2).
We measure income smoothing by examining for an association between the change in
discretionary accruals and the change in R&D investments with the change in prediscre-
tionary accrual and R&D earnings (i.e., core earnings). We select Japanese companies that are
listed on the U.S. stock exchanges for our study to ensure both data availability and
consistency in accounting rules. These companies are matched with U.S. incorporated
companies based on size and industry. Both simultaneous equations and seemingly unrelated
regression (SUR) methodologies are employed to examine for differences in the degree to
which U.S. and Japanese companies smooth income. The results suggest that while both
Japanese and U.S. managers smooth income, Japanese managers do so at a significantly
higher level. Additionally, R&D manipulation is the more influential vehicle used to smooth
income. These results are consistent with the view that the Japanese corporate environment.
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as opposed to the U.S. corporate environment, promotes a greater level of myopic manage-
ment behavior. Some possible explanations for these results are provided.
In Japan, the market crash of 1990 (i.e., the 'bubble burst') had a profound impact on the
business community that resulted in many Japanese companies making significant changes
on a variety of fronts. For example, several keiretsu member companies have reduced their
amount of cross-shareholdings; stock option plans have recently been legalized and
implemented in executive compensation plans; the likelihood of lifetime employment has
decreased; and hostile takeover threats have begun to surface (Amaha, 1999; Business
Week, 1999; Levinson, 1992; Moffet, 1999; Shibata, 1992, 1998; Weinberg, 1997). The
bursting of the Japanese bubble, along with the recent changes to the Japanese business
environment, suggests that the preexisting environment was less than optimal. This paper
focuses on the Japanese business environment prior to the bubble burst, and the results are
consistent with the Japanese environment being less effective than the U.S. environment in
promoting long-term focused management behavior. Measuring the effectiveness of the
recent changes in the Japanese business environment is beyond the scope of this study, and
the potential effects of the bubble burst on our results are addressed in a sensitivity test
described later in the paper.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a brief discussion on some features
of the corporate environments that exist in Japan and the U.S. Section 3 provides a discussion
of incentives and methods commonly associated with income smoothing. We develop our
hypotheses and discuss our sample in Sections 4 and 5, respectively. In Section 6, we provide
a discussion relating to the empirical model employed to test our hypotheses. The results are
presented in Section 7. Section 8 discusses an additional analysis, while Section 9 concludes
our paper.
2. The corporate environments of U.S. and Japan
We expect differences in management behavior to result from differences in the corporate
environments that exist in the two countries. Differences in these environments are discussed
in this section of the paper.
2.1. U.S.
The large volume of trading on the U.S. stock market is an indication of the level of detail
in which investors track companies. For example, 3Com lost US$7 billion in market value in
a matter of weeks after it became known that the firm's earnings would not meet analysts'
expectations (Fox, 1997). Additionally, IBM's stock price declined approximately 10% when
it was announced that they would not meet their eamings forecast (Jacobson & Aaker, 1993).
These examples illustrate the importance placed on accounting information by investors
when monitoring the behavior of management. Empirically, a large amount of financial
research confirms a statistically significant association between unexpected eamings and
residual stock returns (see, for example. Ball & Brown, 1968; Beaver, Clarke, & Wright,
1979; Brown & Kennelly, 1972; Patell, 1976). In summary, an active U.S. stock market
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places heavy emphasis on accounting data when monitoring and evaluating companies, and
in turn, rational managers are expected to consider the market's desires when disclosing
financial information.
The influence that the stock market has on management's horizon when making invest-
ment decisions is dependent on their perceived focus of the stock market. One viewpoint
suggests that managers perceive the stock market as having a short-term focus and thus are
influenced to engage in myopic behavior (i.e., to be overly concerned with short-term
financial results; Dertouzos, Lester, & Solow, 1988; Jacobs, 1991; Morita, Reingold, &
Shimonura, 1986). Regarding income smoothing, rational managers are expected to appease a
myopic stock market by disclosing consistently increasing earnings from period to period. A
sharp increase in earnings is undesirable to management because the expected benefits from
the current increase do not outweigh the potential costs of experiencing a sharp decrease in
future periods. Additionally, a myopic stock market is not expected to penalize the
manipulation of long-term investments, which provides management more opportunities to
smooth income. Thus, an active, myopic stock market provides management both the
opportunity and incentive to smooth income.
An alternative viewpoint suggests that the U.S. stock market has a long-term focus and
thus influences management to maintain a long-term horizon when making investment
decisions (i.e., to maximize the value of the finn). Abarbanell and Bernard (1995) provide
empirical evidence that the U.S. stock market is not myopic, in the sense that it places
weight on expected long-run earnings. Additional empirical research provides evidence that
market prices reflect long-run earning prospects at least partially (Kothari & Sloan, 1992;
Loudder & Behn, 1995; Shevlin, 1991). These results suggest that if U.S. managers
perceive the stock market as having a long-term focus, they would engage in behavior
reflecting a long-tenn horizon. With respect to income smoothing, we expect management
to have less incentive to smooth income because a nonmyopic stock market is less
sensitive to sharp increases or decreases in current period income. Additionally, a
nonmyopic stock market would penalize the manipulation of long-term investments (e.g.,
R&D), which discourages management from smoothing income via these vehicles. There-
fore, a nonmyopic stock market both limits the opportunities and lessens the incentives to
smooth income.
U.S. managers face additional market pressures other than an active stock market. Fama
(1980) describes several market forces that influence management behavior. Two of these
forces are (1) the outside managerial labor market and (2) the market for takeovers. An
active managerial labor market uses the success of the firm as a criterion to assess the
productivity of its management, and also creates an imminent threat of replacement on
management. Thus, management behavior is influenced by a fear of replacement along with
an incentive to improve their own value status in the managerial labor market. The threat of
an outside takeover provides discipline of a last resort. A takeover usually involves a
thorough evaluation, and often replacement, of the existing management team. The U.S.
exhibits both active managerial labor and takeover markets.' These two market forces,
Takeovers of all kinds rose from US$ 1 2 billion in 1 975 to around US$ 1 00 billion in 1 99 1 (Charkham, 1 994).
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along with an active stock market, are believed to significantly influence the behavior of
U.S. managers.
Managers improve their position in all three of the aforementioned markets by engaging in
actions that increase the market value of the company. Consistent with Fama (1980),
management of highly valued firms is positively assessed in the labor market and is less
subject to takeover evaluations. The expected behavior of management is dependent on the
assumption regarding the perceived focus of the active markets discussed (stock, labor, and
takeover). Long-term focused markets promote long-term management behavior, and like-
wise, short-term focused markets promote short-term management behavior. Therefore, the
expected level of income smoothing performed by U.S. managers is dependent on the
perceived focus of the markets.
2.2. Japan'
The keiretsu system in Japan results in a corporate environment quite different from the
one found in the U.S. The keiretsu are six groups that are comprised of most of the largest
corporations in Japan that share common trademarks and are often linked by cross-holdings.^
The keiretsu commonly include a main bank, which acts as the primary lender to the group as
well as being an important stockholder with representation on the member firms' boards of
directors."^ The primary motive for these stockholdings is to solidify a long-term relationship
between the main bank and the fellow keiretsu companies.
The motive for cross-holdings among keiretsu members is to solidify relationships, which
results in 'stable' shareholdings.^ This environment is described by Masaaki Kurokawa of
Nomura Research Institute, as follows:
Stable stockholders seek mainly to increase their business transactions and enhance their
standings with their invested company. They have little interest in selling the stock for profit
. . . Japan's 'interlocked' stock system also dissuades takeover bids, as it forces the potential
acquirer to negotiate with the 'stable stockholders.' If the shareholders choose to sell, it would
mean a renouncement of their agreement, and the termination of their business relationship,
(as quoted in Charkham, 1994)
The typical large Japanese firm has many stable shareholders, each owning a significant
amount of common stock in an effort to solidify relations. No clear distinctions separating
" In this section, we attempt to describe the Japanese corporate environment that was in place for the majority
of our study's time frame (1975-1994).
^ The kind of keiretsu referred to in this paper is the horizontal keiretsu. There are various ways to classify
keiretsu, but the two most common are the vertical and horizontal. The vertical keiretsu involves supplier,
assembly, and distribution firms. See Miyashita and Russel (1994) for a detailed discussion on the various keiretsu
classifications.
In 1987, Japanese banks and insurance companies owned 42.2% of the shares listed on the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (Kang & Shivdasani, 1995).
^ Miyashita and Russel (1994) state that only a little more than one-fourth of the outstanding shares of
Japanese stock is available for trading after accounting for the direct cross-shareholdings by the keiretsu and
institutional shareholdings.
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these stable shareholders from one another exist. Rather, it is a coalition of stable shareholders
— suppliers, lenders, corporate customers — holding a complex blend of claims against the
company (Kester, 1991). For example, the crucial role of the main bank typically involves
holding both debt and equity claims in the company. In addition to these stable shareholders,
another significant stakeholder group in Japanese companies is its employees. The general
rule of lifetime employment results in employees having a significant stake in their companies
of employment (Charkham, 1994). Management is left with the complex task of satisfying
this coalition. Kester (1991) claims that the one objective that most stakeholders can agree on
as having a potential benefit is corporate growth, and thus, growth is considered to be the
common denominator among the stakeholder groups. Creditors and employees are two
influential stakeholder groups that have a particularly strong interest in growth and stability.
The role of the stable shareholder coalition, often with the main bank as leader, very much
depends on the strength of a particular customer (Charkham, 1994). In times of financial
distress, the stable shareholder coalition may replace poorly performing managers (Kang &
Shivdasani, 1995; Kaplan & Minton, 1994). Thus, to avoid unwanted interference from the
coalition of stable shareholders, rational managers are expected to engage in behavior that
improves the perceived growth of the firm, which may involve disclosing consistent earnings
growth through the years (i.e., income smoothing).
An alternative view suggests that due to the limited amount of information asymmetry
between Japanese stakeholders and management, management is able to focus on firm value-
enhancing projects and not be overly concerned with short-term financial results (Darrough et
al., 1998; Jacobson & Aaker, 1993; Stein, 1989). In comparison, the information asymmetry
between shareholders and management in the U.S. causes shareholders to rely heavily on
short-term financial results as signals of performance and, in turn, influences managers to act
with a short-term focus. This viewpoint is well documented throughout the popular press and
suggests that Japanese managers face less pressure, as compared to their U.S. counterparts, to
smooth income.
In summary, the minimal stock market influence in Japan leads to an environment that
creates a managerial perspective with a main-bank focus, which is quite different than the one
created by the U.S. environment. Because of these differing perspectives, we expect
management behavior to differ between the countries.
3. Income smoothing
In general, stable earnings improve the confidence of stockholders and creditors toward
the value of the firm and its management (Lambert, 1984; Ronen & Sadan, 1981; Trueman
& Titman, 1988). The positive benefits associated with this improved confidence (e.g., job
security, increased salary, and lower costs of capital) create an inherent incentive for
managers to disclose stable earnings (i.e., smooth income). Smoothing income becomes a
concern for investors when management manipulates current earnings at the detriment of
the long-tenn value of the firm. The degree of income smoothing perfonned by manage-
ment is influenced by their surrounding corporate environment. This study examines the
effectiveness of two corporate environments (Japan and U.S.) in positioning management to
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better resist the inherent incentive to smooth income at the detriment of the long-term value
of the firm.
Income smoothing is a specific type of earnings management. Schipper (1989) discusses
two levels of earnings management. On the less costly level, management chooses appro-
priate accounting methods to reach a desired level of eamings. That is, they subjectively
choose accounting accrual estimates to achieve a targeted eamings amount for the period and
do not adjust the timing or make up of the strategic decisions of the company. *" The more
costly level of eamings management occurs when management changes the timing and/or
magnitude of strategic decisions. Some examples of the more costly level of eamings
management include manipulating the timing or make up of capital expenditures, R&D
expenditures, and advertising expenditures. We call the two levels of eamings management
discussed by Schipper (1989) as Levels 1 and 2 methods, respectively. This study focuses on
discretionary accmals and R&D expenditures, respectively, to examine each of the two levels
of eamings management. These two methods were chosen for examination because of data
availability and the rich prior literatures on the use of discretionary accmals and R&D for
eamings management.
Management must assess the benefits and costs associated with managing eamings when
making income-smoothing decisions. We contend that the act of manipulating long-term
investment projects (e.g., R&D), and to a lesser extent accounting accmals, to achieve
targeted current period eamings reflects myopic management behavior. The costs associated
with Level 1 methods were recently discussed by Arthur Levitt, Chairman of Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC), who suggested that managing eamings via accounting
methods is eroding the quality of financial reporting, and that corporate managers should
remember that "the integrity of the numbers in the financial reporting system is directly
related to the long-term interest of a corporation" (Levitt, 1998). Additionally, prior literature
suggests that Level 1 methods require at least a limited amount of additional accounting
resources (Fudenberg & Tirole, 1995).^ Level 2 eamings management methods potentially
reduce shareholders' wealth because the act of manipulating the magnitude and/or timing of
strategic investments of the company may have a long-term negative impact on the value of
the firm.
Although Level 2 methods are potentially more costly than Level 1 methods, they are
arguably more effective in managing eamings. By definition, accounting accmals must
^ Management is required to make numerous discretionary accrual type decisions. The Financial Accounting
Standards Board discusses this topic in the Statements of Financial Accounting Topics as follows: "Those who
are unfamiliar with the nature of accounting are often surprised at the large number of choices that accountants
are required to make. Yet choices arise at every turn. Decisions must first be made about the nature and
definition of assets and liabilities, revenues and expenses, and the criteria by which they are to be recognized.
Then a choice must be made of the attribute of assets to be measured — historical cost, current cost, current exit
value, net realizable value, or present value of expected cash flows. If costs have to be allocated, either among
time periods or among service beneficiaries, methods of allocation must be chosen" (Financial Accounting
Standards Board, 1980).
^ Fudenberg and Tirole (1995) state that "such costs of eamings management include poor timing of sales,
overtime incurred to accelerate shipments, disruption of the suppliers' and customers' delivery schedules, time
spent to leam the accounting system and tinker with it, or simple distaste for lying."
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reverse in some future period, which restricts management's abihty to continuously use
accruals to manage earnings in the same direction. For example, if a company experiences
successive periods of low premanaged earnings, management would be limited as to the
amount of income increasing accruals available throughout the succeeding periods. Addi-
tionally, generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) limit the amount and types of
accounting accruals available for management's discretion. Strategic investments, on the
other hand, are nonreversing and are not limited in amount by any external rules. For
example, management may choose to reduce or increase R&D investments by any achievable
amount for a given period. In summary, when deciding upon income-smoothing techniques,
management must assess the costs, benefits, and opportunities associated with the different
methods of earnings management.
Intuitively, when smoothing income, management would first exhaust the Level 1 methods
of earnings management (e.g., discretionary accruals) before resorting to the Level 2 methods
(e.g., R&D investments). However, when the Level 1 methods are not available to manage-
ment, perhaps because of timing of accruals or GAAP restrictions, they must resort to the
Level 2 methods in order to achieve desired earnings. Also, the relative impact of the Level 1
methods (e.g., discretionary accruals) is expected to be significantly less than the Level 2
methods in managing earnings. Management may determine that the insignificance of the
Level 1 methods renders them inadequate in achieving targeted earnings, and thus employ the
Level 2 methods. In summary, we do not have a theory as to which level of methods will be
used the most by management when smoothing income.
4. Hypotheses
The expectation of which country's management, Japan or U.S., engages in a greater level
of income smoothing is dependent upon which previously discussed viewpoints are
assumed. U.S. managers are expected to engage in short-term (long-term) behavior if they
perceive the markets (stock, labor, and takeover) to have a short-term (long-term) focus. The
expected focus of Japanese management behavior depends on whether the Japanese
corporate environment promotes firm growth and stability or if it prioritizes value-enhancing
activities. Japanese management desiring to signal growth and stability to the coalition of
stakeholders is expected to engage in income-smoothing activities, whereas Japanese
management attempdng to maximize firm value is expected to be less concerned with
smoothing income.
We have no expectation as to which country engages in a higher level of income
smoothing. Thus, the following hypotheses (stated in alternative form) are two-sided and
correspond to the two levels of earnings management previously discussed:
Hypothesis J: The degree of income smoothing through the use of discretionary
accruals differs between U.S. and Japanese companies.
Hypothesis 2: The degree of income smoothing through the timing and amount ofR&D
investments differs between U.S. and Japanese companies.
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5. Sample
Our measurements of management behavior for U.S. and Japanese companies require
reliance on financial statement data presented in annual reports. In order to perform a
meaningful comparison between Japanese and U.S. companies, the data used should be
derived from comparable sets of accounting rules. All companies hsted on U.S. stock
exchanges are required by the SEC to either comply with U.S. GAAP or reconcile to U.S.
GAAP.^ Most Japanese companies listed on U.S. exchanges use U.S. GAAP for their
primary consolidated financial statements because at the time they originally listed in the
U.S., Japan did not require consolidated financial statements (Amir, Harris, & Venuti,
1993). Once Japan adopted fiill consolidation, these companies were allowed to retain U.S.
GAAP for Japanese reporting purposes. Godwin, Goldberg, and Douthett (1998) provide
evidence that U.S. GAAP financial statements of Japanese firms are value relevant beyond
that contained in their domestic GAAP statements (i.e., unconsolidated domestic GAAP
statements). Regarding our study, the initial sample of Japanese companies follow U.S.
GAAP for their primary consolidated financial statements, and based on the aforemen-
tioned literature, these statements are value relevant. We assume that the Japanese
managers for our sampled companies recognize the emphasis placed on the U.S. GAAP
financial statements, and act accordingly. Therefore, it appears reasonable to compare the
behavior between Japanese and U.S. managers by examining the primary consolidated
financial disclosures (i.e., U.S. GAAP financial statements) from each country's manage-
ment group.
The initial selection of Japanese incorporated companies listed on U.S. exchanges came
from the January 1997 Compact D/SEC database. This produced a total of 21 companies.
After eliminating nonmanufacturing institutions, the sample totaled 14 companies. One
company had to be dropped due to missing data. We matched the remaining 13 firms with
U.S. incorporated firms based on industry and size. The matching procedure involved
using SIC industry codes and total assets as criteria, in which SIC code was given greater
emphasis. This matching procedure resulted in eight sets of companies being matched on
four-digit SIC code, three sets of companies being matched on three-digit SIC code, and
the remaining two sets of companies being matched on two-digit SIC code. The matched
set of companies is listed in Table 1. The panel data consist of 407 firm-year
observations covering the period 1975-1994 and were obtained via Compustat and Q-
Data SEC files.
In order to ensure that the selected companies incorporated in Japan and listed on U.S.
exchanges are predominantly influenced by the Japanese corporate environment, we
examined the Form 20-F documents from the Japanese selected firms to determine the
percentage of total common stock outstanding found on the U.S. exchanges. The 20-F
documents examined are related to fiscal years 1989 through 1992. From these documents,
the ratio of common stock outstanding in the U.S. markets to total common stock outstanding
We examined the Worldscope database via Dow Jones News/Retrieval and verified that all of the selected
companies comply with U.S. GAAP.
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Table 1
Matched sample items
U.S. companies Primary SIC Japanese companies Primary SIC
Varity 3520 Komatsu 3520
Deere & Co. 3523 Kubota 3523
Illinois Tool Works 3545 Makita 3546
International Business 3571 Hitachi 3571
Machines
Rockwell International 3625 Sony 3651
Zenith Electronics 3651 NEC 3651
North American Philips 3651 Pioneer Electronic 3651
Motorola 3663 Matsushita Electric
Industries
3660
Intel 3674 Kyocera 3660
AMP 3679 TDK 3670
Chrysler 3711 Honda Motor 3711
Eastman Kodak 3861 Canon 3861
Polaroid 3861 Ricoh 3861
was obtained. This information was not available for two of the firms.^ For the remaining 1
1
firms, the mean percentage of common shares outstanding on the U.S. exchanges is 1.236%,
with a median of 0.319%. The largest ratio of the 11 companies is 6.47%. From this data, we
conclude that the percentage of capital obtained from the U.S. markets is quite small for each
of the selected companies, and therefore, despite being listed on U.S. exchanges, these
companies are still predominantly influenced by the Japanese corporate environment.
Prior literature examines several other incentives to manage earnings, which may affect
our sampled companies. One such incentive results from managerial bonuses (Gaver,
Gaver, & Austin, 1995; Healy, 1985). Management compensation structures in the U.S.
typically place heavier emphasis on firm stock price when compared to the management
compensation structures found in Japan. Stock options represented approximately one-third
of U.S. CEO compensation in 1990 and 1991 (Yermack, 1995), whereas stock option plans
are not common in Japanese corporations (Aoki, 1988; Kato, 1997). In summary, the
differences in the compensation structures between the U.S. and Japanese managers suggest
that U.S. managers face a greater stock market influence than their Japanese counterparts,
which is consistent with our previous discussion on the corporate environment differences
of the two countries.
Other earnings management incentives include: to improve managerial buyout price
(DeAngelo, 1986; Perry & Williams, 1994), to avoid political costs (Watts & Zimmerman,
1986), to avoid debt covenant violations (DeFond & Jiambalvo, 1994; Sweeney, 1994), and
to cover up financial difficulties (Palmrose, 1987). All of the companies selected are in
nonregulated industries, and none were involved in a managerial buyout during the years
For one of the firms, the amount of common stock registered to issue on the U.S. exchanges was disclosed,
but the amount outstanding was not. The other firm did not have a Fomi 20-F on the Dow Jones Ne\vs Retrieval
SEC Full-Text Filings database.
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sampled.'^ Thus, we assume that any incentives to manage earnings resuhing from manage-
rial buyouts or poHtical costs are minimal for the selected companies. We further assume that
any incentives to manage earnings to avoid debt covenant violations or to cover up financial
difficuldes are also minimal due to our sample consisting of relatively large, well-established
companies. Additionally, this study uses a panel data set for analysis, which through the
inclusion of firm and year dummy variables inherently controls for firm and year specific
effects. In summary, we assume that the effects resulting from the aforementioned alternative
incentives to manage earnings are either minimal and are being controlled for by the panel
data set, or are consistent with our previous discussion regarding the differences in the
countries' corporate environments.
6. Model development
We attempt to measure both levels of earnings management discussed above. First, we
compare the timing and amounts of discretionary accruals between the countries to examine a
Level 1 method of income smoothing. Second, we compare the magnitude and fiming of
R&D investments between the two countries to examine a Level 2 method of income
smoothing. We rely on methodology developed in prior literature in esdmating discretionary
accruals of our sampled companies. Specifically, we employ the modified Jones' (1991)
model that was found to be the most effective in detecting discretionary accruals of the models
used in the prior earnings management literature (Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995).''
When determining the amount and means in which net income will be smoothed,
management begins with an income amount before the inclusion of discretionary accruals
and R&D expenditures. We refer to this amount as core eamings for the remainder of this
paper. From this amount, management determines the amount of smoothing necessary to
obtain the desired level of reported income. We attempt to capture this behavior by examining
for an association between core eamings and the eamings management activity (i.e.,
discretionary accmals and R&D). In order to focus on the current year behavior of
management, we examine the annual changes of these amounts.
To test the hypotheses, we use a simultaneous equations model. Since both methods of
eamings management are performed to achieve the same objective, it seems reasonable that
'° We performed a full-text Wall Street Journal search via the Dow Jones New/Retrieval for the companies in
our sample using the keywords "management buyout" for the period 1/2/84-12/31/94. This search generated no
articles regarding management buyouts for the selected companies.
" The modified Jones' (1991 ) model involves the use of the following expectations model to estimate the firm-
specific parameters relating to nondiscretionary accruals: TA, = ai(l/^,_ i) + a2(AREV, — AREC,) + a3(PPE,) + y,,
where AREV, = revenues in year / less revenues in year t — 1 scaled by total assets at / — 1 ; AREC, = net receivables
in year t less net receivables in year t — 1 scaled by total assets at r — 1 ; PPE, = gross property plant and equipment in
year t scaled by total assets at r — 1 ; A, _ i = total assets at / - 1 ; y, = the residual and is the estimated discrefionary
accrual amount for year /; TA, = (ACA, — ACL, — ACash, + ASTD, — Dep,)/(A, _
i ), where ACA = change in current
assets, ACL = change in current liabilities, ACash = change in cash and cash equivalents, ASTD = change in debt
included in current liabilities, Dep = deprecation and amortization expense.
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the level of one method will simultaneously affect the level of the other method.'" The
following simultaneous model is employed:
AACCRUAL = Z)o + Z^iAR&D + Z72APRENI + Z^sCOUNTRY
+ Z)4APRENrC0UNTRY + ^5LAG_AACCRUAL + FIRMXX
+ YEARXX + £
AR&D = bo + Z76AACCRUAL + Z77APRENI + Z^gCOUNTRY
+ /?9APRENrCOUNTRY + Z>ioLAG_AR&D + FIRMXX + YEARXX + £
where,
ACCRUAL. This variable equals the change in discretionary accruals from the prior year
divided by current period net sales. '^ Discretionary accruals are calculated using the modified
Jones' (1991) model.
l^R&D. This variable equals the change in R&D investment from the prior year divided by
current period net sales.
AFRENI. This variable is the core earnings amount and equals the prior year change in net
income net of R&D expenditure and discretionary accruals divided by current period net
sales. Specifically, the calculation of this variable is as follows:
APRENI, = (PRENI, - PRENI,_i) /SALES,
where / is the current period, PRENI is net income net of discretionary accruals and
R&D expenditures, and SALES is current period net sales. Specifically, PRENI is
calculated as follows:
PRENI = NETINC, + RD, - DA,
where NETINC is current period net income, RD is current period R&D expenditure, and
DA is current period discretionary accruals.
Regarding the discretionary accrual equation (i.e., where ACCRUAL is the dependent
variable), an increase (decrease) in core earnings from the prior year associated with a
The simultaneous equations approach assumes that discretionary accrual changes and R&D changes behave
as if they are endogenous. We test this assumption by performing the Hausman test for endogeneity. After
considering eight potential outlier observations, the estimated coefficients from the structural equations on the
residuals from the reduced form equations for change in R&D and change in discretionary accruals had P-values
of .05 and .07, respectively. We conclude that the results from this test suggest that change in R&D and change in
discretionary accruals behave as if they are endogenous, and thus, a simultaneous equations approach is
appropriate. As a sensitivity test, we employed OLS regressions to test our hypotheses, and the results remain
unchanged from those reported.
'^ We divide by current period net sales in order to control for size effects that were not eliminated from our
matching procedure. Larger companies may have greater opportunities to manage earnings than smaller
companies due to the amount and number of possible earnings management vehicles. We attempt to control for
these effects by scaling the variables by current period net sales. As a sensitivity check, we scaled the variables by
total assets, and the results remained unchanged.
I
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decrease (increase) in discretionary accruals from the prior year suggests income smoothing.
Therefore, a significant negative coefficient of this variable (^2) suggests that management
uses discretionary accruals to smooth income. Regarding the R&D equation (i.e., where
\R&D is the dependent variable), an increase (decrease) in core earnings from the prior year
associated with an increase (decrease) in R&D investment from the prior year suggests
income smoothing. Therefore, a significant positive coefficient of this variable (bj) suggests
that management uses R&D expenditures to smooth income.
COUNTRY. A dummy variable used to capture the effects of country origin on the
dependent variable. This variable equals if a Japanese company, and 1 if a U.S. company.
APRENI*COUNTRY. An interaction term that is the variable of interest to test our
hypotheses. Regarding the discretionary accruals equation, a significant coefficient on this
variable (Z)4) would indicate that the relationship between AFRENI and AACCRUAL differs
between U.S. and Japanese companies, and would support Hypothesis 1. Regarding the R&D
equation, a significant coefficient on this variable (bg) would indicate that the relationship
between APRENI and AR&D differs between U.S. and Japanese companies, and would
support Hypothesis 2.
LAGAACCRUAL. This variable is a one-period lag of the AACCRUAL variable. Effective
earnings management techniques involve strategically timing the recognition of revenues and
expenses in the desirable period. The nature of an accounting accrual is that it must be
reversed in some future period. Therefore, we expect this variable to be inversely related to
the dependent variable (i.e., the coefficient to be negative).
LAGAR&D. This variable is a one-period lag of the AR&D variable. R&D investments
often require planning over multiyear periods. Therefore, increases (decreases) in R&D
investments for a given year may be part of a long-term trend of planned R&D increases
(decreases). Thus, we expect this variable's coefficient to be positive.
FIRMXX. Dummy variables to control for specific company effects.
YEARXX. Dummy variables to control for the years 1976-1993.
7. Results
The discretionary accruals for each observation were calculated using the modified
Jones' (1991) model, which is described in footnote 11. In estimating the firm-specific
expectation model for a given year, a jackknife approach was used. This involved
estimating the expectation model for each firm while holding out the year of interest.
The estimated model was then used against the year of interest in order to calculate the
discretionary accrual. The number of years used to generate the expectation models ranged
from 11 to 19.
Table 2 presents the mean and the t statistics comparing the mean between the countries
for several variables of interest. The U.S. companies selected have significantly greater R&D
and PRENI than the selected Japanese companies. This suggests that for our sample, U.S.
managers have a greater opportunity to smooth income via R&D investments than their
Japanese counterparts. Additionally, based on the PRENI variable, our sample of U.S. firms
are generally more financially healthy than Japanese firms. However, the Japanese
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics: mean values for 13 U.S. and 13 Japanese firms for the period 1976-1994
Japan («= 191) U.S. (» = 216) t statistic
^ACCRUAL - .00000074 .0000007 .301
AR&D .0068 .0049 2.476*
\PRENI .009225 .010432 .301
SALES 12470.74 9847.57 1.768**
ACCRUAL -.00000145 - .00000046 .299
\ACCCRUAL\ .000012 .000021 2.840*
R&D .0439 .0555 4.388***
PRENI .08055 .102939 3.658***
lSACCRUAL = changQ in discretionary accruals from the prior year/net sales; ISR&D = change in R&D
expenditures from the prior year/net sales; APi?£'M= change in core earnings from the prior year/net sales
[(PRENI,- PRENI,
_i)/SALES,]; SALES=tota\ sales (in millions of dollars); ACCRUAL = discretionary accruals
in the current year/net sales; \ACCRUAL\ = absolute value ofACCRUAL; R&D = R&D expenditures in the current
year/net sales; PRENI= core earnings in the current year/net sales.
* Statistically significant at less than the .05 level.
** Statistically significant at less than the .10 level.
*** Statistically significant at less than the .001 level.
companies' average core earnings is around 8% of sales (0.08055), which suggests that these
companies are financially healthy as well.^'* The selected Japanese companies have
significantly greater Ai^cfeD than the selected U.S. companies, and suggests that on average,
the Japanese companies change R&D fi*om the prior year by a greater amount than their
U.S. counterparts. The SALES variable is significantly different at the .10 level, which
suggests that our matching procedures based on size were imprecise. However, size effects
are controlled for in our model by scaling the variables by current period sales. The
reversing nature of the ACCRUAL variable results in averages close to zero, therefore, the
absolute value of this variable is presented (\ACCRUAL\). The large difference between the
ratios ofR&D to core earnings and \ACCRUAL\ to core earnings for both countries indicates
that the R&D vehicle provides management with a greater opportunity to manage earnings.
Specifically, the ratio of R&DIPRENI for both countries is slightly over 50% (54.5% for
Japan and 53.9% for U.S.), while the rafio of \ACCRUAL\IPRENI for both countries is close
to zero. The remaining variables of interest are not statistically different between the
countries at any conventional level.
Table 3 presents the correlation matrix of the variables included in our simultaneous
model. Not surprisingly, high correlations exist between the interaction variables and their
related individual variable, and the lag variables and the related variable being lagged. The
highly positive correlation between A.R&D and AFRENI (.25) suggests R&D investments are
being manipulated to smooth income, which is consistent with Hypothesis 2.
We utilize the two-staged least square (2SLS) technique to estimate the simultaneous
equations previously stated. Table 4 presents the results of the simultaneous equation model
''^ As a sensitivity test, the models in this study were run using only positive earning years. A total of 38 years
had negative earnings, with 35 of these years being from U.S. companies. When these years are excluded from
analysis, the results remain relatively unchanged from those stated.
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Table 3
Correlation matrix of independent variables
APRENI* LAG LAG
AR&D APRENI COUNTRY COUNTRY AR&D AACCRUAL
AACCRUAL .03 .07 .01 .07 -.05 -.50
AR&D .25 -.12 .17 .52 -.04
APRENI .02 .95 .08 -.09
COUNTRY .13 -.10 .04
APRENI*COUNTRY .08 -.05
LAG AR&D -.01
AACCRUAL = change in discretionary accruals from the prior year/net sales; A7?cfeD = change in R&D
expenditures from the prior year/net sales; APRENI= change in core earnings from the prior year/net sales;
COUNTRY= 1 if a U.S. company, if otherwise; APRENI*COUNTRY= interaction term of the variables APRENI
and COUNTRY:, LAG_AR&D= 1-year lag of AR&D; LAG_AACCRUAL= 1-year lag of AACCRUAL.
for discretionary accruals. AFRENI is in the predicted direction but is not statistically
significant at any conventional level. This suggests that managers overall do not use
discretionary accruals to smooth net income. The test variable, APRENI*COUNTRY, is also
not statistically significant (P-value = .175), and thus, Hypothesis 1 is not supported.
Table 5 presents the results of the simuhaneous equation model for R&D investments.
JSFRENI is statistically significant (P-value<.001) in the expected direction and suggests
that managers overall use R&D investments to smooth net income. The test variable,
APRENI*COUNTRY, is also statistically significant (P-value<.001), and thus, Hypothesis
2 is supported. The negative sign on the coefficient for APRENI*COUNTRY suggests that the
Table 4
Simultaneous equations analysis discretionary accruals
AACCRUAL = bQ + 6,AR&D + ZjjAPRENI + Z73COUNTRY + Z74APRENI*COUNTRY
+ 65LAG_AACCRUAL + FIRMXX + YEARXX + e
Predicted Estimated Standard
Variable relation coefficients errors t statistic
INTERCEPT none -.00001 .00002 -.075
AR&D none - .00089 .00078 -1.151
APRENI - - .00023 .00025 -.931
COUNTRY none - .00001 .00002 -.489
APRENI*COUNTRY none .00033 .00024 1.360
LAG AACCRUAL — - .43023 .03807 -11.300*
Number of observations 407
System weighted R' .45
A/lCC^f//iZ. = change in discretionary accruals from the prior year/net sales; A/?<fi:Z) = change in R&D
expenditures from the prior year/net sales; APRENI= change in core earnings from the prior year/net sales;
COUNTRY= 1 if a U.S. company, if otherwise; APRENI*COUNTRY= interaction term of the variables APRENI
and COUNTRY, LAG AACCRUAL = I -year lag of the variable AACCRUAL; EIRMXX= dummy variables to
control for each company; YEARXX= dummy variables to control for the years 1976-1993.
* Statistically significant at less than the .001 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose
relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
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Table 5
Simultaneous equations analysis R&D
AR«&D = bo + Z)6AACCRUAL + /77APRENI + /jgCOUNTRY + 69APRENI*COUNTRY
+ 6ioLAG_AR&D + FIRMXX + YEARXX + e
Predicted Estimated Standard
Variable relation coefficients errors / statistic
INTERCEPT none .00170 .00238 .713
ACCRUAL none -10.42413 12.39635 -.841
\PRENI + .19010 .02959 6.425*
COUNTRY none -.00581 .00257 -2.262**
\PRENI*COUNTRY none -.16781 .03026 -5.545*
LAG^R&D + .21515 .05887 3.655*
Number of observations 407
System weighted R~ .45
A^CC/?fZ4Z = change in discretionary accruals from the prior year/net sales; A/JcfeZ) = change in R&D
expenditures from the prior year/net sales; APRENI= change in core earnings from the prior year/net sales;
COUNTRY= 1 if a U.S. company, if otherwise; AP^^f'/V/*CO t/A^77?7= interaction term of the variables APRENI
and COUNTRY LAG_M&D= 1-year lag of the variable AR&D; FIRMXX= dummy variables to control for each
company; YEARXX= dummy variables to control for the years 1976-1993.
* Statistically significant at less than the .001 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose
relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
** Statistically significant at less than the .05 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose
relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
relationship between R&D investments and core earnings is stronger for Japanese than U.S.
companies. The estimated coefficient of ^RENI (0.1901) for Japanese companies is over
eight times greater than the estimated coefficient of AP/^^M (0.02229)'^ for U.S. companies.
This evidence suggests that Japanese managers smooth net income to a significantly greater
degree than their U.S. counterparts.
8. Additional analysis
As an additional analysis, we employ SUR (Zellner, 1962). This method fully exploits any
matched-sample dependency between our sampled U.S. and Japanese firms and improves the
power of our tests. Specifically, SUR is usefiil when the error terms are believed to be
contemporaneously correlated across equations. In this case, Zellner (1962) has shown that
estimating the two equations simultaneously, although they may be seemingly unrelated, can
improve the efficiency of the estimators over that found if each is estimated separately
(Gujarati, 1995). The sample of firms used in this study are matched on size and industry, and
therefore, it is possible that the error terms for the matched U.S. and Japanese companies at
the same point in time are correlated. Thus, the SUR method may be appropriate to test the
This amount is the sum of the coefficients of the variables APRENI and APRENI*COUNTRY.
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hypotheses stated above. This methodology estimates coefficients for U.S. and Japanese
companies separately, and therefore, the hypotheses are tested by examining for differences
between the U.S. and Japanese test variables' coefficients.
The SUR model employed to test Hypothesis 1 is as follows:
AACCRUAL = bQ + ^i APRENI + /)2LAG_AACCRUAL + FIRMXX
+YEARXX + £
where,
MCCRUAL, ^PRENI, LAG_^ACCRUAL, FIRMXX, and YEARXXare the same variables
used in the simultaneous equation model and are defined above.
Hypothesis 1 is tested by examining for differences between the specific country
coefficients estimated for the variable APRENI. The magnitude of this coefficient may be
used as a metric for the degree of income smoothing. Again, SUR estimates a coefficient
relating to this variable for both U.S. and Japanese companies. A difference between these
coefficients would support Hypothesis 1.
Hypothesis 2 is tested by examining the association between current year changes in core
earnings and R&D investment. The SUR model employed to test Hypothesis 2 is a modified
version of the one described above and is as follows:
AR&D = bo + Z^i APRENI + Z72LAG_AR&D + FIRMXX + YEARXX + e
where,
^PRENI, LAG_\R&D, FIRMXX, and YEARXX are the same variables used in the simulta-
neous equation model and are defined above. Hypothesis 2 would be supported if a difference
was found between the Z?i estimates generated by SUR for U.S. and Japanese companies.
Table 6 presents the results of the SUR model used to test whether U.S. and Japanese
managers use discretionary accruals to smooth net income. Panel A (Panel B) shows the
estimated coefficients for U.S. (Japanese) companies. The test variable of interest, APRENI,
has a negative and marginally significant coefficient for Japanese companies (P-value = .136)
and is not statistically significant at any conventional level for U.S. companies. The amount
of difference of these two coefficients is statistically significant (P-value = .01 3), which lends
support for Hypothesis 1. Overall, these results marginally support that Japanese managers
use discretionary accruals to smooth income to a greater degree than their U.S. counterparts.
Table 7 presents the results of the SUR model used to test whether U.S. and Japanese
managers use R&D investments to smooth net income. Panel A (Panel B) shows the
estimated coefficients for U.S. (Japanese) companies. The test variable of interest, APRENI,
has a significantly positive coefficient for both U.S. and Japanese companies (P-value<.01
and .001, respectively). This suggests that both U.S. and Japanese managers use R&D
investments to smooth net income.
To test Hypothesis 2, we compared the coefficients on AP/^^M between U.S. and Japanese
companies. The estimated coefficient of AFRENI for Japanese companies is nearly seven
times greater than the estimated coefficient of APRENI for U.S. companies, and these
coefficients are statistically different at a high level of significance (P-value<.001).
Consistent with the simultaneous equations results, these results support Hypothesis 2 and
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Table 6
SUR results — discretionary accruals
AACCRUAL = bo + 6i APRENI + 62LAG_AACCRUAL + FIRMXX + YEARXX + e
Predicted Estimated Standard
Variable relation coefficients errors / statistic
Panel A: U.S. companies
INTERCEPT none - .00000 .00002 -.009
liJ'RENI — .00008* .00007 1.192
LAGAACCRUAL - - .56848 .07093 -8.015**
Number of observations 186
Model F-value {df= 30) 3.223
Model P-value .0001
Model R^ .38
Panel B: Japanese companies
INTERCEPT none - .00000 .00002 -.046
APRENI - - .00023* .00021 -1.103
LAG AACCRUAL — -.30108 .05312 -5.668**
Number of observations 186
Model F-value {df= 30) 1.813
Model P-value .0106
Model R- .26
z\^CCi?(X4L = change in discretionary accruals from the prior year/net sales; APi?£A'/= change in core
earnings from the prior year/net sales; LAG_AACCRUAL= I -year lag of the dependent variable; FIRMXX=-
dummy variables to control for each matched set of U.S. and Japanese companies; YEARXX= dummy variables to
control for the years 1977-1993.
* Coefficients are significantly different (/'-value = .013) for U.S. vs. Japanese companies.
** Statistically significant at less than the .001 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose
relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
suggest that Japanese managers use R&D expenditures to smooth net income to a greater
degree than their U.S. counterparts.
8.1. Sensitivitv tests
In order to test the robustness of our resuhs and the specification of our models, we
performed several sensitivity analyses. First, we address the possibility that the positive
relationship between A.R&D and IS.PRENI reflects differences in investment opportunities or
incentives rather than differences in accounting treatment. The simultaneous equations were
rerun including a control variable proxying for the change in investment opportunities as a
right-hand side variable of the AR&D equation. Several control variables were used to proxy
for investment opportunities, including change in cash (both pre-R&D and ending cash
balance) from prior year, level of ending cash (both pre-R&D and ending cash balance), and
the change in capital expenditures from the prior year. The change in capital expenditures
from the prior year was the only proxy statistically significant (.001 ). The positive coefficient
on this variable suggests that R&D expenditures are correlated with investment opportunities
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Table 7
SUR results — R&D
AR&D = bQ + Zji APRENI + /72LAG_AR&D + FIRMXX + YEARXX + e
Predicted Estimated Standard
Variable relation coefficients errors / statistic
Panel A: U.S. companies
INTERCEPT none - .00354 .00282 -1.257
^PRENI + .02459* .00890 2.764**
LAG_M&D + .27254 .08520 3.199**
Number of observations 200
Model F-value (#=31) 7.795
Model P-value .0001
Model ^- .59
Panel B: Japanese companies
INTERCEPT none .00495 .00204 2.427***
APRENI + .16793* .02399 7.000****
LAG AR&D + .03342 .07845 .426
Number of observations 200
Model F-value(c//= 31) 9.241
Model P-value .0001
Model R- .63
A/?cS:D = change in R&D expenditures from the prior year/net sales; AP/?£7V/= change in core earnings from
the prior year/net sales; Z,^G_A/?cS:Z)= 1-year lag of the dependent variable; FIRMXX= dummy variables to
control for each matched set of U.S. and Japanese companies; YEARXX= dummy variables to control for the years
1976-1993.
* Coefficients are significantly different (P-value = .000) for U.S. vs. Japanese companies.
** Statistically significant at less than the .01 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose
relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
*** Statistically significant at less than the .05 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables whose
relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
**** Statistically significant at less than the .001 level based on one-tailed (two-tailed) tests for variables
whose relation to the dependent variable is (is not) predicted.
from year to year. However, the variables of interest, ^PRENI and lAPRENI''COUNTRY,
remain highly significant in the same direction as previously reported. Thus, the relationship
between \R&D and ^PRENI remains after controlling for changes in investment opportu-
nities, which suggests that the selected companies' managers smooth income using R&D
expenditures. Additionally, the significant interaction term (APRENI*COUNTRY) suggests
that Japanese companies smooth income using R&D expenditures to a significantly greater
degree than their U.S. counterparts, which is consistent with our previously stated results. In
summary, the variables of interest remain statistically significant in the consistent direction
for all of the models that included the previously stated proxies for investment opportunities.
Second, we observed studentized residuals to identify possible outlier observations. The
models were rerun excluding potential outlier observations, and the results remain unchanged
from those stated. Third, we used different methods to control for firm size effects.
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Specifically, we reran the models after (1) dividing the variables by total assets and (2)
including a size variable as a separate independent variable. The results from all these models
remain unchanged from those reported. Fourth, we tested our model specification by
examining the sensitivity of our results on higher-order lags of our dependent variables.
Specifically, second- and third-order lags were included in our models. Again, the results
remained unchanged from those reported. Finally, the potential effects of the "bubble burst"
of the Japanese economy were considered. We partitioned our data to before and after the
"busting of the bubble" (i.e., pre- and post-1990). We reran our models using each of these
data sets, and the results remain unchanged for both data sets from those reported. Based on
the results from these sensitivity tests, we conclude that our results are robust.
9. Discussion and conclusion
This paper performs an examination for differences in the level of myopic management
behavior between U.S. and Japanese companies. We contend that the act of manipulating
R&D investments, and to a lesser extent accounting accruals, to obtain a targeted current
period earnings amount is reflective of myopic management behavior. We examine the extent
to which managers of both countries use (1) discretionary accruals and (2) R&D investments
to smooth income. Our results suggest that neither U.S. nor Japanese managers use
discretionary accruals to smooth income. However, the results suggest that both U.S. and
Japanese managers use R&D investments to smooth income and that Japanese managers do
so at a significantly greater degree. These results provide evidence that the different corporate
environments of each country are associated with different management behaviors.
Our results are consistent with U.S. managers resisting the inherent incentive to smooth
income at the detriment of the long-term value of the firm more so than their Japanese
counterparts. Overall, both countries' managers smooth income using R&D investments, but
Japanese managers do so to a significantly greater degree. Thus, apparently because of their
corporate environment surroundings (particularly an active stock market), U.S. managers
appear better able to resist the inherent desire to smooth earnings than their Japanese
counterparts. This is consistent with the stream of literature that supports the efficient market
hypothesis and suggests that the nonmyopic U.S. stock market helps promote long-term
management behavior (Abarbanell & Bernard, 1995; Kothari & Sloan, 1992; Loudder &
Behn, 1995; Shevlin, 1991).
Given the plethora of financial press in the 1 980s that promoted Japanese management
superiority over their U.S. counterparts, some readers may find these results counterintuitive.
In hindsight, the Japanese bubble burst in the early 1990s suggests that the conventional
wisdom of the 1980s regarding the Japanese corporate environment may have been flawed.
That is, perhaps Japanese managers had greater opportunity to engage in myopic behavior
because they did not face the monitoring of a nonmyopic stock market. Additionally, perhaps
the keiretsu system creates the incentive for management to signal growth and stability to
their fellow keiretsu members, which results in the myopic behavior of income smoothing.
The recent changes to the Japanese business environment suggest that Japanese companies
are slowly moving toward a more equity-focused environment. For example, stock option
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plans were recently legalized; hostile takeover threats have begun to surface; the lifetime
employment concept is disappearing; and cross-shareholdings among keiretsu members are
declining (Amaha, 1999; Business Week, 1999; Levinson, 1992; Moffet, 1999; Shibata,
1992, 1998; Weinberg, 1997). Not surprisingly, a call for an overhaul of the Japanese keiretsu
system is beginning to surface in the financial press (Business Week, 1999; Hanke & Walters,
1994). In support of the recent changes in the Japanese business environment, the results from
our study suggest that a more capital market-focused environment may help promote long-
term focused management behavior.
This study is subject to limitations. The companies included in the sample are all large firms
that are listed on U.S. stock exchanges. These companies, and the behavior of their manage-
ment, may not be representative of other companies incorporated in the respective countries
under study, and thus, the generalization of the results may be questioned. Also, while this
study examines smoothing net income via discretionary accruals and R&D investments, there
exist other ways in which management can smooth net income (e.g., repairs and maintenance
expenditures, advertising expenditure, and managing the timing of asset sales). Perhaps, our
examination of only two income-smoothing vehicles is not reflective of the overall smoothing
strategies employed by the sampled companies. Additionally, the available vehicles to manage
earnings may not be equal for Japanese and U.S. companies. That is, perhaps U.S. companies
have greater opportunity to employ the alternative earnings management vehicles (i.e., other
than discretionary accruals and R&D expenditures). If one country is systematically employ-
ing these alternative vehicles to smooth income more so than the other country, our results
may be misleading. We encourage future research to identify and examine for differences of
usage between U.S. and Japanese managers regarding these alternative methods. Finally, there
may be omitted variables that are correlated with both the change in premanaged net income
variable and the variable used to measure earnings management. This paper provides some
initial empirical resuhs related to possible differences in behavior between U.S. and Japanese
managers. We hope our results will encourage further research in this area.
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International Accounting: A User Perspective
by Shahrokh M. Saudagaran South-Western College Publishing/Thomson Learning,
Cincinnati, Ohio, 2001, xii+228 pp.
International Accounting: A User Perspective, by Shahrokh M. Saudagaran, is well written
and approachable. This text's coverage and organization are similar to Mueller, Gemon, and
Meek [MGM] (1997) and the new 5th edition, Gemon and Meek [GM] (2001). Yet, the
content and level of discussion are more developed, suitable for its target audience of senior
undergraduate accounting majors, graduate students, and executives. With this target
audience, the author appropriately adopts a user perspective to understanding international
financial accounting and reporting. A distinctive feature of the text is that it effectively
incorporates relevant research into the presentation and discussion of topics. However,
despite adopting a user perspective, a drawback of the text is that too little substantive
discussion is devoted to major differences in accounting measurement across countries and
financial statement analysis across countries.
The book's seven chapters cover five main topics: reasons for differences in accounting
across countries and accounting harmonization (Chapters 1 and 2), major accounting
measurement issues and differences (Chapters 3 and 4), using financial statements across
countries (Chapter 5), emerging markets (Chapter 6), and issues in managerial accounting
(Chapter 7). The coverage of the first two chapters on reasons for differences in accounting
across countries and accounting harmonization, as well as the last chapter on managerial
accounting, are similar to Chapters 1, 3, and 11, respectively, in MGM (1,3, and 10 in GM).
Of the two chapters on major accounting measurement issues and differences, one focuses on
foreign currency accounting and the other covers four topics: accounting for changing prices,
goodwill and intangible assets, geographical segment disclosures, and social reporting.
The foreign currency accounting chapter presents the topic in depth, covering SFAS 8,
SFAS 52, and IAS 22. Materials in the chapter are also timely, highlighting the transition to
the euro and derivative accounting. If the book is used as a supplement in an advanced
accounting course, a significant amount of the material in this chapter may overlap with the
advanced accounting text.
The other chapter on major accounting issues and differences across countries, entitled,
"Selected Financial Reporting and Disclosure Issues in the Global Context," is disappoint-
ing in depth, integration of research, and number of issues selected. In discussing accounting
for changing prices, the text perpetuates the conflision that general price level accounting
and current cost accounting are both altemative methods of inflation accounting (p. 90).
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While other chapters do integrate relevant research, this chapter would benefit from
references to work such as Barth and Clinch (1998) and Easton, Eddey, and Harris (1993)
on current cost accounting or Amir, Harris, & Venuti (1993) on major differences in
accounting measures across countries. Even though the four topics that the author selects are
major issues and differences in accounting across countries, other major issues with
significant potential economic exposure, such as accounting for pensions, postretirement
benefits, and deferred taxation, are not discussed. These topics may be considered more
advanced topics, not appropriate for an introductory accounting text, but their exclusion
could significantly mislead a user of the financial statements about a company's operations
and financial position.
Similarly, the chapter on using financial statements across borders, entitled "Using
Corporate Financial Reports Across Borders," devotes too few pages to analyzing and
comparing companies across countries. The majority of the chapter discusses preparers' and
users' responses to financing and investing in a global environment, similar to the discussion
in MGM's Chapter 4. While this information is interesting, it does little to offer guidance on
how to use corporate financial reports across countries. The pages (144-148) devoted to
international financial statement analysis discuss main issues using a study by Choi et al.
(1983) that compares key financial ratios of Japanese, Korean, and US firms. This approach is
effective, and the chapter would benefit by expanding along the same lines.
Questions, exercises and cases, included in end-of-chapter materials, are more sophisti-
cated than those found in MGM and better suit the intended audience. Questions are targeted
and thought-provoking: many are open-ended to provide a base for an interesting discussion.
The exercises, which reinforce and extend material presented in the text, are more stimulating
than the cases. The exercises often ask students to seek additional materials such as financial
statements from real companies on the web and analyze relevant aspects related to the
chapter. Cases, which analyze a fictional company or situation, are short, self-contained, and
somewhat contrived.
In view of its coverage and length, the text is appropriate as a supplemental text in an
advanced accounting course. It also could serve as the basis for an international accounting
course but would require additional, substantial supplemental materials.
Elizabeth A. Gordon
Rutgers University
New Brunswick, NJ, USA
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International accounting, financial reporting, and analysis
by Allan B. Afterman, New York, NY, Warren Gorham & Lamont/RIA Group, Release 11,
1999, three-ring binder, four updates per year
The stated purpose of this book is to provide a comprehensive reference source for
identifying accounting and financial reporting diversity among foreign countries, and to
assist users of foreign financial statements and others to assess the impact of diversity on
reported amounts. Release 11 of the book uses a cut-off of June 1, 1999 with occasional
reference to other dates. Updating occurs four times a year, thus requiring the book to be in
loose-leaf form.
This book is not intended to be a manual of accounting standards for any of the countries
covered. The countries are grouped in four geographic regions, which include (the number of
countries in each region is indicated in parentheses): the Americas (5), Asia/Pacific (7),
Europe (8), and Africa/Middle East (2). All of the major economic national powers are in
these groups as are the European Union (EU) and International Accounting Standards
Committee (lASC). The author has employed a variety of sources to compile the book's
contents, including official standards, unofficial publications, and conversations with standard
setters and practicing accountants in foreign countries.
Three parts, labeled A, B, and C, divide the book into sections covering the gamut
indicated by its title. Part A looks at the accounting and financial reporting of U.S.
multinational enterprises. Part B is devoted to comparative international accounting, and
Part C covers a variety of additional topics.
Part A is itself divided into three topics. Accounting for foreign currency-denominated
transactions, following the guidance contained in Statement 52 of the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB), is covered first. Translation of foreign currency-denominated
financial statements is the next topic, once again following Statement 52 guidelines. Both
topics are described, analyzed, and illustrated in sufficient detail to assist a person
unfamiliar with these subjects to understand the required accounting and financial reporting.
Illustrations include journal entries, consolidation work papers, and summarizing tables.
The treatment of these two topics is similar to that found in Advanced Accounting
textbooks. The third topic deals with accounting for exchange rate risk management using
derivative instruments.
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Hedging of exchange rate risk is explained and illustrated by drawing on FASB Statements
52 and 133. The latter pronouncement deals with derivative instruments. Statement 138, a
modification of Statement 133, was released after the date of this book. However, the author
does not cover all aspects of hedging in Statement 133, choosing to focus on foreign currency
risk. For example, interest rate risk and forecasted transactions are not included. Even the
topics covered are not complete, as can be seen in the section on currency swaps where there
are no examples or the section on options that does not mention "collars." Overall, this
section is done on an introductory level that will prove unsatisfactory to a reader who is
searching for a deeper understanding of the topic of hedge accounting.
Part B comprehensively compares the accounting and financial reporting of 1 8 countries,
the lASC, and the EU. The 18 countries are listed on pages Bl-40 and B 1-41. In addition, the
accounting in four selected developing countries — Argentina, Brazil, China, and Poland—
is briefly summarized. Specific areas of comparison were selected fi^om a 1993 Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) study that identified the most frequently cited items requiring
reconciliation to U.S. GAAP. They include topics such as capitalization of interest cost,
pension costs, deferred taxes, and consolidation. Additional topics were selected for coverage
because of their diversity among nations and their potential significance to eamings. All told,
more than 60 specific, broad accounting topics are covered. Each topic is discussed,
comparisons made between countries, ample illustrations provided of financial displays
and notes, and the analytical implications of differences pointed out. Throughout Part B, U.S.
GAAP serves as the benchmark. This section is very well done and should prove to be a
valuable reference to a variety of readers.
Part C deals with a number of different topics, starting with the financial reporting of
foreign companies wishing to offer securities in U.S. markets or list their securities on an
exchange or on the national over-the-counter (NASDAQ) market. In this section, there is
extensive examination and illustrations of SEC requirements for registration statements and
financial statements, both interim and annual. The reconciliation of home jurisdicfion
accounting with U.S. GAAP is illustrated, using disclosures from an actual filing made with
the SEC. Management's discussion and analysis of a foreign company is also illustrated and
contrasted with that of a U.S. firm. The experience of Daimler-Benz (now DaimlerChrysler)
in listing their stock in the U.S. is described and analyzed, thereby providing an insightfial
look at the complications faced by foreign firms but also demonstrating why the SEC's
steadfast position of not making exceptions to their rules is necessary. ' Methods of working
around SEC requirements, by employing private placements and offshore transactions
(Regulation S), are explained.
The second section considers the issue of the reliability of financial information by looking
at auditing standards and practices in foreign countries. Auditing standards are briefly
examined and auditors' reports from several countries illustrated. Some procedures are
described and contrasted between certain countries. Several other auditing-related topics,
The principal issue concerned the use by Daimler-Benz of "hidden reserves" and income smoothing
over time.
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such as the harmonization of standards, are also touched upon. The treatment in this section is
not exhaustive; however, the book does not hold itself out as dealing with auditing.
Analyzing financial statements of foreign entities is the next area of focus. Initially,
comparative analysis of firms fi^om the same jurisdiction is discussed and examined. Then,
the problem of analyzing and comparing firms in different jurisdictions is considered. The
difficulty of making the latter kind of analysis of financial information is well demonstrated.
Finally, a fi^amework for comparative muhijurisdictional analysis is proposed, including a
comprehensive checklist for identifying international accoundng differences.
The next section covers techniques of financial statement analysis, such as ratios and
common-size statements. The examples used to illustrate this kind of analysis are well done,
being similar to materials found in textbooks. In the following section, three excellent case
studies of financial statement analysis are provided, including the use of the checklist
mentioned above and a complete set of financial statements of the subject companies. These
carry the subject of statement analysis to a higher level. Cash flow statements and analysis is the
subject of the final section in Part C. How to construct statements, the definitions of operating
cash flows, and the uses of cash flow analysis are laid out. How diverse accounting standards
affect cash flow analysis is discussed, with particular attention to specific areas, such as revenue
recognition and leased assets. This latter portion is especially interesting and helpfiil.
Five appendices and a glossary conclude the book. Appendix A contains the financial
statements of three foreign companies. Appendix B summarizes International Accounting
Standards and compares them to U.S. GAAP. Appendix C is a checklist of accounting
differences, by each of 17 countries and International Accounting Standards, with cross-
references to Part B of the book. Appendix D is the prospectus of a Brazilian company that
was filed with the SEC. The last appendix, E, is a list of the three-character currency codes
established by the International Standards Organization.
In conclusion, this book achieves its objects and is a worthwhile reference book for those
involved in the international financial arena.
Richard A. Scott
University of Virginia
Charlottesville, VA, USA
PII: 80020-7063(01)00089-9
The history of accounting: critical perspectives on business management
John Richard Edwards (Ed.), Routledge, London, 2000, four volumes, lii+1959 pp., £475
(approximately US$680).
This is a handsome, four-volume set that brings together 68 previously published research
articles and chapters from books on the broad subject of accounting history. The editor and
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compiler, who has written an insightful introductory essay that nicely characterizes and
positions these articles as well as many others that are not reproduced here, is the
distinguished British accounting historian John Richard Edwards, the founder and editor of
Accounting, Business and Financial Histoiy. The introductory essay constitutes a valuable
guide and explanation both for novices and experienced historians.
Of the 68 reproduced works, 62 were published since 1980, and a further six were
published between 1964 and 1977. All of the works are therefore of recent vintage, and, from
what I can determine, all of their authors are living.
Edwards' stated aims have been to assemble readings (1) for courses on accounting history
and as background for other courses; (2) as an initial source of reference for doctoral students
and members of faculty who are embarking on accounting history research; and (3) for the
edification of business historians (p. xxiv). The collection of readings represents excellent
coverage of the landscape of accounting history research in the last quarter century, reflecting
a wide range of subject areas and methodologies. The four volumes are divided into topical
areas: method and theory; recording and reporting; cost and management accounting; and the
professionalization of accounting. Despite the impression given by the book's subtitle,
Edwards provides a good representation of work from both the traditional and
"new" historians.
As a member in good standing of the guild of book reviewers, I am obliged to ask
whether this enterprise suits its aims. In countries with an emerging accounting research
culture, as well as in countries where English is not the ruling language, this four-volume
set will fill an important need, if the cost can be managed. In the UK, North America,
and Australia, one suspects that libraries and academics are not likely to spend £475 for a
four-volume set, most of whose contents are accessible in leading journals. Of the 63
articles in the collection taken from journals, 29 were published in journals that, in a
recent study of the accounting research journals received by 12 leading libraries (Zeff,
1996), were received by all 12 libraries. A fiirther 15 were published in joumals received
by at least eight of the 12 libraries. Thus, a total of 44, or 70%, of the journal articles are
likely to be available in good research libraries. For other libraries, the cost, again, could
be an obstacle.
The tariff for the four-volume set probably could have been significantly reduced if the
articles had been photoduplicated instead of entirely reset. Moreover, photoduplication would
have had the major advantage of preserving the original page numbers of the reproduced
articles and chapters, so that citations to those page numbers, which appear in the editor's
introductory essay and in articles throughout the collection, could actually be used to find the
full context of what is being cited or quoted. Ball and Smith (1992) represent a good example
of a large collection of research articles produced by photoduplication.
None of the "classic" articles or chapters by deceased authors such as Hatfield, Littleton,
the De Roovers, Gamer, and Solomons was included. Edwards defends their omission on the
ground that "they have been the subject of subsequent review, discussion and analysis in
papers that are reproduced here" (p. xxiv). Yet quite a few of the articles included in the
collection are also analyzed and discussed in other articles in the collection, as well as by the
editor in his introductory essay. A better argument is that the editor has chosen to place
emphasis on the advances made during the last 20-30 years.
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It would have been apposite to the stated aims of the book, which are unquestionably
worthy, if the excellent series of annotated bibliographies of works on accounting history by
Parker (1969, 1977, 1980, 1988) were to have been included. These bibliographies draw
attention to books as well as articles. Other than for this omission, I will not presume to
second-guess the editor's selection of items to be included.
This is indeed a valuable collection that amply testifies to the major progress that
accounting history research has achieved in the last quarter century. Three journals have
been founded that are devoted exclusively to such research, and other joumals of high
standard cater to work in history. As the editor's introductory essay and a number of the
reproduced items bring out, battles are being fought between the partisans of new approaches
to historical inquiry and the defenders of the ancien regime. Samuelson (1963, p. 231) has
wisely written that "Methodological discussion, like calisthenics and spinach, is good for
us." Tolerance of methodological diversity is a sign of maturity in a literature, and one hopes
that the expanse of approaches that are richly on display in this anthology will continue to
illuminate the horizon.
Stephen A. Zeff
Rice University
Houston, TX, USA
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The impact of culture on the relationship between budgetary
participation, management accounting systems,
and managerial performance:
An analysis of Chinese and Western managers
Judy S.L. Tsui*
Department ofAccountancy, City University ofHong Kong, 83 Tat Chee Avenue, Kowloon, Hong Kong, China
Abstract
This study tests the hypothesis that the behavior and attitudes of Chinese and Western managers to
budgetary participation will be different because of cultural differences. Chinese managers are used to
represent managers from a high-collectivist, large-power distance, and long-term orientation culture
while Caucasian expatriate managers are used to represent a culture that is low-collectivist, small-
power distance, and short-term orientation. Data were collected from 5 1 Chinese subunit managers in
Xian, China and 38 Caucasian expatriate subunit managers in Hong Kong who were requested to
respond to questioimaires designed to measure the 'availability' of broad scope and timely
management accounting systems (MAS), budgetary participation, and their managerial performance.
Multiple regression analysis showed that the three-way interaction term was significant, thus,
suggesting that the interaction effects ofMAS and budgetary participation on managerial performance
were different, depending on the cultural background of the managers. More specifically, the
relationship between MAS information and managerial performance of Chinese managers was
negative for high levels of participation but positive for Caucasian managers. These results have
implications for the design of effective control subsystems and suggest that the management
accounting theories developed in the context of Western economies may not be generalizable to the
Chinese environment. © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Culture; Budgetary participation; Management accounting systems; Managerial performance
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1. Introduction
A significant strand of management accounting research focuses on the notion that
national cultural variables could affect the relationship between management control
systems and performance (Awasthi, Chow, & Wu, 1998; Bimberg & Snodgrass, 1988;
Chow, Shields, & Chan, 1991). It is argued that people from different cultures have
different attitudes to similar management control systems and management practices
(Chow, Harrison, Lindquist, & Wu, 1997; Harrison, 1992). As a result, management
control tools and management practices found to be effective in one environment
could be ineffective or even dysfiinctional in another environment (Chow, Kato, &
Merchant, 1996). Thus, these differences as a result of culture have far reaching
implications for the design and implementation of management control systems in
different countries.
While there are a number of studies that have examined the relationships between
culture and various aspects of marketing and organizational behavior, research on the
relationship between culture and management control systems is by comparison still
scarce (Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Kagitcibasi & Berry, 1989). In particular, there
have only been a handful of studies that have examined managers' attitudes to
management confrol systems across national boundaries (Awasthi et al., 1998; Bimberg
& Snodgrass, 1988; Chow et al, 1996; Chow, Kato, & Shields, 1994; Dunk, 1989;
Harrison, 1992; Harrison, McKinnon, Panchapakesan, & Leung, 1994; Merchant, Chow,
& Wu, 1995). For example, Bimberg and Snodgrass (1988) conducted a field study in
US and Japan and found that culture affects the nature of formal confrol system.
Another study conducted in Australia and Singapore found that culture influenced the
relation between reliance on accounting performance measures in the evaluative style of
superiors and work-related attitudes of subordinates (Harrison, 1992). Other aspects of
management controls such as the link between budgetary participation and management
accounting systems (MAS) still remain to be explored. Most studies (Chow et al., 1991,
1996; Daley, Jiambalvo, Sundem, & Kondo, 1985; Harrison, 1992; Harrison et al.,
1994) have focused on managers in Japan, US, Singapore, and Ausfralia with little or
no evidence on how Chinese managers would behave. The extension of these types of
studies to Chinese managers is important given the recent surge of multinational
business activities in China and the lack of empirical data on Chinese management
accounting practices. Moreover, Chinese culture emphasizes values that are diametrically
opposed to Westem values (Qui & Tsui, 1993, 1995; Hofstede, 1991). Thus, empirical
evidence from China would provide important insights into the role of culture in the
application of management accounting across national boundaries.
This study examines how MAS and budgetary participation affect the performance of
Chinese subunit managers in the Chinese Mainland and expatriate Caucasian managers in
Hong Kong. Both MAS (Chenhall & Morris, 1986) and budgetary participation (Brow-
nell, 1982a; Lau, Low, & Eggleton, 1995; O'Connor, 1995) have been identified as key
elements in a firm's management control system that is expected to affect managerial
performance. However, according to Hofstede (1980, 1991), Chinese managers are
i
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expected to behave differently from Western managers in managerial decision-making
situations such as budgetary participation because of cultural differences.'
In the case of budgetary participation, there are at least two ftirther aspects to consider. The
first issue relates to the motivational role of participation. The dominant Western theories on
motivation such as the needs-based theories (Alderfer, 1972; Herzberg, Mausner, & Synder-
man, 1959; Maslow, 1954; McClelland, 1975) all emphasize that recognition, influence, and
achievement are primary motivators. Participation in the decision-making process caters to
these needs of recognition and influence and is, therefore, likely to be a motivating factor.
However, the application of these theories in a non-Western environment is questionable.
Hofstede (1980) argued that these motivational theories are culture-bound and are relevant
only to Western countries. Similarly, Kanungo (1983) suggested that while we may accept the
needs to motivate employees, the nature of those needs may be influenced by cultural values.
In a recent survey in China, it was found that Herzberg 's model had to be modified for it to be
applied to the Chinese environment (Yu, 1991). Thus, the motivational role and advantages of
participation is not clear in a non-Western environment. Second, even though the participative
decision-making style is used in non-Western culture, it, in itself, is not widely accepted in
Asian cultures. Several studies have shown that a more directive style whereby the leader or
top management makes a decision on his own and then persuades the subordinates to accept
that decision is preferred in Asian cultures (Deyo, 1978; Redding & Casey, 1976; Redding &
Richardson, 1986). Moreover, unlike Western cultures where direct objections and frank
discussions are preferred, managers in Asian cultures prefer restraint, politeness, and indirect
objections (Kirkbride, Tang, & Westwood, 1991; Thompson, 1989). Thus, the participative
decision-making style is not expected to be consistent with Chinese culture which has, until
recently, been insulated from Western ideology. As a result, the expected positive relationship
between MAS and managerial performance for high levels of budgetary participation, as
expected in Western society, may not exist for Chinese managers in the Mainland.
Section 2 of the paper provides a review of the relevant literature, which leads to the
development of the hypothesis tested in this study. This is followed by Section 3,
which is about the methodology of the study, and Section 4, which discusses the results
and conclusions.
2. Hypothesis development
As pointed out earlier, both participation and other accounting information system (AIS)
tools should be viewed as a confrol package and are considered interdependent (Emmanuel,
Otley, & Merchant, 1990). For example, participation may be more meaningful in organ-
izations that have sophisticated MAS so that managers can use that information for
participative decisions on resource allocation among the operating units (Chow, Cooper, &
Waller, 1988; Waller, 1988). Further, with the opening up of the Chinese economy and
The idea that culture can affect the budget participation -performance relationship was also suggested by
Brownell (1982a).
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Western influence, some level of participation is being practiced but their use is not as
entrenched as MAS information for purposes of control (Fang & Tang, 1991). However, the
role of participation in China is not clear since, as pointed out earlier, there are cultural factors
which suggest that participation in the budgetary process could, in fact, be dysfiinctional.
Hofstede (1991) and Hofstede and Bond (1988) identified five dimensions of culture that
are labeled power distance, uncertainty avoidance, collectivism, masculinity, and long-term
orientation." Of relevance in this context are the dimensions of power distance, collectivism,
and long-term orientation since these three dimensions may be theoretically linked to
budgetary participation. Power distance is defined as the degree of inequality among people.
This can range from relatively equal (small-power distance) to extremely unequal (large-
power distance). In the large-power distance countries, individuals accept the inequalities that
exist in society and even subscribe to such inequalities. Authority and seniority are important
and individuals are comfortable with the superior- subordinate relationships. In a recent
study, Hofstede (1993)"^ suggested that China is at the high end of the power distance scale
compared to the US, which is on the low end of the scale, where equality and participatory
management would have positive motivational effects.
Collectivism is defined as the form and manner of the relationship between an individual
and others in society. Chinese society is characterized by a high degree of collectivism while
Western society emphasizes individualism (Meindl, Hunt, & Lee, 1989). In low-collectivist
(high individualist) Western society, the individual places his own interest above that of other
members and questions of independence at work and the ability to influence organizational
decisions becomes paramount. In high-coUectivist societies such as China, individuals are
committed to the group and they see themselves in a network of relationships. For these
individuals, the need to be part of the decision-making process in the organization is less
important than for individuals fi*om low-collectivist societies (Meindl et al., 1989).
It is unlikely that participation will be effective in Chinese society, which is high-power
distance and high-collectivist. Chow et al. ( 1 996) also drew attention to the fact that participation
is more likely to succeed in a society which has a highly individualist culture as in the US. On the
other hand, participation in a culture that emphasizes collectivism such as in China (Hofstede,
1993) would not be successful in inducing goal congruence, communication, and coordination.
Hofstede (1984, p. 394) also pointed out that subordinates in large-power distance countries
^ According to Gul and Tsui (1993) and Perera (1989), it is necessary to examine the pertinent dimensions in
the context of each study. In most cross-cultural studies, only the pertinent dimensions are used to explain cross-
cultural differences in management control system (e.g.. Chow et al., 1996; Harrison et al., 1994; O'Connor,
1995). Specifically, there is a substantial amount of literature that supports the association between individualism
and participation (see Chow et al., 1991; Harrison, 1992; Lincoln & McBride, 1987). In addition, Frucot and
Shearon's (1991) study provided evidence that power distance is an important cultural variable in explaining
participation as well. It can also be argued that the most important characteristic of long-term orientation is the
notion of wu lun, which is consistent with the dimension of power distance, characterized by the respect of
authority and unequal relationships among people. Therefore, only these three dimensions are considered relevant
for the context of this study.
^ For power distance, US had a score of 40 while China had a score of 80. Similarly, the individualism score
for US was 91 and for China was 20.
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have "strong dependence needs . . . and . . . expect superiors to behave autocratically and not to
consult them." Therefore, allowing subordinates to participate in budgetary matters would be
counter to such expectations ofauthoritative leadership styles. In contrast, subordinates in small-
power distance countries would prefer to participate in budgetary decision (O'Connor, 1995).
Thus, on the basis of these cultural dimensions, it is unlikely that participation in the budgetary
process would be successful in China.
Long-term orientation represents the idea of Confucian dynamism, which consists of the
following values: persistence, thrift, having a sense of shame, ordering relationships by status,
and observing this order (Hofstede, 1991). One of the most important characteristics of long-
term orientation is the notion of wu lun, which emphasizes the respect for authority and the
unequal relationships between people. Wu lun consists of five basic relationships: ruler-
subject, father-son, older brother-younger brother, husband-wife, and senior friend-junior
friend. For example, in an organization, the junior manager owes the senior manager respect
and obedience; the senior manager owes the junior manager protection and consideration
(Hofstede, 1991). Hofstede (1991) also found that long-term orientation is correlated with
large power distance. China is classified as long-term while the US is classified as short-
term."^ Therefore, in the Chinese culture that is classified as large-power distance and is long-
term in its orientation, it is likely that participation would be frowned upon since it is
inconsistent with the philosophy of unequal relationships based on the principles of wu lun.
Several control tools such as AIS including MAS information are now available in
Chinese enterprises as a result of the economic structural reforms. For example. Fang and
Tang (1991) drew attention to the fact that there are now concerted attempts to develop
accounting information for both macro- and microeconomic management including sophis-
ticated computerized management information systems. The AIS, in general, and MAS in
particular, are being used at different levels by Chinese manufacturing companies to improve
managerial performance. In this study, the MAS dimensions of scope and timeliness were
selected because of their theoretical links with budgetary participation and managerial
performance. MAS scope refers to the focus, quantification, and time horizon of the
information (Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Gordon & Narayanan, 1984). Traditional MAS
information in terms of scope would include information that is confined to the organization,
financial in nature and essentially historical, whereas broad scope MAS information would
also provide information that is external, nonfinancial, and future-oriented including
probabilistic data. Timeliness refers to the provision of information on request and the
frequency of reporting systematically collected information. A MAS that is characterized by
the existence of high frequency reports and rapid feedback is considered to be more useful
than one that lacks these features (Chenhall & Morris, 1986). Both these features of scope
and timeliness of MAS are likely to positively affect managerial performance. For example,
given the dynamic nature of the business environment, both broad scope and timely
information will assist managers make more informative decisions which in turn will
'* The long-term orientation score for China is 118 while for US the score is 29.
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improve performance (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984). Chenhall and Morris (1986, p. 31)
emphasized the importance of studying this relationship:
Perhaps, most importantly, the effect of different types of MAS on managers' performance
should be investigated. It is hoped that such approaches will enhance our abilities to
understand what types of MAS are appropriate in different situations and, as a result, to
improve the likelihood that MAS will help managers improve their performance and that of
their organizations.
Taken together, both broad scope and timely MAS information are also expected to
facilitate participative budgetary decision making. For example, broad scope MAS informa-
tion would be useful in budgeting and evaluating the costs involved in servicing the diversity
of decisions that managers face. Chenhall and Morris (1986) and Simon, Guetzkow,
Kozmetsky, and Tyndall (1954) refer to the usefulness of broad-based "attention-directing"
and "problem-solving" information to assist managers in pricing and sales, inventory control,
and marketing. This presumably includes setting the sales budget, inventory budget, and
advertising and marketing budget to name a few. Further, the evaluation of budgetary
performance of subunit managers is also likely to be assisted by broad scope, nonfmancial
information regarding managers' reliability, cooperation, and flexibility in the budget setting
process (Chenhall & Morris, 1986; Hayes, 1977). Similarly, the provision of future-oriented
information is likely to complement budgetary participation as this would improve managers'
ability to make more informed decisions and formulate more realistic budgets. Timely MAS
information would enhance the budgetary participation process since it reports on the most
recent events and provides rapid feedback on the budgetary decisions.
National Culture
Budgetary Participation
MAS ^ Managerial
Performance
MAS = Management Accounting System
Fig. 1. MAS = Management Accounting System
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In order to test the joint effects of MAS and budgetary participation on managerial
performance, MAS is identified as the primary independent variable and budgetary partic-
ipation is the moderating variable as shown in Fig. 1.
Budgetary participation is considered a moderating variable because the availability of
MAS in improving managerial performance is likely to be influenced by participation. Thus,
while a positive relationship between MAS and managerial performance is expected, it is
likely to be moderated by budgetary participation; at high levels of budgetary participation, it
is likely that there would be a negative relationship between MAS and managerial perform-
ance for Chinese managers. Chinese managers are expected to be uncomfortable with
participation and this may negate the positive effects of MAS information on managerial
performance. Since participation in decision making is consistent with Western cultural
beliefs, a positive relationship between MAS and managerial performance is expected at high
levels of budgetary participation for Western managers. This reasoning suggests the following
three-way interaction hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1: The interaction effects of MAS and budgetary participation on
managerial performance will be different depending on the cultural background of
the managers. High levels of budgetary participation will be associated with a
negative relationship between MAS and managerial performance for Chinese
managers but will be associated with a positive relationship for Western managers.
3. Methodology
A survey was employed to collect the data for this study. Pilot tests of the Chinese versions
of the different instruments were conducted prior to distribution to ensure that the translations
were valid and reliable. Questionnaires were then distributed to subunit managers in selected
Chinese manufacturing enterprises in Xian, China and English versions to Caucasian subunit
managers in selected manufacturing enterprises in Hong Kong. The English version of the
questionnaire consisting of four parts on the detailed measurement of the variables (as
discussed below) with instructions to the respondents is attached in Appendix A.
3.1. Measurement of variables
Managerial performance was measured through a self-evaluation questionnaire (Mahoney,
Jerdee, & Carroll, 1963). Respondents were asked to rate on a nine-point Likert scale their
own perceived performance on eight subdimensions of planning, investigating, coordinating,
evaluating, supervising, staffing, negotiating, and representing (Brownell & Hirst, 1986; Gul,
1991). An overall score calculated by averaging the eight subdimensions^ was used as a
Most prior studies used the overall measure for performance as the dependent variable. A number of
Chinese managers did not complete the overall measure and in order to improve the sample size, the eight items
were selected as the measure of performance. The high Cronbach's alpha value for the eight items suggests that
this was appropriate.
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measure for managerial performance. There is some criticism of this measure because of its
subjective nature and the leniency bias of such self-rating scales. Empirical evidence,
however, suggests that such concerns regarding subjectivity are unwarranted (Heneman,
1974; Venkatraman & Ramnujam, 1987) and the evidence regarding the extent to which self-
ratings exhibit a leniency bias is equivocal (Nealey & Owen, 1970). A Cronbach's alpha
value of .88 showed satisfactory convergence of the items.
Budgetary participation was measured by using Milani's (1975) six-item measurement
instrument (Brownell, 1982b). The items measured subjects' perceptions of the amount of
influence and involvement that a manager has on a jointly-set budget. Cronbach's alpha for
the scale was .82.
MAS was measured by using the two dimensions adapted from the Chenhall and Morris'
(1986) instrument. First, only the dimensions of scope and timeliness were examined, while
Chenhall and Morris also examined the dimensions of aggregation and integration. Our
selection of scope and timeliness is based on its theoretical linkages to budgetary participation
(Gul, Shields, Fong, & Kwok, 1995) and performance (Gordon & Narayanan, 1984). Second,
Chenhall and Morris evaluated the "perceived usefulness" ofMAS, whereas in this study, we
measured the "availability" of MAS. This modification was necessary since the dimensions
of a MAS may be perceived to be "useful" but if they are not available, they are unlikely to
have any impact on performance.
Nine questions based on the Chenhall and Morris (1986) instrument were included in the
questionnaire in order to evaluate the availability of MAS scope and timeliness character-
istics. Of these, five questions focused on the availability of external, nonfinancial and future-
oriented information, i.e., broad scope characteristics. Four questions were asked on the
frequency and speed of reporting in establishing the information characteristic of timeliness.
It was decided to combine these items since factor analysis revealed that all the items loaded
significantly on one factor. Cronbach's alpha for the nine items was .79.
Cultural background was operationalized in terms of dummy variables with representing
Chinese and 1 representing Western subunit managers, respectively.
Demographic statistics are given in Table 1. Descriptive statistics for the independent
variable, MAS, and the moderating variable, budgetary participation, as well as the
dependent variable, managerial performance for both Chinese and Western managers, and
Table 1
Demographic statistics
Mean
Chinese managers (N= 51)
Age 39.11
Experience 17.33
Western managers (N= 38)
Age 35.76 (r = 0.1586)
Experience 16.71 (r = 0.7585)
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their average scores for each subdimension, characteristic, and item for the above variables
are given in Table 2.
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Panel A: summarized dimensions
Variables Mean^ Standard deviation Actual range Theoretical range
Chinese managers (N= 51)
Managerial performance (Y)
MAS (Xi)
Budgetary participation (^2)
Western managers (N= 38)
Managerial performance (Y)
MAS (Xi)
Budgetary participation (X2)
5.92 1.54
3.96 1.17
4.04 1.12
6.59 1.34
3.95 1.11
5.15 1.17
2.00-8.50
1.78-6.56
1.00-6.50
1.88-
1.67-
1.00-
6.50
6.83
1.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-7.00
Panel B: summarized subdimensions
Variables Average Standard deviation Actual range
\
Chinese managers (N= 51)
Managerial performance (Y)
Subdimension 1 5.82 1.58
Subdimension 2 5.98 2.01
Subdimension 3 6.43 1.92
Subdimension 4 5.96 1.87
Subdimension 5 6.04 2.37
Subdimension 6 4.94 2.63
Subdimension 7 6.22 2.19
Subdimension 8 5.67 2.19
MAS (X,)
Characteristic 1 4.69 1.77
Characteristic 2 3.31 1.73
Characteristic 3 3.27 2.03
Characteristic 4 4.27 1.86
Characteristic 5 3.02 1.75
Characteristic 6 3.90 1.84
Characteristic 7 3.94 2.11
Characteristic 8 3.84 1.77
Characteristic 9 3.65 1.98
Budgetary participation (X2)
Item 1 4.22 1.72
Item 2 4.39 1.60
Item 3 4.06 1.85
Item 4 4.00 1.73
Item 5 3.65 1.44
Item 6 3.92 1.81
1.00-8.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
0.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
1.00-
0.00-
0.00-
1.00-
0.00-
0.00-
0.00-
0.00-
0.00-
7.00
6.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
7.00
1.00-7.00
0.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
(Continued on next page)
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Table 2 (continued)
Panel B: summarized subdimensions
Variables Average Standard deviation Actual range
Western managers (N= 38)
Managerial performance (Y)
Subdimension 1
Subdimension 2
Subdimension 3
Subdimension 4
Subdimension 5
Subdimension 6
Subdimension 7
Subdimension 8
MAS (Xi)
Characteristic 1
Characteristic 2
Characteristic 3
Characteristic 4
Characteristic 5
Characteristic 6
Characteristic 7
Characteristic 8
Characteristic 9
Budgetary participation (Xj)
Item 1
Item 2
Item 3
Item 4
Item 5
Item 6
6.58 1.67
6.61 1.37
7.05 1.66
6.61 1.64
6.50 1.96
6.13 2.32
6.84 1.94
5.71 2.13
4.45 1.61
3.45 1.84
4.32 1.76
3.76 1.55
3.29 1.61
3.37 1.65
3.63 2.17
4.16 1.67
4.05 1.58
5.24 1.63
4.82 1.56
4.55 1.77
5.32 1.45
5.82 1.47
5.13 1.63
1.00-9.00
4.00-9.00
3.00-9.00
1.00-9.00
0.00-9.00
0.00-9.00
2.00-9.00
0.00-9.00
0.00-7.00
0.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
0.00-6.00
0.00-7.00
0.00-6.00
0.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
1.00-7.00
X] = availability of MAS scope
^ Mean of the overall score
and timeliness information; X2 = budgetary participation,
for each variable.
A correlation matrix for MAS, budgetary participation, and performance is given in Table
3. As expected, the correlation matrix shows that both MAS and budgetary participation are
positively correlated to managerial performance with a significant positive correlation
between MAS and budgetary participation as well.
3.2. Sample size and data collection
The sample consists of Chinese and Western subunit managers drawn from a cross-section
of different manufacturing companies in Xian, China and Hong Kong, respectively. The
managing directors and personnel managers of selected manufacturing companies were
personally approached by the researchers to assist in questionnaire distribution to subunit
managers of three large manufacturing enterprises in Xian, China and four large manufactur-
ing enterprises in Hong Kong. A total of 124 questionnaires were distributed. Ninety-five
questionnaires were returned with six unusable questionnaires representing a response rate of
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Table 3
Correlation matrix^
Variable Y Xx X2
Managerial performance (7)
MAS {X\)
Budgetary participation {X2)
1.00
0.28*
0.50**
1.00
0.27* 1.00
Xi = availability of MAS scope and timeliness information; ^2 = budgetary participation.
'' Based on all the summarized average scores.
* P<.01.
** p<m\.
72%. The mean age of the respondents was 40 (range 21-66) and mean experience was 17
years (range 1-39).^
3.3. Data analysis
To test the hypothesis, the following multiple regression model is employed (Eq. (1)):
F = a + PiXi + 32^2 + (33^3 + %X, X2 + 35^2^3 + 36^1^3 + 37^1^2^3 (1)
where Y= managerial performance; Xx = availability of MAS scope and timeliness
information; Jl2 ^ budgetary participation; ^13 = dummy variable for cultural background,
representing Chinese managers, 1 representing Western managers; X1X2, X\X^, ^2^3,
X1X2X3 = interaction terms; Hi: Pyt^^O.
The multiplicative interaction term is expressed as the cross-product "... occurring
between independent variables in their effect on the dependent variable" (Southwood,
1978, p. 1155). It is used to test the interaction effects of the availability levels of MAS,
budgetary participation, and cultural background on managerial performance in the multiple
regression model. If the 3 for the interaction term does not equal to 0, this implies that the
interaction is significant. For a significant interaction, it is insufficient to examine only the
interaction term because the algebraic sign of the interaction term only gives an indication of
whether the effects are in the hypothesized direction (Gul & Tsui, 1995; Schoonhoven, 1981).
A partial derivative equation is calculated from the main regression equation to determine the
nature and direction of the interaction. Since the focus of this study is on the interaction
effects between budgetary participation, MAS, and cultural background on managerial
performance, the effects of the independent and moderating variables on the dependent
variable individually need not be interpreted. The question of multicollinearity, which is
common in multivariate models, is also a nonissue in this analysis^ (Govindarajan & Fisher,
1990; Gul & Tsui, 1995; Gupta & Govindarajan, 1989).
As shown in Appendix A, information on gender was not requested.
They argued that through a priori linear shifts in the origin points ofXi and Xj, the correlations between ^^1X2
and both X^ and X2 can always be reduced to 0. Since it is mathematically proven that these represent mere shifts
in the origin points of Xi and X2, they are meaningless and do not affect the information value of ^'1^2. As such,
multicollinearity is a nonissue.
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4. Discussion of results and conclusions
Panel A of Table 4 reports the regression results for two sets of equations based on
average scores for the different variables. Equation A gives the regression results for
MAS, budgetary participation, cultural background, and their two-way interactions on
managerial performance. Equation B shows the results for the same regression with the
addition of the three-way interaction term, which is significant (37 = .51, P<.05). With
the introduction of the three-way interaction term, the adjusted R^ significantly
increases by 4%. The findings of both Equations A and B confirm that there is a
significant three-way interaction between budgetary participation, MAS, and cultural
background of the managers on managerial performance. Additional analyses are run
using factor scores for each variable and results show that they are very similar (Gul
& Chia, 1994).
The three-way interaction term, by itself, does not provide any information on the nature
and direction of the relationships. In order to do this, the interaction term in the regression
equation needs to be explained mathematically in terms of the partial derivative equation
(Govindarajan, 1986). The partial derivative of Equation B in Panel A of Table 4 yields the
following result:
bY/bXi = 0.99 - 0.14X2 - 3.10X3 + 0.51X2X3 (2)
Eq. (2) suggests that the effects of MAS on managerial performance is a function of
budgetary participation and cultural background. In order to further analyze this interaction
relationship for Chinese and Western managers, X3 was set at (for Chinese managers) and 1
(for Western managers) in the following two equations:
Chinese Managers : (3)
bY/bXi =0.99-0.14X2
Western Managers : (4)
bY/bXi = -2.11 +0.37X2
Eq. (3) suggests that for Chinese managers, the positive relationship between MAS and
managerial performance decreases as budgetary participation increases. On the other hand,
Eq. (4) suggests that for Western managers, low levels of budgetary participation is associated
with a negative relationship between managerial performance and MAS, but this relationship
becomes positive at high levels of budgetary participation.^
The evidence supports the hypothesis that the relationship between MAS and
budgetary participation on managerial performance is different depending on the cultural
background of the managers. The finding that there is a negative relationship between
These results are similar for Panels B and C of Table 4 based on factor scores.
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Table 4
Panel A: Based on average scores. Regression results of MAS, budgetary participation, and cultural background
on managerial performance {N= 89)
Variables Equation A Equation B
MAS X^ 0.24 (0.45) 0.99* (0.53)
Budgetary participation ^2 0.23(0.47) 1.00* (0.55)
Cultural background ^3 1.14(1.36) 10.52*** (3.96)
Interaction term X^Xj 0.04 (0. 10) - 0. 14 (0.12)
Interaction term ^2^3 0.25(0.27) -1.70**
Interaction term ;ri^3 -0.55* (0.29) -3.10*** (1.05)
Interaction term ^^1^2X3 26% 0.51** (0.20)
Adjusted R- - 30%
F value 6.07*** 6.44***
Panel B: Based on factor scores. Regression results of MAS (timeliness), budgetary participation and cultural
background on managerial performance (A'^= 89)
Variables Equation A Equation B
MASXi 0.26* (1.70) 0.17 (1.09)
Budgetary participation X2 0.42*** (2.82) 0.49*** (3.36)
Cultural background X^ - 0.07 ( - 0.35) - 0.29 ( - 1 .34)
Interaction term X^Xj 0. 1 2 (0.95) - 0. 1 6 ( - 0.97)
Interaction term X2X3 0.23(0.96) 0.33** (1.37)
Interaction term X^X^ - 0.56* ( - 1.98) - 0.65** ( - 2.37)
Interaction term XiX2Xi - 0.64** (2.59)
Adjusted R^ 23% 28%
F value 5.47*** 5.97***
Panel C: Based on factor scores. Regression results of MAS (scope), budgetary participation and cultural
background on managerial performance (N= 89)
Variables Equation A Equation B
MASXi 0.41*** (2.78) 0.39*** (2.68)
Budgetary participation X2 0.37** (2.53) 0.38*** (2.65)
Cultural background X3 -0.02 (-0.12) -0.08(-0.41)
Interaction term X^Xj 0.07 (0.5 1) - 0.06 ( - 0.43)
Interaction term X2X3 0.16(0.75) 0.18(0.82)
Interaction term X^X^ - 0.37 ( - 1.53) - 0.59** ( - 2.21)
Interaction term JriA'2A'3 - 0.54* (1.80)
Adjusted R^ 23% 28%
F value 6.28*** 6.00***
Standard errors are in parentheses.
Adjusted R" explained by three-way interaction term = 4%.
Xi = availability ofMAS scope and timeliness information; X2 = budgetary participation; A3 = dummy variable for
cultural background, representing Chinese managers, 1 representing Western managers.
* P<.10.
** P<.05.
*** P<.0\.
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MAS and managerial performance at high levels of budgetary participation is therefore
consistent with the cultural characteristics of Chinese society and Hofstede's (1991)
cultural theory. In a large-power distance, high-collectivist, and long-term orientation
society like China, high levels of budgetary participation in the presence of available
management accounting information would not result in high managerial performance.
However, consistent with Western theories underlying the motivational effects of
participation, it was found that there is a positive relationship between MAS and
performance for high levels of budgetary participation for Western managers. A
significant implication of the results concerns the fact that management accounting
theories developed in the Westem context may not be generalizable to the Chinese
environment. These results are also seen to be consistent with Otley's (1980) view that
MAS and budgetary participation constitute an overall control package and are
interdependent. More importantly, the application of this control package should also
consider cultural differences. In order to implement control strategies successfully,
organizational designers should consider these cultural factors.
Another implication of this study is that top management must recognize and proactively
manage differences in culture. In designing management control systems, top managers of
multinational corporations should be aware of the extent to which reward and evaluation
systems and decision-making processes reinforce differences in culture.
This study is subject to the usual limitations of questionnaire survey methodology
(Bimberg, Shields, & Young, 1990). Subjects were not selected at random and general-
izing the results to other organizations should be viewed with caution. The use of
respondents' perceptions to measure the variables has been criticized on the grounds that
they are not objective. This is not a serious limitation since managers' actions and
decisions are based on their perceptions. This study focused on budgetary participation,
certain characteristics of MAS and performance measured in terms of managers'
perceptions of their own performance. Other control tools such as decentralization and
other types of MAS/AIS should be examined in future studies with different measures of
performance such as job satisfaction. Moreover, the classification of cultural differences
was based on Hofstede's (1991) analysis, and it may have been useful to retest the
cultural dimensions of the respondents. These future studies should provide more evidence
regarding the role of control tools and their impact on managerial performance in different
cultural environments.
This study examined the theory that there is a difference between Chinese and
Westem managers' attitudes and behavior towards management control tools. In
particular, this study tested the hypothesis that Chinese managers would not react
positively to budgetary participation because of their cultural background. The partial
derivative analysis showed that the positive influence of MAS on managerial perform-
ance for Chinese managers decreased at progressively higher levels of budgetary
participation. On the other hand, for Westem managers, at low levels of budgetary
participation there was a negative relationship between MAS and managerial performance
but progressively higher levels of participation were associated with a positive relation-
ship between MAS and managerial performance. These results suggest that management
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accounting theories developed in the Western economies may not be generahzable to the
Chinese environment.
Appendix A. Research on managerial performance
This research aims to investigate the effects of MAS, budgetary participation, and
managerial performance. The following questionnaire consists of four pasts which measure
your perceptions of these variables. Please answer all the questions following the instructions
given. Completion of the questionnaire should not take more than 25 min of your time. All
responses will be treated in the strictest confidence and only summarized results will be
published. Your time and cooperation is very much appreciated.
Thank you.
A.l. Part A: Budgetary participation
The following items can be used to describe the role that you play in the development of
the budget for your group. Please respond by circling a number from 1 to 7 on the scale for
each of the following items.
(a) Which category below best describes your activity when the budget is being set? I am
involved in setting:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
All of None of the
the budget budget
(b) Which category below best describes the reasoning provided by your superior when
budget revisions are made? The reasoning is:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very sound Very arbitrary
and/or logical and/or illogical
(c) How often do you state your requests, opinions, and/or suggestions about the budget to
your superior without being asked?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very frequently Never
(d) How much influence do you feel you have on the final budget?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very high amount None
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(e) How do you view your contribution to the budget? My contribution is:
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very important Very unimportant
(f) How often does your superior seek your requests, opinions, and/or suggestions when
the budget is being set?
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Very frequently Never
A. 2. Paft B: Performance evaluation
Effective managerial performance may be regarded as depending on competence in the
areas of managerial activity listed below. For each area of activity, please rate your own recent
performance in each area.
Please respond by placing a number from 1 {very low) to 9 {very high) in the appropriate
space to rate your own recent performance in each area. The following scale should be used
for reference:
Performance: Below average Average Above average12 3 4 5 6 7
Performance
(number
from 1 to 9)
(a) Planning: Determining goals, policies and courses of action;
work scheduling, budgeting, setting up procedures, programming.
(b) Investigating: Collecting and preparing information for records,
reports and accounts, measuring output; inventorying, job analysis.
(c) Coordinating: Exchanging information with people in your
organization in order to relate and adjust programs; advising
and liaison with other personnel.
(d) Evaluating: Assessment and appraisal of proposals for reported
or observed performance; employee appraisals, judging output
records, judging financial reports; product inspection.
(e) Supervising: Directing, leading and developing your personnel;
counselling, training and explaining work rules to subordinates;
assigning work and handling complaints.
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(f) Staffing: Maintaining the work force of your organization; recruiting,
interviewing and selecting new employees; placing, promoting
and transferring employees.
(g) Negotiating: Purchasing, selling or contracting for goods or
services, contacting suppliers, dealing with sales representatives.
(h) Representing: Attending conventions, consultation with other
firms, business club meetings, public speeches, community drives;
advancing the general interests of your organization.
(i) Overall Performance: The following section of the questionnaire seeks some information
relating to your firm's performance in the recent past year. If you have no definite figures
we would appreciate approximate figures.
Please indicate the intervals which best depict your enterprise's performance by circling an
appropriate number for questions (a) and (b).
(a) On average, the growth of sales revenue for the past 3 years is:
Below 10% 1 51-60% 6
11-20% 2 61-70% 7
21-30% 3 71-80% 8
31-40% 4 81-90% 9
41-50% 5 Above 90% 10
(b) On average, the growth of net profit before taxes the past 3 years is:
Below 5% 1 26-30% 6
5-10% 2 31-35% 7
11-15% 3 36-40% 8
16-20% 4 Above 45% 9
5% 5
(c) What was the number of employees when the enterprise started?
What is the number of employees at present?
(d) Which year did your enterprise start its operation?
A. 3. Part C: Management accounting system
Listed below are nine information attributes. Two questions are addressed in relation to
each of them.
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To what extent do you believe your organization's MAS contains this information attribute?
Please circle the relevant number on each of the seven-point scales below your perceptions.
(a) Reports are provided frequently
on a systematic, regular basis
(b) Information which relates to
possible future events (if
historical information is most
useful for your needs, mark the
lower end of the scale).
(c) Nonfinancial information
that relates to production and market
information such growth share etc.
(if you find that a financial
interpretation of marketing information
is most useful for your needs, please
mark the lower end of the scale).
(d) Requested information to
arrive immediately on request.
(e) Quantification of the likelihood
of future events occurring
(e.g., probability estimates).
(f) There is no delay between an
event occurring and relevant
information being reported to you.
Small extent
1 2 3
Small extent
1 2 3
Small extent
1 2 3
Small extent
1 2 3
Small extent
1 2 3
Small extent
1 2 3
(g) Noneconomic information, such as Small extent
costumer references, relations,
attitudes of government and 1 2 3
consumer bodies, competitive threat.
(h) Information on broad factors Small extent
external to your organization,
such as economic conditions, 1 2 3
population growth, technological
developments, etc.
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Great extent
4 5 6
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
Not applicable
7 8 9
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(i) Information supplied to you Small extent Great extent Not applicable
automatically upon its receipt
into information systems or as 1234567 8 9
soon as processing is completed.
A.4. Part D: Background
All responses will be treated in the strictest confidence and only summarized results
are published.
(a) Name of your enterprise:
(b) Nature of your business:
(c) What position do you hold in your enterprise?
(d) How many years of total working experience?
(e) How many years have you held this position?
(f) Date of birth:
Thank you.
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Abstract
This paper compares the positions taken by IAS 38 over brands and the related treatments in France
and Germany. Despite many points of convergence, the paper shows that these two countries, often to
be found in the same cluster of national accounting systems (the "Continental-European" model),
have adopted very different solutions in relation to each other and to IAS 38. The results of the study
highlight the difficulty of international harmonization. They also show that as far as the qualitative
characteristics of accounting are concerned, the frequently made association between Anglo-American
accounting philosophy and "relevance," and between Continental-European accounting philosophy
and "reliability," may not apply when it comes to brand accounting. To resolve this intemational
"disharmony," our paper militates in favor of disclosure of additional information. © 2001 University
of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Intangibles have become an increasingly important factor in economic life and the success
of corporate activities (Duizabo & Guillaume, 1996; Ochs, 1996). For the majority of
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companies, intangibles are essential for progress and a considerable part of the corporate
value. One type of the very broad spectrum of corporate intangibles is brands. Brands can be
defined as any word, tone, symbol or design to identify and distinguish one product or group
of products from other products (Plasseraud, Plasseraud, & Dehaut, 1994). However, brands
are more than just the name or sign. In a broader sense, they create a unique image of the
branded product or service, its quality and attributes as perceived by customers (Meffert &
Burmann, 1998, p. 81; Smith, 1997, pp. 38-44; see also Kapferer, 1998). In the consumer
product industry particularly, they are regarded as a key competitive factor influencing
consumer preferences for a product and, therefore, the corporate sales level.
'
Because of the importance of brands for the economic development of certain businesses,
their accounting treatment has been a matter of debate and controversy in many countries, for
example, in Australia and the United Kingdom, where companies such as Grand Metropolitan
and Rank Hovis McDougall decided in 1988 to include the value of brand names, either
purchased or internally developed, in their consolidated balance sheets (among others see
Barwise, Higson, Likierman, & Marsh, 1989; Power, 1992). In France, too, the consequence
of accounting for intangible assets, including brands, is important for certain companies
because of their potential relative significance in the presentation of the balance sheet. For
example, in 1998, brands represented 22.8% of the balance sheet total for "Remy Cointreau"
and 11.9% for "Danone" (X, 1999a). The most remarkable transaction concerning brands in
Germany was the acquisition of the "Rolls-Royce" and "Bentley" brands by BMW and VW
in 1998. For Beiersdorf there is an assumption that the "Nivea" brand is more valuable than
the balance sheet total (Breit, 1997).
Against this background, the International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC) issued
its International Accounting Standard 38 in July 1998 (IAS 38, intangible assets, see Gelard,
1998; lASC, 1998b), following the publication of two Exposure Drafts (E50, June 1995, see
Gelard, 1995; lASC, 1995; X, 1995a, 1995b and E60, August 1997, see lASC, 1997). The
standard sets out proposals for the recognition, measurement, amortization, and disclosure of
intangible assets. Accounting treatment of brands is included in the scope of this text.
It is often stressed that the process and outcome of lASC standard setting are very much
influenced by the Anglo-American accounting approach, which theoretically emphasizes
"relevance." This is considered one of the major reasons why countries with other
accounting approaches are clearly reluctant to adopt the international accounting standards.
That is particularly true of countries belonging to the "Continental-European conception,"
which is supposed to stress reliability, objectivity, and prudence in income calculation. It is
thus highly interesting to examine whether the treatment described in IAS 38 differs from
accounting practice in Continental-European countries, and to consider if the content of the
standard could easily be adopted by enterprises in those countries. This is the main objective
' An empirical study (sample of 400 companies) carried out in Germany indicates that more than 80% of
managers are convinced that the importance of brands has increased considerably during the last few years. At the
same time, taking all industries together, brand values represent on average 56% of the market values of German
companies (Wermelkirchen, 1999).
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of our paper, which compares the positions taken by standard IAS 38 over brands with the
related treatments" in two countries not often studied together: France and Germany.
The remainder of our paper proceeds as follows. The next section presents the recognition
of brands as an asset, covering such fundamental problems as the definition of intangible
assets, the principles governing the recognition of brands (acquired or self-generated) and
initial measurement of brands. Section 3 describes the subsequent measurement (amortiza-
tion, revaluation, and value recovery) and Section 4 suggests some limitations of our study
and directions for future research. Section 5 presents the conclusions.
2. Recognition of brands as an asset and initial measurement
Because brands are intangible items, their recognition on the balance sheet primarily
depends on their compliance with the definition of intangible assets. The classification of
intangibles as assets is therefore the preliminary step in our investigation.
2.1. Definition of intangible assets
IAS 38 (para. 7) defines an intangible asset as an "identifiable nonmonetary asset without
physical substance held for use in the production or supply of goods or services, for rental to
others, or for administrative purposes." An asset "is a resource (a) controlled by an enterprise
as a result of past events; and (b) from which fiiture economic benefits are expected to fiow to
the enterprise." The standard indicates (LAS 38, para. 8) that "enterprises frequently expend
resources, or incur liabilities, on the acquisition, development, maintenance or enhancement
of intangible resources such as . . . trademarks (including brand names and publishing titles)."
Not all intangible items meet the characteristics of an intangible asset, that is, "identifiability,
control over the resource and existence of fiiture economic benefits" (IAS 38, para. 9).
IAS 38 requires an intangible asset to be "identifiable to distinguish it clearly fi^om
goodwill" (para. 10), which is the case "if the asset is separable" (para. 11). Separability
exists "if the enterprise could rent, sell, exchange or distribute the specific future economic
benefits attributable to the asset without also disposing of future economic benefits that flow
fi-om other assets used in the same revenue earning acdvity" (para. 11). But it may also be
possible to prove the identifiability of an asset in some other way (see IAS 38, para. 12). LAS
38 assumes that "an enterprise controls an asset" if it "has the power to obtain the future
economic benefits fiowing from the underlying resource and also can restrict the access of
others to those benefits" (para. 13). Future economic benefits may "include revenue from the
sale of products or services, cost savings, or other benefits resulting fi*om the use of the asset
by the enterprise" (para. 17).
The definition and explanations given by LAS 38 are much more detailed than German and
(particularly) French texts on the subject. In Germany, intangible assets, like tangible assets, are
not legally defined. The general definition of an asset, derived in German accounting tradition
The notion of "treatments" comprises accounting rules, principles, and company practices.
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from the "principles of proper accounting" {Grundsdtze ordnungsmdfiiger Buchfuhrung) and
the purposes of financial accounting, in fact applies to tangibles as well as intangibles. Thus,
intangible assets are all items that correspond to the general asset definition, and are fixed but
not tangible (i.e., without physical substance) or financial (Haller, 1998, p. 564). The major
formal difference compared to the lASC definition is that the German definition does not
explicitly stress the characteristic ofa "future economic benefit." It speaks about an "economic
value" inherent to an item, and this generally but not necessarily implicitly incorporates the
idea of a future economic benefit (Hommel, 1997, p. 352; Moxter, 1986, pp. 246-247). The
two predominant components of the German asset definition are quite similar to the lASC
approach, in that an asset must be identifiable and independently and reliably measurable
(Baetge, 1996, pp. 148-155; Haller, 1998, p. 575; Hommel, 1997). Idenfifiability means that
the item can be separated from the business and its economic benefits can be disposed of
separately in any form. Thus, in terms of separability of the item from the enterprise, and its
independent and reliable measurability, the definition of intangible assets in Germany is quite
similar to that given by the lASC (Haller, 1998, p. 575; Hommel, 1997, p. 363).
In France, however, the General Accounting Plan {Plan comptable general) 1982 (CNC,
1986, 1.33; Orsini, Gould, Mc Allister, & Parikh, 1998) defines intangible assets as being
fixed assets other than tangible or financial assets, with a fixed asset being defined as an asset
acquired for long-term use in the operation of the business. The general definition of an asset
is "... an element of net worth which has a positive economic value for the firm." (The
concepts of "identifiability" and "separability" are not dealt with). Therefore, intangible
assets are recognized only by comparison with tangible assets, which correspond to real rights
over tangible objects. The new version of the General Accounting Plan, dating from 29 April
1999 (X, 1999c), no longer provides a definition of intangible assets. However, the general
opinion is that the definition given in 1982 is still valid.
It could therefore be claimed that the German and French definitions of intangible assets
are not in contradiction with the IAS 38, but are simply less specific. Nevertheless, they are
not totally comparable because of the differences in the general asset definition regarding the
characteristic of "friture economic benefits" (see Table 1).
2.2. Principles for recognition of brands
In IAS 38 (brands are mentioned on several occasions, most importantly in the overall
definition of intangible assets), and also the accounting rules in France and Germany,
brands are regarded as a type of intangible item whose recognition could become possible
or even necessary.
Table 1
Definition of intangible assets
IAS 38 France Germany
Identifiable, nonmonetary
assets without physical
substance
Fixed assets other than
tangible or financial
No legal definition. In practice:
fixed assets other than tangible
or financial
H. Stolowy et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 147-167 151
IAS 38 has made a considerable effort to clarify matters by indicating (para. 18) that an
intangible item should be recognized as an asset if it "meets the definition of an intangible
asset" mentioned above, plus two additional "recognition criteria set out in the Standard":
(a) "it is probable that the future economic benefits that are attributable to the asset will
flow to the enterprise"; and
(b) "the cost of the asset to the enterprise can be measured reliably" (para. 19).
Before looking into the possibilities for recognizing brands in France and Germany, we
should remember that Articles 9 and 10 of the Fourth Directive, No. 78/660/EEC of 25 July
1978, stipulate that, in order to be included in balance sheet assets, brands should be:
• either "acquired for valuable consideration and need not be shown under goodwill";
• or "created by the undertaking itself, in so far as national law permits their being shown
as assets" (EEC, 1978, Article 9 C).
This European Directive lacks precision and therefore leaves European Union countries
considerable scope for initiative. In France and Germany, this part of the Directive was turned
into a simple rule concerning the format ofthe balance sheet. Although France goes so far as to
cite brands in the balance sheet headings for intangible assets, they are not explicitly mentioned
in the corresponding balance sheet position under German rules (HGB -Handelsgesetzbuch
(Commercial Code) -para. 266 [2]), but they are covered as they belong to the term
gewerbliche Schutzrechte (industrial property rights), which are mentioned in the national rule.
Looking at the conditions of recognition in more detail, differences between the three
regarded sets of rules become obvious.
2.2.1. Probability offuture economic benefits
According to LAS 38 (para. 20), "an enterprise should assess the probability of future
economic benefits by using reasonable and supportable assumptions that represent manage-
ment's best estimate of the set of economic conditions that will exist over the useful life of the
asset." In Germany, as already mentioned, future economic benefits are not explicitly referred
to in the intangible asset definition. In France, the same applies for individual financial
statements. However, the new regulation on consolidated accounts (X, 1999b, para. 2111)
includes the requirement of future economic benefits.
2.2.2. Reliable measurement of cost
Brand value, as a key management responsibility, should be assessed, monitored,
maintained, and enhanced for the following reasons: (1) maximization of shareholder value
through maximization of brand value, (2) estimation of the value of a company in the context
of mergers and acquisitions, (3) determination of royalties for brands, and (4) for accounting
purposes. While many companies include brands on balance sheets, many also charge
subsidiaries for access to and use of brands (e.g.. Nestle), and many companies are acquired
as much for their brands as for their tangible assets (e.g., Nabisco, Jaguar). Brands must also
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be valued because they are increasingly the subject of litigation. The more valuable they are
perceived, the more companies are prepared to spend to defend their values. One role of
assessing the value of brands is to convince the courts of the gravity of the offense and to help
the court assess the damage in settlement.
Besides the need to identify the asset, the key issue in brand valuation is the selection of an
appropriate valuation method, which is based on a subjective process emphasizing economic
benefits. Various valuation methods are discussed and proposed in literature and used in
practice. In general, these methods can be divided into three approaches: the cost approach
(historical cost method or replacement cost method), the income approach (namely the
royalty-relief method, and all types of discounted cash-flow and earnings methods), and the
market approach (comparison with other transactions) (see among others Barwise et al., 1989,
pp. 53-76; Haigh & Perrier, 1997; Kahn, 1997; La Villeguerin, 2000/2001; Medus, 1990;
Nussenbaum, 1991; Reilly & Schweihs, 1998, pp. 426-433; Roeb, 1994, pp. 80-133;
Sattler, 1995; Smith, 1997; Viale, 1991).
In practice, the accounting policy followed for brand recognition and, in particular, the
choice of a valuation method, depends on the way the brands have been obtained by the
enterprise: separate acquisition (including acquisition without charge or by exchange),
acquisition as part of a business combination (mergers or acquisition of subsidiaries), or
internal generation.
2.2.2.1. Separate acquisition. According to IAS 38 (para. 23), "if an intangible asset is
acquired separately," its cost "can usually be measured reliably." This is particularly so when
the purchase consideration is in the form of cash or other monetary assets." When a brand is
acquired by exchange (or as part of an exchange) with another asset (tangible or intangible), it
must be measured at its fair value, "which is equivalent to the fair value of the asset given up
adjusted by the amount of any cash or cash equivalents transferred" (IAS 38, para. 34).
In France, brands acquired for a consideration are treated as intangible fixed assets and as
such are recorded under the heading Concessions et droits similaires, brevets, licences,
marques, procedes, logiciels, droits et valeurs similaires (Concessions and similar rights,
patents, licenses, brands, processes, software, rights, and similar assets). Like all other
assets, the value recorded is the acquisition cost paid (La Villeguerin, 2000/2001; Viale &
Lafay, 1990). An asset acquired by way of an exchange should be recognized at its market
value, which is the price that would have been paid under normal market conditions (i.e., in
an arm's-length relationship). Measurement of acquired brands is therefore similar under
IAS 38 and French rules. Furthermore, the National Accounting Council (Conseil national
de la comptabilite, CNC), the standard-setting body attached to the Ministry of Economy
and Finance, set up a committee to work on brands in 1990-1991. This committee issued a
report (CNC, 1992) in April 1992: it refers to acquired brands without discussing their
recognition and measurement.
In Germany, until the adoption of the Markengesetz (MarkenG, Brands Act of October 25,
1994), it was not possible to sell a brand separately, but only with the whole enterprise or with
the business of an enterprise possessing the brand. Today, a brand itself can be sold separately
without any connection to the sale of the whole enterprise or parts of it (MarkenG, para. 27).
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Because reliable cost measurement is the predominant requirement for recognition of an
intangible asset, recognition depends on the acquisition being for a consideration, which
gives a reliable indication for measurement. Therefore, a brand, like all other intangible
assets, must be recognized at acquisition cost if it has been acquired for a consideration
(Coenenberg, 1996, pp. 83; Keitz, 1997, pp. 66-68). Brands acquired by way of exchange
can be initially measured either at the fair value of the asset given up or at its carrying amount
(Knop & Kilting, 1995, pp. 1047-1048).
In the event of separate acquisition of a brand, IAS 38 and both French and German
accounting rules require initial measurement of the brand to be based on the acquisition cost,
and so only the historical cost approach is appropriate. The definition of acquisition cost is
similar in the three sets of rules. It comprises purchase price, including any import duties and
nonrefiindable purchase taxes, and any directly attributable expenditure on preparing the asset
for its intended use. There is only one difference, relating to the treatment of professional fees
and legal charges, which are not included in France. With regard to brands acquired by way
of exchange, the three sets of rules are similar.
2.2.2.2. Acquisition as part of a business combination (merger or consolidated financial
statements). IAS 38 (para. 27-32) covers the treatment of intangibles acquired as part of a
business combination as defined in IAS 22 (lASC, 1998a). In this context, the cost of an
intangible asset "is based on its fair value at the date of acquisition" (IAS 38, para. 27).
Judgement is needed to determine whether the fair value of the intangible asset can be
ascertained with sufficient reliability. In such cases, IAS 38 (para. 28) states that "quoted
market prices in an active market provide the most reliable measurement of fair value." "If
no active market exists for an asset, its cost reflects the amount that the enterprise would have
paid, at the date of the acquisition, for the asset in an arm's length transaction between
knowledgeable, and willing parties, based on the best information available" (para. 29). IAS
38 also cites several other methods to estimate the fair value, e.g., multiplicators or
discounted cash flows (LAS 38, para. 30), and concludes, "if the cost (i.e., fair value) of
an intangible asset . . . cannot be measured reliably, that asset is not recognized as a separate
intangible asset but is included in goodwill (LAS 38, para. 31-b)."
Because it is usually difficult to arrive at separate evaluations of brands acquired as part of
a business combination, then as we understand IAS 38, the first consolidation will only
seldom lead to separate recognition of a brand because of the lack of sufficient reliability in
measurement (see also LLarding, 1995, p. 9). IAS 38 actually leaves companies the option of
whether to separate the brand or to include it in goodwill. Additionally, the Basis for
Conclusions for IAS 38, para. 37-b (lASC, 1998c), a separate document prepared by the
LASC Staff giving their reasons for supporting or rejecting alternatives on certain specific
issues, does not explicitly require an active market for an intangible asset to be separated from
goodwill in a business combination and measured at fair value. In the final analysis, as the
treatment of goodwill is consistent with that of intangible assets, separate recognition of
brands is only a question of disclosure and additional information and has no material impact
on net income (at least as long as amortization is the same for goodwill and brands) (lASC,
1998c, para. 57-59).
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The Fourth (EEC, 1978) and Seventh European Directives (EEC, 1983) do not include any
explicit advice on how to treat intangible assets acquired through a merger or with a
subsidiary. Implicitly, however, it can be concluded that such assets, if identifiable, should be
recognized and measured separately.
The position taken by the lASC differs slightly from French rules and practice. In
France, when an enterprise is first included in consolidated accounts, brands may be
capitalized in recording the difference between the cost of acquiring a company and the
proportion of the net assets acquired, including profits for the accounting year to date. This
difference comprises two elements: firstly, the positive or negative valuation differences on
certain identifiable assets when restated at fair value, and secondly, a remainder, which
cannot be allocated, called the "acquisition difference" (goodwill). With respect to
valuation differences, the National Accounting Council specifies, in an Opinion dated
January 15, 1990 (CNC, 1990), that "among these identifiable elements should be included
intangible assets, which have not been included in the individual company accounts:
commercial networks, market shares, databases, etc." The CNC opinion does not mention
brands specifically, but commentators (and French companies) made two remarks following
the publication of the Opinion:
• logically, it is possible to argue that brands are more easily identifiable than market
shares, which are explicitly mentioned in the Opinion;
• the presence of the "etc." at the end of the sentence leaves the list open to
additional items.
Consequently, in practice a certain number of French companies allocate a part of the
difference on first consolidation to brands. In fact, according to the annual review by a group
of accounting firms of published annual reports for 1998 (X, 1999a), 48 of the hundred
groups reviewed allocate a part of the consolidation difference to brands, and in some cases
the brands concerned amount to more than 20% of the balance sheet total.
To confirm the analysis of the 1 990 Opinion by commentators, the new regulation on
consolidated financial statements (X, 1999b, para. 2111) explicitly quotes brands in the list of
identifiable intangible assets, thus clearly saying that brands can be recognized as assets
within the context of a business combination.
As far as the valuation of brands is concerned, several methods exist side by side, as
presented in literature and more particularly in the National Accounting Council report (CNC,
1992). Methods based on the capacity to generate future cash flows (or profitability methods)
can be used to value a brand in the context of a merger or the first consolidation of an
acquisition, in order to separate the valuation difference into identifiable components. The
royalty-relief method is the most standard approach and, if applicable, the most often used for
brand valuation in France (La Villeguerin, 2000/2001).
In Germany, if the acquisition cost is higher than the proportional net asset value of the
acquired subsidiary, the difference on first consolidation must be allocated between the
various assets, or offset against certain liabilities of the acquired company (HGB, para. 301 al.
1, s. 3). The portion of the consolidation difference that cannot be allocated to specific assets
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has to be treated as goodwill {Geschdfts- und Firmenwert) (HGB, para. 268 al. 2) and
recorded under the balance sheet heading of intangible assets.
Under the generally accepted principles, there is certainly no option on separate recognition
of brands, since it is either obligatory (HGB, para. 246, al. 1) or forbidden (HGB, para. 248 al.
2). If the purchased company possesses (internally generated) brands, the acquiring company
must recognize the brand in its balance sheet if there is a reliable basis of measurement
(Rohnke, 1992; Stein & Ortmann, 1996, p. 788). Because of the difficulties mentioned above
in determining identifiable intangibles and measuring them reliably, the majority of German
companies include the vague amount corresponding to intangibles acquired with a subsidiary
in goodwill. Nevertheless, some authors refer to a possible price arrangement for specific
items in the contract of sale or in the underlying valuations, which might be a value indication
(Richter, 1990, p. 23), while some also list several of the abovementioned methods for brand
valuation and give practical advice for their use (Rohnke, 1992).
While France believes that measurement of brands is sufficiently reliable, the lASC and
Germany have concluded otherwise. How can this difference be excplained? One answer
could be France's long tradition and a great amount of literature dealing with the valuation of
brands. Therefore, the reliability argument is not considered an obstacle to putting "rele-
vance" first. Another reason relates to the fact, already referred to, that separability is not a
specific characteristic in the French definition of an asset. Therefore, there is no need to
comply with a "separability" or "identifiability" requirement in recognizing a brand. A more
practical reason for the transfer from goodwill to brands of part of the difference on first
consolidation could be the positive effect on income for French companies, as brands are
regarded as nonamortizable^ (see below, Section 3).
2.2.2.3. Internal generation. As IAS 38 (para. 39) points out, "it is sometimes difficult to
assess whether an internally generated intangible asset qualifies for recognition." The
standard indicates that, with regard to intangible assets "arising from development (or from
the development phase of an internal project)," special conditions that give more concrete
guidance for recognition must be met (para. 45, a-f). They are "the technical feasibility of
completing the intangible asset so that it will be available for use or sale," the "intention to
complete the intangible asset and use or sell it," "the ability to use or sell the intangible
asset," the demonstration of probable fiature economic benefits, "the availability of adequate
technical, financial and other resources to complete the development and to use or sell the
intangible asset" and the "ability of the enterprise to measure the expenditure attributable to
the intangible asset during its development reliably."
Most surprisingly, without taking into account whether the concrete conditions are fulfilled
or not, IAS 38 (para. 5 1 ) states specifically that "internally generated brands . . . should not be
recognized as intangible assets." This is because the lASC believes "that expenditure on
^ This reasoning is in conformity with the experience of the UK before FRS 10 (ASB, 1997) was adopted. The
treatment of brands was in practice affected by considerations concerning its effect not on taxable income but on
critical accounting ratios (Muller III, 1999).
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internally generated brands . . . cannot be distinguished from the cost of developing the
business as a whole" (IAS 38, para. 52). With this concrete prohibition, the lASC is taking a
very prudent point of view that sfresses reliability.
hi principle, the French viewpoint is opposed to the IAS, but in practice, it conforms to
it. The General Accounting Plan even includes a specific balance sheet heading to record
"expenses incurred to obtain the benefit that comes from the protection afforded ... to the
beneficiary of the operating rights ... to a brand" (CNC, 1986, 1.25; X, 1999c, para.
441). Based on a broad interpretation of this heading, enterprises could include self-
generated brands in their balance sheets. However, in practice, French companies do not
recognize internally generated brands as assets. The major arguments against it are the
high degree of uncertainty as to the nature of expenses that can be capitalized, and the
impact on taxable income, given the close interdependence of financial accounting and
taxation in France.
The first of these arguments against recognition is highly debatable, especially as the CNC
report (CNC, 1992) states that an intangible item developed internally by an enterprise should
be included in the balance sheet fixed assets if:
• it is possible to demonsfrate, with reasonable probability, that the item is capable of
generating fiiture economic benefits in favor of the enterprise;
• it is intended to be used durably in the enterprise;
• and its cost can be calculated in a reliable way, with the help ofa specific individual project.
The CNC report, modeled on the measures adopted in the CNC opinion on computer
software (CNC, 1987), undertakes an in-depth study of the process of brand creation and
proposes step-by-step solutions for recording a brand as an asset, based on the different stages
of this process. All the reasoning is based on the concept of a "project," where the following
seven criteria must be met to record the output (brand) as an asset:
1
.
Specification of the output (brand) (answer to the question: what?);
2. Identification ofthe process to develop this output (brand) (answer to the question: how?);
3. Allocation of human, financial, commercial . . . means (resources) to the project (answer
to the question: with what resources?);
4. Implementation of management tools to control the process, in order to (a) measure the
cost of the brand created, (b) match the expenses to the different steps of the project, (c)
evaluate, at each step, the probability of commercial success or failure (answer to the
question: with what control tools?);
5. Explicit commitment to produce the output (use the brand) whose development is
in process;
6. Reasonable probability of generating fiiture advantages (commercial profitability);
7. Long-term use of the output produced (brand created).
If Criteria 1 to 5 are satisfied, we have a real "project." If Criteria 1 to 5 plus 6 and 7 are
satisfied, the output (brand) can be capitalized. The report goes on to describe the different
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phases of development of a brand and explains when (at which phase) the brand can be
recorded as an asset.
For determining the production cost of a brand produced by the enterprise for its own use,
current accounting discussion in France has concluded that this method is:
• reliable, through use ofthe project concept applied to the brand creation process (see above);
• relevant, according to the CNC (1992), particularly for valuing a recent brand
with a serious chance of commercial profitability but which has not yet attained
its full maturity.
This production cost method leads to separate valuation of the brand, and the result is
relatively objective in the way it is determined (project) and consistent with the standard
accounting measurement approach based on costs. Unfortunately, the CNC report has never
been turned into a standard, probably because of the taxation effect already mentioned.
We have not discovered any official indications in Germany of a similar reflection to that
undertaken in France concerning the recognition of self-generated brands. On the contrary, in
Germany, the recognition of internally generated noncurrent intangible assets is illegal
because of the lack of sufficient reliability of measurement (HGB, para. 248, al. 2; Adler,
During, & Schmaltz, 1995, No. 23 to HGB, para. 248). Without any doubt, brands are
covered by this ban.
The ideas contained in the CNC report are very interesting and show that, contrary to what
is affirmed in IAS 38, solutions exist to calculate the cost of internally generated brands. It
may seem surprising to find a method that is considered both reliable and relevant in France,
although the lASC and Germany believe that reliability is impossible in the field of internally
generated brands, especially given that the criteria (Steps 1 to 7) proposed by the CNC are
quite close to the requirements indicated in IAS 38 (para. 45). We do not think that the French
proposal is less rigorous than systems applied elsewhere, or that French "specialists" are
somehow "cleverer." We believe that the cultural weight of "reliability" is very important
elsewhere and that the French proposal still includes assumptions that leave it open to
criticism and discourage other countries from following its lead.
3. Measurement after initial recognition
When brands are recognized separately, their value must be examined at the balance sheet
date. This may result in (1) amortization, (2) revaluation, or (3) a possible write-down or
write-up.
3.1. General reflections on brand amortization
There is considerable discussion about whether a brand should be subject to amortization
at all, and how to determine its usefiil life. The main arguments against a definite useful life,
and therefore against amortization of brands, are as follows:
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• In many countries the legal protection of brands is unlimited, or at least renewable
indefinitely (e.g., for Community Trademarks within the European Union, in France,
Germany, and the USA). Hence from a legal point of view, the use of a brand is not
limited for its owner.
• Some brands are very old, sometimes reaching 150 years in certain sectors: in France,
for instance, 150 years for champagnes such as "Moet," or cognacs like "Martell" and
"Remy Martin"; 100 to 150 years for mineral water ("Evian," "Vittel," "Badoit,"
etc.); 50 to 100 years for spaghetti ("Lustucru"), chocolate ("Lanvin"), and pastis
("Ricard") (CNC, 1992). Other examples of "old" brand names are "The Times,"
"Coca-Cola," and "Walt Disney." Although the useful life cannot be known with
certainty, particularly in advance, age is an ex post facto proof of a long economic life.
• Some authors argue that the value of a brand is maintained or even increased by huge
advertising expenses, which are recognized as expenses and do not therefore justify
amortization or a limitation of the useful life. In a similar situation, the useful life of
tangible assets would be estimated based on the assumption of regular maintenance. In
addition to this, amortization of the brand would result in double impact on the profit
margins (amortization and maintenance) (Harding, 1997, pp. 81-84;Pizzey, 1991, p. 26).
• There are no doubts about the possibility of a brand value declining, but there are doubts
about the regularity of the decline. Consequently, brands should be subject to write-
downs if necessary but not to regular amortization (Smith, 1997, pp. 104-123; Wild &
Scicluna, 1997, pp. 94-96).
Those in favor of amortization and a limited useful life for brands put forward the
following responses to these arguments:
• For the purposes of financial accounting, the economic approach is more relevant than a
legal point of view (Barth & Kneisel, 1997, p. 474). Although the legal right to use a
brand might last indefinitely, the ability to achieve future economic benefits from this
brand is what settles the question of amortization and useful life. It is not the legal aspect
of a brand that creates future economic benefits but the higher sales of products, the
stabilized connections between customers and the branded products, and the savings on
advertising expenses (Barwise et al, 1989, pp. 29-32; Gold, 1998, p. 958; Meffert &
Burmann, 1998, p. 87; Stein & Ortmann, 1996, p. 790). Brands are closely connected
with the product sold under the brand. But products, their technology, customer
expectations, and market conditions change constantly. So if the brand is not supported
by management action to anticipate or oppose these changes, the value of the brand
diminishes quickly (this conclusion has been reached from several different
perspectives, see Barwise et al., 1989, pp. 32-38; Meffert & Burmann, 1998). The
question raised by this argumentation is whether, from this point of view, the brand is
still an identifiable and separable asset, or whether it is in fact too closely connected to
the products or services to allow separate recognition.
• The expenses incurred to maintain a brand, e.g., advertising costs, are not an argument
in favor of an indefinite life. The value of a brand is a certain customer connection that
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leads to higher sales. With time this connection loses strength, then advertising creates
new customer connections. So even when sales levels are constant, they are in fact
different in substance from the original sales. This line of thought thus concludes that
the purchased brand is eventually replaced by an internally generated brand, which
should not be recognized as an asset (Barth & Kneisel, 1997, pp. 476-477; Boorberg,
Striingmann, & Wendelin, 1998, p. 1115).
• Just as there seem to be examples of brands always keeping their value, there are also
brands that have vanished, like "Steinhager" (spirit), "Simca" and "Triumph" (cars)
(Harding, 1997, p. 82; Stein & Ortmann, 1996, p. 791).
In the end, the debate over brand amortization is based on how we understand the function
of amortization. If amortization should reflect current value, there seem to be more objections
than reasons for its application; if amortization is to distribute the recognized amount over a
limited time, there are more arguments in favor of regular amortization (Barth & Kneisel,
1997, p. 474). The rules of the lASC, France, and Germany clearly reflect this discrepancy.
3.2. Amortization of brands under IAS, French, and German accounting rules
According to IAS 38 (para. 63), "after initial recognition, an intangible asset should be
carried at its cost less any accumulated amortization and any accumulated impairment losses."
Later, the standard states (para. 79) that "the depreciable amount of an intangible asset should
be allocated on a systematic basis over the best estimate of its useful life" and that "there is a
rebuttable presumption that the usefiil life of an intangible asset will not exceed 20 years." In
the case of control "achieved through legal rights that have been granted for a finite period,"
the standard adds that "the usefiil life of the intangible asset should not exceed the period of
the legal rights unless: (a) the legal rights are renewable and (b) renewal is virtually certain"
(para. 85). However, because of the existence of economic factors, "the useful life is the
shorter of the periods determined by" economic and legal "factors" (para. 86).
Moreover, "in rare cases, there may be persuasive evidence that the usefiil life of an
intangible asset will be a specific period longer than 20 years. In these cases, the
presumption that the usefiil life generally does not exceed 20 years is rebutted and the
enterprise (a) amortizes the intangible asset over the best estimate of its usefiil life; (b)
estimates the recoverable amount of the intangible asset at least annually in order to
identify any impairment loss. .
.; and (c) discloses the reasons why the presumption is
rebutted and the factor(s) that played a significant role in determining the useful life of the
asset" (para. 83).
The idea that the asset may never be amortized is explicitly mentioned, as the standard adds
that "the usefiil life of an intangible asset may be very long but it is always finite" (para. 84).
Article 35 of the Fourth European Directive of 1978 (para. 1. b) stipulates that "the
purchase price or production cost of fixed assets with limited useful economic lives must be
reduced by value adjustments calculated to write off the value of such assets systematically
over their useful economic lives." This article gives a general definition of depreciation.
However, the Directive does not provide any special guidance for brands, in contrast to
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formation expenses (article 34) and costs of research and development (article 37, para. 2).
Once again, member states enjoy the widest latitude in dealing with brand amortization.
In France, the depreciable nature of brands was the subject of considerable debate in the
report on brands mentioned above (CNC, 1992), due to a lack of clarity in the General
Accounting Plan. The Plan seems (implicitly) to exclude amortization of acquired brands,
because they are not mentioned in the asset subheading "Amortization of concessions,
patents. . ." whereas they are included in the asset heading "Concessions, patents. .
.
brands..." At the same time, a write-down expense is allowed, if necessary: the asset
subheading "Write-down (provision) expense for intangible assets: concessions. . ." includes
brands explicitly. Considering matters from a conceptual point of view, the CNC report added
that there is no irreversible amortization of a brand, and so it concluded that a brand (acquired
or internally generated) should not be amortized. Instead, a regular test of impairment should
be implemented.
In Germany, recognized intangible assets, with the exception of the acquired goodwill,
have to be amortized over their useful life. In this country, recent discussions dealt with the
question of whether a brand has a determined usefiil life and, if so, what the appropriate
period is for financial accounting purposes. In 1996, the federal court for tax affairs
{Bundesfinanzhof) ruled that there is no reliable estimation for a specific limitation of the
useful life and amortization of brands: therefore, brands should not be subject to amortization.
In reaction, the ministry of finance took a contrary position in 1998, declaring that it generally
supposes a usefiil life for brands to be 15 years (the same as for goodwill) if the owner cannot
justify a shorter period. Since accounting for tax purposes and financial accounting are
closely connected in Germany (see Haller, 1992), these statements are in fact relevant for
financial accounting, too.
Since the decision of 1996, several comments have been published in literature (see among
others Barth & Kneisel, 1997; Boorberg et al., 1998). Nearly all authors criticize the decision
of the federal court; in doing so they put forward a range of arguments (most ofthem included
in the list above), and recommend amortization of brands (exception: Pick, 1997). Even the
presumption of 15 years is considered too long. Instead, a useful life of between 3 and 5 years
is proposed. This shorter period is justified by the prudence principle, as there is no reliable
measurement, or by reference to life cycles (Meffert & Burmann, 1998, pp. 96-1 18; Stein &
Ortmann, 1996). For extremely strong brands only, a longer usefial life may be applied
(Boorberg et al., 1998, pp. 1114-1116). These arguments correspond to the general opinion
before the 1996 court ruling (Richter, 1990). Because of the range of opinions, the question of
applying amortization remains unclear for both financial and tax accounting purposes.
A brand acquired in an acquisidon of a whole enterprise (in a merger or other business
combination) and which is not reliably separately identifiable is, as mentioned above,
included in goodwill. This goodwill (and therefore the brand, being part of it) can, in
Germany, be either amortized over a maximum of 4 years or a longer usefiil life, or treated
directly as an expense. If the company opts to amortize intangible assets over more than 4
years, a useful life of 15 years is usually applied in the financial accounts due to a
corresponding fiscal regulation. Goodwill arising from a business combination can addition-
ally be set off against reserves. The considerable number of options in the treatment of
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goodwill arising from a business combination shows that in Germany it is significant whether
a brand is separated from the goodwill and recognized as an identifiable asset or incorporated
in the goodwill. Whereas in the first case it must be amortized over its usefiil life, in the
second it can be amortized over a period of up to 4 years, amortized over the useful life of the
goodwill, directly expensed, or set off against reserves. This means it really matters how a
brand acquired in a business combination is recorded.
And so a general divergence emerges between the German and French accounting
conceptions regarding the amortization of brands, resulting—as already seen—from different
perceptions of the fiinction of depreciation. According to HGB, para. 253, al. 2, s. 2 the
dominant objective of normal depreciation in Germany is not to take account of a fall in value
but to spread the cost over the usefiil life (Coenenberg, 1996, p. 130; Doring, 1995, pp. 926-
928; Moxter, 1996, pp. 215-217). The same reasoning is followed by the lASC (1998, para.
46). The purpose of amortization is therefore clearly defined under IAS and German rules,
whereas in the French General Accounting Plan amortization "hesitates between the
objective of assessing depreciation and that of spreading costs" (Klee, 1992, p. 50).
There are thus important differences between Germany and France with respect to both the
concept and the period of brand amortization. Whilst in Germany brands are treated as
amortizable assets with relatively short lives, in France brands are nonamortizable intangible
fixed assets. LAS 38, with its rebuttable presumption of a useful life no longer than 20 years,
lies somewhere in between these positions, albeit closer to the German position (see Table 2).
3.3. Revaluation
For the valuation of intangible assets at the end of the financial year, IAS 38 defines a
benchmark freatment and an allowed alternative treatment (para. 63-64). The benchmark
treatment is based on the initial measurement minus accumulated amortization and
accumulated impairment losses, as explained above. Under the allowed alternative treat-
ment, "an intangible asset should be carried at a revalued amount, being its fair value at the
date of the revaluation less any subsequent accumulated amortization and any subsequent
accumulated impairment losses. . . . Fair value should be estimated by reference to an active
market" (para. 64). However, as LAS 38, para. 67 specifies, "an active market cannot exist
for brands," as is the case for other intangible assets, like newspapers, mastheads,
publishing rights etc., because "the fransactions are relatively infrequent." Therefore, the
prices for recent transactions do "not provide sufficient evidence of the fair value" of other
Table 2
Amortization of brands
IAS 38 France Germany
• Amortization required over the useful life No amortization Amortization required
• 20 years normally the maximum Impairment possible Generally over 3-5 years,
(rebuttable presumption) limited possibility
• Disclosure if the amortization period exceeds 20 years over 20 years
• Impairment test if amortization period > 20 years
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brands. Due to this lack of a reliable measurement basis, IAS 38 appears not to allow
revaluation of brands.
The situation is absolutely clear in Germany and France. There, in accordance with the
Fourth European Directive (Article 33, para. 1), the revaluation of intangible assets is
generally not allowed. In Germany, due to the strong principle of prudence, revaluation is not
allowed for any asset. In France, the general revaluation option is limited (as it is in Article 33
para. 1 of the Fourth Directive) to tangible fixed and financial assets.
In practice, the positions taken by LAS 38 and the French and German laws lead to the
same result: revaluation of brands is forbidden.
3.4. Recovery of the carrying amount
Brands may be subject to a write-down because of extraordinary conditions that lead to an
unexpected decline in value. Examples of such circumstances are a loss of customer
confidence because of an event such as the "Elch-Test" for Daimler-Benz or a loss of
image such as "Brent Spar" was for Shell (Meffert & Burmann, 1998, pp. 118-119).
To determine whether or not an intangible asset is impaired, an enterprise applies IAS 36
("Impairment of Assets"). In addition to the requirement included in this standard, IAS 38
adds that "an enterprise should estimate the recoverable amount of the following intangible
assets at least at each financial year end, even if there is no indication that the asset is
impaired: (a) an intangible asset that is not yet available for use; and (b) an intangible asset
that is amortized over a period exceeding 20 years fi-om the date when the asset is available
for use" (para. 99).
This mandatory write-down, in the case of impairment, is a direct consequence of the
worldwide-applied principle of "lower of cost or market." Therefore it is compatible with the
French and German rules.
In France, the Commission des Operations de Bourse (COB — French equivalent of the
Securities and Exchange Commission) also indicates that management is responsible for
determining the objective and verifiable numeric criteria upon which the value of elements of
intangible assets may be based year by year (COB, 1991, p. 10; X, 1991).
German rules regarding write-downs differentiate between state-owned corporations and
private companies, current and noncurrent assets, and whether the decline in value is
expected to last for a longer or shorter period. In the standard case of a state-owned company
whose brands are classified as noncurrent assets, the brand must be written down to its fair
value if an event has decreased the value of the brand for quite a long time. If there is a
recovery of value later, the company must restate the brand at the lower of cost or market
(HGB, para. 280).
4. Limitations and directions for future research
The topic of brand valuation has not been developed further here because it represents a
separate topic in itself The reliability and relevance of each of the methods in either Germany
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or France or within the context of lASC standards is open to discussion. It would also be
interesting to address the following questions:
• How do industry norms for tradable assets (e.g., landing slots, franchise rights) differ in
France and Germany?
• What are the limits of market valuation?
• How do companies deal with the following problems encountered in the use of royalty-
relief methods: selection and determination of royalty rates, discount rates, protection/
renewal and length of brand life, and calculation of discounted value on the basis of a
terminal value or to perpetuity?
Harmonization efforts are long-run and evolutionary in nature, with the market ultimately
determining which of the existing alternatives will prevail. Harmonization also requires
countries to change their domestic practices at some point — at least for muhinational
reporting. In this context, our conclusions on the difficulty of harmonization may by limited
by the fact that any assessment as to whether harmonization initiatives have worked or are
working is difficult on a spot basis.
5. Conclusion
The Fourth and Seventh European Directives allow wide latitude for the treatment of
brands, in relation to their capitalization, their valuation and amortization, and the treatment
of the difference arising on first consolidation. This partly explains the emergence of
accounting solutions that may be divergent or even contradictory in different European
countries, as in the examples studied, France and Germany. Table 3 presents the major
differences between the three sets of rules.
Firstly, it becomes obvious that with regard to self-generated brands German standards
have more in common with the lASC opinion than with leading accounting assumptions
in France. In consolidated financial statements, as far as brands are concerned, France
clearly has no hesitation in breaking away from the focus on the prudence principle and
Table 3
Fundamental differences
IAS 38 France Germany
Capitalization of internally
generated brands
Allocation to brands of the difference
arising on first consolidation
Amortization
Impossible
Reliability
Possible in theory,
difficult in practice
Reliability
20 years
Reliabilitv/relevance
Might be possible Impossible
Relevance
Possible and
widely practiced
Relevance
No amortization
Relevance
Reliability
Possible in theory,
difficuh in practice
Reliability
Short amortization
Reliability
164 H. Stolowy et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 147-167
moving towards a more economic approach to accounting. Most surprisingly, the lASC
stresses the reHabihty aspect ("separabihty," "identifiabiUty," and "rehable measurement
of cost") over the relevance aspect in connection with brands. Finally, regarding the
concept and period of amortization of brands, the lASC's position is closer to Germany
than France.
Brand accounting is the focus point of the conflicting relationship between the major
characteristics of accounting data, "relevance" and "reliability." This research shows that
the frequently stated association between the Anglo-American accounting philosophy and
"relevance," and between the Continental-European philosophy and "reliability," may not
apply when it comes to brand accounting (see Table 3). It also questions the research concept
of clustering national accounting systems, because France and Germany, two countries often
found together in the "Continental-European cluster" (Choi, Frost, & Meek, 1999, p. 37),
have adopted very different solutions for brand accounting in relation to each other and to
the lASC.
Although we worked on a spot basis (see above), this paper seems to be a good
illustration of the difficulty of international accounting harmonization. It could be worth-
while to think about other ways of making accounting comparable in the meantime, in
order to avoid fimdamental opposition (we find it difficult to imagine French companies
starting to amortize brands, even over 20 years), for example by providing additional
information in the notes. One idea could be the disclosure of an additional statement of the
breakdown, changes, and values for the most important groups of intangible assets in a
corporation (Haller, 1998, pp. 583-591). This should show to what extent the corporate
value is made up of different sorts of intangibles. Such a statement would have to be
accompanied by additional information, e.g., explaining the brand(s) and its (their)
valuation. Our reflections demonsfrate that brands in particular and intangibles in general
are set to remain a major accounting challenge in the future.
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1. Introduction
Over the last 1 5 years there has been increasing interest in enhancing the harmonization of
accounting and financial reporting by banks. For example, as part of its harmonization
program, the European Union issued in 1986 the Council Directive which contains
regulations on the layout of bank balance sheets and profit and loss accounts.^ The
International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC) also issued International Accounting
Standard (LAS) No. 30: Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar
Financial Institutions (1990) and IAS No. 32: Financial Instruments: Disclosure and
Presentation (1995). And more recently, the Basle Committee (1998a, 1998b) and the
United Nations (1996b) issued studies that attempt to enhance transparency and compara-
bility in banks.
It is argued that the need for international accounting harmonization should be met
by an international accounting organization (Carsberg, 1998). Transnational institutions
(e.g., World Bank, United Nations, European Union, Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development, and the Basle Committee) support the LASC as the
only plausible world harmonizer of accounting (Nobes, 1996). Furthermore, the LASC is
working with the International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) to
bring about the possibility that companies with stock market listings in many countries
can satisfy all the regulatory requirements with one set of accounting standards, LASC
standards. The LASC is also working with the Basle Committee on an exposure draft
that deals with accounting for financial assets and financial liabilities. This covers,
among other things, important matters relating to banks, e.g., how to deal with impaired
loans, how to report borrowings, and how to account for the effect of transactions
undertaken to hedge risks.
The recent global economic crisis also seems to have renewed support to the need for a
lingua franca of financial reporting, thereby giving fiirther endorsement to the work of the
lASC as a vehicle for achieving international harmonization of financial reporting. For
example, it is reported that the Group of Seven leading industrial nations (G7) "will expect
nations to work towards a common accounting practice, which is obviously likely to work
towards companies adopting a common accounting standards."'^ Furthermore, the World
Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) could probably put more pressure on
regulators by tying their loans to use of lASs. It is also reported that the World Bank and IMF
agreed with the Big Five accounting firms that lASs and International Standards on Auditing
"are the standards that should be used by financial institutions in those countries to
accomplish the World Bank and IMF objectives of fostering economic stability."^ The
World Bank would also like to see the Big Five accounting firms stop putting their names to
accounts drawn up under local standards that do not meet international reporting standards."^
' For more details see Arthur Andersen & Co. (1987).
^ Accounting and Business (1998, p. 2).
^ IFAC Quarterly (1998, p. 7).
"* Accountancy International (1998, p. 6).
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These efforts tend to fall in line with the lASC's aim in the longer term to develop "a single
set of high-quality accounting standards for all listed and other economically significant
business enterprises around the world" (lASC, 1998b).^
International accounting harmonization may be defined^'^ as "the process of bringing
international accounting standards into some sort of agreement so that the financial statements
from different countries are prepared according to a common set of principles of measurement
and disclosure" (Haskins, Ferris, & Selling, 1996, p. 29).
It is also argued that harmonization "(often equated with the adoption of IAS) . .
.
implies that accounting is a transaction-specific activity and, therefore, the relationships
among transactions, events, and systems are universal in their application without regard
to geographic, temporal, or systematic differences" (Larson & Kenny, 1996, p. 5-6).
Hence, according to some (e.g., Briston & Wallace, 1990; Wyatt, 1991), harmonization
implies that accounting standards can be the same worldwide. This view is supported by
intemadonal standard-setters who argue that "I have never been convinced that cultural or
economic differences fi^om country to country justify different accounting for similar
business activities in large organizations. Reasonable people, accepting the desirability of
harmonization, should be able to agree eventually on common solutions" (Carsberg,
1995, p. 4).
Wyatt (1992, p. 40) also claims that "the accounting issues in the international arena are
not fundamentally different from those in national arenas."
However, the above view of harmonization is challenged on the grounds that "the
movement towards international harmonization, whose principles should eventually lead to
a certain uniformity in accounting standards, comes into confiict with a number of objectives
of financial statements and, more fundamentally, with the economic, social and cultural
contexts of different accounting systems, and even with some manifestations of national
sovereignty" (Hoarau, 1995, p. 220).
Such a concern is shared by others who are of the opinion that "financial reporting and its
regulation may have multiple purposes reflecting each country's social, cultural and political
environment. . . Thus the original idea of harmonization as moving towards uniformity in
accounting standards across countries may not be achieved as long as social, cultural and
political differences exist across countries" (Hussein, 1996, p. 95).
^ The US Financial Accounting Standards Board (FASB) shares the lASC aim that "ideally, the ultimate
outcome would be the worldwide use of a single set of high-quality accounting standards for both domestic and
cross-boarder financial reporting," but differs with LASC in that "FASB might reorganize itself to become an
international standard setter or that an alternative international structure and process could be established that
meets the FASB's fundamental objectives" (FASB, 1998, pp. 6, 7-8).
^ See also Nobes and Parker (1995), Tay and Parker (1990), and van der Tas (1988, 1992).
^ The literature (e.g., Most, 1994, p. 4) distinguishes between uniformity (the elimination of alternatives in
accounting for economic transactions, other events, and circumstances), standardization (the reduction of
alternatives while retaining a high degree of flexibility of accounting response), and harmonization (the
reconciliation of different accounting and financial reporting systems by fitting them into common broad
classifications, so that form becomes more standard while content retains significant differences).
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Hamid, Graig, and Clark (1993, p. 146) lend support to the cultural influence on the
international harmonization of accounting. They argue that "religion in general and Islam in
particular have the potential to extend [sic] a profound cultural influence in the quest for the
intemational harmonization of accounting.
"
This point is developed further later in the paper.
The accounting firms have also voiced their concern on the issue of harmonization. It is
claimed that "the harmonization of intemational accounting standards. . .is a worthy
objective, but a choice has to be made between the advantages of harmonized standards
and its disadvantages. Users should be particularly wary of cases where the same terminology
in different countries actually represents very different characteristics" (Price Waterhouse,
1990, p. 15).
Goeltz (1991, pp. 85, 86) goes further and argues that "fiill harmonization of
intemational accounting standards is probably neither practical nor tmly valuable. . . A
well developed global capital market exists already. It has evolved without uniform
accounting standards."
In addition to the above, a study by the United Nations (1996a) outlines differences in
national accounting practices and the related obstacles to harmonization. The study suggests
that some differences are caused by unique historical events, some by forces extemal to a
country and some by different purposes for financial reporting. The latter is described as
the most fundamental of the causes of differences (see also Nobes, 1996).
Islamic banks are ethically fiinded organizations that are established in various parts of the
world, particularly in the Middle East. It is generally believed that Islamic banking started to
take off in the aftermath of the boom in the oil prices in 1973-1974 (Moore, 1997; Wilson,
1997). So far, in Iran, Sudan and, to some extent, Pakistan the whole banking system has been
transformed to comply with Islamic Shari'a.^ The growth of this industry has been
remarkable. It is reported that in 1996 the total assets of the 166 Islamic financial institutions
reached US$137 billion.^
Islam does not recognize the separation between spiritual and temporal affairs, and
considers commerce as a matter of morality and is subject to the precepts of the
Shari'a}^ Hence, Islamic banks, like other Islamic business organizations, are established
with the mandate to carry out their transactions in strict compliance with Islamic Shari'a
mles and principles. The business of Islamic banks, therefore, is driven by Shari'a
approved contracts.
Shari'a is the sacred law of Islam. It is derived from the Qur'an (The Muslim Holy book), the Sunna (the
sayings and deeds of Prophet Mohammed), Ijma (consensus), Qiyas (reasoning by analogy), and Maslaha
(consideration of the public good or common need).
^ The Intemational Association of Islamic Banks (1996).
'° The blending of religion and business has also been recently appreciated in other firms. For example,
reflecting on the USA business environment Zelizer (1998, p. 8A) reports that "in the 21st century more religious
leaders will be found in the corporation than in the conventional church" and that "the gap between religion and
the corporate world is narrowing."
R.A.A. Karim / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 169-193 173
Such an approach to business has implications for the vahdity of applying the concept
of 'economic substance over legal form' in accounting for the economic transactions
undertaken by Islamic banks. According to Gambling and Karim (1991, p. 103) "the
conceptual framework of accounting currently applied in the West finds its justification in
a dichotomy between business morality and private morality. As such, it cannot be
(unquestioningly) implemented in other societies which have revealed doctrines and morals
that govem all social, economic and political aspects of life." Indeed, Western accounting
rules are presented as technical, not ethical rules (Karim, 1996a). Hence, in the context of
Islamic banks, if accounting information is to give a faithful representation of the
economic fransactions or events that it purports to represent, it is necessary that they
are accounted for and presented in accordance with the substance as well as form of
Shari'a confracts that govem these transactions or events. For example, murabaha is not
an 'in-substance' purchase finance by a loan, and ijarah muntahia bittamleek is not an 'in-
substance' capital lease."
In 1990, the Accounting and Auditing Organization for Islamic Financial Institutions
(AAOIFI), a private standard setting body, was established by Islamic banks and other
interested parties to prepare and promulgate accounting, (and recently) auditing and
govemance standards based on the Shari'a precepts for Islamic financial institutions.
Karim (1990) claims that Islamic banks have taken the initiative to self-regulate
their financial reporting for fear that the regulatory bodies in the countries in which
they operate may otherwise intervene and mandate the accounting policies of
Islamic banks.
AAOIFI's pronouncements are intended to serve Islamic banks in the various
countries in which they operate. However, like the lASC, AAOIFI has no power to
enforce its standards. Karim (1990) suggests that since Islamic banks mainly operate
in government-driven economies, AAOIFI might find that the only way to implement
its promulgated standards fully was by depending on the cooperation of the national
banking regulators.
This paper examines the impact of the religion of Islam on the international efforts to
harmonize accounting and financial reporting. Whilst earlier efforts (e.g., Hamid et al., 1993)
endeavored from a conceptual perspective to argue for the influence of the religion of Islam
on international harmonization of accounting, their work did not relate to lASs nor to the
accounting practices of Islamic banks.
The paper argues that the structure and processes of Islamic banks do not readily fit in
with those of conventional universal banking, which combines both commercial and
investment businesses. This seems to have resulted in supervisory bodies adopting different
approaches to regulate Islamic banking. Such variations in the regulation of Islamic banking
appear in turn to have resulted in Islamic banks adopting different accounting treatments for
the same transaction, although most of the countries in which these banks operate either
look directly to lASs as their national standards or develop national standards based
Murabaha and ijarah muntahia bittamleek are defined later in the paper.
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primarily on lASs.^^ This rendered the financial statements of Islamic banks noncompar-
able, thereby departing fi^om the concept of comparability which is considered in the lASC
(1989) Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial Statements as one of
the four principal qualitative characteristics that make the information provided in the
financial statements useful for users. This implies that the calls for worldwide adherence to
lASs to achieve harmonization in financial reporting regardless of cultural differences
should not go unchallenged. Rather, Islamic banks should be asked to implement AAOIFI's
standards, as is currently the case in some countries. This would render the financial
statements of these banks comparable because AAOIFI's standards are specifically
developed to cater for the unique characteristics of the Shari 'a contracts that govern the
Islamic banks' financial instruments.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
• A brief account of commercial and investment banking.
• An overview of the characteristics of Islamic banks and discusses investment accounts,
which represent one of the unique financial instruments that are used by Islamic banks
in their mobilization of funds.
• An examination of the approaches pursued by supervisory authorities to regulate
Islamic banking.
• A discussion of the different accounting treatments of investment accounts adopted by
Islamic banks prior to compliance with the pronouncements of AAOIFI.
• Concluding remarks.
2. Commercial and investment banking*^
In the USA, UK, and Japan, commercial banking (broadly comprising receiving deposits,
effecting customers' payment instructions, and providing finance in a variety of ways) is
separated Irom investment banking (including capital market activities on behalf of the bank,
investment management, and corporate financing and advice), although with varying degrees
and forms. However, recent market pressures, among other things, in these countries have
gradually led to the breaking down ofthis separation between the two types ofbanking, thereby
moving towards the German model of universal banking — banks being able to engage in
securities and other activities, including holding equity stakes in nonfinancial corporations.'"^
'^ The problem is that the Islamic transactions do not correspond to the transactions for which the lASs were
intended, and may therefore be applied to them in different ways, none of which is satisfactory, e.g., the
application of IAS 3 1 : Financial Reporting ofInterests in Joint Ventures ( 1 993) to mudaraba or musharaka (these
financial instruments are defined later in the paper).
' TTie information on commercial and investment banking draws irom Cranston (1997) and Dale (1996).
'*
In practice not only does universal banking permit the combination of commercial and investment banks,
but in many places it also enables banks to provide a number of other services such as insurance, real-estate
brokerage, and travel agency (Cranston, 1997, p. 34).
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In the USA, the banking and securities business regulation takes legal form in the
famous 1933 Glass-Steagall Act, which imposes strict separation between commercial and
investment banking. According to this legislation banks are not permitted to undertake
securities business or to own securities firms. This is meant to ensure that the risks incurred
by commercial and investment banks are kept separate. In recent years the Glass- Steagall
Act has been under enormous pressure. Substantial effort has been put into exposing the
historical false underpinning of this Act and to demonstrating that the risks and abuses
were not as great as its proponents claimed. ^^ In addition, the USA regulatory authorities
have recently started to adopt a more liberal interpretation of this statute, thereby
permitting commercial banks to develop significant securities operations through special-
purpose affiliates.
^^
As in the USA, the separation between commercial and investment banking was also
enforced by law in Japan after World War II. However, in line with the general liberalization
of financial markets, the 1992 Financial System Reform Act allowed commercial banks and
securities firms to expand into each other's business territory by establishing separate
subsidiaries.
In the UK, separation between commercial banking and investment banking (also known
in the UK as merchant banks or acceptance houses) was based on tradition:
The institutional history, rather than any policy decision that it was risky to associate
core [commercial] banking with securities activities, seems to explain the distinctive
spheres of activities. The separateness of functions was reinforced by conservatism and
cartelization: there was no desire on the part of insiders to change matters, and outsiders
could not break the mould. Certainly there was no major legal impediment to
multifunctional banking, in which commercial and investment banking are combined
(Cranston, 1997, pp. 21-22).
The amendment of the rules of the London Stock Exchange in 1986 to allow acquisition of
member firms by outsiders, including commercial banks, has eroded the traditional dis-
tinction between commercial and investment banking.'^ Firewalls (to divide the different
firms in the conglomerate legally, financially, and managerially) are often erected to prevent a
securities subsidiary of a commercial bank exposing the bank to securities market risk as a
result of problems with the subsidiary.
In contrast to the USA, Japan, and the UK, the law and custom, in Germany have long
sanctioned universal banking:
Private bankers engaged in deposit taking, lending, and securities underwriting from the
eighteenth century, and the joint-stock banks of the nineteenth century operated as universal
banks from the outset (Cranston, 1997, p. 22).
^^ See, for example, Benston (1990).
'^ At the time of writing this paper, it was reported that the US Administration and Congress have reached an
agreement to roll back the restrictions of the Glass -Steagall and Bank Holding Company Act, thereby eliminating
barriers between banks, securities firms, and insurance companies (Labaton, 1999).
'^ For more details on the integration of banking and securities business, see Dale (1992).
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In this structure the risks involved in commercial and investment banking are pooled.
In the European Community universal banking is also legally sanctioned. This is contained
in the Second Banking Directive and the Investment Services Directive. These laws were
drawn up on the assumption that universal banking would be the relevant model. A recent
study endorses this view: "Clearly, the future of banking systems will be the universal
banking model prevailing in Europe rather than the highly segmented American and Japanese
models" (United Nations, 1996b, p. 23).
Risk and conflict of interest are two of the main issues that lie behind the justification
of rules to separate commercial banking fi*om investment banking. The main business risk
which commercial banks face is credit risk, whereas for investment banks it is security
market risk. Commercial banking involves nonmarketable assets, which are typically held
on the balance sheet until maturity, whereas investment banking involves marketable
securities that are of a rapid turnover nature. Given the different nature of the assets of
both types of banking, the issue is whether commercial banking should be allowed to
combine with the riskier business of investment banking and to be involved in the
underwriting activity which might lead to bank failures. A case in point is the mixed
banking-securities business of Barings Bank in the UK and the way in which its banking
arm was able to fund its risky securities operations in Singapore.'^ Cranston (1997, p.
101) notes that "whereas the independent securities firm which collapses can probably be
wound up in an orderly fashion by selling off its marketable assets [with little difference
between the value of these assets on a going concern basis and in liquidation because
they are determined on a mark to market basis], if the securities side of a bank
collapses this may mortally wound the banking side [thereby exposing depositors to
heavy losses because banks' assets are generally worth significantly less in liquidation
than on a going concern basis]. The funding base (deposits) of core banking is inherently
volatile and may evaporate on the slightest hint of trouble in a banking group as
a whole."
Firewalls are meant to be one of the means to address the risk of this contagion problem.
Firewalls should also enable the commercial banking side to resist calls for financial support
when the investment business of the bank is exposed to serious problems. However, it is
argued that not much seems to have been done as to how the potential contagion of risk can
be managed.'^
Conflict of interest takes place, for example, if a commercial bank is allowed to underwrite
securities, as it may underwrite poor securities for a borrower to pay the bank's poor loans
with this borrower. While a bank concerned with its reputation will refrain from such
behavior, less trustworthy banks may attempt to fool naive investors. The 1986 Financial
Services Act in the UK called for the erection of Chinese walls to restrict the flow of
information between related firms in a conglomerate, thereby preventing such conflicts of
interests from arising.
'^ See Dale (1996) for more details on the case of Barings pic.
''^ Cranston (1997, p. 104).
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Of particular relevance to this paper is the fiduciary service of investment management
that is provided by investment banks. According to Hitchins, Hogg, and Mallett (1996, p.
492) investment management is "a business in which institutions manage financial assets
for their own account or on behalf of clients. This may involve individual management
of a customer's portfolio or may be performed through an investment vehicle which
pools investors' funds to provide the investors with professional investment management.
In the former case, funds may be managed on an advisory basis where the fiind manager
will act in accordance with specific instructions irom their client or on a discretionary
basis whereby the fund manager takes responsibility for making investment decisions on
behalf of their clients. In pooled fiinds, units or shares in the fiind are sold to the
investors and the proceeds are predominantly invested in securities to achieve stated
investment obj ectives . '
'
Hitchins et al. (1996, p. 491) further state that "fiduciary services provide a bank with a
source of fee and commission income without . . . [exposing] a bank to market or credit risk
except to a very limited extent; however, they do create fiduciary risk, or the risk that the bank
will fail to carry out the customer's instructions or will do so in a way that can be shown to be
negligent or unprofessional, with the result that the bank may be open to a claim for damages
and suffer a loss of reputation."
Income generated fi'om managing these fiands is recognized in the bank's income state-
ment, although the fiinds themselves are treated off-balance sheet. Heffeman (1996) argues
that banks enter the off-balance sheet business because they believe it will enhance their
profitability, for different reasons. For example, off-balance sheet instruments may improve a
bank's risk management techniques, thereby enhancing profitability and shareholder value
added. In addition, to the extent that regulators focus on bank balance sheets, off-balance
sheet business, as in the case of investment management, may make it easier for a bank to
meet capital and liquidity requirements.
Treating funds received on fiduciary basis as an off-balance sheet item is in line with
lASs. IAS 30 Disclosures in the Financial Statements of Banks and Similar Financial
Institutions, which is the only standard issued by the lASC specifically for banks, states
that "banks commonly act as trustees and in other fiduciary capacities that result in the
holding or placing of assets on behalf of individuals, trusts, retirement benefit plans, and
other institutions. Provided the trustee or similar relationship is legally supported, these
assets are not the assets of the bank and, therefore, are not included in its balance sheet"
(lASC 1990, paragraph 55).
The next section provides an overview of the characteristics of Islamic banks and examines
the extent to which these characteristics fit in with those of commercial and investment
banking. The section also discusses investment accounts in detail. These accounts represent
one of the unique financial instruments that are used by Islamic banks in their mobilization of
fiinds. In the majority of Islamic banks, these accounts represent a high percentage of the total
balance sheet fiinding.^^
See Karim (1996b) and Karim and Ali (1989).
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3. An overview of the characteristics of Islamic banks
Islamic banking is a type of universal banking. However, Islamic banks have their own
special characteristics. The majority of Islamic banks perform two basic functions, namely
investment management and commercial banking. Unlike conventional commercial banks,
Islamic banks do not pay or charge interest on lending or borrowing of money. This is because
the Shari'a strictly prohibits, among other things, the receipt and payment ofriba (interest).^
^
Hence, Islamic banks cannot hold or issue interest-bearing securities such as treasury bills or
bonds. The banking services provided by Islamic banks to business customers are mainly
confined to letters of guarantee, letters of credit, and current/demand accounts. They also
provide other trade finance services via various types of contract which are mentioned below.
Investment management is the main service provided by almost all Islamic banks. As an
altemative to borrowing funds and paying interest on them, Islamic banks use a version of the
profit sharing mudaraba contracr~ (explained in detail later) to mobilize funds in investment
accounts in order to invest them on behalf of holders of these accounts. This service is
performed also, but to a lesser extent, on the basis of the agency contract. As an altemative to
lending funds and charging interest on them, Islamic banks use various contracts (e.g.,
murabaha, musharaka, ijarah, salam, etc.) including the mudaraba contract to invest funds
under management as well as their shareholders' funds.
Although Islamic banks tend to perform a hybrid of services of both commercial and
investment banking, the structure and processes of Islamic banks do not readily fit in with
those of conventional universal banking, which combines banking and investment businesses.
For example, unlike universal banks. Islamic banks do not erect firewalls to separate, legally,
financially, and managerially their investment and commercial banking services. Rather, the
majority of Islamic banks commingle investment accounts' funds with their shareholders'
funds, invest both fiinds under the bank's management in the same investment portfolio, and
report these investments and their results in the bank's balance sheet and income statement.
Hence, investment accounts' funds are not 'ring fenced' from the bank's funds.
Furthermore, investment companies^"^ (e.g., mutual funds) "sell their capital to the public,
while Islamic banks accept deposits from the public. This implies that shareholders of an
investment company own a proportionate part of the company's equity capital and are entitled
^' Riba is translated strictly as usury, but interpreted by modem Islamic scholars as being equivalent to interest
(see Mallat, 1988; Saleh, 1992; Taylor & Evans, 1987).
The original form of the mudaraba contract is very similar to that of the commenda contract in general use
by Italian and other merchants in the late middle ages and early modem period; see Bryer, 1993; ^izak^a, 1996.
Murabaha is sale at cost plus an agreed upon margin of profit; musharaka is a form of partnership; ijarah is
leasing; and salam is a purchase of a commodity for deferred delivery in exchange for immediate payment. For
more details on these and other contracts see AAOIFI (1998).
" It is worth noting that there are Islamic investment companies (e.g., Al-Tawfeek Investment-Bahrain,
International Investor-Kuwait) and Islamic Investment Banks (e.g., First Islamic Investment Bank-Bahrain, Al-
Tawfeek Investment Bank-Pakistan), which do not perform any commercial banking operations. Whilst central
banks supervise Islamic investments banks, in some countries Islamic investment companies are regulated by a
different body.
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to a number of rights, including receiving a regular flow of information on developments of
the company's business and exerting voting rights corresponding to their shares on important
matters, such as changes in investment policy. Hence, they are [in principle] in a position to
influence strategic decisions. By contrast, depositors in an Islamic bank are entitled to share
the bank's net profit (or loss). . . Moreover, depositors have no voting rights because they do
not own any portion of the bank's equity capital. Hence, they cannot influence the bank's
investment policy" (Errico & Farahbaksh, 1998, p. 11).^^
And unlike those of investment companies. Islamic banks' financed assets are neither
marketable securities nor are they measured on the basis of "mark to market" or fair
value.^^'^^ Rather, as mentioned above, the assets of Islamic banks are governed by
various forms and are stated at cost and/or the lower of cost and market. However, given
that Islamic banks cannot hold treasury bills or bonds or other interest yielding securities,
it is claimed that bank supervisors would have difficulty in putting a value on the assets
of these banks. Steele (1984) argues that this is because "the traditional banking system
has much of its assets in fixed interest instruments and it is comparatively easy to value
that. . . But it is very difficult indeed to value an Islamic asset such as a share in a joint
venture; . . .and the. . . [bank supervisors] would have to send a team of experienced
accountants into every Islamic bank. .
.,
to try to put a proper and cautious value on
its assets."
Furthermore, the characteristics of Islamic banks tend to raise a set of issues
conceming corporate governance and agency problems (Archer & Karim, 1997; Archer,
Karim, & Al-Deehani, 1998) that have no parallels in either commercial banks or
investment banks.
The mudaraba contract has detailed juristic rules that are derived fi'om the Shari 'a^^ and
which regulate the relationship between investment account holders (lAH) as providers of
funds and the bank in its capacity as mudarib (entrepreneur). The mudaraba contract is a
profit sharing financial instrument^^ that is neither a financial liability nor an equity
instrument in the normal sense. Unlike equity instruments, investment accounts are
As mentioned later, the mudaraba contract does not allow investment account holders to interfere in the
management of the bank.
^^ For more details see Karim (1995a).
^' In the terms of IAS 39 Financial Instruments: Recognition and Measurement, Islamic banks' assets are
neither (a) held for trading nor (b) available for sale. Note that the IAS 39 measurement basis for such category of
assets is cost or amortized cost subject to review for impairment (and not fair value). In general, AAOIFI standards
do not differ from lASs when the substance of the transaction is the same.
For a comprehensive coverage of these details see Udovitch (1970) and Vogel and Hayes (1998).
^^ The mudaraba contract is not similar to a joint venture, which is the subject matter of IAS 3 1 : Financial
Reporting of Interests in Joint Venture. A joint venture is defined as "a contractual arrangement whereby two or
more parties undertake an economic activity which is subject to joint control" (IAS 31, paragraph 2). However, in
a joint venture, as envisioned in IAS 31, the power to govern the financial and operating policies of an economic
activity is shared by two or more parties, whereas in the mudaraba contract the power to govern the financial and
operating policies of the activity is the sole prerogative of the mudarib (i.e., the bank). LAH have no right to
intervene in these policies.
180 R.A.A. Karim / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 169-193
redeemable at maturity or at the initiative of their holders,^*^ but (usually) not without the
prior consent of the bank. Islamic banks can refuse to pay lAH until the results of
the investments financed by lAHs' funds are determined. In addition, lAHs do not have
the benefit of a board of directors to monitor management on their behalf ^^ On the other
hand, unlike debt instruments, investment accounts are not a liability of the bank because
they earn their returns by sharing in the profits generated from their funds, and also bear
their share in any losses incurred. Furthermore, Islamic banks do not guarantee the value
of these investment accounts. Thus, holders of these accounts have a claim on the bank's
earnings or assets, which ranks pari passu with that of the shareholders.^^ The fact that the
mudaraba contract is neither a debt nor an equity instrument means that it is not a hybrid
instrument comprising debt and equity (for example, it is not debt with an embedded
equity derivative).
In the unrestricted type of mudaraba, lAHs authorize the bank to invest their fijnds at
its discretion including commingling the lAHs' funds with those of shareholders. In the
restricted mudaraba, lAH specify to the bank, among other conditions,^'^ the type of
investment in which their funds should be invested, e.g., real estate, currencies, leasing,
etc. However, in both types of mudaraba LAH do not have the right to interfere in the
management of the fund, and violation of this condition can nullify the contract. Hence,
although holders of both types of investment accounts are exposed to different degrees of
risk, their relationship with the management of the bank is subject to the same
monitoring arrangements.
The aggregate investment portfolio of an Islamic bank is usually financed by LAHs'
funds, plus some of shareholders' equity and other sources of fiinds (e.g., current
accounts), the latter being mobilized on bases other than the mudaraba contract. If the
aggregate investment portfolio yields a positive return, then the shares of profit are
allocated between the parties to the contract, lAH and the bank, according to their
proportionate shares of their respective investments in the portfolio. The bank's share of
profit relates to both its shareholders' funds and to other funds invested in the investment
portfolio that do not participate in profit-sharing (e.g., current accounts which are capital-
protected but nonparticipating).^"^ It is to be noted that shareholders' funds invested in the
investment portfolio (and elsewhere) and the other nonparticipating funds are not covered
by the mudaraba contract, and are not governed by its rules. Hence, the bank's
shareholders receive the entire profit from these sources, and lAH cannot claim any profit
share from them. The bank also receives what is called the mudarib share of profit, based
in principle on a predetermined percentage of the profit attributable to the lAH, which is
"^ In this respect (but not in others) they resemble "puttable stock"; however, the put option is usually not
absolute, but subject to the bank's agreement to its exercise.
31
32
^' For more details see Archer et al. (1998).
For more details see Al-Deehani, Karim, and Murinde (1999)
For other types of restrictions see AAOIFI (1993, paragraphs
Shareholders receive profit generated from investing the oth(
providers of these funds are compensated from shareholders' equity.
^^ 12, 13).
^'^ er sources of flinds because in case of loss
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specified in the contract. This is a reward for the managerial effort of the bank in managing
the funds of lAH. The mudarib share of profit allocated to the bank constitutes a return to
the bank's shareholders.
If the bank's aggregate investment portfolio yields a negative return, then, according to
the mudaraba contract, this loss should be borne by the lAH and shareholders pro rata to
their respective investments in this portfolio, bearing in mind what was said in the previous
paragraph. Like that of shareholders, the liability of lAH is limited to the amount of their
investment and no more. In the case of a negative retum, in addition to the shareholders'
proportion of the loss which is determined pro-rata as indicated above, the bank in its
capacity as mudarib receives no profit on behalf of its shareholders (the mudarib share
having a lower bound of zero). However, according to the mudaraba contract, if the loss is
due to misconduct or negligence of the mudarib, then the Islamic bank has to make good
the loss.^^
The above analysis indicates that the structure and processes of Islamic banks do not
readily fit in with those of universal banking, which combines both banking and investment
activities. The next section examines the approaches adopted by the supervisory authorities to
regulate Islamic banks.
4. Banking regulation of Islamic banks
It seems that so far the supervisory authorities in the countries in which Islamic banks
operate have not appreciated the implications of the unique characteristics of Islamic banks.^^
Errico and Farahbaksh (1998, p. 5) note that "until now the issue of what standards used for
conventional banks should apply to Islamic banks has received little attention, even in
countries where all banks follow Islamic principles."
For example, a central banker claims that "in a dual banking system, the supervision
of banks basically applies to both Islamic and conventional banks. So far there are no
particular banking regulations that apply specifically to Islamic Banks. With some
degree of changes in terminology, the prudential regulations for conventional banks
have been adopted to Islamic banks. All provisions for conventional banks. . .are also
applied to Sharia Banks. The implementation of banking supervision for profit sharing
banks, however, differs slightly from those of a conventional bank" (Joyosumarto
1995, p. 12).
The above view is not widely shared. For example, there has been concern about the
implication of applying the Basle capital adequacy ratio to Islamic banks (Dale, 1997; Karim,
1996b). At issue is whether investment accounts "be defined as a bank deposit. . .[or] as
investments in a collective investment scheme" (Ainley, 1997, p. 73). Karim (1996b)
proposes four possible scenarios for the treatment of investment accounts in the calculation
^^ Formore details see AAOIFI (1996, 1997).
For more details on issues relating to the supervision of Islamic banks, see Wilson ( 1 997).
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of the capital adequacy ratio for Islamic banks. Each scenario, it is argued, tends to have
implications for the financial and marketing strategies of Islamic banks.
Furthermore, Errico and Farahbaksh (1998, p. 3) argue that "a number of standards
and best practices established by the Basle Committee on Banking Supervision. . .are
not always applicable [as they stand] to Islamic banking. An appropriate regulatory
framework governing Islamic banks needs to place greater emphasis on the management
of operational risks and information disclosure issues than is normally the case in
conventional banking."
So far, there are no generally accepted guidelines on which central banks, in the
countries in which Islamic banks operate, would base the treatment of profit sharing
investment accounts for the purpose of calculating the capital adequacy ratio for
these banks. '^^
There is also lack of agreed upon guidelines on the liquidity requirements of Islamic banks
(Karim, 1995b; Khalid, 1995). Khalid (1995, p. 125) argues that "the conceptual difference
which gives rise to different liquidity ratios between an Islamic bank and a conventional bank
is that for a conventional bank, all its deposits represent its direct liability to the depositors.
The same is true for Islamic bank, but only in the case of deposits in the current and savings
accounts. In the case of general investment accounts and special investment accounts, the
Islamic bank does not borrow or guarantee the fiind."
The lack of common understanding of the unique characteristics of Islamic banking
seems to have been reflected, among other things, in the various approaches taken by
supervisory authorities to regulate Islamic banking. These approaches can be categorized
into three groups.
The first group of countries (e.g., UAE, Iran, Sudan, Turkey, Yemen, and Malaysia) have
enacted Islamic banking in their laws. However, the laws of Islamic banking in some
countries in this group (e.g., Malaysia, Iran, Sudan, and Turkey) suggest that they are framed
mainly from a commercial banking perspective. For example, in Iran (where the whole
banking system has been transformed to comply with Islamic Shari'a) "The Law for Usury-
free Banking" specifies the aims of the banking system to include, among other things:
"Creation of a monetary and credit system. . ." The Law also provides brief details on the
mobilization of funds in current accounts, savings accounts, and "long-term investment
deposits," and on the providing of finance to various industries using Islamic financial
instruments.^^ In Turkey, the "Decree on the Establishment of Special Finance Houses" also
provides details on mobilization of funds in current accounts and participation accounts, and
the utilization of these funds. In Malaysia, the "Islamic Banking Act 1983" defines
"investment account liabilities" to mean "the deposit liabilities at that [Islamic] bank in
respect of funds placed by a depositor with that bank. . .under an agreement to share the
profits and losses of that bank on the investment of such funds." The Act consistently refers
Due to the absence of such guideHnes, AAOIFI has issued a Statement on the Purpose and Calculation of
the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks (AAOIFI, 1999a).
These instruments are mentioned earlier in the section that provides an overview of the characteristics of
Islamic banks.
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to the Islamic bank lending or advancing of money.^^ In Sudan (where the whole banking
system also has been transformed to comply with Islamic Shari'a), the "Banking Regulation
Law 1991 " attempts to differentiate between a bank and a financial institution as follows. The
former performs all commercial banking activities in addition to accepting investment
accounts. A financial institution is defined as an investment company established for the
purpose of investments and performs banking activities. However, this differentiation does
not seem clear as both types of institutions perform both types of Sanctions. The laws of the
other countries in the same group (e.g., UAE and Yemen) explicitly mention that Islamic
banks may perform both banking and investment business, but make a brief reference to
investment banking.
However, none of the laws in the countries that have promulgated an Islamic banking act
provides guidance on issues that are pertinent to investment business. As examples, one may
cite the disclosure of specified information to investors to assess the risk of their investments,
the fiduciary responsibility of the bank, insider dealing, and guidance on the conflict of
interest that may arise from investing both separately and jointly shareholders' fiands and
lAHs' funds.
The second group of countries (e.g., Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan)"*^
has not so far enacted laws to regulate Islamic banks. Rather, Islamic banks operate within
the laws that govern all the banks in these countries. These laws mainly focus on commercial
banking. The third group of countries (e.g., Lebanon) also has not enacted Islamic banking
law, but subjected Islamic banks to their fiduciary law. Whilst in all three groups Islamic
banks are supervised by the central bank, in some countries (e.g., Kuwait) Islamic banks are
supervised by the Ministry of Commerce.
The next section discusses the relationship between the approaches adopted by various
countries to regulate Islamic banking and the accounting treatments of investment accounts
by Islamic banks. These discussions will be used to illustrate how difficult it would be to
compare the financial statements of Islamic banks if they continued adhering or were asked to
adhere to lASs, supposedly in the interests of achieving international harmonization of
financial reporting.
5. Accounting treatments of investment accounts prior to self-regulation
Prior to the promulgation of AAOIFI's Financial Accounting Statement No. 2: Concepts of
Financial Accountingfor Islamic Banks and Financial Institutions (FAS 2), Islamic banks did
not differentiate between restricted and unrestricted mudaraba in their accounting treatment
of investment accounts."^' In addition, Islamic banks were divided on the accounting
^^ See, for example, Articles 16(4); 19(l)(b); 24(1 )(b).
A special law was enacted for the first Islamic bank established in Egypt and Jordan. The other Islamic
banks in these two countries that were established later are regulated by the general banking law.
*' According to AAOIFI (1993), unrestricted investment accounts should be treated on balance sheet, while
restricted investment accounts should be treated off balance sheet.
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treatment of investment accounts. It is worth noting that most of the countries in which
Islamic banks operate either look directly to lASs as their national standards or develop
national standards based primarily on lASs.^^
As outlined in the section that deals with banking regulation of Islamic banks, there seem
to be three approaches adopted by supervisory authorities to regulate Islamic banking. These
are depicted in Fig. 1 . The first approach is characterization of a group of countries that
sought specifically to cover Islamic banking in their national legislation. The financial
statements prepared by the Islamic banks (e.g., Kuwait Turkish Evkaf Finance House-Turkey,
Bank Islam Berhad Malaysia, Faisal Islamic Bank-Sudan, Dubai Islamic Bank, Tadamon
Islamic Bank-Yemen) that operate in these countries show that these banks have treated
investment accounts as an on-balance sheet item and classified these accounts as a liability.
This treatment, which is similar to that of deposits in commercial banks, is not unexpected
since the laws that govern these banks were either fi^amed mainly fi^om a commercial banking
perspective or made only brief reference in their laws to investment banking.
The second approach is represented by a group of countries (e.g., Bahrain, Qatar, Saudi
Arabia, Egypt, and Jordan) that have subjected Islamic banks to the general law that governs
all banks without specifying how investment accounts should be reported. This leaves open
the accounting treatment of investment accounts within this group, so that it falls into two
categories (see Fig. 1). The first category of Islamic banks have treated investment accounts
as an on-balance sheet item, while those in the second category (e.g., Faysal Islamic Bank of
Bahrain, Arab Islamic Bank-Bahrain, and Al Rajhi Banking and Investment-Saudi Arabia)
have treated investment accounts as an off-balance sheet item. Some Islamic banks (e.g.,
Bahrain Islamic Bank, Qatar Islamic Bank, Jordan Islamic Bank, Faisal Islamic Bank in
Egypt) in the first category that have treated investment accounts on the balance sheet have
reported them as a liability, while others (Arab Banking Corporation Islamic Bank in Bahrain)
have treated these accounts as part of equity.
The third approach represents a group of countries (e.g., Lebanon) that subjected Islamic
banks to their "fiduciary" (i.e., investor protection) law. Islamic banks (e.g., Al-Baraka Bank-
Lebanon) are required by law to treat investment accounts as an off-balance sheet item,
similar to managed mutual funds (the presumed model).
Islamic banks that have treated investment accounts as a liability item would justify such a
treatment on the grounds that investment accounts are more akin to deposits in a commercial
bank. Such a justification is not entirely unfounded. As noted in the Section 4, in the
'^^ The International Accounting Standards Committee newsletter. Insight (October 1997), reported
the following:
A preliminary lASC staff analysis of the responses to a 1996 survey conducted for lASC has found that
56 of 67 countries either look directly to IAS as their national standards or develop national standards
based primarily on IAS (p. 15).
The following countries in which Islamic banks operate are reported in the lASC survey: Kuwait, Pakistan,
Malaysia, Jordan, Sudan, Iran, Tunisia, and Turkey. Although not mentioned in the lASC survey, the following
countries also look directly to lASs as their national standards or develop national standards based primarily on
lASs: Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Qatar, Lebanon, and Egypt.
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Approaches Adopted by Countries to Regulate Islamic Banking
Islamic banks are regulated
by an Islamic banking act
banks are governed by a
regulated all banks
Islamic banks are regulated
by a fiduciary law
Islamic banks treated
investment accounts as
an on-balance sheet tern
Some Islamic banks treated
investment accounts as
an on-balance sheet item
Some Islamic banks treated
investment accounts as
an off-balance sheet item
Islamic banks are required
by law to treat investment
accounts off-balance sheet
Investment accounts
treated as a liability
Investment accounts
treated as a liability
Investment accounts
treated as part of equity
Fig. 1 . Regulatory framework of Islamic banking.
Malaysian Islamic Banking Act investment accounts are referred to as "investment account
liabilities." Although the Islamic bank is not contractually liable to absorb losses, it would be
under commercial pressure to meet lAH's expectations and compensate holders of these
accounts in order to maintain the bank's reputation and goodwill.'*^ These Islamic banks (and
by implication their auditors)'*^ would argue that they were accounting for the economic
substance of the transaction rather than the legal form of the mudaraba contract."^^
Such a treatment of investment accounts would tend to satisfy the features that lASs
require to be considered when deciding whether an item qualifies to be treated as a liability.
According to the lASC Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial
Statements: "In assessing whether an item meets the definition of an asset, liability or equity,
attention needs to be given to its underlying substance and economic reality and not merely
its legal form" (lASC, 1989, paragraph 51).
AAOIFI's Statement on the Purpose and Calculation of the Capital Adequacy Ratio for Islamic Banks
(AAOIFI, 1999a) takes into consideration what it terms "displaced commercial risk." The Statement states that
"An Islamic bank is liable to find itself under commercial pressure to pay a rate of return to its PSIA-holders
[profit sharing investment account holders] which is sufficient to induce those investors to maintain their funds
with the bank, rather than withdrawing them and investing them elsewhere" (p. 7). Furthermore, AAOIFI's
Financial Accounting Standard No. II: Provisions and Reserves (AAOIFI, 1999b) requires Islamic banks to
disclose any amounts paid by the Islamic bank from its mudarib share to investment account holders in order to
increase the latter's rate of return.
A cursory examination of the annual reports of Islamic banks indicates that the "Big Five" accounting firms
audit most of these banks.
It is worth noting that unlike the lASC Framework for the Preparation and Presentation of Financial
Statements (1989), AAOIFI (1993) makes no reference to the concept of substance over form.
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However, the above analysis raises the fundamental issue of whether the separation
between the economic substance of a transaction and its legal form is valid in the case of
transactions governed by Islamic Shari 'a. Compliance with Shari 'a precepts is not simply a
matter of form, but affects the substance of the transaction. For example, murabaha and
ijarah muntahia bittamleek are distinguished from their conventional equivalents (asset-based
loans and capital or finance leases) not merely by the absence of interest, but in the
assumption of asset risk by the financier, hi the case of murabaha, the financier bears the
asset risk until delivery and passage of title to the customer. "^^
As stated earlier in the paper, Islamic banks are driven by Shari 'a approved contracts
because they have to comply with Islamic Shari 'a rules and principles in all their transactions:
Islamic banks were developed on a foundation that does not permit the separation between
temporal and religious matters. That foundation requires compliance with Shari'a as a basis
for all aspects of life. This covers not only religious worship but also business transactions
which should comply with Shari'a precepts (AAOIFI, paragraph 8).
Islamic banks that have treated investment accounts as part of equity on the balance sheet
have classified these accounts as participating shares or what is known as class "B" shares.
According to these banks, both investment accounts and participating shares are financial
instruments that are used to mobilize fiinds. Moreover, the economic substance of both
instruments is the same, namely their return is based on that of the underlying assets. Hence,
this group of Islamic banks and their auditors who have supported this treatment of
investment accounts on the balance sheet would justify it on the basis of their interpretation
of IAS 32, which states in the section relating to the presentation of liabilities and equity that
"the issuer of a financial instrument should classify the instrument, or its component parts, as
a liability or as equity in accordance with the substance of the contractual arrangement on
initial recognition and the definitions of a financial liability and on an equity instrument"
(lASC, 1995, paragraph 18).
Islamic banks in the above two groups that treated investment accounts on the balance
sheet recorded the application of the funds of investment accounts as assets. This does not
satisfy the definition of an asset under lASs. According to the LASC Framework for the
Preparation and Presentation ofFinancial Statements, "an asset is a resource controlled by
the enterprise as a result of past events and from which future economic benefits are
expected to flow to the enterprise" (LASC, 1989, paragraph 49(a)). However, the control
and use of assets represented by investment accounts result in a flow of future economic
benefits to the Islamic bank only in the form of the mudarib share, which may have a lower
bound of zero.
Islamic banks that have treated investment accounts as an off-balance sheet item would
argue that the nature of these accounts is similar to that of funds under management. Put
another way, these Islamic banks would suggest that investment accounts should be
accounted for from the perspective of the investment management funcdon performed by
Islamic banks. These Islamic banks would support their argument by claiming that their
For ijarah muntahia bittamleek see footnote 48.
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accounting treatment of these accounts was based on their (and by imphcation their
auditors') interpretation of IAS 30. According to IAS 30, if a bank acts in a fiduciary
capacity that results in the holding or placing of assets on behalf of individuals, then these
assets are not the assets of the bank and, therefore, are not included in its balance sheet."^^
This reasoning is applied not just to restricted investment accounts, but also to unrestricted
investment accounts.
However, informed market players would question such a treatment of unrestricted
investment accounts, thereby casting doubt on both the relevance of lASs for Islamic banks
and the auditors' opinion on the financial statements of these banks. For example, the 1995,
1996, and 1997 financial statements of Faysal Islamic Bank-Bahrain (FIBB) are audited by
Price Waterhouse who has issued an unqualified opinion and stated that the accounts are in
accordance with LASs. Yet, in December 1996 Capital Intelligence, one of the few rating
agencies that rate a number of Islamic banks, qualified its rating of FIBB. Capital Intelligence
(1997) states that its qualification of FIBB was "due to the large degree of uncertainty
concerning the effect the transfer of off-balance sheet unrestricted investment accounts to the
balance sheet (in compliance with the introduction of [AAOIFI's] Islamic Financial
Accounting Standard (IFAS) No 1 ), would have on the Bank's liquidity and capital adequacy
ratios" (p. 3).
Capital Intelligence (1998) further claims that in its opinion, "the supplementary
information [presented by FIBB based on AAOIFI's standards] enables one to form a more
accurate picture of the financial health of FIBB. For example, under the new accounting
treatment (including unrestricted investment accounts on balance sheet). . .profitability ratios
such as return on average assets become more meaningful (2.06% as opposed to 6.4% using
IAS). . . Thus in analyzing the composition of FIBB's asset structure, we have assumed
unrestricted investments to be part of the Bank's balance sheet, since they have a direct effect
on the Bank's liquidity and profitability and give a more accurate reflection of the magnitude
of business operations" (p. 3).
On the other hand, since lASs do not provide specific guidelines for the accounting
treatment of investment accounts (as well as other Islamic financial instruments),^^ they may
have provided Islamic banks with an opportunity to choose the accounting treatment that
satisfies their objectives. For example, the treatment of investment accounts as an off-balance
'*^ IAS 30, paragraph 55.
'* For example, ijarah muntahia bittamleek (a lease contract that ends up with the transfer of ownership of
leased assets to the lessee). Prior to the promulgation of AAOIFI's Financial Accounting Standard No. 8: Ijarah
and Ijarah Muntahia Bittamleek, most Islamic banks that used lASs accounted for this financial instrument as a
finance lease. However, contrary to the requirements of lASs, the Shari 'a precepts that govern this financial
instrument do not allow for the substantial transfer of all significant risks and rewards from the Islamic banks as
lessors to the lessee. Some Islamic banks presented the assets of this financial instrument on their balance sheet as
leased assets while other Islamic banks presented them as receivables. However, Islamic banks that presented
these assets as leased assets did not deduct any amount for their depreciation possibly based on the Islamic banks'
interpretation of IAS 16: Property, Plant and Equipment (revised 1993), thereby overstating their reported profit.
On the other hand, the accounting treatment of this financial instrument as receivables may benefit the Islamic
bank if the provision for doubtful debts would be less than the amount that would be provided for depreciation if
they were treated as leased assets.
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sheet item would appeal to the Islamic banks that considered it was not in their interest to
have these accounts included in the calculation of their capital adequacy ratio in order not to
be asked to increase their equity capital.^^ Another possible reason that would make this
treatment appealing to these banks is that it enables them to hide negative information relating
to investment accounts, especially losses due to misconduct or negligence. In this respect it
should be noted that lASs are silent on the disclosure of losses incurred in the investment
portfolio funded by investment accounts.
The external auditors of these Islamic banks would also have a vested interest in
supporting the off-balance sheet treatment of these accounts. Since external auditors may
not be directly responsible for making a full audit of off-balance sheet items, this treatment
would reduce the risk of legal liability to which they would be exposed. Hence, losses due to
misconduct or negligence, which according to the mudaraba contract should not be borne by
lAHs, may go undetected.
Given that, in the majority of Islamic banks, investment accounts represent a very high
percentage of the total balance sheet funding. Islamic banks that have treated investment
accounts on the balance sheet may have given more consideration to the size of their balance
sheet totals. However, since the balance sheet model based on lASs and other accounting
standards assumes that funds can only be mobilized through debt and/or equity, this group of
Islamic banks had no choice but to treat investment accounts either as a liability or as equity
depending on whether they treated these accounts as deposits or as an unsecuritized equity or,
in rare cases, securitized financial instrument, respectively.
The theme emerging from the preceding analysis suggests that although the three different
accounting treatments of investment accounts tended to be based on each group's interpre-
tation of the IAS that was believed to be relevant to the mudaraba contract, these treatments
rendered the financial statements of Islamic banks noncomparable. This draws attention to the
fact that lASs are insufficient to cater for the unique characteristics of the financial
instruments used by Islamic banks. Karim (1996a) gives support to this proposition by
arguing why accounting standards (e.g., lASs) developed for secular business organizations
are of limited applicability to Islamic banks.
The above implies that the use of lASs as a vehicle for achieving international
harmonization of financial reporting will not be effective in making financial reporting by
Islamic banks more comparable, and may have the opposite effect because of the "slack"
resulting from the inadequate "fit" of lASs to Islamic transactions. It also provides a case for
regulating the financial reporting by Islamic banks by reference to accounting standards that
cater to the unique characteristics of the financial instruments used by Islamic banks, in order
to make the financial statements of these banks more comparable. ^^ This lends support to the
theoretical proposition that the factor of culture, namely religion, would influence the
international harmonization of accounfing and financial reporting.
"*'
In some of the largest Islamic banks the shareholdings are concentrated in a few hands, for example, Dar-
Al-Mal Group, Dalla Albaraka Group, and Al Rajhi Corporation for Banking and Investment.
See Karim ( 1 996a) for other attributes of the mudaraba contract, namely economic consequences which are
a central feature that is embodied in the rules of this contract, but are not recognized in the conceptual framework
of the lASC.
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6. Concluding remarks
Islamic banks are established with a mandate to adhere to Islamic Shari'a rules and
principles in all their transactions. The majority of Islamic banks perform both commercial
and investment banking services. However, unlike conventional commercial and investment
banks, Islamic banks do not establish firewalls to separate legally, financially, and mana-
gerially these two services. Rather, the majority of Islamic banks commingle their own funds
with those of lAHs, invest both funds under the bank's management in the same investment
portfolio, and report these investments and their results in the bank's balance sheet and
income statement.
Supervisory authorities in countries in which Islamic banks operate have taken various
approaches to regulate Islamic banking. These include promulgating Islamic banking acts to
regulate Islamic banks, subjecting Islamic banks to existing fiduciary laws, and regulating
Islamic banks by the laws that govem all banks. The paper suggests that the perspective
adopted by the supervisory authorities to regulate Islamic banking tended to influence the
accounting treatment of investment accounts adopted by Islamic banks, although most of the
countries in which these banks operate either look directly to lASs as their national standards
or develop national standards based primarily on lASs. This has rendered the financial
statements of Islamic banks noncomparable.
The above implies that the calls to use lASs as a vehicle to achieving international
harmonizafion of financial reporting must not go unchallenged, so far as Islamic banks are
concerned. Rather, the case of Islamic banks casts light on the need to develop and implement
accounting standards that specifically cater for the unique characteristics of the contracts that
govem the operations of these banks.
In fact, Islamic banks have gone a long way towards achieving this objective. In 1990,
AAOIFI was established to prepare and promulgate accounting, (and recently) auditing and
govemance standards. To date, AAOIFI has issued 14 accounting standards, including two
statements that represent a conceptual framework that guides the preparation of its standards.
In addition to market pressures for compliance coming fi^om international credit rating
agencies, the supervisory authorities in both Sudan and Bahrain have required Islamic
financial insdtutions to comply with AAOIFI's standards. Efforts are underway in other
countries (e.g., Malaysia, Qatar) that may result in adherence to standards based primarily on
AAOIFI's standards. Some Islamic banks (e.g.. Bank Islam Berhad Malaysia, Islamic
Development Bank) have also started to voluntarily use AAOIFI's accounting standards to
prepare their financial statements.
However, there seem to be several factors that have contributed to the low implementation
of AAOIFI's standards in the countries in which Islamic banks operate. These include, among
others, the lack of appreciation by the relevant agencies that are responsible for enforcing
accounting standards of the benefits that can be gained by implementing AAOIFI's standards,
namely (a) rendering the financial statements of Islamic banks comparable and transparent;
and (b) providing relevant and reliable information to users of financial statements of Islamic
banks. This would require AAOIFI to exert more efforts to have its standards recognized by
an increasing number of countries.
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The broad acceptance for AAOIFI's standards will tend to challenge the call for worldwide
adherence to lASs to achieve international harmonization in financial reporting regardless of
cultural differences. They also raise the issue of what collaborative relationship could
productively be established between specialized regulatory bodies such as AAOIFI, and
"general purpose" regulatory bodies such as the lASC, IOSCO, and the Basle Committee on
Banking Supervision.
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Abstract
This study contributes to each of knowledge of comparative international reporting practices by
exploring an aspect of the annual report package not previously researched from a transnational
perspective. The financial graphs in the corporate annual reports of 50 companies in Australia, France,
Germany, The Netherlands, the UK, and the US are investigated using an established methodology.
We conclude that companies in different countries adopt significantly different graphical practices,
with German graphical practice being especially different. Findings with regard to selected graphical
reporting dimensions are not generally consistent with predictions based on the macro/micro-
orientation of countries. © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The globalization of international markets, with the concomitant increase in the importance
of international investment, necessitates further research to enhance our understanding of
comparative international financial reporting practices. These practices concern measurement,
disclosure, and presentational issues. At the national level, the different accounting environ-
ments caused by divergent factors have been studied extensively. Nobes (1983), for example,
classifies national accounting environments into two broad hierarchical divisions: macro-
continental accounting practices (e.g., France and Germany) and micro-Anglo Saxon
pracfices (e.g., the US, the UK, and the Netherlands). More recently, Salter and Niswander
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(1995) test Gray's (1988) theory that cultural factors determine different patterns of
accounting in different parts of the world. Much less attention, however, has been paid to
the financial reporting practices of individual companies in a comparative international
context. Consequently, very little evidence exists as to whether the actual practices followed
by companies confirm their national classification.
This neglect of transnational research into the reporting practices of individual companies
is particularly true in the area of voluntary reporting practices that reveal transnational
managerial preferences for reporting financial information. Further research into voluntary
reporting practices will enable a better understanding and appreciation of different managerial
cultures across countries. This article focuses upon one particular aspect of voluntary
reporting, financial graphs.
Financial graphs offer companies an alternative method of presenting financial information
to the traditional alphanumeric table and continuous narrative text formats. Financial graphs
are particularly attractive to management as presentational formats, since they have several
important advantages. First, graphs, by their very nature, attract the reader's attention. Much of
the presentation of information in an annual report is dictated by regulatory requirements, such
as those from the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in the US and the London Stock
Exchange in the UK. Graphs, however, are a voluntary presentational medium that may be
used either to summarize or to present mandatory or voluntary information. Graphs often
repeat, in an attractive and accessible format, information that is presented elsewhere in the
annual report in tabular form. Such redundancy reflects the importance placed by management
upon these messages (Lothian, 1976). Moreover, differences in visually perceptible properties,
such as length of column or color, are readily detected (Kosslyn, 1994). Graphs, which are not
regulated, can be used to add color, interest, and originality to an otherwise tightly controlled
financial document. In short, they can enliven the presentation of the corporate annual report.
Second, graphs are memorable. Pictorial and graphical representations are remembered
more easily and accurately than numbers (Leivian, 1980). As Kosslyn (1989) and Lew-
andowsky and Spence (1989) observe, graphs effectively exploit the natural perceptual,
cognitive, and memory capacities of individual readers. Third, graphs are very effective at
communicating financial information. In effect, they summarize and distil data trends and
identify numerical relationships. As Pinker (1990, p. 73) comments, "[a] striking fact about
human cognition is that we like to process information in graphic form." Typically, corporate
annual reports are primarily concerned with a company's performance over time. Graphs,
especially column graphs, are able to portray this information simply and effectively. Patterns,
trends, relationships, and anomalies become more apparent, facilitating comparisons and
projections (Harris, 1996). For the unsophisticated reader, in particular, they may permit
easier understanding than the traditional financial statements. Fourth, graphs are able to
capture the essence of a company's performance by highlighting a few key financial
indicators such as sales, earnings, earnings per share (EPS), dividends per share (DPS), cash
flow, and return on capital employed (ROCE).
These communication advantages of graphical presentation are being appreciated increas-
ingly by corporate management worldwide. In addition, financial graphs, being voluntary,
potentially allow management partially to control the disclosure process. As management
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realize this and exploit the annual report's potential as both a major public relations and
promotional opportunity as well as a regulated document (Hopwood, 1996), there is a
concomitant growth in the incidence of companies using graphs. A substantial majority of
large US and UK companies now use graphs and present them prominently in their annual
reports (e.g., Beattie & Jones, 1997; Steinbart, 1989). In an international context, graphs are
particularly usefiil since they constitute a readily understood, largely language-independent,
communication medium.
Despite the popularity of graphical usage, academic research into the use of graphs in
corporate annual reports is still in its infancy. We know of only eight systematic, empirical
published studies, with each study typically relating to only one country. This lack of
research, especially at the transnational level, is disappointing, since the study of graphs may
provide potentially rich insights into managerial preferences for information disclosure.
In this study, we document for the first time the graphical reporting practices of companies
in six selected major countries of key importance to the study of international accounting. We
summarize the findings of a systematic study of 300 annual reports, comprising the top 50
companies for six important countries worldwide: Australia, France, Germany, The Nether-
lands, the UK, and the US. General graphical information (for example, the fi^equency of
graph use, the variables selected, and the graphical formats chosen) is collected.
We conduct our research in two stages. In the first stage, we identify significant
transnational variations in graphical practice. Then, in the second stage, we investigate
whether these differences can be explained by differences in national accounting environ-
ments. To do this, we looked at two broad theories of differences used previously by
international accounting researchers: micro/macroclassification theory (Nobes, 1983) and the
cultural influence theory (Gray, 1988). Hypotheses, based on the macro/microcountry
classification, are developed and tested.
The remainder of this paper is presented in four sections followed by a conclusion. Section
2 reviews two distinctly different, but pertinent, literatures: the previous single-country
studies into financial graphs and the theories of intemational accounting differences. On the
basis of these literatures, a series of five parallel hypotheses are developed conceming the
existence and nature of intercountry differences in graphical formatting choices. In Section 3,
we outline the methods used in this study. Section 4 presents our results. Having first
established that there are differences between countries, we attempt to explain them using the
micro/macroaccounting classificational framework. A discussion follows in Section 5.
Finally, Section 6 summarizes and concludes.
2. Prior literature and hypotheses
2.1. Single-country financial graphs studies
We are aware of only one previous intemational comparison of financial information using
graphs (Beattie & Jones, 1997). This study is significant in that it compares more than one
country: the UK and the US. However, these countries have similar accounting systems.
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resulting in little diversity of practice. There are, in addition to Beattie and Jones (1997),
seven single-country, empirical studies of graphical formatting choices in corporate annual
reports (in the US, Johnson, Rice, & Roemmich, 1980; Steinbart, 1989; in the UK, Beattie &
Jones, 1992a, 1992b; in Ireland, Green, Kirk, & Rankin, 1992; in Canada, Canadian Institute
of Chartered Accountants, 1993; and in Australia, Beattie & Jones, 1999; Mather, Ramsay, &
Serry, 1996). We provide a summary of the key features of these studies in Table 1.
As Table 1 shows, there is much commonality in the findings of the seven studies. All
focused in general upon large listed companies. Graph usage for these companies was
consistently high, except in Ireland where only 54% of semistate and public limited companies
used graphs. Across Australia, Canada, the UK, and the US, graph usage ranged from 73% in
Australia (Mather et al., 1996) to 92% in the US (Beattie & Jones, 1997). Clearly, management
tends to see graphs as a standard component of their annual financial reporting package.
The mean number of graphs used also indicates that graphs are widely used. Except, for
the very high mean usage found by Beattie and Jones (1997) in the US, the mean number of
graphs used ranged from 5.9 in the UK (Beattie & Jones, 1992a,b) to 9.4 in Australia (Beattie
& Jones, 1999).
Finally, turning to the most frequently graphed variables, there is again a broad
consistency, especially for Australia, UK, and the US. All are financial measures. Income
Table 1
Summary of key features of financial graphs literature
Mean
Graph number Most frequently
Country Companies studied usage (%) of graphs graphed variables
Johnson et al. US 125 graphs from 50 Not 8.5 Not given
(1980) Fortune 500 annual
reports for 1977 and 1978
reported
Steinbart (1989) US 319 Fortune 500 annual
reports for 1986
79 8.0 Sales; net income;
dividends
Beattie and Jones UK 240 large companies 79 5.9 Sales; earnings
(1992a,b) in 1989 before tax; EPS;
DPS
Green et al. Republic 1 1 7 semistate sector and 54 6.0 Not given
(1992) of Ireland public limited companies
(year not given)
Canadian Institute Canada 200 companies in 1991 83 8.4 Sales earnings;
of Chartered shareholders'
Accountants equity; assets
(1993)
Mather et al. Australia (a) 43 top Australian listed a, 83; b, 73 Not Sales; earnings;
(1996) and (b) 44 not-for-profit
endfies for 1991 and 1992
given EPS; dividends
Beattie and Jones UKAJS 176 leading companies. UK, 80; UK, 7.7; Sales earnings
(1997) 1990 annual reports US 92 US, 13.0 EPS; DPS
Beattie and Jones Australia 89 leading Australian 89 9.4 Sales earnings;
(1999) listed companies EPS; DPS
V. Seattle, M.J. Jones / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 195-222 199
Statement measures, such as sales, earnings (net income and EPS), and dividends (DPS)
predominate. In Canada, however, two balance sheet measures (shareholders' equity and
assets) are also important (Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants, 1993).
Overall, therefore, our summary of the findings of the prior studies suggests that there is a
high degree of conformity in graph usage across important developed countries. In particular,
graphs are widely used and numerous with the emphasis being on sales, earnings, and
dividends graphs.
2.2. Theories of international accounting differences
The prior literature on international accounting indicates that there are different patterns of
accounting internationally (see, for example, Gray, 1988; Wallace & Gemon, 1991).
Unfortunately, the prior literature throws little light upon the reasons for observed differences.
To identify a fi^amework within which to investigate this issue, we explored both Nobes'
(1983) judgmental classification of international accounting systems into micro-Anglo Saxon
practices and macrocontinental accounting practices and Gray's (1988) theory of cultural
influence in accounting.
Nobes (1983) builds on earlier attempts (for example, Mueller, 1967, 1968; Seidler, 1967)
to classify accounting systems based on intuifive examinafion. In particular, Nobes (1983)
criticized work by Nair and Frank (1980) and others who attempted to analyze statistically
financial reporting practices using data originally compiled by Price Waterhouse International
(1973, 1975, 1979). Nobes attempted to build a hierarchical classification of accounting
systems based on expert knowledge. His solution proposed a broad twofold classification
comprising micro-and macroaccounting practices.
Microbased accounting practices are generally characterized by comparatively weak
governmental influence on accounting, relatively strong accounting professions, and com-
paratively active equity markets. The focus is on measuring the net worth and earnings of the
firm for the benefit of the external stakeholders. In contrast, macroaccounting practices are
generally characterized by comparatively strong govemmental influence on accounting,
relatively weak accounting professions, and comparatively inactive equity markets. Account-
ing practices are legalistic and tax-based, tending to be uniform and inflexible. Mueller,
Gemon, and Meek (1991) refer to countries with macrobased accounting systems as 'code
law countries.' Based on this classification, four of the countries covered in the present study
have a microorientation (Australia, the Netherlands, the US, and the UK) while two have a
macroorientation (France and Germany; Nobes, 1983). Nobes' classification is reinforced by
Zysman's (1983) research into credit and capital market-based systems. Moreover, Doupnik
and Salter (1993, 1995) and Salter and Doupnik (1992) find empirical support for a two-
cluster solution that corresponds broadly to Nobes' classification. Australia, the Netherlands,
the UK, and the US are all microcountries, while France and Germany are macrocountries.
Gray's (1988) theory of cultural influence in accounting is based on Hofstede's (1980)
generic cross-cultural research, which explored four societal values (termed Individualism,
Power Distance, Uncertainty Avoidance, and Masculinity) across 40 countries. In short. Gray
seeks to explore and explain accounting values and systems using cultural constructs. Perera
200 V. Beattie, M.J. Jones / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 195-222
and Hector (1989) provide a useful review of both studies. In an invited keynote paper
presented at the 1986 American Accounting Association, Hofstede states that Power Distance
and Uncertainty Avoidance are the two societal values "most relevant for the functioning of
organizations" (p. 7). In particular, "from a cultural point of view, accounting systems in
organizations are best understood as uncertainty reducing rituals, fulfilling a cultural need for
certainty, simplicity, and truth in a confusing world regardless of whether this truth has any
objective basis" (p. 4).
Gray (1988) uses Hofstede's (1980) work to set four accounting values: two related to
authority and enforcement (Professionalism and Uniformity) and two related to measurement
and disclosure (Conservatism and Secrecy). The latter two dimensions, particularly secrecy,
are most relevant to this particular study, with secrecy relating principally to disclosure and
conservatism relating principally to measurement. A preference for secrecy is consistent with
strong uncertainty avoidance following from a need to restrict information disclosures so as to
avoid conflict and competition and to preserve security (Gray, 1988, p. 11). Thus, one might
expect 'secretive countries' to display less graphs, particularly of key financial information.
In both Gray (1988) and Hofstede (1986), the dimensions are represented graphically
along two axes and individual countries are plotted (Hofstede: Power Distance vs. Uncer-
tainty Avoidance; Gray: Conservatism vs. Secrecy). In both cases, Australia, The Nether-
lands, the UK, and US (the four microcountries considered in the present study) are plotted
close together in one quadrant. By contrast, France and Germany (the two macrocountries
considered in the present study) are grouped together in one quadrant by Hofstede and in two
different quadrants by Gray. Thus, as with the Nobes' classification, the microgrouping
appears more homogeneous than the macrogrouping.
Salter and Niswander (1995) test Gray's (1988) theory using data from 29 countries. The
theory is best at explaining actual financial reporting practices rather than professional and
regulatory structures. Gray's four accounting values were generally significantly related to
only one of Hofstede's (1986) constructs (Uncertainty Avoidance), with a particularly strong
association to Secrecy. This suggests that Hofstede was right in describing Uncertainty
Avoidance as a key dimension for accounting.
Collectively, these studies do, however, confirm that, from a cultural perspective, Nobes'
macro/microclassification does have broad validity. Interestingly, the countries in the micro-
group are once again found clustered more tightly than those in the macrogroups (Doupnik &
Salter, 1993, 1995), indicating that their accounting practices are likely to be more homoge-
neous. At the most detailed nine-cluster solution, Australia, the Netherlands, and the UK are all
still clustered together in the same group. Meanwhile, the macrogroup splits into seven groups.
2.3. Hypotheses
A set of exploratory research hypotheses was developed from our consideration of the
accounting graphics and theory of differences literatures. We first explore whether differences
exist (Hypotheses la, lb, 1 c, Id, and 1 e). In the second stage, we investigate the extent to which
the macro/microclassification is able to explain observed differences. These hypotheses (stated
in alternative form) reflect our prior expectation that different countries' patterns ofgraph usage
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will reflect persistent differences. Our research is thus congruent with the wide sweep of
international accounting research that focuses on cross-national similarities and differences
(Gemon & Wallace, 1995). The existence of these differences is explored over a range of
graphical reporting dimensions (presence of graphs, presence of key performance variable
(KPV) graphs, choice of topics, prominence of graphs, and length of time series graphed). We
classify any time-series performance-related variable graphed by over 25% of companies in a
country as a KPV. We state our five hypotheses (Hypotheses la, lb, Ic, Id, and le) below:
Hypothesis la: The degree to which graphs are used or not used by companies will vary
between countries both in terms of (i) any financial or nonfinancial variable and (ii) at
least one KPV graph.
Hypothesis lb: The degree to which companies graph specific KPVs will vary
between countries.
Hypothesis Ic: The choice of topics graphed by companies will vary between countries.
Hypothesis Id: The degree to which graphs are displayed prominently will vary
between countries.
Hypothesis le: The length of the time series graphed by companies will vary
between countries.
We next address the issue of why companies in different countries would be expected, a
priori, to use graphs in systematically different ways. As a broad framework, we use the macro/
microclassification. Overall, we predict that companies in microbased countries will exhibit
different patterns of graph usage from companies in macrobased countries, with these differ-
ences in financial presentational practices arising, at least partially, from the same factors that
result in different accounting measurement and disclosure practices. In particular, we refer to
Doupnik and Salter (1993, 1995) who compare the disclosure practices ofcompanies in macro-
and microcountries. Doupnik and Salter ( 1 993) find that across 4 1 disclosures, microcompanies
tended to disclose more than macrocompanies. Therefore, we expect that the extent ofgraphical
reporting in microcountries, in general, will be greater than that in macrocountries.
More specifically, external financial reporting is likely to be geared towards the needs
of 'outsiders' rather than 'insiders' (Nobes, 1998). In microbased countries, accounting is
thus likely to be geared towards the needs of outsider stockholders. In macrobased
countries, insider lenders dominate. They are thus less likely to demand extensive levels of
financial information.
In microbased countries, accounting is also likely to be geared towards the needs of
stockholders, whereas in macrobased countries, the needs of other external users (such as
banks and creditors) are likely to dominate. These other external users have more extensive
altemative channels of financial communication to the corporate annual report. Thus,
Hypothesis 2a: Graphs of (i) any financial or nonfinancial variable and (ii) at least one
KPV graph are more likely to be included in the corporate annual reports of companies
in microbased countries than in those in macrobased countries.
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Companies in microbased countries are also likely to be keener than those in macrobased
countries to communicate performance data to enable stockholders to assess more fully the
financial performance of the company. In addition, external financial reporting in microbased
countries is particularly focused on the external investor and upon the needs of the equity
market. Thus,
Hypothesis 2b: Graphs of KPVs are more likely to be included in the corporate annual
reports of companies in microbased countries than in those in macrobased countries.
The priorities ofmanagement in microbased countries will differ fi*om those in macrobased
countries, resulting in a different set of topics being graphed. In particular, companies in
microcountries will be more likely to communicate financial investor-oriented information
than companies in macrocountries. By contrast, companies in macrocountries will be more
likely to communicate nonfmancial data (social, employee, and environmental), which are of
less interest to stockholders. Thus, we develop 2c, 2ci, and 2cii.
Hypothesis 2c: There will be differences in the choice of topics graphed between
companies in microbased countries and those in macrobased companies.
In particular.
Hypothesis 2ci: Companies in microbased countries will be more likely than companies
in macrobased countries to include graphs of financial information.
Hypothesis 2cii: Companies in macrobased countries will be more likely than
companies in microbased countries to include graphs of nonfinancial graphs,
particularly on social, employee, and environmental data.
Companies in microbased countries will be keener to emphasize their performance data by
locating KPV graphs more prominently within the annual report than companies in macro-
based countries. In addition, this conforms to the cultural tenet of Secrecy, whereby the
microcountries scored higher in Uncertainty Avoidance and thus would be expected to be
more up-front in their presentation of key data. Thus,
Hypothesis 2d: KPV graphs in the annual reports of companies in microbased countries
will be presented more prominently than those in macrobased countries.
Microbased countries' financial reporting is geared towards equity investors who are
generally considered to be interested in short-term financial performance rather than long-
term gain. Thus,
Hypothesis 2e: The annual reports of companies in microbased countries are likely to
contain KPV graphs displaying relatively shorter time series than those in
macrobased countries.
In summary, we expect the annual reports of companies in microbased countries to be
more likely to include (1) graphs per se, (2) KPV graphs, and (3) graphs of other financial
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variables and (4) to display their graphs more prominently and (5) to include graphs covering
a shorter time period. However, they will be less likely to graph nonfmancial variables (such
as social, employee, and environmental graphs).
3. Methods
The six countries selected as the basis for this study were Australia, France, Germany, the
Netherlands, the UK, and the US. These countries were chosen because of their importance in
any consideration of international accounting. Five of these six countries (France, Germany,
the Netherlands, the UK, and the US) have long been recognized, on the basis of economic
and accounting factors, as being vital countries' for the study of comparative international
accounting (Mason, 1978, p. 40; Nobes & Parker, 1998, p. 13). In addition, Australia was
included because of its international economic importance and because of the emerging
importance of the Pacific Rim countries (Cooke & Parker, 1994). Our country selection thus
includes representatives of the two major international taxonomical groups: macro (France
and Germany) and micro (Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US).
Extel Financial identified the top (by market capitalization) 100 domestically listed-only
enterprises in 1993 for five ofthe countries: France, Germany, the Netherlands, the UK, and the
US. We requested that Extel exclude cooperatives, nationalized industries, and financial
companies, such as banks and building societies, since a previous study of graphical practices
(Beattie & Jones, 1992a) demonstrates that such companies have different graphical reporting
practices to nonfmancial, independently operated companies. In addition, we requested that
Extel exclude companies with extemal debt listings on foreign exchanges, as we felt that having
an extemal debt listing might make a company more inclined to adapt its annual report for a
foreign audience and we wished to focus on those companies most likely to adopt distinctive
national reporting practices. In essence, therefore, our aim was to focus on important domestic,
nongovernmental enterprises in order to highlight transnational graphical differences. This
distinguishes our study from other comparative international studies of voluntary disclosure
which have focused upon multinational companies (for example. Meek & Gray, 1989; Roberts,
1990). We concentrated upon the 'top' enterprises because of their economic significance and
because we believe that these companies are market leaders in corporate communication. The
Australian companies were drawn from the top (by market capitalization) listed 1 00 Australian
companies as of 31 December 1992 (Australian Stock Exchange, 1992).'
Companies were requested to supply a copy of both their 1992 report published for
domestic users and the supporting English translation (where appropriate and available). To
secure an effective sample size of 50 companies for each country, we selected the top 50
Once again, we focused on industrial, nonfmancial companies. However, strict comparability with the Extel
listings was not achieved, since we did not sample domestically listed-only companies and our Australian sample
consisted of 1991, not 1992, annual reports. These minor differences in our sampling frame must be borne in mind
when interpreting our results. Australia was substituted for the country of our original choice, Japan, as we
encountered data collection problems for the Japanese companies.
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qualifying enterprises, which responded to our request.^ For Austraha, a sample of 89 out of
the top 100 annual reports for 1991, collected by Beattie and Jones (1999), was used from
which we selected the top 50 nonfmancial companies.
To ensure the relevance and completeness of the data checklist, the authors designed it
with reference to the prior statistical graphics literature (especially Cleveland, 1985; Kosslyn,
1989, 1994; Schmid 1983; Schmid & Schmid, 1979; Tufte 1983) as well as with reference to
prior empirical studies of financial graphs (especially Beattie & Jones, 1992a,b). The
checklist was pilot-tested initially on 10 companies' annual reports to check for clarity and
lack of ambiguity and then revised. A two-stage data collection process was conducted in
order to identify the KPVs in each country. The study initially focused upon the four KPVs
(sales, earnings, EPS, and DPS) that were found by Beattie and Jones (1992a,b) to be
important in the UK context. However, after data relating to the incidence with which all
topics were graphed had been collected, the checklist was amended to collect additional data
on any time-series performance variable graphed by over 25% of companies (i.e., 13 or more)
in each country.^ Two additional KPVs were identified: ROCE for the US and cash flow for
France and The Netherlands. We do not provide explicit definitions of these variables as we
simply adopted the terms used by the companies themselves to label the graphs. Various
categories of data were extracted from the 300 annual reports by a research assistant (a
professionally qualified accountant) and entered into the data checklist: company details, the
number of graphs, the topics graphed. In addition, for KPVs, the graph type used, the time
period graphed, and their location within the corporate annual report were entered. The data
checklists were then checked for completeness and accuracy, coded, and analyzed by one of
the authors.
We tested our hypotheses in two stages. First, we conducted chi-square {y^) tests on our
data to establish whether observed country differences were statistically significant (Hypoth-
eses la, lb, Ic, Id, and le).^ Second Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 2e, which make specific
predictions concerning the nature of transnational differences, were tested using both y^ for
^ Each company's annual report was scrutinized to ensure that the company satisfied our sample requirements
and that the annual report was the original domestically produced report for nonfmancial, nonholding companies.
In addition, we attempted to eliminate companies which were known subsidiaries of foreign and domestic
companies. The only country for which this proved difficult was France. Many of the listed companies on the
French Bourse are subsidiaries of larger French companies and prepare accounts for their minority shareholders. In
order to maintain the French sample size at 50, we retained three of these subsidiary companies.
Although the generic form of the variables remains the same, the precise definition varies fi^om country to
country. Thus, for example, profit before tax is most commonly graphed earnings variable in the UK, while in the
US, net income/earnings (profit after tax) dominates.
The degrees of fi^eedom [dfl^or the x" on individual variables is 5. For Tables 2 and 3, the individual
variables' x statistics were based on equal sample sizes with uniform expected values for each country. This is the
most logical assumption, given that the initial sample sizes of 50 companies per country were the same. For Tables
4 and 5, given unequal sample sizes, the expected values for individual variables were nonuniform. If the expected
value of more than 20% of cells was less than 3 or any of the cells' expected values was less than one, then the
tables were collapsed. This is broadly in line with Siegel and Castellan (1988, p. 123). However, following Silver
(1992), we use Lawal's (1980) recommendation that tables should be collapsed when the critical value of cells is 3
rather than Siegel and Castellan's very conservative 5.
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the whole data set and the two-sample proportion t test for individual variables (macro and
micro, representing the two sample groups; Clarke & Cooke, 1983).
4. Results
4.1. Graph use
Across the six countries, 263 (88%) of the companies studied included graphs in their
annual reports. In total, there were 2364 graphs, including 515 KPV graphs across 196
companies. The incidence of graph use (any financial or nonfinancial variable) in the annual
reports for each country was consistently very high, ranging fi^om 92% of companies in
Australia to 82% in the UK (see Table 2 and Fig. 1). The three countries with the highest
percentage of companies using graphs were Australia, The Netherlands, and the US. This
overall consistency led to a lack of significant association between graph usage and individual
countries (Hypothesis lai) and between graph usage and the macro/microclassification
(Hypothesis 2ai). Across the whole sample, 65% of companies used at least one KPV. French
and Dutch companies were the highest users of KPVs (80%), while German companies used
the least (28%), reflecting wide intercountry variation. Evidence was found of a statisfical
Table 2
Incidence of graph use in the annual reports of 50 large listed companies in six countries
Country effect Micro/macroeffect
(Hypotheses la (Hypotheses 2a
Australia France Germany Netherlands UK US and lb; and 2b; t'^
Variables graphed^ (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%) x^'' (two-tailed) (one-tailed)
Any financial or 92 88 84 90 82 90 0.43 0.62
nonfinancial variable
At least one KPV graph 76 80 28 80 50 78 17.85** 2.92**
Specific KPV graphs
Cash flow 14 54 16 44 2 18 40.16*** -2.94**
DPS 34 32 6 20 34 48 17.76** 2.70**
EPS 40 34 2 34 32 54 22.24*** 3.83***
Earnings 66 68 8 70 44 50 27.20*** 3.18***
ROCE 24 4 20 6 34 30.46*** 4.39***
Sales 38 68 28 64 40 54 12.87* 0.16
" KPVs are those graphed by at least 25% (13 or more) of companies in a given country. However, to aid
interpretation of the data, all instances of any of these variables are recorded here even when under 25%.
'' Cramer's F ranged fi^om 0.13 to 0.37 for the significant variables.
'^ These are the results using the two-sample proportion t test. A negative sign indicates that the proportion of
macrocountries graphing these topics was greater than the comparable proportion of microcountries and vice
versa.
* Significant at .05 level.
** Significant at .01 level.
*** Significant at .001 level.
U.S.
U.K.
Netherlands
Germany
France
Australia
DAt least one KPV
graph
Q Any financial or
non-financial
variable
20 40 60
% of sample
80 100
Fig. 1 . Incidence of graph use in the annual reports of 50 large listed companies in six countries.
association between individual countries and the use of at least one KPV (x''=17.85;
significant at the .01 level) and between the macro/microclassification and the use of at least
one KPV {t=2.92\ significant at the .01 level). Hypotheses laii and 2aii are supported.
Turning to individual KPV graphs, sales was the only performance variable to be classed
as a KPV in every country studied. Earnings and EPS, however, were KPVs in all countries
except Germany. Cash flow was a KPV in only two countries, being graphed by 54% and
44% of French and Dutch companies, respectively. The US was the only country where
ROCE was classed as a KPV. The US and France were the only countries where companies
graphed five out of the six KPVs. German companies, however, graphed only one KPV, sales.
In only three instances were specific KPVs graphed by over two-thirds of a national sample:
earnings in The Netherlands and sales and earnings in France.
Testing the statistical significance of this variation, an overall association was found
between specific KPV graph usage and country across the set of six KPV graphs (x^ = 77.36,
P.ooi^ 52.62, df^25). Moreover, each of the six individual KPVs was significant at the .05
level or above (see Table 2, second last column), with cash flow, EPS, earnings, and ROCE
all significant at the .001 level. Hypothesis lb was, therefore, supported.
In addition, we found a significant associafion between KPV graph usage and the macro/
microclassification across the set of six KPV graphs (x^ = 34.82, Pooi =20.52, df'^S). Five of
the individual macro/microspecific KPV comparisons proved significant at the .01 level or
above using the two-sample proportion t test (see Table 2, final column). Companies in
microcountries used significantly more DPS, EPS, earnings, and ROCE graphs and
significantly more companies in these countries graphed at least one KPV graph. On the
other hand, significantly fewer companies in microcountries used cash flow graphs. These
results are driven, in particular, by the exceedingly low level of usage of KPVs by German
companies. Apart from cash flow, these results support Hypothesis 2b.
V. Beattie, M.J. Jones / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 195-222 207
4.2. Topics graphed
In Table 3, we report the 26 topics totaling 10 or more graphs for any country.^ The topics
are shown in descending order of total frequency across the six countries. The rank order of
graph usage was France (551 graphs), Australia (447 graphs), the US (439 graphs), Germany
(342 graphs). The Netherlands (326 graphs), and the UK (259 graphs). Thus, French
companies use, on average, 11.0 graphs in each annual report, while UK companies use
only 5.2 graphs in each report. When adjusted to include only those companies using graphs,
this becomes 12.5 graphs for each French company and 6.3 graphs for each UK company.
Thus, the total number of graphs shows distinctive national pattems.
The four most frequently graphed topics across the six countries are segmented sales,
eamings, sales, and segmented earnings, demonstrating the importance of sales and earnings
across our sample.^ French and Dutch companies include the greatest number of these four
topics: 205.7 and 150.7 graphs, respectively. However, when expressed as a percentage of the
total number of graphs used in individual countries. The Netherlands and the UK were the
countries, which most favored these topics, constituting 46.2% and 40.2% of all graphs,
respectively.^ Only Germany failed to include more than 10 eamings graphs, with only three
eamings graphs (including segmented eamings) in total.
Two other topics constitute over 100 graphs across the six countries: capital expenditure
and employees. France included the greatest number of capital expenditure graphs (28.3),
with the US, the UK, and Germany all including approximately 19 graphs each. Interestingly
(and perhaps defensively), given the UK's often lamented record on capital investment, the
UK included the highest proportion of capital expenditure graphs. For employee graphs,
France and Germany showed the highest absolute frequency, presenting 43.5 and 3 1 .0 graphs,
respectively. These two countries also showed the highest relative proportion of such graphs.
There was a virtual absence of employee graphs from corporate annual reports in Australia,
the UK, and the US.^
Reviewing the other topics graphed, distinctive national graphical reporting preferences
become apparent. Australian companies were keen to report raw material prices (39
graphs) and raw material products (25 graphs), reflecting the extractive nature of much of
their business. French companies were particularly forthcoming about stock market
information (37.2 graphs related to share price, while 25.5 related to market indices)
Where a company presented two variables on the same graph (for example, EPS and DPS), this would count
as 0.5 of a graph for both EPS and DPS.
We distinguish between aggregate sales and aggregate eamings (defined as KPVs) and segmental sales and
segmental eamings. Where segmental information (for example, Afiican sales) is fiirther divided into individual
countries (such as Botswana and Nigeria), we classify this as secondary segmental information.
Our sample sizes are constant. We, therefore, discuss both the absolute number of graphs of a particular topic
in each country and their percentage of the overall total number. The absolute number of graphs indicates the
overall importance of a topic to managers in a particular country. The percentages show the relative importance of
each topic.
It should be recognized that our study is confined to corporate annual report and account documents and does
not extend to special employee reports, which may be issued by companies.
I
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and cash flow (24 graphs). In Germany, companies frequently provided operating
information (27.7 graphs) and balance sheet analysis (31 graphs).^ Dutch companies, in
addition to providing operating information (16 graphs), also focused on cash flow (11.3
graphs). In the UK, performance measures were more in evidence, with 19.5 EPS graphs
and 17.5 DPS graphs. Finally, in the US, EPS (23 graphs), unit sales (21 graphs), and
DPS (19.5) graphs were particularly important. However, in the case of EPS graphs,
although the US is the greatest user in absolute terms, UK managers consider them to be
relatively more important (7.5% vs. 5.2%).
The data in Table 3 are used to test Ic, 2c, 2ci, and 2cii. Hypothesis Ic was significant
across the set of 26 topics (x^ = 990.05, Pooi = 149.4 when df> 100). Moreover, significant
results were obtained (at the .05 level or greater) for each of the 26 individual topics and for
the total number of graphs (see Table 3, second last column). Raw material prices
(x~= 158.87), total number of graphs (x^= 139.69), balance sheet analyses (x^= 105.60),
and employees (\^ = 77.76) were most significant. The results for raw material prices
appeared to be driven by Australia, those for balance sheet analysis by Germany and those
for employees by France and Germany. Overall, when comparing the observed individual cell
frequencies with the expected values (not reported here), in the contingency tables for the 26
variables tested, France (9 out of 26 topics) and Germany (7 out of 26 topics) were the
countries, which had the greatest deviations from the expected the most number of times.
These two macrocountries' patterns of reporting were, therefore, distinctively different fi"om
those in microcountries. By contrast. The Netherlands (8 out of 26 topics) and the US (5 out
of 26 topics) deviated the least from the expected cell frequencies the most often. Hypothesis
Ic is supported.
For the set of 26 topics, there was an association between the macro/microclassification
and the particular topics graphed (x~ = 278.24, Pooi "=52.62, df=25). Moreover, 17 out of 26
individual paired macro/microcomparisons were significant at the .05 level or greater (using
the two-sample t test; see Table 3, final column). In particular, eight comparisons were
significant at the .001 level: in four cases, the microproportion was greater than the
macroproportion (EPS, raw material products, raw material prices, and ROCE), and in
another four cases, the macroproportion was greater than the microproportion (employees,
share price, balance sheet analysis, and source and application of funds). Hypothesis 2c is
broadly supported. Further examination of the individual cell frequencies (not reported here)
in the contingency tables shows that, across the 26 topics, these results are driven especially
by German graphical practices. For three out of the eight results significant at the .001 level
(balance sheet analysis, source and application of flinds statement, and EPS), Germany's
observed results deviated the most (out of the six countries) from the expected results. For the
first two variables, the number of German graphs was significantly more than expected, while
Germany graphed significantly less EPS variables than expected. German results were,
therefore, the most distinctively different of the six countries.
^ A 'balance sheet analysis' graph is a graph that subdivides the company's capital employed into the principal
asset categories.
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The more specific hypotheses (Hypotheses 2ci and 2cii) were partially supported. Only 12
of the 23 individual financial variables were used proportionately more (10 at the .05
significance level or greater) by microcountries rather than macrocountries (as expected) and
the two nonfinancial variables (employees and national economic statistics) were used more
(employees at the .001 significance level) by macro- than microcountries (as expected). In
addition, an overall association between macro/microclassification and use of the set of
financial/nonfinancial variables was confirmed, supporting Hypotheses 2ci and 2cii
(X' = 43.75, Pool = 10.83, #=1).
4.3. Location ofKPVs
From this point on, our analysis focuses exclusively on the KPV graphs. Table 4 reports
the prominence given to these graphs within the annual report. We term the KPV graphs,
together with those graphs grouped and displayed with them, as 'highlighted' graphs. Based
on a review of the structure typically found in annual reports and the typical locations of the
financial graphs, we allocated these highlighted graphs into three principal categories: front
(first five pages of report), middle, and back (last five pages of report). The first five pages of
annual reports typically include the financial highlights section, the President's letter, and the
operations review. Subsequent sections include the Management Discussion and Analysis
(MDA) and the financial statements. Following this, there are typically few pages (average 5),
which might contain stockholder information and an historical summary, in varying order.
Most often, graphs of the KPVs tend to be included, as a group, within the highlights section
or the historical summary. '° In some cases, a company's KPV graphs were located in more
than one category (e.g., front and middle). Across the six countries, 40% of highlighted
graphs were grouped prominently at the front of the report. There was, however, substantial
variation: the majority ofUK and Australian companies placed these graphs at the front of the
report, whereas the majority of German and Dutch companies placed them in the middle. US
companies' highlighted graphs were found mostly in either the front or middle of the report.
Finally, French companies' highlighted graphs were dispersed widely throughout the report.
French graphs (as Fig. 2 shows) occupied three times as many pages as Australian, UK, and
French KPV graphs.
Table 4 provides the data to test Hypotheses Id and 2d. The table rows were collapsed
(due to the number of empty cells) for the y^ testing into two categories: (1) those graphs
located in the 'fi-ont' and 'fi^ont and middle' (first two rows of Table 4) and (2) those
graphs located in the 'middle,' 'middle and back,' 'back,' or 'Iront and back' (next four
rows of Table 4). When Hypothesis Id was tested, the overall x^ was 53.84 (significant at
the .001 level, Pooi = 20.52, df=5). An association was, therefore, found between country
' Behaviorally, many users tend to read annual reports very briefly. Indeed, Squiers (1989) reports that 40%
read them for only a few minutes. In such circumstances, we reason that only material at the front (or perhaps the
back) will be noticed. It is known that many people, somewhat perversely, read magazine-style the documents,
from the back to the front! In this context, the magazine-type qualities of the modem annual report are documented
by Graves, Flesher, and Jordan (1996).
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Total Sample
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0.5 1 1.5
Mean number of pages
Fig. 2. Mean number of pages occupied by KPV graphs.
and location of the graphs, supporting Hypothesis Id. When the individual cells of the
contingency table (not reported here) were examined, The Netherlands was found to be the
country, which was driving the overall x" statistic (contributing 30.32 to the overall x~ of
53.84). In particular, The Netherlands had a very small number of graphs at the front of the
annual report (7.5%).
The relationship between graph location and the macro/microclassification was tested on
the set of location categories and on the individual categories. The overall association across
the set of six location categories was nonsignificant (x^ = 0.25, ^05 = 3.84, df=\). Further-
more, only one of the six individual t tests was significant at the .001 level (middle and back
category). This result was driven by the large number of French graphs (25%), which fell into
this category. Although this one individual result was in line with our hypothesis, mainly we
found Hypothesis 2d to be unsupported (i.e., graphs in microcountries were not generally
presented more prominently than those in macrocountries).
4.4. Time series graphed
We report the number of years graphed for the KPVs in Table 5 and Fig. 3. Across the six
countries, 5 years was the most popular (59.1%), followed by 10 years (12.2%) and then by 3
years (8.5%). Five-year trends were particularly popular for Dutch (75%) and Australian
(71%) KPV graphs. Short time trends of 5 years or less were used for the KPV graphs of 81%
of Dutch companies, for 82% of Australian companies, for 83% of German companies, and
for 87% of French companies. By comparison, a sizeable minority ofUK and US companies
graphed time series of longer than 5 years. In particular, 19% of UK and 26% of US KPV
graphs were for 10 years.
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Fig. 3. Length of time series graphed in KPV graphs by 50 large listed companies.
Table 5 provides data, which allow testing of Hypotheses le and 2e. The table rows were
collapsed due to the number of empty cells into a 3 x 6 (less than 5 years, 5 years, and more
than 5 years x six countries) contingency table for the x^ testing. When Hypothesis le was
tested, the overall x" was 70.67 (/'ooi ^29.59, df^ 10). The three individual x" statistics on
the collapsed table were also significant (see Table 5, second last column). In particular, both
the less than five and greater than five categories were significant at the .001 level. An
association therefore exists between country and length of time series graphed. Hypothesis le
is supported.
The effect of the macro/microclassification was tested using x~ ^^ the set of time
series length categories and the two-sample proportion t test on individual categories.
The overall x^ across the set of three collapsed time series length categories was 32.62
(Pool = 13.82, df=2). Turning to individual years, 4 (/ = -4.46) and 10 years (/=3.54)
were significant at the .001 level. With three collapsed categories {t results not shown in
table), both the less than 5 years (r = —4.68) and greater than 5 years (r=4.34)
categories were associated with the macro/microclassification. In particular, macrocoun-
tries are significantly more likely to graph shorter time trends than microcountries, while
microcountries are significantly more likely to graph longer time series than macro-
countries. This was counter to Hypothesis 2e. An examination of the individual cells of
the contingency table shows this resuh to be driven by France and the US.'' Hypothesis
2e is not supported.
French companies deviated most from the expected cell frequencies (contributing 14.0 to the overall y^ of
21.3) for the less than 5 -year category. However, US companies deviated most from both the 5 year (contributing
6.0 to the overall \" of 12.6) and greater than 5 year categories (contributing 21.0 to the overall x" of 36.7).
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5. Discussion
Results show that the extent of intercountry variation in reporting practices was itself
variable across the graphical issues examined. There was little variation in the proportion of
companies using graphs. By contrast, there was considerable variation in (1) the proportion of
companies graphing KPVs, (2) the topics graphed, (3) the locational prominence of KPV
graphs, and (4) the length of time series graphed. Certain distinctive national reporting
patterns emerge, and we highlight in this discussion the key features of each country in turn,
considering first the group of macrocountries (France and Germany).
French companies used the greatest number of graphs (551 graphs, 11.0 graphs per
company) with over two-thirds graphing sales and earnings. French companies also
produced (in both absolute and relative terms) the greatest number of stock market
information, cash flow, and employee graphs. Although we had expected the high
frequency of employee graphs, the incidence of the other performance-orientated graphs
in a macrooriented country was unexpected. Perhaps, French companies are more equity
shareholder-oriented than is normally appreciated. Results for Germany, by contrast, were
more in line with our expectations. Sales was the only performance variable graphed by
more than 25% of German companies. The other topics graphed by German companies
differed markedly from the other countries studied, with little emphasis being placed on
earnings, DPS, or EPS but more attention being paid to employee information, operating
information, and the balance sheet. The majority of German KPV graphs was located in the
middle of the annual report. France and Germany, surprisingly, were most likely to present
short time series of 5 years or less.
Turning now to the four microcountries (Australia, The Netherlands, the UK, and the
US), Australian companies (92%) were found to be the most likely to use graphs and
were the only companies to graph, in any great numbers, raw material product and price
information. This reflects the mining and extractive nature of many of the Australian
companies sampled. KPV graphs were generally presented prominently at the fi-ont of
the annual report. The Netherlands (along with France) was the only country where cash
flow was graphed by more than 25% of companies. In addition, The Netherlands (along
with Germany) was the only country where DPS failed to count as a KPV. Dutch
companies focused on segmental sales graphs, with Dutch KPV graphs being typically
found in the middle of the report. Perhaps surprisingly, UK companies were the least
likely to use graphs (259 graphs in total, 5.2 per company). They were, however, the
most likely to place them at the front of the annual report (72%). Together with US
companies, UK companies graphed the longest time trends. Finally, the US was the only
country (apart fi-om France) where we found five KPVs. Particularly interesting was the
graphing of return on average capital employed by 17 US companies. US companies
also graphed the longest time trends, with 38% of US KPVs being graphed for 10 or
more years.
Our results broadly confirm the pattem of usage demonstrated by the prior financial
graphs literature by showing that many companies use graphs and present them in
material numbers. Indeed, for all countries, we found graph usage above 80%. This is in
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line with the frequencies presented in Table 1. Mean graph usage ranged from 5.2 (UK)
to 11.0 (France). This confirms the rather parsimonious use of graphs by UK companies
found by Beattie and Jones (1992a,b). Overall, this result is also in line with the prior
literature for Australia, the UK, and the US, except for Beattie and Jones (1997).
Finally, we also find, as did the prior literature, earnings, sales, and EPS to be important
graphed variables.
Hypotheses la, lb, Ic, Id, and le concerned the existence of intercountry variation in
graphical reporting practices. We found mixed support for Hypothesis la that the use of
graphs was associated with different countries (supported for Hypothesis laii: at least one
KPV; not supported for Hypothesis lai: any financial or nonfinancial variable). Statistical
testing, mainly, supported Hypotheses lb, Ic, Id, le, and i.e., there were significant
intercountry differences in the use of individual KPV graphs, the individual topics
graphed, graph location, and the length of the time series graphed.
Hypotheses 2a, 2b, 2c, 2d, and 2e concerned the existence of differences between the
graphical reporting practices of macro- and microcountries. These hypotheses were, in
general, only partially supported. There was mixed support for Hypothesis 2a that suggests
that the annual reports of microbased companies would contain more graphs than the
annual reports of macrobased companies. This hypothesis was supported in respect of at
least one KPV but not supported in respect of any financial or nonfinancial variable. We
found distincdve predictable differences between macro- and microcountries with respect to
the use of individual KPV graphs (Hypothesis 2b). In particular, as expected, companies in
microcountries were more likely than companies in macrocountries to use specific KPV
graphs. This is consistent with the proposition expressed by disclosure researchers that, on
average, microbased countries disclose more than macrobased countries. However, within
the macrogroup, we found clear differences between Germany and France. Germany, as
expected, was a very low user of KPV graphs. However, France was a surprisingly high
user in line with levels found in microcountries. In the case of France, the use of graphs
appears to diverge from disclosure practices.
We also found differences between macro- and microcountries with respect to the topics
graphed (Hypothesis 2c; significant for 17 out of 26 topics). In 12 out of 23 cases, financial
variables were graphed more by microcompanies than by macrocompanies (as expected,
but a marginal result). However, 10 out of the 12 results were significant (Hypothesis 2ci).
Of the 1 1 results that were counter to expectations, five were insignificant. However, six
variables were graphed significantly more by macrocompanies (segmented sales, share
price, market indices, cash flow, balance sheet analysis, and source and application of funds
analysis). For the first four significant variables, the result is driven by France, whereas
Germany drives the last two. We speculate that the focus on sales, cash fiow, balance
sheets, and source and applications may reinforce the view that macrocountries are
Cash flow statements and sources and application of funds statements are broadly similar yet differ in
certain key respects. While both present changes in liquidity, the sources and applications of funds statements
focus on changes in balance sheet structure, whereas cash flow statements focus more directly on cash flow. We
have, therefore, treated them as distinct variables in this study.
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relatively more interested in growth and stability than in earnings performance. By contrast,
the focus by French companies, in particular on graphs of share price and market indices is
much more surprising. Macrocountries were not predicted to be so capital market driven.
Further research is needed to establish why France is so capital market-driven. Hypothesis
2cii was also supported. In particular, French and German companies were significantly
more likely to include employee graphs in their annual reports than were companies in the
microcountries. We found no support for Hypothesis 2d of an association between macro/
microclassification and graph location. For Hypothesis 2e, we did find distinctive differ-
ences between the length of time series graphed in macro- and microcountries. In particular,
macrocountries graphed shorter time trends than microcountries (contrary to expectations).
This counter-intuitive finding may indicate that the microbased countries are seeking to
provide their users with more meaningful performance-based data and/or may refiect the
relatively less sophisticated and established nature of corporate reporting in France and
Germany. In these two countries, consolidated accounts are comparatively new, and thus,
the historical records for past time series may just not be available. ^^
It is interesting to speculate on why Germany, but not France, appears to have a distinctly
different pattern of graphical reporting to the microcountries. Germany does emerge as a
reporting outlier within our six countries. This result is not predicted by the prior literature
(Doupnik & Salter, 1993, 1995; Gray, 1988; Nair & Frank, 1980; Nobes, 1983). Prior
research broadly indicates that France and Germany are macrocountries at the class level.
Although, there is some evidence that they may be different when countries are analyzed into
more refined subgroups (Doupnik & Salter, 1993, p. 53). However, in general, the prior
literature provides little indication that Germany, rather than for example France, is a
reporting outlier.
We speculate that this difference between France and Germany may lie in recent
developments in international business. Both France and Germany are increasingly seeking
international listings and adopting Anglo Saxon accounting practices. Consolidated accounts
in both countries can now be drawn up in accordance with international principles. However,
this trend towards the adoption of international accounting principles is more evident in
France than in Germany. In January 1998, 32 French companies, but only 10 German
companies, referred to International Accounting Standards in their accounts (Roberts,
Weetman, & Gordon, 1998). Meanwhile, 15 French companies, but only 9 German
companies, were listed on the New York Stock Exchange in February 1999 (New York
Stock Exchange, 1999).
Our study may reflect these wider trends in financial reporting. It is possible that the
presentation of financial graphs, being voluntary, magnifies underlying trends in reporting.
Financial graphs may be used as a signal by management to external investors. The greater
use ofKPV graphs and other financial performance graphs by French companies in 1992 may
signal their greater willingness to adopt Anglo-American accounting. By contrast, it may also
signal German redcence to adopt international principles.
'^ We are grateful to Professor Stuart McLeay for this point.
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6. Conclusions
This study has examined an aspect of voluntary corporate reporting practices not
previously explored from a transnational perspective. The graphical reporting practices of
50 companies in each of six important countries worldwide (Australia, France, Germany,
The Netherlands, the UK, and the US) are documented. Five issues are analyzed: existence
of graphs, existence of KPV graphs, topics graphed, prominence of presentation, and length
of time series graphed. There is little variation in the percentage of companies using graphs.
Six KPVs, graphed by over 25% of companies in any country, are identified: sales, earnings,
DPS, EPS, ROCE, and cash flow. Particular intercountry differences in terms of KPVs are
that only French and Dutch companies graph cash flow, only US companies graph ROCE,
while German companies graph only sales. Although companies in all countries, except
Germany, graph an earnings variable, the exact definition of earnings varies from country to
country. For example, UK companies graph profit before taxation while US companies
graph net income (i.e., profit after tax). Statistically significant intercountry differences in
practice were found in terms of KPVs graphed, topics graphed, location of KPVs, and length
of time series graphed. German companies' graphical practices appeared to be most at
variance with those of the other countries. Some evidence was discovered that graphical
practices in the microbased countries (Australia, the Netherlands, the UK, and the US) were
significantly different from those in the macrobased countries (France and Germany).
However, these results were driven more by Germany than France. This casts some doubt
on the ability of this simple dichotomous classification to explain frilly companies' voluntary
reporting practices.
The results of this study broadly confirm that the microreporting group is more homoge-
neous than the macrogroup (as demonstrated by Doupnik & Salter, 1993, 1995). In particular,
France and Germany's graphical reporting practices are extremely different, especially in
terms of KPVs. Whereas German companies are parsimonious users of graphs, French
companies are keen users. On a country level, this research, therefore, indicates that French
accounting practices may not be as distinctive from microbased countries' practices as prior
literature suggests. Of our results, Germany emerged as a graphical reporting outlier. These
differences between France and Germany within the macrogrouping are consistent with the
nine-cluster solufion of Doupnik and Salter (1993, 1995).
To date, research into international accounting practices has focused on measurement and
disclosure issues. In fact, graphs are an indirect product of these practices and form part of the
financial reporting process generally. Our findings provide preliminary evidence that graph-
ical reporting practices are not well explained by the broad macro/microclassification. Further
research is, therefore, required to identify and investigate the factors that drive the range of
graphical reporting practices.
Our research also has wider implications for future work into country studies and for
international voluntary reporting practices. First, more work is necessary on the nature of the
relationship between the three different aspects of reporting practices (i.e., measurement,
disclosure, and presentation) and between mandatory and voluntary disclosure. For example,
do conservative measurement and/or disclosure practices carry over to presentational
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reporting practices? Second, further research would be useful, on a bilateral basis, to establish
the similarities and differences between the accounting practices of France and Germany. This
would establish whether it is justifiable to class them together as macrocountries or as a
Continental European group. Third, it would be useful to review accounting practices in both
France and Germany in the light of recent developments concerning the International
Accounting Standards Board. Given that France and Germany are both macrocountries, the
potential adoption of a core set of accounting standards based essentially on microaccounting
philosophy may cause particular difficulties for these countries.
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Abstract
This paper derives an intellectual structure of the international accounting literature using co-citation
analysis. The structure is found to be fragmented, with a number of areas needing ftirther research to
integrate them. The paper identifies the 1 most fi^equently cited documents. These are predominantly
books and standards. It appears that books written by key researchers provide a foundation for the
development of related research. The paper also identifies a core literature in international accounting,
which focuses on the areas of comparative systems, classification studies, foreign currency, and
inflation. By examining the structure and nature of intemational accounting research in the early 1990s,
this study provides insights into the antecedents to contemporary intemational research. This is useful in
assessing how this area of research has developed since then as it creates a benchmark for comparison.
The study also contributes to defining the boundaries of the area. Finally, the paper provides a measure
of the degree of fi-agmentation of the intemational accounting literature and identifies areas that may be
integrated through fiirther research. © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
I An overall view of the intellectual structure of a field is useful for researchers, teachers, and
students (Borokhovich, Bricker, & Simkins, 1994). It provides a means for researchers to
"locate" their research within the field and identify potential new directions. Teachers may use
the intellectual structure to inform the way they address the intemational accounting literature
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and to check that key Hterature is covered. Students benefit from the broad view ofthe Hterature
as a starting point for more detailed study. In the case of international accounting, these benefits
are particularly important given the eclectic nature of the area and the lack of a clear definition
or guiding methodology (American Accounting Association, 1993; Locke, 1992).
International accounting has emerged as a specialty area for teaching and research (Bindon
& Gemon, 1987; Evans, Taylor, & Holzmann, 1985; Samuels & Piper, 1985; Wallace, 1987),
although there is still uncertainty about its boundaries and what role it should have in the
accounting curriculum (e.g., Agami, 1991; Cohen, Pant, & Sharp, 1991; Fleming, Shooshtari,
& Wallwork, 1993; Gray & Roberts, 1984; McClure, 1988; Mintz, 1980; Mueller &
Zimmerman, 1968; Seidler, 1967; Sherman, 1987; Stout & Schweikart, 1989; Stout, Wygal,
& Volpi, 1988). As an area emerges and develops, it is important that researchers and teachers
have an overview of the specialty and its direction. These understandings are fostered by
traditional review articles and bibliographies of international accounting that have provided
classifications and descriptions of international accounting research (Agami & Kollaritsch,
1983; American Accounting Association, 1993; Berry, 1990; Bindon & Gemon, 1987;
Gemon & Wallace, 1995; Kubin & Mueller, 1973; Needles, 1997; Prather & Rueschhoff,
1996; Prather-Kinsey & Rueschhoff, 1999; Wallace, 1987).
The purpose of this study is to derive empirically an intellectual structure for interna-
tional accounting for the period 1977-1993 using co-citation analysis. An understanding of
the antecedent literature informs research directions today and may be a basis for under-
standing developments since the 1990s. Co-citation analysis is a technique that uses
citations to map communication networks providing information about the pattems of
communication among researchers and the level of integration of the literature (that is, the
effectiveness of the communication).
A view of the intellectual structure of a disciplinary area using co-citation analysis provides
additional perspectives to traditional reviews because: (1) it allows a large portion of the
researchers active in the area to "unselfconsciously" provide the data for the analysis, (2) it
does not depend on the reviewers' knowledge of the literature, and (3) it allows a more
extensive overview of the literature than is possible otherwise (Bricker, 1987, 1989).
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 briefly describes the co-citation technique.
Section 3 describes the data and includes a description of the most highly cited documents.
The nature of fragmentation and its impact on the development of literature in a specialty is
described and evidence about fragmentation in international accounting is provided in Section
4. Section 5 describes the intellectual structure of international accounting based on the co-
citation analysis. Section 6 provides a summary and conclusions regarding areas of
fragmentation in international accounting, intemational accounting curriculum design, and
the state of development of the literature.
2. Co-citation analysis
The specific co-citation technique used in this paper was developed by Bricker (1987) to
derive an intellectual structure for the accounting discipline and to identify the level of
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fragmentation present. Similar techniques have also been used in accounting by Gamble,
O'Doherty, and Hyman (1987) and McRae (1974), and extensively in other fields (e.g.,
Bayer, Smart, & McLaughlin, 1990; Braam, Moed, & van Raan, 1988, 1991; Crawford &
Crawford, 1980; McCain, 1983, 1991; Small, 1977; White & Griffith, 1981). In conjunction
with other citation measures, it is able to provide a representation of the way ideas have been
interrelated in a research area, the pattern of development of ideas in the field and identify the
core literature. Co-citation analysis provides only one view, but it is a view derived from the
interconnections between ideas as represented by citations by a large section of publishing
researchers in the area and as such avoids the limitations of individual reviews.
Co-citation analysis was originally developed by Small and Griffith (1974) to investigate
two central hypotheses: first, that "science is made up of a structure of specialties that can be
defined by objective means" and second that a "particular citation measure of the common
intellectual interest between two documents was a practical way of defining the structure"
(Garfield, 1979, p. 99). Co-citation analysis has subsequently been refined and widely used
(Bricker, 1989, p. 250; Garfield, 1979, p. 135).
The first step in the analysis is to identify a sample of source documents. These should be
drawn from the field of interest, in this case international accounting. Each source document
will include citations to previous work that the author perceived as linked to his or her
research. By identifying two or more previous works as related to their current research, the
author also identifies a link between those previous works by citing them together. Co-
citation analysis focuses on the links created between the cited works as a result of their being
co-cited by a source author.
Once the sample of source documents has been selected, every work cited in a source
document is paired' to form co-citation pairs. The co-citation procedure seeks to identify
unique pairs of documents. For this reason, it is the combinations of pairs and not the
permutations that are of interest.
The pairing process is repeated for all source documents and then the frequency of
occurrence of each unique pair is computed. The more times a co-citation pair occurs (i.e.,
the greater the number of source documents that cite both the documents together) the stronger
the link between the pair of papers. This frequency of co-citation, called co-citation strength,
shows how many times the ideas contained in the two previously published documents were
linked in later documents, and thus reflects the degree ofconsensus within an area about the link
between the two documents in a co-cited pair. Braam, Moed, and van Raan (1991, p. 248)
explain that while it may be shown that "source publications do share a focus on the most recent
earlier literature, but consensus about what most recent earlier literature is important (and
should be 'cited' ) only exists among the publications citing co-citation clusters. " The higher the
co-citation strength of a pair of documents, the greater the consensus among citing authors that
the documents should be cited and that there is an intellectual link between them.
One approach to mapping pattems of linked ideas is to use co-citation pairs to seed co-
citation clusters of a given minimum co-citation strength. The clustering sequentially links all
' The "co" in co-citation analysis refers to this pairing. Tri-citation analysis has been considered and ruled out
because the number of repeated citations of triples of papers is very low (Small, 1980).
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pairs of documents that have one paper in common. Once all the documents that have any
link with the original pair have been included in the cluster, the cluster is complete. Thus,
each cluster will include documents that are linked, either directly or indirectly, with
documents already included in the cluster. When the first cluster is complete, a pair from
any of the remaining pairs is used to seed the next cluster and so on until all the pairs are
clustered or shown to be isolated as clusters of only one pair.
The extension of the method to include sequential co-citation threshold stepping is a useful
advance in the method's application (Bricker, 1987). This method applies citation threshold
levels (CTLs) stepping through from a minimum to a maximum and plotting the resultant
clusters on a dendogram. Thus, if the threshold is three, each co-cited pair to be included for
clustering must have been cited together at least three times. As the threshold is raised, fewer
documents of more general application are included. The highly co-cited documents included
at high CTLs are naturally also included at lower CTLs, so in general, any document included
in a level higher than the current CTL must also be included in the current CTL.
A dendogram is a way of representing this nesting of the clusters across threshold levels.
As more pairs are included in the clusters, some clusters are likely to merge as additional pairs
create links to bring the clusters together. It is this relationship between the clusters that is
reflected in the dendogram. Each branch represents a cluster and they are shown to merge in
the nesting structure as the lines meet in the dendogram.
Stepping through the threshold levels thus provides a nested structure of the research area
(Bricker, 1989, p. 250; Garfield, 1979, p. 102). The benefit of sequential co-citation threshold
stepping is that it allows the focus of the structure to be expressed from very narrow on the
right hand side of a dendogram to very broad on the left. That is, it reveals the levels of
nesting within clusters.
The combined characteristics of capturing the intellectual exchange of ideas through
citations, the dynamic nature of the co-citation analysis, and the ability to describe the
structure of the research area make co-citation analysis an appropriate technique to provide a
description of the subject matter of intemational accounting.
2.1. Strengths and limitations of co-citation analysis
The main strength of co-citation analysis is its objectivity and the availability of the data.
An alternative technique for identifying the structure of a discipline is to survey researchers in
the area about relationships among topical areas. In a discipline with an extensive range of
literature, it may be very difficult for researchers to formulate a "big picture" view of the
structure, and when asked to do so, they may necessarily weight their response towards the
areas in which they are involved — not necessarily because of a deliberate bias, but because
of their greater familiarity with that area. It is also difficult to "average" responses to survey
questions on patterns of relationships in a field. Co-citation analysis uses data produced
unselfconsciously by researchers and provides a means of transforming such data into a map
of the discipline or specialty.
Studies that have sought to verify a co-citation structure by comparing it to one produced
by experts in the field have in the majority of cases, found that the experts concur with the
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relationships identified by the technique (Braam et al., 1991, p. 241; Garfield, 1979, pp. 72-
73; McCain, 1986; Small, 1977; White & Griffith, 1981). In the case of accounting, Bricker
(1987) validates the results of the co-citation analysis by using multiple discriminant analysis
on the articles classified in Brown and Vasarhelyi's (1985) Accounting Research Directory.
The test is designed to confirm that the multiple discriminant analysis technique classifies the
articles into the same groups as the co-citation cluster analysis (Bricker, 1987, p. 100). This
validation technique confirms the representational structure generated by the co-citation
analysis (pp. 143-148).
Co-citation analysis also has certain limitations. There is the assumption that a citation by
the source author of a previous study represents an intellectual connection. That is, the author
has read the earlier work and has concluded that it is relevant to the point he or she is
currently making. When a source author cites two earlier works co-citation analysis is
premised on the idea that the source author identified and has created an intellectual link
between those two papers.
Other features of citing behaviour have been raised as impacting on citation studies (Baird
& Oppenheim, 1994; Liu, 1993). The tendency to over-cite in order to "demonstrate" a
knowledge of the literature (Baird & Oppenheim, 1994; Moravcsik & Murugesan, 1975;
Subotnik, 1991) and the potential to inflate the importance of the author's own work by
extensive self-citation (Baird & Oppenheim, 1994; Liu, 1993; Moravcsik & Murugesan,
1975) are two commonly discussed problems. Another concern is the appropriate treatment of
a negative citation, that is, a reference to an early work that disagrees with its methods or
findings (Downing & Stafford, 1981). Under-citing may also be a problem, but since
researchers are sensitive to the unacknowledged use of their work this practice has a social
pressure to reduce its occurrence. One type of under-citing is through the phenomenon of
obliteration by incorporation (Garfield, 1979, 1980; Merton, 1965). This occurs as a theory or
finding becomes so well known that it is no longer referenced to its original publication.
While it may represent the ultimate compliment for a researcher's work to attain such a status,
it also means that the use of citation techniques will not reflect the continuing use of the idea.
3. Data
The relevant data for this study are the citations from published work in the international
accounting area. Journal articles are the most commonly used source of citations in citation
studies. The citations are obtained either directly from the journals or indirectly through
indexing services such as the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI). In the case of international
accounting, the SSCI does not cover journals that regularly publish international articles
(American Accounting Association, 1993; Social Sciences Citation Index Guide and Journal
Lists, 1993). The use of an existing database also means that the difficulties associated with
errors in mass data input are unavoidable (Beattie & Ryan, 1989; Brown & Gardner, 1985). For
this study, the source articles in the International Journal of Accounting (IJA) were used to
create the database of citations manually. The IJA was selected as a well-respectedjournal in the
intemational accounting field. It was cited most frequently (146 times) out of all the periodicals
228 J. Locke, H. Perera / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 223-249
included in Agami and Kollaritsch's {\9%1)) Annotated International Accounting Bibliography
(The Bibliography). It has also been highly ranked in journal ranking studies (Benjamin &
Brenner, 1974; Houghton & Bell, 1984; Howard & Nikolai, 1983; Hull & Wright, 1990;Nobes,
1985; Reeve & Hutchinson, 1988). It is also recognized within the international field as an
important journal and as having a long and consistent publication history, having retained
the same editor for a substantial period of the journal's life (Leung, 1988, p. 60; Mintz, 1980,
p. 140). Needles (1994) describes why he selected the IJA for his study:
. . .because it has the longest continuous history of published research in international
accounting and for most of this time period was, in fact, the only outlet for this type of
research in the United States, (p. 75, see also Needles, 1997)
Westin, Roy, and Kim (1994) make a similar choice and explain it as follows:
An argument can be made for the use of several journals to represent a discipline. It is the
opinion of these authors, however, that the use of a single, well selected, core journal is better
suited for the methodology employed here. Since this method considers all citations stemming
from the journal and makes comparisons across time periods, it is believed that the consistency
provided by a single journal is preferable, (p. 27, see also Gustafson & Kuehl, 1974)
By selecting the IJA for this study, we were able to include a longer period of citations to
allow a time series analysis ofthe development ofthe knowledge base as part offurther research.
There are two potential disadvantages of this approach. First, it effectively relies on the
judgement of the editorial board of the IJA to select articles relevant to international
accounting research for publication. It also means that the particular preference by the
editorial board of the journal for (or against) a certain type of research may bias the sample.
As mentioned above, however, a review of The Bibliography (Agami & Kollaritsch, 1983)
indicated that the IJA was represented across a wide cross-section of subject areas. Also, since
it was the most highly cited journal in The Bibliography, it appears that the editorial board is
successfiilly selecting international accounting articles of significant interest to key research-
ers in the area. Second, the strength of the American bias likely to be present in the authorship
of the articles is a disadvantage. This is a difficuh problem to avoid, since many of the highly
ranked journals are based in the United States and it is difficult to justify using less well-
respected journals in preference. However, as Prather-Kinsey and Rueschhoff (1999) show,
the most frequently published authors in those journals are not always from the United States.
In summary, the IJA offers a consistent, well-respected, and comprehensive reflection of the
literature over the period of the study.
3.1. Database
The citations from all articles in the IJA were entered for the period 1977-1993 inclusive
(17 years) except for the last issue in 1993." All citations from these source articles are
The length of period analysed ensures that the intellectual structure identified is representative of the base
structure of the area. Additional years' data are not likely to significantly impact the structure.
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included in the study except for references to case law. The body of citations that form the
data for analysis includes books, conference papers, working papers, official pronounce-
ments, foreign language documents, and all from any year before (and potentially including)
the last source article year.^
The references from each article were entered in a database and carefully checked for
accuracy. For the 1 6 volumes (42 issues'*) entered as the sample there were 348 source articles
referencing 4502 unique documents. The total citations were 5787, an average of 16.63
citations per source article.^ The source articles in Bricker's (1987) study had an average of
25.6 citations per article. Gustafson and Kuehl (1974) report the average citations per article
for one journal from each of the discipline areas of finance, management, and marketing. In
each case, the average increased over the period of the study. The authors suggest that the
average rate of citation may be an indirect measure of the growth in the literature of a
discipline. In 1971, the latest year included in their sample, the average rate for finance was
13.7 per article, for management, 18.7 per article, and for marketing, 13.1 per article (p. 447).
This suggests that the average citation rate per article for intemational accounting is at a
similar level to finance and marketing some 25 years ago, when their literatures were less
developed. The higher rate for accounting as a whole may well be similar to the current rates
for these other business discipline areas. Apart Irom a potential link with the growth of the
literature, the lower average citation rate per article may have implications for the levels of
citation frequency for documents that are discussed next.
Of the unique documents, 680 were cited more than once, with the maximum number of
citations being 36 for Choi and Mueller's (1978) An Introduction to Multinational Account-
ing. There were 420 references only cited twice. Fig. 1 shows the number of unique
documents cited at each citation level.
The lack of depth in the citation patterns is reflected in the fact that only 15% of the unique
documents cited were cited more than once, and further, over 60% of the documents cited
more than once were only cited twice. This suggests that within the literature there is a low
level of consensus regarding the important documents (Cole & Zuckerman, 1975). This may
be a function of the relative youth of the subdiscipline or its rate of growth (Menard, 1971,
p. 21). A related finding is Heck, Jensen, and Cooley's (1991) analysis of the authorship of
the IJA. They found that it was unusual for an author to publish more than one article in the
IJA, "with only 21 (8.75%) out of 240 contributors having an adjusted frequency greater than
1.00" (p. 11). The large number of different authors would contribute to a low level of
multiple citations in a field lacking in a strong underlying theory or having low consensus.
Whether the high level of author "turnover" is a function of the low productivity of
intemational accounting researchers (perhaps related to difficulties in access to data) or is a
^ The source articles are all drawn from the IJA, the data from tha citations, however, covers the broad range of
materials from many journals, books, conferences papers etc. . . that authors cited.
Note that the IJA changed its system of issuing journals from two per year up until 1988 to four issues per
year thereafter.
Note this is a similar number to the manual processing undertaken by Usdiken and Pasedeos (1995). Bricker
(1987) used the SSCI and had 428 source articles generating 10,911 useable citations.
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Fig. 1 . Frequency of multiple citations.
characteristic of the subject area or the journal cannot be estabhshed in this study. It is clear,
however, that there is a low level of consensus between the source authors regarding the
important work in the international accounting area, since a high level of consensus would
generate high citation rates even with many different authors. Another related factor
introduced earlier is the lower rate of citation per source article for international accounting.
This may be a factor in the lower levels of citation or may be another characteristic of the
same underlying feature, the relative newness of the subject as a field. The lack of depth in
the citation pattern is also reflected in the co-citation pairing of documents.
3.2. Highly cited documents and their characteristics
The 10 most frequently cited documents over the period 1977-1993 are shown in Table 1.^
The dominance of books and standards in the most highly cited literature is interesting in the
context of Beattie and Ryan's (1991) argument (following Mullins, 1973) that "the publication
of a book is indicative of the fact that a theory group within a discipline has reached an
The database was analysed for self-citations by any of the three source authors recorded for each source and
cited document. There were 83 self-citations to 64 unique documents. This is very close to 1.42% of the base
figure in both cases. The low percentage of self-citations suggests that this is not a particularly strong tendency in
the literature.
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Table 1
Top 10 highly cited documents
Citations Author Title Type Year Reference
36 Choi, F. D. S. & An introduction to B 1978 Englewood Cliffs,
Mueller, G. G. multinational accounting NJ: Prentice-Hall
20 FASB Statement of Financial
Accounting Standards No. 52,
Foreign Currency Translation
S 1981 Stamford,
CT: Author
18 Frank, W. G. An empirical analysis of
international accounting principles
J 1979 JAR, Autumn,
593-605
16 Mueller, G. G. International accounting B 1967 London:
Collier-Macmillan
16 Nair, R. D. &
Frank, W. G.
The impact of disclosure
and measurement practices on
international accounting classifications
J 1980 AR, July, 426-450
14 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 8, Accounting for the
translation of foreign currency
transactions and foreign
S 1975 Author:
Stamford, CT
13 Arpan, Jeffery S. &
Radebaugh, Lee H.
International accounting and
multinational enterprises
B 1981 NY: Wiley
13 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting
Concepts No. 1
:
Objectives of fmancial reporting
by business enterprises
S 1978 Stamford,
CT: Author
13 FASB Statement of Financial Accounting
Standards No. 33: Financial reporting
and changing prices
S 1979 Stamford,
CT: Author
12 Nobes, Christopher W. & Comparative international EB 1981 Oxford England:
Parker, R. H. accounting Phillip Allan
Key: B = book, S = standard, EB = edited book, J =journal article.
advanced stage of development" (p. 33). They also analysed the accounting and finance
literature to identify the extent and disciplinary source of cited books. They found that book
citations represent 17.9% of all cited items (p. 36), and that references to professional and
governmental publications were 4.9% of total citations (p. 46). The degree of citation of
government and professional publications was seen as an indication of the existence of a gap,
widely asserted to exist, between research and practice (p. 33). A difficulty with this type of
approach is that there is no way of determining what is a high enough citation rate to suggest a
close relationship or a highly formalized theoretical body. However, it is interesting to compare
Beattie and Ryan's results with those of the current study to see how international accounting
fares relative to the broader accounting discipline.
In this vein, it is noteworthy that the 10 most highly cited documents consist of four
standards, four books, and two journal articles. The books are all specifically intemational
accounting books suitable for use as texts. The earliest of these is Mueller's (1967) book,
which was the precursor of Choi and Mueller (1978). Mueller describes the purpose of the
book as providing useful material to a broad range of students and practitioners (p. ix). He
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also suggests that it may have a role to play in helping to establish clearer boundaries for the
emerging specialty area (p. x). Choi and Mueller state that multinational accounting had come
of age and that their book "is the first comprehensive text book in the field" (p. xi). This
suggests an interesting progression in the state of knowledge in the area as perceived by these
seminal writers. While the first book was intended to assist in the formalization of the area,
the second book eleven years later reflects a sense of having attained that goal. Arpan and
Radebaugh (1981) suggest that in comparison with other areas of accounting, intemational
accounting lacked courses, books, and articles (p. xiv). They also suggest that their work may
be useful to encourage further work in the area. Nobes and Parker (1981) identified the need
for a textbook to specifically deal with comparative accounting issues, formalizing, and
"refocusing" some of the extant literature (p. x).
This deliberate use of books to try and stimulate the development of an area is contrary to
Beattie and Ryan's (1991, p. 34) premise that the use of textbooks is an indication of the
achievement of a level of formalization and "routinization" in the literature. In this view,
books are produced in order to maintain the "group's theoretical perspective" (p. 34). The
four seminal books in intemational accounting have had a pivotal role in providing a base for
development of the area, but not through the development of a theory base as suggested by
Beattie and Ryan. Rather the emphasis was on descriptive material and classification as a
foundation for teaching and fiirther development. It is also interesting that no book fi^om
another discipline plays a significant role in the core literature of intemational accounting.
The standards are all issued by the FASB and suggest the strength of the American
influence on intemational accounting literature as captured through this sample. Two of the
standards relate to foreign currency translation and reflect the importance of this topic in the
intemational accounting literature. The other two standards relate to more theoretical issues,
and it is interesting to see the significance of measurement issues in accounting reflected in
the high citation rates for SFAS 33. The joumal articles are closely related, intemational
classification papers that have Professor Werner Frank as a common author. The use of
rigorous statistical techniques in these articles in an attempt to address such a broad issue of
basic importance to intemational accounting research attracted significant attention within
the specialty.
4. Fragmentation
Fragmentation in the context of a discipline is the state of research when the specialized
areas within the discipline become isolated and disconnected. When a specialty area like
intemational accounting becomes fragmented, literature from one area of the specialty is not
communicated to other areas and it begins to disintegrate into incommensurate areas of
interest. This results in a lack of efficiency in research outputs or even the disintegradon of
the specialty (Entman, 1993). Fragmentation of the research literature has been identified as a
problem in accounfing (Bricker, 1987; Manicas, 1993; Mattessich, 1972, 1995). Co-citation
provides a basis for assessing the level of fi-agmentation in intemational accounting through
an analysis of the co-citation pairs generated.
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The 5787 cited documents formed 1 1,377 co-citation pairs of which 1217 were cited more
than once (i.e., 10.6% of the total co-citation pairs). There were 9981 unique pairs giving an
average co-citation strength of 1.15. The large reduction in the number of documents included
in the fiirther analysis suggests that there are low levels of consensus among the source
authors regarding the appropriate ideas to link (Braam et al., 1991). Small and Griffith's
(1974) calculation of a measure of connection provides insight into the impact of this
reduction. The number ofunique documents included in the co-citation pairs is identified, and
the theoretically possible number of pairs that could be formed from that many documents is
then calculated. The measure of connection (c) of the actual pairs achieved is obtained by
dividing the number of actual pairs by the theoretically possible pairs, given the number of
unique documents included in the pairs:
where a = actual number of co — citation pairs formed and
n = the number of documents.
The result of applying this formula is presented in Table 2.
The measures of connection are not similar to a measure of significance in that there is no
theoretically "correct" level to be attained. The measure is purely descriptive of the degree of
connection between the documents in a sample. While the levels of connection reported for
the international accounting literature are higher than the minimum possible, they are very
much lower than 1 00%. This suggests that a large number of documents are cited by different
source articles and so are never paired. This indicates that the authors of source documents in
the literature base perceive a great variation in the documents from which they draw ideas for
adding to the body of knowledge.
While there is no benchmark level for connection, it may be compared with the levels
found in other studies. Small and Griffith (1974) found that the level of connectedness for the
whole Science Citation Index citations for the first quarter of 1972 to be 1.2%. They suggest
that this indicates that the structure is loose (p. 22); however, the effect of including multiple
disciplines in the calculation is not clear. Bricker (1987) does not provide a calculation of the
connectedness of the accounting literature, but there is sufficient detail provided to calculate
the percentage at CTL 3, which is Bricker's lowest CTL level. There were 1513 pairs
Table 2
Connection of pairs
1977-1993 1977-1981 1982-1986 1987-1991 1992-1993
Actual unique pairs (a) 9981 1194 3796 3045 1744
Unique documents (n) 680 238 390 322 252
Theoretical maximum 230,860 28,203 75,855 51,681 31,626
no. of pairs (?)
Actual connection {alf/o) 4.32% 4.23% 5.00% 5.89% 5.51%
Minimum possible 0.29% 0.84% 0.51% 0.62% 0.79%
connection {n - 1 )/t%
Note that the number of years included in the last column is smaller than for the others, so the figures for a
and n are not comparable with the other 5-year time periods. The connection figure as a percentage is
comparable, however.
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Table 3
Frequency of co-cited pairs at each co-citation level
Co-citation level Number of pairs
2 1042
3 128
4 26
5 9
6 4
7 4
8 3
10 1
1217
including 443 unique documents, giving a connectedness measure of 1.5%. These compar-
isons suggest that a 4.32% level of connection represents a greater tendency by citing authors
to include a wide range of documents.^ In the case of international accounting, however,
there is also a low level of co-citation frequency. This is directly related to the low levels of
individual document citation discussed in an earlier section. The structure of the data with
respect to the frequency of pairs at each co-citation level is shown in Table 3
.
The underlying lack of consensus and potential for unnecessary fragmentation that the lack
of depth in citing indicates are factors relating to the low levels of co-citation.
In summary, the pairs have a relatively high level of connectedness effectively at the cost
of a low level of citation frequency. That is, as the pairs formed are summed across all the
source documents, because the co-citation frequency is low, there are more unique pairs.
Thus, while the cited documents are more connected by the generation of a greater number of
connections in the form of pairs, the level of connection between the citing documents lacks
depth because they do not frequently cite the same pairs of documents.
5. Intellectual structure
The intellectual structure of the international accounting literature is derived by clustering
the co-citation pairs using single link agglomerative co-citation clustering (Bricker, 1987;
Garfield, 1979; Small, 1993). This clustering procedure was performed over the co-citation
pairs cited more than once (CTL 2). Omitting pairs only co-cited by one source article is a
minimal requirement to reduce self-citation and spurious citation problems. The clustering
procedure was carried out over each CTL from two to five.^ Clustering at higher levels was
not useful because of the small number of documents eligible for inclusion and the resulting
^ It seems reasonable to conjecture, however, that the connectedness measure is likely to be higher at higher
levels of co-citation since only more highly cited papers are included in the calculation. This is also an area that
has not received much attention in the literature.
^ Note that the CTL is a minimum co-citation strength, so at CTL 5 all pairs co-cited five times or more
are included.
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small number of clusters generated. At CTL 2, all 1217 pairs formed 42 clusters, while at
CTL 5, 21 pairs formed four clusters.
The description of the clusters is based on a content analysis of the titles of the cited
documents included in the cluster. Where the title was insufficient to identify the subject area
or theme of the document, the abstract or complete document was consulted. In some cases,
the source articles citing the clustered documents were checked to ensure that the cluster
theme related sensibly to the subject of those articles.
A dendogram of the clusters formed at each of the CTLs is shown as Fig. 2. Each
cluster is given a descriptive title, a number, and the number of unique documents
included in it is shown.
To facilitate the process of understanding the intellectual structure represented by the
dendogram from its core outwards, the clusters are described beginning with the highest CTL,
which may be described as the core literature.^ Areas in which further research may help
reduce fragmentation are identified.
5.7. Clusters at CTL 5
At CTL 5, Cluster 1 dominates the structure. It contains most of the documents and
includes 6 out of the 10 most highly cited documents. It is the only cluster at this level to
contain books of the type, which act to coalesce a discipline area and may be used as
textbooks. These include Arpan and Radebaugh (1981), Choi and Mueller (1978),
Lafferty (1972), Mueller (1967), and Nobes and Parker (1981). This cluster also includes
the key classification studies by Frank (1979) and Nair and Frank (1980), as well as Da
Costa, Bourgeois, and Lawson (1977-1978). Cluster 1 has a strong comparative and
international accounting classification theme, and this result shows that these works are
perceived by citing authors to constitute the heart of the international accounting
subdiscipline. Cluster 2 also has a comparative theme, but it contains the survey type
studies, which, along with Fitzgerald, Stickler, and Watts (1979) grouped in Cluster 1,
were widely used as data for later studies. Professional body standards and reports
dominate Clusters 3 and 4. Cluster 3 contains two FASB statements on foreign currency
translation. It is interesting that there is such a strong influence from these standards. It
suggests both an American dominance in this sample of the literature and also the lack of
a major theoretical or empirical research analysis of the issue such as was present in the
Comparative/classification literature.
While the professional bodies also dominate the third cluster, the input comes fi"om
both the UK and the USA, suggesting a broader influence on the literature. The
Sandilands report (Inflation Accounting Committee, 1975) is included in this cluster
and may also be seen as incorporating an overview of available theoretical approaches
and as such perhaps some theoretical basis is captured in this document.
Details of all the individual documents included in each cluster are available from the authors.
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5.2. Clusters at CTL 4
Not surprisingly, the comparative survey data documents of Cluster 2 at the previous level
merge into Cluster 1 — Comparative/classification cluster at this level, and the Price
Waterhouse (1975) survey is added. The comparative theme is continued with the addition
of Barrett (1976) and Mueller (1968). The interest in the empirical approaches to classi-
fication is also reinforced in the cluster at this level by the introduction of Nobes (1981) "An
empirical analysis of international accounting principles: A comment." Harmonization and
the effects of culture appear for the first time in McComb (1979).
The theoretical level of argument in the foreign currency translation cluster emerges at this
level with the inclusion of a book by Hepworth (1956) tided, Reporting Foreign Operations.
The age of this contribution to the area is interesting and suggests that theory development
has not progressed substantially fi-om the 1950s. The Accounting Review article by Aliber
and Stickney (1975) is similarly reasonably old for a journal contribution to the area to be a
highly cited document on the topic.
Cluster 4, Accounting for Inflation, continues to have a strong input fi-om the professional
bodies with the only addition being another standard.
An interesting new cluster to emerge at this level has been characterized as Capital Markets
(Cluster 5). It includes Ball and Brown (1968) and Beaver (1968). Both documents are
seminal works in the area of the relationship between earnings figures and capital markets.
These are the first methodological documents without a specific "international" focus to
cluster. The application of this approach to many countries with stock exchanges is an obvious
extension of the original work and of potential interest to international accounting researchers.
Cluster 6 is derived fi^om a broader business literature and has as its focus the management
of multinational businesses. This cluster is the first representative of a management
perspective in the international accounting literature, which at the previous CTL was
dominated by external financial reporting perspectives.
The final cluster at CTL 4, Accounting Faculty Publication (Cluster 7), is a self-reflective
academic type grouping about journal rankings. It has an international flavor, including the
"Intemational variations in perceptions of accounting joumals," by Nobes (1985), and
appears to reflect an interest in academic publication and a review of intemational research in
the IJA. As would be expected, this cluster does not merge with the main intemational
Comparative/classification cluster at any CTL.
Overall, this CTL reflects an expansion in the types of topic areas clustering and is
significant in the emergence of the capital markets cluster, which is so influential in the
accounting discipline as a whole (Bricker, 1987).
5.3. Clusters at CTL 3
This cluster run with CTL > 2 required for documents to be eligible resulted in 20 clusters.
The foreign currency translation cluster merges with the dominant Comparative/classification
grouping. Culture is included for the first time at this level in the form of Hofstede's (1980)
Cultures Consequences, Hofstede (1987), and Gray (1988). Foreign currency translation
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draws in several new documents and a new topic area, cash flow accounting, emerges in the
form of SFAS 95. Reflection on international accounting as a research area is evident in the
inclusion of Scott and Troburg's (1980) Eighty-eight International Accounting Problems in
Rank Order ofImportance and Choi's (1981) Multinational Accounting: A Research Frame-
workfor the Eighties. It is interesting that both these works appear as books. This suggests a
greater degree of formalisation of the issue of what direction international accounting should
take than would publication as journal articles.
The comparative and classification topic areas in this cluster were boosted by the addition
of a further 1 1 documents. Harmonization and uniformity begin to emerge as an issue with
the inclusion of three additional documents. A new element emerging in Cluster 1 at this
level is the subject of financial accounting theory with five documents added to the cluster,
including the FASB's (1978) Statement ofAccounting Concepts No. 7, which was one of the
10 most highly cited documents. Although this cluster has been described as Comparative/
classification and Foreign Currency, it is clearly diversifying into a range of external
financial reporting perspectives with the addition of harmonization and financial accounting
theory documents.
Cluster 8 is a new cluster at this level. It has an audit focus, and it appears from the source
documents that cite the documents in the cluster that interest is particularly in the role of the
accounting professional and independence. It is not integrated with Cluster 13, which has a
similar focus, but is based in accounting research literature rather than regulatory or
professional bodies' publicafions.
The emergence of a separate foreign currency translation cluster is indicative of a lack of
integration of this material in the literature. The two documents that group to form Cluster 9,
appear to differ from the other translation documents in their emphasis on a review or
theoretical perspective.
Cluster 4 maintained its clear focus on accounting for changing prices and also remained
solely constituted by professional body publications. It added to its international flavor with
the New Zealand Society of Accountants' (1982) exposure draft on current cost accounting. It
is isolated fi*om Cluster 19, which is also a profession-based, international view of reporting
for changing prices. It is surprising that these clusters do not merge given that the Australian
and Canadian professional bodies are quite commonly linked with the New Zealand body in
discussions of accounting standard setting. This is especially true in the light of the Closer
Economic Relations Agreement between Australia and New Zealand. Another inflation
cluster that does not merge with the others is Cluster 18. This grouping is a little different in
character from the other two in that it is made up of books written by accounting academics
rather than publications of professional bodies. It has a more theoretical bias, and it is
interesting that this cluster and the professional pronouncements cluster are not integrated in
the literature.
The Capital Markets cluster, 5, begins to show its international character at this CTL with
both the documents added dealing with stock exchanges outside the United States.
Cluster 10 is a methodological grouping dealing with attitude measurement. These
documents are both drawn from an edited book titled Readings in Attitude Theory and
Measurement by Fishbein ( 1 972).
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The 1 1th cluster is made up of documents produced by multinational regulatory bodies, the
United Nations, and the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development. The
focus is on financial reporting to facilitate international investment.
Clusters 12, 15, and 16 all share a common theme in exploring the role of accounting in
developing countries. There is no apparent systematic difference between the different
clusters, and once again, it appears to be a topic area which is specifically international in
character, but which has not been integrated in the literature. Cluster 17 is also related to the
developing country theme and includes two documents by the same authors, Charles K.
Wilber'^ and Kenneth P. Jameson. The subject area is economic development.
Multinational Financial Control (Cluster 6) increases by only one document and so the
dominance of external financial reporting issues remains unchallenged at this level.
Clusters 14 and 20 have an external reporting emphasis. Cluster 20 focuses on the use of
financial reports and does not have an international character. Cluster 14 emerges immediately
as a relatively large cluster about financial reporting disclosure issues. While overall this cluster
is not particularly international in character either by topic or publication venue, Choi's (1973)
article, "Financial disclosure and entry to the European capital market" is an exception.
Cluster 2 1 , which is a new one at this level, contains only two documents and is clearly
focussed on accounting in countries with nonmarket economies. Both articles were published
in the IJA and this is a cluster with an intemational perspective.
The remaining cluster at this level. Cluster 22, is characterized as dealing with professional
requirements. Both publications are by the American Institute of Certified Public Account-
ants, and discuss education and experience requirements for accounting professionals. The
specific inclusion of this cluster reinforces the perceived importance of professional issues in
the intemational accounting literature.
At this level, the intemational flavor ofmany of the clusters is clear, but there are a number
that appear to link directly into the accounting literature as a whole. The lack of integration in
some key topic areas for intemational accounting, such as developing countries, is indicative
either of the early stage of development of this topic area or of a lack of awareness of the
literature by some authors or potentially there is a distinction being drawn by the citing
authors which is not clear. The first possibility seems unlikely given the age of the joumal
articles included in these clusters, so exploring the other two options would be a useful
strategy for writers in the area.
Table 4 shows the most fi^equently cited documents in each cluster fi^om CTL 3 to 5.
5.4. Clusters at CTL 2
At CTL 2, the chances of spurious citing by the same author or of less reliable linkages is a
significant concem. It does, however, serve the useful purpose of indicating the pattems of
nesting for clusters formed at higher levels, as shown in the dendogram discussed in Section
6. At CTL 2, 42 clusters were generated. Out of the 42 clusters, 37 appear for the first time at
Citing authors varied in the spelling of this name, sometimes using Wilbur.
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this level and the majority of these new clusters contain only two documents. This once again
reflects the lack of depth in the citation patterns discussed earlier, and it is important not to
draw strong conclusions from the nature of the small clusters emerging at this level.
Of more interest is the nesting of all but one cluster existing at CTL 3 into the large first
cluster characterized as International Financial and Management Accounting. This cluster has
a strongly international flavor and is clearly the major group of co-citations for the
international accounting literature. It includes four more general areas, three of which are
drawn directly from the accounting literature, while the attitude measurement cluster is drawn
from psychology. The more general accounting areas are auditor independence, capital
markets, and accounting for inflation. The other major cluster grouping. Accounting Faculty
Publication, which includes 18 documents at CTL 2, remains separate from the major
intemational group suggesting that it has been clearly distinguished by citing authors.
Although the cluster does include significant management oriented clusters, especially if
the macro accounting approach adopted in the developing countries studies is considered to
be more management in style, the financial accounting emphasis is dominant.
The two other significant clusters, formed at CTL 3, which do not merge into Cluster 1
are Information Needs of Users and Nonmarket Economies. The exclusion of the latter
cluster is surprising given that it adds four documents at CTL 2 and still does not merge into
the main group.
The fragmentation of topic areas is evident in the clusters that form at CTL 2. Multiple
small clusters form for the areas of survey of accounts, research methods, and fransfer pricing.
Intemational accounting education forms as a relatively large cluster of eight documents for
the first time at this level. It includes four books, one by the American Assembly of Collegiate
Schools of Business dealing with "intemationalizing" the business school curriculum.
Eamings Forecasts is a fragmented area that forms two two-document clusters and a six-
document cluster at this level. Overall, the documents in these clusters reflect broader
accounting issues, with the exception of the Ferris and Hayes' (1976-1977) study
specifically relating to the United Kingdom and Mak's (1989) article on the New
Zealand situation.
Predicting Takeovers and Mergers forms a large cluster for the first time at this level. This
cluster is strongly influenced by the finance discipline with three of the six documents being
from finance journals and two of the remaining being from the Journal ofBusiness Finance
and Accounting. The only potential for an intemational view in the cluster is a study
specifically relating to the United Kingdom (Barnes, 1990).
In summary, the dendogram shows that significant clusters at higher CTLs do form a large
cluster, Intemational Financial and Management Accounting at CTL 2. This forms the core
literature for the intemational accounting specialty. The nature of the literature included in the
core is distinctively intemational and so suggests that the literature of the area is more suited
to specialist courses rather than absorption into the traditional areas of teaching in accounting.
The Comparative/classification grouping is the strongest in this cluster, followed by
Accounting for Inflation, Capital Markets, and Multinational Financial Control, which are
not large but have a greater depth of citing. Financial Disclosure is a relatively large cluster
that nests into the major group, but it only forms at CTL 3 before merging. The Developing
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Countries cluster all group into the main cluster and could be more significant were it not for
fragmentation into many clusters. There remain quite a large number of clusters that are
isolated, however, and this suggests that, along with the lack of integration in particular
topic areas discussed above, the literature is fragmented. The financial perspective dominates
the literature.
6. Summary and conclusions
The analysis of this study suggests that there is a lack of consensus among researchers in
intemational accounting in citing previous work. This may be the result of the area's relative
youth or a frirther reflection of the extent that researchers in the area have differing views
about what is important research. The dominance of books and accounting standards in the 10
most highly cited documents is interesting in that it appears that "cutting edge" research in
the form of journal articles had yet to make a significant impact on the field, with Frank
(1979) and Nair and Frank (1980) being the notable exceptions.
Detailed analysis of the co-citation clusters shows areas of research with common subjects
were isolated from one another This is a basic form of fragmentation in the literature. Areas
particularly affected were auditing, foreign currency franslation, accounting for changing
prices, and accounting in developing countries. While this source of fragmentation is present
and is also reflected in the low level of homogeneity measured in the citations, the literature is
very cohesive in terms of its reliance on accounting as a reference discipline. This finding
suggests that Gemon and Wallace's (1995) call for increased interdisciplinary approaches
should not substantially increase the fragmentation of the literature and that a focus on the
specific topics identified as fragmented could lead to increased integration in the area.
The dendogram of the intellectual structure of intemational accounting literature suggests
that there is a core for a distinctive specialty that could form the basis of separate courses in
intemational accounting. While this does not preclude the approach of integration with
fianctional areas in the curriculum, the dendogram may be used to pinpoint those areas that
will not fit into traditional accounting courses.
Finally, this study through the co-citation analysis and dendogram provides a view of the
topics that researchers in intemational accounting were pursuing and had linked into the field
in the period up to the early 1990s. This can form the basis for devising future directions for
the area and as a benchmark for further investigation. Further research to extend the analysis
to cover more journals and subsequent years will allow an analysis of the nature of
developments in the stmcture of intemational accounting research since the 1990s.
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Capsule commentaries
GAAP 2000: A Survey of National Accounting Rules in 53 Countries edited by
Christopher W. Notes, PricewaterhouseCoopers, London, 2000, 126 pp.
This useful report is based on a questionnaire survey of large accountancy firms in 53
countries. The firms were asked to benchmark their local written rules in force for financial
reporting periods ending December 31, 2000 against 62 salient accounting variables in the
International Accounting Standards (lASs). The editor was assisted by the Big Five firms plus
Grant Thornton and BDO.
Of the 53 countries, 25 are European (including all of the EU countries), 15 are fi^om Asia
Pacific, 8 come from the Americas, 3 are from the Middle East, and 2 are from Africa.
The report succinctly summarizes the reported variations, which are keyed to specific lASs
and usually even to paragraph numbers. For each country, the variations fi-om lASs are
organized into three groupings: the absence of specific local rules, the absence of specific
local disclosure requirements, and inconsistencies between local rules and the analogous
lASs. Each country is covered in one to three pages.
The editor discusses a number of methodological issues and has reproduced the sur-
vey questionnaire.
Copies of the report may be downloaded from the PricewaterhouseCoopers website: http://
www.pwcglobal.com/corporatereporting/.
UK/US GAAP Comparison: A Comparison Between UK and US Accounting
Principles by David Cook and Larissa Connor, Ernst & Young, London, fourth edition,
2000, x.xvii+686pp. (£49)
This is a handy, detailed correlation between the authoritative literatures in the US and the
UK. Facing pages show the UK position on the left and the US position on the right, all keyed
to the relevant statement and paragraph numbers. Two appendices enumerate the authoritative
statements in both countries, and the initial chapter summarizes the regulatory settings ofUK
and US financial reporting. The principal difierences between the two countries' GAAP are
usefully summarized in a concluding chapter.
Students and academics may purchase copies at 50% off: £24.50, including postage, by
writing to the following address: Financial Reporting Group, Attention: Emma Drysdale,
Emst & Young, 7 Rolls Buildings, Fetter Lane, London EC4A INH England, UK.
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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IAS/US GAAP Comparison: A Comparison Between IAS and US Accounting
Principles by the Financial Reporting Group of Ernst & Young, London, 2000, xxvii+691
pp. (£49 UK/Europe; £53 (US$82) rest of world)
The format of this volume parallels that of Ernst & Young's UK/US GAAP Comparison:
facing pages show the IAS position on the left and the US position on the right, all keyed to
the relevant statement and paragraph numbers. Two appendices enumerate the authoritative
US statements and those of the lASC, and the initial chapter summarizes the regulatory
setting ofIAS and US financial reporting. Like the UK/US volume, this is a valuable synoptic
comparison between two standard-setting regimes.
The principal differences between the lASs and US GAAP are usefully summarized in a
concluding chapter.
Copies of this volume, as well as one entitled IAS/UK GAAP Comparison, may be
ordered from the lASC's Webstore (see: http://www.iasc.org.uk, and click Publications/
Other Publications).
Accounting Update compiled by Chris D. Knoops, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam,
revised monthly
This is an electronic service, ftimished without charge, which tracks developments in
international accounting and auditing, including pronouncements and other publications
emanating from the lASC, IFAC, OECD, FEE, and other international organizations, as well
as from the US, UK, and Canada. Accounting Update was launched in September 2000 and is
provided every month. Hyperlinks are provided to facilitate downloading from the original
sources. Interested readers should access the following website: http://www.eur.nl/topics/
accounting/info/au3 10101 .htm.
Accounting Standard Setting in Europe Federation des Experts Comptables Europeens,
Bruxelles, 2000, 44 pp. (free)
This is a useful compilation of data about the accounting standard-setting bodies and
enforcement agencies in the EU countries (other than Greece), Norway, Switzerland, the
Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, and Slovenia. Factual information is given about their
membership and roles, and addresses are provided. Tables show the membership composition
of the bodies, the organizations that may appoint members to the bodies, and how the bodies
are funded.
A nice addition would have been a bibliography of articles and books that give more
extensive information on the programs in the several countries.
Readers may download this publication at the following address: http://www.fee.be/
publications/main.htm.
Stephen A. Zeff
Rice University, Houston, TX, USA
The
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Accounting
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Book review
International accounting and comparative financial reporting: selected essays of
Christopher Nobes by Christopher W. Nobes, Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, Glos UK,
Northampton, MA, USA, 1999, xvi+240 pp. (US$90).
This book is a carefully edited selection of previously published work by Christopher
Nobes, written over a period of 20 years on comparative international financial reporting. It is
meant to improve access to an important body of literature published in a wide array of
journals. The essays, consisting of papers as well as comments, contain discussions on a wide
range of topics organized into five sections by subject matter.
The first section deals with the International Origins of double-entry bookkeeping. The
initial paper is entitled "The Gallerani Account Book of 1305-1308" {The Accounting
Review, 1982) and deals with perhaps the oldest surviving double-entry records in England.
By analyzing the treatment of different items such as cash entries, opening and closing
procedures, etc., the author concludes that these features "may justify a claim that this
account book was part of a double-entry system" (p. 3).
The second paper, "The Pre-Pacioli Indian Double-Entry System of Bookkeeping: A
Comment" {Abacus, 1987), is a comment on the paper by Lall Nigam (1986) in which he
claims the invention of double-entry by the Indians in the 4th century BC. Nobes
demonstrates that this claim is merely of a speculative nature.
The second section of the book deals with "Causes of Intemational Differences and
Classification of Systems." It consists of seven papers and comments, and it covers a
period of 20 years of fundamental research in the field of comparative intemational
financial reporting.
In the first paper in this section, "A Judgemental Intemational Classification of Financial
Reporting Practices" {Journal ofBusiness Finance and Accounting, 1983), Nobes proposed
an altemative approach for classifying financial reporting practices, combining judgmental
elements with rigorous statistical analysis. The second paper, "An Empirical Analysis of
Intemational Accounting Principles: A Comment" {Journal ofAccounting Research, 1981),
illustrates this altemative approach.
The impact of these papers on intemational accounting textbooks was significant, but
others have criticized it (e.g., Caims, 1997; Feige, 1997; Shoenthal, 1989). The next three
chapters contain small contributions to the classification literature in the form of comments or
replies to the abovementioned criticisms.
The next paper (with M. Lamb and A. Roberts) on "Intemational Variations in the
Connections Between Tax and Financial Reporting" {Accounting and Business Research,
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1998) clearly points out that the interrelationship between tax rules and financial reporting is
a very important but rather complex one. This paper "constructs a method for assessing the
degree of connection between tax rules and practices and financial reporting rules and
practices" (p. 57) and is applied to four countries.
The last paper of this section, "Towards a General Model of the Reasons for International
Differences in Financial Reporting" {Abacus, 1998), investigates which factors finally cause
differences in international financial reporting. Nobes presents his model based essentially on
two factors: the strength of the equity markets and the degree of cultural (not "colonial")
influence. An important conclusion is that accounting practice systems, rather than countries,
should be classified.
The third section consists of three papers on International Differences and Their Effects.
The first paper, "A Review of the Translation Debate" {Accounting and Business Research,
1980), analyzes the discussions about the different foreign currency translation methods in the
US and the UK. Although this paper is more than 20 years old, it has not lost its relevance, as
the FASB's Statement of Financial Accounting Standards 52 and the UK's Statement of
Standard Accounting Practice 20 are still in force.
The next paper (with J. Norton), "Effects of Alternative Goodwill Treatments on Merger
Premia: A Comment" {Journal of International Financial Management and Accounting,
1997), is a comment on Lee and Choi (1992) dealing with international differences in
accounting for goodwill and its impact on international acquisitions.
The last paper in this section (with S. Miles), "The Use of Foreign Accounting Data in UK
Financial Institutions" {Journal of Business Finance and Accounting, 1998), investigates
how foreign accounting data are used by analysts and fund managers. The technique used is
that of interviews with 17 London-based international analysts and fund managers. One of the
important findings is that fund managers relied on analysts to restate accounting data, but "a
large majority of the analyst interviewees (and all the fund managers) did not restate
accounting data to a benchmark, and most did not use available reconciliation data" (p. 132).
Secdon 4 introduces European harmonization issues and contains six papers that are to be
read in the context of the European accounting harmonization through the different Directives
(2nd, 4th, 7th and 8th). The first paper, "The Evolution of the Harmonising Provisions of the
1980 and 1981 Companies Acts" {Accounting and Business Research, 1983), traces the
incorporation of various European (particularly German) ideas into UK legislation.
The second paper (with L. Evans), "Some Mysteries Relating to The Prudence Principle in
the Fourth Directive and in German and British Law" {The European Accounting Review,
1996), examines the issue of prudence as well as British and German influences on the Fourth
Directive and its implementation in British and German law.
The following paper deals with the "true and fair view" (TFV) provisions, under the title
"The True and Fair View Requirement: Impact on and of the Fourth Directive" {Accounting
and Business Research, 1993). The concept of TFV first appeared in the British Companies
Acts of 1947/1948, and it was later exported through the 4th Directive into the legislation of
the European Union (EU) countries. Nobes analyzes the concept of TFV in different
European languages, and he divides European countries into several groups with respect to
the effects of having this concept in law.
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In the next paper (with G. Diggle), "European Rule-making in Accounting: The Seventh
Directive as a Case Study" {Accounting and Business Research, 1994), EU rule-making is
analyzed using the 7th Directive as a case study. Different key players are identified, as well
as the degree of influence they have exerted.
In a paper published in The European Accounting Review, Hoarau (1995) defended the
idea of mutual recognition with benchmarks, rather than American hegemony in intema-
tional accounting harmonization. In the following paper, "International Accounting Har-
monization: A Commentary" {The European Accounting Review, 1995), Nobes briefly
reacted, pointing out that "the regretted changes brought about in France from the late
1980s... have resulted from the choices made by the French when implementing the
Seventh Directive" (p. 195).
The last paper in this section, "Harmonization of the Structure of Audit Firms:
Incorporation in the UK and Germany" {The European Accounting Review, 1998), with L.
Evans, addresses the harmonization of audit regulations (the 8th EU Directive) between the
UK and Germany.
Finally, Section 5 contains two papers on lASC harmonization. The first article was
published in The British Accounting Review (1990), and is entitled "Compliance by US
Corporations with lASC Standards." It tries to identify the potential effects of lASC
Standards on listed US corporations, and concludes that "differential requirements of lASs
are not obeyed by most listed companies" (p. 233).
A short commentary concludes this section. In "An Empirical Investigation of the
Observance of lASC Standards in Western Europe: A Comment" {Management International
Review, 1987), Nobes disputes the assertions of Doupnik and Taylor (1985), who purported to
examine compliance with lASC standards on financial reporting over time and across regions,
based on a Price Waterhouse (PW) survey of 1979 and the authors' own questionnaire sent in
1983 to PW offices, resulting in 50 country responses.
As section 5 contains only material published prior to 1992, when the LASC was beginning
to improve its standards and increase its profile, Nobes warns the reader that "Current
empirical work would probably show major effects in several Commonwealth countries and
on some large continental European companies" (p. xiii).
This book presents a fair overview of the impressive work done by Christopher Nobes. It
illustrates his important contributions in the area of international financial reporting.
It is somewhat surprising to find as many as eight comments, together with the 12 articles,
in the different sections of the book. Although Nobes advises the reader that "of course,
'comments' can only be fully understood and assessed in the context of the original papers
and any replies" (p. ix), they are sufficiently intelligible by themselves and have perhaps the
advantage of being brief and to the point in illustrating the arguments at stake. They are
important as clarifications of arguments.
While the book has many strengths, it will, however, be obvious to the reader that the last
section on lASC harmonization was published before the "comparability" efforts of the
lASC and the subsequent developments. Although the conclusions in this section were valid
at that time, they are, to me, not so relevant nowadays. This part could have been omitted
without damaging the content and the purpose of the book.
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In summary, Nobes provides a very interesting look at international financial reporting,
and I am certain that academic researchers and scholars will appreciate the book as an
important and welcome addition to the existing literature.
C. Lefebvre
K.U. Leuven, D.T.E.W.
Leuven, Belgium
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Book review
Principles of Auditing: An International Perspective
by Rick Hayes and Arnold Schilder with Roger Dassen and Philip Wallage. McGraw-Hill,
London, 1999, xxi+522 pp.
This book has a distinguished authorship of three Dutchmen and an American. The authors
have an exceptional range of experience, including audit practice, academe and central
banking, all at the highest level. It might be expected that if there are to be four authors of an
international textbook, then a wider cross section of nationalities could be helpfiil. The Dutch,
however, do have a strong international and European outlook. In any case, the textbook does
not purport to be a comparative analysis of different national approaches or requirements, but
a distillation of what is common around the world, using international standards as the guide.
This is timely given the growing influence of international standards on national standards
and practice. By way of an introduction, the book is given an enthusiastic welcome by Robert
Roussey, Chair of the International Auditing Practices Committee.
The approach therefore has much to commend it, but there are risks:
Does thefocus on (international) standards as being the legitimate source ofinternational
auditing knowledge cause the text to be "dry "?
I did not find the textbook overly dominated by standards. Indeed, it avoids constant
reference to standards, and, by concentrating on their application, ends up being not that
dissimilar from established textbooks that focus on the application of a national set of
standards! After all, national standards are consistent with the international, and so at the
practical level this text is not in fact particularly distinctive. One thing that is quite
distinctive, however, is the use of interviews with leading practitioners of international
standing. Their experiential viewpoints help to enrich the text and contribute to a book that
in any case is quite readable.
Is there too little coverage ofcase law and governance arrangements rooted in local laws
and custom?
I certainly felt that there was less coverage of case law than you get in some nationally
based texts, perhaps because there are few principles that emerge as being of truly
international application across all legal jurisdictions. Different governance arrangements
and board structures between nations also moderate the development of international
standards except at a high level. As with the influence of case law, the influence of
governance on auditing is an area for comparative analysis, and perhaps more of this could
have been done. For example, the choice of an Anglo Dutch company to illustrate a
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corporate governance report is a good one, but perhaps more could be done to discuss the
different governance traditions of the two countries. On ethics and independence, there is
in Chapter 3 a comparison between countries. Although it is of a somewhat descriptive
nature, this chapter does begin to demonstrate some of the difficulties in adopting a "one
size fits all" approach to a world with diverse cultures and traditions.
Because standards tend to lag behindpractice, is there too little coverage ofthe new audit
methodologies and other comparatively recent developments?
The new audit methodologies have been rolled out around the world by the big audit firms
and might therefore be expected to feature strongly in an international textbook. However,
the standard setters have not fully caught up with this movement in terms of rethinking,
reorienting and rephrasing either the national or international standards. The implications
of the new audit methodologies for auditing standards are currently under review by
standard setters. Arguably, current standards still tend to have an old-fashioned feel,
particularly in relation to understanding the business in its strategic context, the business
risks, business style, and their relevance for the selection of appropriate control philos-
ophies. With its focus on standards, this textbook, like most others, does not fully engage
with the new audit methodologies or their implications. Much of the text, though clear and
well written, has a conventional feel and is given over to well-trodden paths on audit
planning, internal control assessment, substantive testing, and audit completion. The
emphasis is on the traditional notion of the audit as evidence, rather than the slightly
different nuance of audit as knowledge. It is on the audit as a professional and technical
process rather than audit as social control.
There is, however, a chapter (Chapter 13) on auditing beyond 2000. This is short but good,
as far as it goes. It includes coverage of the IFAC assurance fi^amework, the work of Robert
K. Elliott on the future of assurance services, the difficulties of dealing with complex
financial instruments, reporting on internal controls, the environment, and risk.
One area where there has been much development in practice is the adoption of enterprise
planning and other standardizing, integrative computer systems. Another area is the arrival
of the Internet, e-commerce, and the knowledge economy. These are developments driving
the global economy and, hence, indirectly the demand for international standards. One
impact of these developments is the growing significance of information outside the
traditional boundaries of the financial statements. I believe that the coming generation of
leading textbooks and e-leaming materials ought to provide significant discussion of these
issues, and I did not feel that this textbook was altogether convincing in this regard.
Does the focus on (international) standards mean that the many insights of academic
research are neglected?
In my opinion, there are very few, if any, textbooks that successfully integrate academic
audidng research and professional material. I did not find this book to be an exception. The
authors have repeated material from both the professional (mostly) and academic (more
occasionally) literatures where they felt it to be of a high standard and not easy to improve
upon. This is good. Nevertheless, there is not an effective overview of academic research
and whether/how it challenges the current orthodoxies embedded in the standards. Perhaps,
given the pedigree of the authorship and the Dutch tradition of practitioner-academics, I
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had expected a stronger bibliography. Again, this would not necessarily be a weakness if
the book were aimed solely at professionals, but it is a weakness when it is aimed at
university students, especially those at postgraduate level.
Drawing these thoughts together, this textbook claims to be the first auditing text to describe
and explain International Auditing Standards. I believe this claim is true, and it captures the
mood of global standards for a global economy and global capital markets. However, I am
unsure of its uhimate significance at either a practical or a theoretical level. Much of this book
deals with professional principles and practice, and these are consistent with both national and
intemational standards. Consequently, the book is not radically different, at a detailed content
level, from many extant English-language textbooks. It is similar to most of these books in
following standards rather than the newer audit methodologies, and in focusing on the
traditional financial audit rather than on new assurance services and other topical issues.
My criticisms of this particular book are therefore relevant to all current textbooks and
ultimately, in my opinion, relate to the overly technical orientation ofmany university courses
in auditing, due largely to the influence of accreditation.
It is, however, a well-written and well-presented textbook, with many good features such
as the interviews with intemational practitioners. In addition, there is a valuable chapter on
how to do an audit, with good coverage of the planning process. The authors claim the text
contains the latest on govemance, intemal control, and audit technology. Certainly, these
issues get good coverage, but I am a little skeptical as to whether the focus is on the "latest"
thinking. It is, in essence, a practical book and is well endowed with checklists, question-
naires, and a good glossary. It resists the temptation to provide the attendant slides, teaching
manuals, and computer disks typical of many US texts. These do tend to encourage a
systematic but rather unchallenging leaming environment.
Overall, this is a thoroughly competent book, highly suitable for the current genre of
undergraduate programs, and stands well in comparison to the existing market leaders.
However, many undergraduate programs receive accreditation from national professional
bodies, and generally such bodies expect a focus on national standards. No doubt, this will
change, and, when it does, textbooks that already follow the intemational standards will be
well positioned. Is it even possible that the existence of an intemational textbook might
hasten this change?
David Hatherly
University ofEdinburgh
Edinburgh, Scotland, UK
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Book review
Financial statement analysis. An international perspective by Peter Walton, Business
Press/Thomson Learning, London, 2000, vi+305 pp.
Accounting is a difficult subject for managers without a business or an accounting degree.
Nevertheless, every manager needs a minimum knowledge of accounting information in
order to understand better the situation and perspectives of the firm. On the other hand, all
decisions have economic consequences, which in most cases can be measured using
accounting techniques. Because of this, a knowledge of accounting can help the manager
to take more rational decisions.
As the Preface states, this book has been conceived as a support for MBA courses whose
objective is to provide students with a working understanding of accounting and the meaning
of accounting numbers. Financial reports and their understanding are the central issue of this
book. It does, however, aim to go beyond that, and it sets out to deal with a wide range of
accounting-related issues of interest to the business manager and to provide background
knowledge usually absent from a textbook. Financial Statement Analysis assumes that the
reader has no prior knowledge of accounting, which is the situation of many of students at the
beginning of an MBA program.
The book is divided in five parts. Part 1 looks at the environment within which financial
reporting takes place and what an accounting department in a company does. In this part,
annual financial statements are introduced as well as the uses of these statements and
accounting regulation. The author explains how accounring is controlled by govemments, the
stock exchanges and other institutions. Other areas analyzed in Part 1 relate to accountants
and their profession. It also introduces independent accountants, the auditing profession and
the external audit.
Part 2 goes deeper into the study of the basic financial statements: the balance sheet and the
profit and loss account. The construction of these statements is explained in a manner that can
be useful not only for accountants but also for managers who will be users of accounts. This
is the reason why bookkeeping techniques are not explained. No doubt this is a sensible
option that reduces the unnecessary and more tedious aspects of accounting for managers.
The presentation is based on worksheets that show what is happening in the company's
accounting database, rather than the formal bookkeeping techniques, which involve debits
and credits. This method is very useful when we try to teach accounting to non-accounting
people. In this part, the author covers important topics such as measurement concepts, accrual
accounting, fixed assets and depreciation. The book aims to go beyond the traditional
financial accounting framework. This is the reason why current topics like the limitations of
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the present conceptual accounting framework as well as relevant costs, hidden reserves and
intellectual capital are introduced in this part.
Part 3 offers an introduction to financial statement analysis. The subjects covered include
financial structure, working capital management and performance measurement. The tools
presented are the traditional ones: time series analysis, cross-sectional analysis, management
performance ratios and financial strength ratios. Cash flow statements are also studied in this
part, particularly how to construct and analyze a cash flow statement.
The accounts of multinational companies are explained in Part 4. It covers how group
companies prepare consolidated accounts in order to be able to present a worldwide picture of
their economic situation. This part studies topics like group accounts, foreign operations,
currency translation, translation of subsidiaries, segment reporting, international taxation and
auditing and corporate governance. Proof of the international focus ofthe book is the length of
this part, 90 pages, which represents nearly one-third of the book. Furthermore, throughout the
book, there are numerous excerpts from pertinent International Accounting Standards. As in the
rest of the book, this part includes hot topics such as earnings management and environmental
disclosures, which are currently subjects of large debates in academic and business forums.
Part 5 goes back to the analysis of financial statements. It is devoted to the study of more
sophisticated techniques, which include strategic ratios, Z scores, growth calculations and
shareholder value, among others.
Finally, the last chapter in this part provides a few bridges towards further study of
financial reporting. Among other things, it points toward some of the next developments in
accounting regulations, such as the introduction of fair value in some lASs.
An important feature of the book is that it is not situated in any one national regulatory
base, and it is intended to be usable in any national context and applicable to most
multinational companies. The technical accounting references are the standards of the
International Accounting Standards Committee, which are introduced in the majority of the
topics covered, as mentioned before. The examples are drawn from many different countries.
This orientation can be very useful for managers with an international focus.
The book is very well executed. The ultimate objective of the book is to enable accounting
information to be used effectively. This objective is well achieved overall. The language is
rigorous but easy to read. Every chapter has specific objectives and a summary. The book
includes many examples from the financial statements of very well known international
companies, such as Nestle, General Electric, Cap Gemini, SAS, Lufthansa, Nokia, Volvo,
Roche, Cadbury Schweppes and Bosch, among others. These examples can help to increase
the interest of the student in the topic. Another feature of the book is that it includes many
worked examples and questions at the end of each chapter, including exercises to be solved
by the reader. These questions are powerful tools to practice the concepts explained. It would
be valuable if these questions were solved at the end of the book to facilitate self-evaluation
by the student. Another suggestion would be to provide a short list of references at the end of
each chapter, which could be used by students interested in deepening their knowledge of the
subject. In any case, the material provided by the book is sufficient for the needs of an MBA
student. Another feature of the book is that it can be read by omitting chapters that are not
interesting to a particular reader.
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In spite of the stated aim that the book is intended for students and managers with no prior
knowledge of accounting, some basic knowledge of accounting is needed in order to
understand all of the topics covered in the book.
To conclude, MBA students and business managers will find the main features of this book
very helpful: rigorous but easy-to-understand language, an international orientation, strong
emphasis on the framework of the International Accounting Standards, insights that go
beyond the traditional financial accounting fi^amework, worked examples coming from many
countries and end-of-chapter questions. I am sure that many lecturers will adopt this book as
the basis for MBA accounting courses, especially if they want to provide an international
emphasis to the program.
Oriol Amat
Department d'Economia I Empresa
Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Barcelona, Catalonia, Spain
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The Future of Corporate Governance: insights from the Netherlands by Ian Fraser,
William Henry and Philip Wallage; The Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland;
Edinburgh, Scotland, 2000, xx+ 228 pp.
There are few topics that are more important to the accounting and auditing profession than
corporate governance. There are a number of proposals in the US to improve the effectiveness
of audit committees and provide oversight of the auditing profession. Corporate governance,
however, is a much broader concept, dealing with such issues as who should provide
oversight, the nature of that oversight, and reports that should be provided to those
performing the oversight activities.
This research monograph provides a European view of corporate governance and is a
valuable addition for anyone interested in corporate governance or performing research on
corporate governance.
In the preface to the monograph, Curtis Verschoor, the Ledger and Quill Research
Professor at DePaul University, states:
Internal auditing has been undergoing considerable re-evaluation and self study. Its
potential to provide valuable services has never been greater . . . These proposals [contained
in this monograph] should be carefully considered by thought leaders in corporate
governance in the US as well as those in the internal auditing profession, (p. ix)
I concur with that recommendation and urge all parties, including external audit
thought leaders, to examine this monograph and the basis for the recommendations
contained in this research.
1. Major contributions of the research
The monograph does an excellent job of integrating the views on corporate
governance across Europe and the US. Some European countries, especially the
Netherlands and Germany, have developed the concept of a "supervisory board,"
which operates independently of management and of the corporate board. These
supervisory boards provide oversight for stakeholders beyond stockholders. In many
companies, the supervisory board (or committee) has vast powers, including the
authority to change management. The supervisory board exists in companies that also
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PII: 80020-7063(01)00100-5
268 Book review / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 267-270
have audit committees. The monograph enhances our understanding of alternative
corporate governance structures.
The book proceeds by:
• Reviewing recommendations made in the Auditing into the Twenty-first Century issued
in 1993 by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland.
• Reviewing Anglo-American and Dutch work on corporate governance and the auditor's
role in governance processes.
• Developing insights on corporate governance through interviews with executives of
three Dutch companies, including the directors of internal auditing.
The researchers examine cultural differences between Scotland (where the recommenda-
tions originated) and the Netherlands to see if the recommendations work in a different
culture. We often talk about cultural differences, but unfortunately, we spend little time
examining the implications for corporate governance. This monograph does a terrific job in
bringing cultural differences to our attention. It also focuses our attention on other forms of
corporate governance to help us understand whether or not proposals made in our economy
would work as effectively elsewhere.
The monograph does an excellent job on the first two points (examining corporate
govemance and making recommendations for auditing in the 21st century), but it is less
effective in the section examining corporate govemance in the three Dutch companies. The
researchers provide interesting insights that are not often seen in the US literature. It does an
excellent job in comparing and contrasting major works on corporate govemance such as the
Cadbury Report, the McFarlane Report, the Tumbull Report, (all fi^om the UK), the
Macdonald Report (Canada), the Blue Ribbon Committee on Improving the Effectiveness
of Corporate Audit Committees (US), as well as others. This is the best single review of the
similarities, differences, and implications of these reports that I have seen. The book is worth
purchasing just because of the authors' review.
The monograph performs a thorough review of the recommendations made in the
Auditing into the Twentyfirst Century (21st Century) research committee report. Before
reviewing these recommendations, I would like to digress briefly to talk about audit
committee proposals that have recently been advanced in the US. These proposals push
greater responsibility onto audit committees in such areas as reviewing the appropriateness
of accounting principles, the adequacy of internal controls, and the independence of the
external auditor. These proposals come when audit committee members are increasingly
concerned about their legal responsibilities and when there is little evidence that existing
audit committee members have the time, expertise, background, or information to perform
the activities suggested for them. The research monograph presents another view
advanced by the 21st Century committee. That view is that organizations ought to have
Financial Reporting and Audit Committees with sufficient time and resources to evaluate
the controls over major business processes. Further, the internal audit function ought to
report directly to this Financial Reporting and Audit Committee and should provide the
committee with sufficient information to properly assess the business controls and the
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quality of financial reporting. In addition to this proposal, the 21st Century committee
also proposes that the external audit function become "external assessors," and the
external assessors should focus on evaluating the work performed by the internal auditors.
This is a significant proposal.
The research interestingly reviews the recommendations contained in the 21st Century
report developed in Scotland to see whether or not they would work in a different corporate
govemance culture such as that found in the Netherlands. The proposals are listed below in
italics along with a brief comment on the research findings.
Proposal 1: Each company should appoint a strong internal audit team that is capable of
providing the Financial Reporting and Audit Committee with sufficient information to fulfill
its responsibilities on behalf of the board.
The researchers find support for this proposal and develop recommendations for strength-
ening the internal audit function in Dutch companies.
Proposal 2: The findings of each investigation by the internal audit function should be
reported to the chief executive, the Financial Reporting and Audit Committee, and the
external assessors.
This proposal is quite common, although the notion of "investigation" needs to be
better defined.
Proposal 3: (an extended proposal). The chief internal auditor should report on the
establishment and effectiveness ofmanagement information and internal control systems, and
on the conformity of financial statements with the accounting records and legal and
accounting standards.
The researchers suggest the above requirement be extended to include the identification of
significant business risks; the effectiveness of financial, operational, and compliance controls;
the quality of management information and the effectiveness of management (emphasis
added). This recommendation is consistent with the movement of internal auditing on a
global basis, with one exception. The reporting on the "effectiveness of management" is new
and is consistent with the cultural difference that focuses on a supervisory committee
evaluating the effectiveness of all operations, including the effectiveness of management in
accomplishing organizational objectives.
Proposal 4: The external auditors should be renamed the external assessors and that, to a
considerable extent, the external assessors would cany out their work by assessing the work
of a company's internal auditors.
The authors assert that this recommendation is consistent with the cooperation seen
between the extemal and internal auditors in the Dutch system and the movement of extemal
auditing to a strategic systems-based approach.
Proposal 5: An Independent Audit and Review Panel should be established to take
responsibility for the supervision of the assessment process on behalf of the primary
stakeholders, while being responsive to the needs ofthe secondary and tertiary stakeholders.
This proposal recognizes (a) the weaknesses in the focus only on audit committees; and (b)
the recognized need to serve stakeholders beyond shareholders.
Proposal 6: The Audit and Review Panel should be proactive in supervising the work of
the external assessor to make sure it is performed with due rigor, and is to perform a
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periodic review of the internal audit function to confirm its effectiveness and independence
within the organization.
These are interesting proposals to enhance overall corporate governance, and they suggest
interesting changes to the auditing profession. Anyone interested in corporate governance
should take the time to read the detailed rationale for these proposals.
2. Weaknesses of the monograph
A weakness of the monograph is that the review of the three Dutch companies tends to be
repetitious and not very insightful. In addition, I am surprised that a monograph with a 2000
copyright has not been updated to reflect the change in the definition of internal auditing that
was approved by the board of directors of the Institute of Internal Auditors in June 1999. It is
a major omission in a monograph that focuses as heavily as this one does on internal auditing.
3. Recommendation
Good research should: (a) provide new insights; (b) challenge traditional thinking, help us
understand new phenomena or, as in this case, examine the applicability of existing findings
to a different cultural setting; and (c) stimulate the reader to think more deeply about
fundamental issues. This monograph succeeds on all three of these criteria, but, most
importantly for me, it forced me to rethink assumptions and recommendations regarding
the effectiveness of audit committees. It suggests a form of corporate governance that might
be more effective than existing US proposals. It also suggests ways in which we can include
governance input from other major stakeholders. There is a lot to learn in this monograph. It
includes an excellent bibliographic reference section and it does not take long to read. I
heartily recommend it to anyone interested in corporate governance or intemal auditing.
Larry E. Rittenberg
School ofBusiness
University of Wisconsin-Madison
Madison, WI 53706-1323, USA
E-mail address: lrittenberg@yahoo.com
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The impact of national influence on accounting estimates:
Implications for international accounting standard-setters
Joseph J. Schultz Jr.^'*, Thomas J. Lopez'''^
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AZ 85287-3606, USA
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Abstract
The results of prior research suggest that national accounting systems are significantly associated
with differences in market valuations and various other macromeasures. These results, however, rely
heavily on the analysis of archival data or survey evidence directed at national system differences. As
Pownall and Schipper [Accounting Horizons (1999) 259] note, archival research necessarily depends
on the information in the financial reports and cannot explain the process linking the underlying
standards to the reported information. This study examines this process by investigating judgments
made by accountants in France, Germany, and the United States. To facilitate a comparison of this
process across intemational boundaries, our experiment presents these accountants with the same
economic facts that are governed by similar financial reporting rides. Our results indicate that, even
given similar facts and rules, judgments among the three nations' accountants vary significantly. They
also suggest that national culture interacts with findings accepted as general within behavioral decision
research. © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keyyi'ords: Intemational accounting standards; Uniform; Harmonization; De jure; De facto; Financial reporting
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1. Introduction
Previous international financial reporting research has focused on developing an
understanding of the different effects that national accounting systems have on firm
valuation (e.g., Saudagaran & Meek, 1997; Tay & Parker, 1990; van der Tas, 1988).
The general conclusion of this research is that different financial reporting systems have
diverse effects on firm valuation. The purpose of this paper is to extend the current
literature by investigating whether the factors associated with system differences tend to
affect differences in individual accounting judgments when the accounting standards across
countries are nearly identical. In contrast to the prior literature, our study focuses on the
individual judgment of accountants who are faced with similar accounting standards. Thus,
our study has the capability of addressing whether uniform accounting standards will result
in comparable financial reporting across borders.^ Our work is motivated by the decision of
the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to consider the implementation of uniform
international accounting standards.
Several recent studies question the inferences that can be drawn from the prior literature
due to limitations in the research designs employed (Gemon & Wallace, 1995; Pownall &
Schipper, 1999; Prather & Rueschhoff, 1996; Saudagaran & Meek, 1997). For example,
Pownall and Schipper (1999, p. 261) point out that archival studies necessarily depend on
reported information and cannot detect differences that might arise in the process linking
countries' standards and reported information. Specifically, they note that "existing research
methods cannot in general distinguish the effects of standards fi"om the effects of interpreta-
tion/application." Our primary objective is to address the concerns of Pownall and Schipper
by investigating whether the financial reporting judgments made by accountants in different
nations are consistent when those accountants are faced with the same economic facts and
similar financial reporting standards. Thus, our study addresses the issue of the cross-border
effects of "interpretation/application" on financial reporting.
" The issue under consideration is whether consistent standards [such as those being considered by the
International Accounting Standards Committee (lASC)] are being interpreted consistently across international
boundaries. The lASC will develop consistent standards with the objective of achieving comparable financial
reporting across countries. This will only be achieved if the standards are applied consistently across countries.
While we are not examining the application of an "international accounting standard," we are examining a
consistent standard across these countries, which is the objective of the lASC. SFAS 5 (FASB, 1975) governs the
accounting for warranty expense in the United States. According to SFAS 5, the estimated amount of warranty
expense should be charged to income if the following two conditions are met: (1) on the balance sheet date, it is
probable, from information available before the release of the financial reports, that the entity has incurred a
liability, and (2) the entity can reasonably estimate the amount of the warrant expense. Afterman (1995) indicates
that the accounting rules governing the recognition of contingent losses in France and Germany are similar to
those in the United States. That is, all three countries require the accrual of likely (probable) contingent losses.
Further, the accounting for contingent losses in all three countries is subject to relatively broad guidance, which is
generally characteristic of international accounting standards. Brackner (1985) expresses concern over the
diversity that exists in the application of SFAS 5 with respect to the estimation of fiature events or probabilities.
This same issue is addressed by Afterman (p. B 10.04) when he indicates that contingent loss accruals are subject
to manipulation for the purpose of income smoothing in France and Germany.
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Several influential actors in the standard-setting arena have argued in support of
international accounting standards as a basis for bringing consistency to financial state-
ments across nations (e.g., Beresford, 1990; Wyatt, 1989). However, Bindon and Gemon
(1995) note that the principal benefit of harmonization is to set a floor requirement that
leaves a wide elective range for what is actually disclosed. Tay and Parker (1990) and van
der Tas (1988) warn that there is a difference between de jure and de facto accounting
where de jure accounting represents consistency in form or rules and de facto accounting
represents consistency in actual application. Contrary to the opinions expressed by
Beresford (1990) and Wyatt (1989), Van Hulle (1997) has expressed the view that de
facto application across nations would not necessarily arise due to de jure consistency."^
Thus, there is no clear consensus on the effect of uniform international accounting rules
on financial reporting across countries.
Our primary finding is that uniform international accounting standards are not likely to
result in de facto uniformity among nations, particularly when the standards allow for
significant discretion in application. Our study also provides mixed support for proposi-
tions rooted in behavioral decision theory. The most interesting result supports the notion
advanced by Sharp and Salter (1997) that national cultural characteristics may interact
with behavioral propositions. Our results are consistent with the interpretation that
experienced accountants from countries high on uncertainty avoidance are more sensitive
to framing effects than accountants from low-uncertainty avoidance countries. These
results suggest that the phrasing of international accounting standards or the way that
accountants interpret those standards may play an unintended role in accounting
measurement across nations.
Our findings have important implications for international accounting standard-setters. The
international accounting community has undertaken the costly task of reviewing current
cross-border accounting standards based on the implicit belief that uniformity will result in
consistent financial reporting across countries. Our results question the validity of this
assumption, particularly where the underlying economics involve uncertainty and ambiguity.
We provide evidence on the cross-border application of extant accounting rules, which may
assist accounting regulators in the promulgation of uniform international standards. We
believe these results are important to the SEC's assessment of international accounting
standards. Specifically, undue latitude in international accounting standards may result in
significant differences in reported amounts.^
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides a discussion of the
theory background and hypothesis development. Section 3 outlines the research design and
methodologies employed. Section 4 presents the empirical findings and Section 5 provides a
brief summary and conclusion.
Van Hulle is the principal party responsible for the harmonization ofaccounting rules with the European Union.
Some accounting treatments are likely to involve judgment latitude. Accounting estimates represent an
example as the recorded amounts depend on an assessment of fiiture events. In such cases, standard setters in
accounting and auditing can work together to constrain wanton interpretation and application. Wallace (1993)
discusses several issues bearing on this matter.
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2. Theoretical background and hypothesis development
Previous accounting research has developed a hnk between numerous factors and
differences in national accounting systems (Saudagaran & Meek, 1997). These factors
include legal systems, the relationship between the providers of capital and enterprises,
tax systems, inflation patterns, political and economic ties, levels of economic devel-
opment, and education. Various authors have proposed comprehensive explanatory
models incorporating these and other variables (e.g., Gray, 1988; Perera, 1989; Schwei-
kart, 1985). Arguably, Doupnik and Salter (1995) represent the most comprehensive
empirical study of these factors. Their study includes environmental, institutional, and
cultural variables. We investigate the impact of their most influential variables on
judgments made by accountants when faced with the same facts and governed by
similar accounting guidelines.
2.1. National differences in accounting systems
Doupnik and Salter (1995) consider work by Gray (1988), Harrison and McKinnon
(1986), Robson (1991), and Schweikart (1985) to establish the theoretical underpinning of
national accounting development. Schweikart proposes that environmental factors (e.g.,
economic, educational, political) condition the institutional structure (e.g., corporations,
stock exchanges) and the decision-makers (e.g., investors and lenders) across nations.
These structures, subject to the cultural idiosyncrasies, contribute to the type and amount
of information provided to the public in a particular country. Gray identifies four primary
values that distinguish national accounting systems. His accounting values, primarily a
fiinction of culture, consist of: professionalism (versus statutory control), the extent to
which a nation's accounting system allows for a broad range of personal judgment versus
rigid, legalistic control; uniformity (versus flexibility), the degree to which a system allows
for the differential handling of idiosyncratic accounting events; conservatism (versus
optimism), the extent to which a system prefers a cautious approach to measurement to
cope with the uncertainty of future events versus a more optimistic, risk-taking approach;
and secrecy (versus transparency), the degree to which a system allows for restriction of
information to those closely involved with the entity's management and financing versus
a more transparent, publicly accountable approach. Harrison and McKinnon conclude that
accounting system change relies principally on intrusive events, intrasystem activity,
transsystem activity, and cultural environment. Robson posits that accounting systems
change to provide a vehicle to translate economic needs to other extant systems within
the environment.
From this theoretical base, Doupnik and Salter (1995) settle on three principal categories
that determine a nation's accounting development — the external environment, cultural
values, and the institutional structure. Using this framework, they test environmental
measures for: (1) legal system, (2) nature of the relationship between business enterprises
and providers of capital, (3) tax laws, (4) inflation levels, (5) level of education, and (6) level
of economic development. Relying on Gray's (1988) work, they also include Hofstede's
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(1980) four cultural variables: (1) individualism/collectivism, (2) uncertainty avoidance, (3)
power distance, and (4) masculinity.^
They gather survey responses from 174 experts on 100 accounting practices in 50
countries. Cluster analysis of their survey results conforms closely to Nobes' (1983)
micro-based and macro-based accounting system categories. Micro-based systems in this
context are characterized by comparatively complex, less conservative measurement practices
and generally higher disclosure than macro-based ones. Notably, the United States falls at the
extreme end of the micro-based system countries, while France and Germany are included
among the macro-based countries (with Germany next to the most extreme).^
Doupnik and Salter (1995) perform canonical analysis and other tests that relate the
underlying dimensions of accounting practice to their 10 predictor variables.^ Their results
show that the legal system variable is very important, with code-based countries leaning
heavily toward macro-based system indicators. Uncertainty avoidance and reliance on
equity capital are the two other very significant variables. Uncertainty avoidance is
positively related to macro-based system indicators and reliance on equity capital is
negatively related to macro-based systems. These three variables dominated the other
predictor variables in the analysis.
Doupnik and Salter (1995) suggest that the legal system is an institutional indicator that
influences not only how accounting rules are promulgated but also the content of the rules.
For example, code-based systems generally are more rigid and allow for less discretion in
application than common-law systems. Radebaugh and Gray (1997, p. 49) identify France
and Germany as examples of countries with traditions of code-based law and the United
Kingdom and the United States as representative of countries with a common-law heritage.
Doupnik and Salter (1995) report that countries that rely on equity-based financing will
generate more sophisticated accounting information, because stakeholders in these
countries have limited access to alternative sources of information. That is, in countries
where bankers, governments, or families are the primary sources of financing, access to
private information reduces the need and desire to develop more open and informative
In a massive global study ofIBM personnel, Hofstede (1980) isolated four cultural dimensions that relate to
how societies organize and view the workplace. These are: power distance, the degree to which hierarchy and
unequal power distribution in institutions and organizations are accepted; uncertainty avoidance, the extent to
which the society feels uncomfortable with ambiguity and an uncertain future; individualism (versus collectivism),
the degree to which society views "I" versus "we," its preference for a loose social fabric versus a tight, more
interdependent fabric; and masculinity (versus femininity), the degree to which a society differentiates and
emphasizes gender roles and visible performance achievement — traditional masculine values — versus
relationships and caring — traditional feminine values culture. Later work by Hofstede (1991) and Hofstede and
Bond (1988) argue for a fifth dimension, Confucian dynamism — long-term orientation. However, Yeh and
Lawrence (1995) cite a data problem in this work, showing that once an outlier is removed, Conflician dynamism
disappears and is absorbed by the concept of individualism.
^ Nobes (1998) modified his prior accounting classification schemes. In his 1998 work, he proposes a two-way
classification using two variables; the strengths of equity markets and the degree of cultural dominance.
The study includes 1 1 predictor variables with two included for equity-oriented financing sources: market
capitalization as a percentage of GNP and total value of market capitalization.
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accounting systems. Radebaugh and Gray (1997, p. 55) indicate that share ownership is
much more widespread in the United States than in France and Germany. They also
indicate that the government is a major source of financing in France, while in Germany
banks are the major source. Radebaugh and Gray also cite evidence fi'om the hitemational
Finance Corporation (1993, p. 10) showing that in 1992 the United States had just under
one-half of all market capitalization in the world and over 13 times as much as France
and Germany.
Doupnik and Salter's (1995) other major predictor was Hofstede's (1980) uncertainty
avoidance dimension. We believe that cultural differences play a special role in defining the
differences in the development of accounting systems and particularly individual judgments
related to accounting measurements and disclosures. Our beliefs are similar to those of Gray
(1988), who suggested that cultural values arise over long periods and contribute to the
formation of institutions and other environmental elements. Our notion is further supported
by the definition of culture offered by Hofstede (p. 25). He defines culture as "a collective
programming of the mind which distinguishes one group fi-om another."
In the context of our study, which involves the measurement of warranty expense,
conservatism appears to be the most relevant characteristic. Gray (1988, p. 10) supports this
contention. He notes that conservatism "would seem to be the most significant accounting
value dimension" due to its pervasive role in accounting measurement. The intuition behind
this argument lies in the notion that warranty expense relies on future outcomes and
accountants surrounded by societal values stressing conservatism are more likely to adopt
a more cautionary measure than those in other, less conservative settings.
Table 1 shows Gray's (1988) expected relationships between conservatism and Hof-
stede's cultural dimensions. In discussing his framework, Gray posits a strong positive
relationship between conservatism and uncertainty avoidance and a weaker link between
individualism and masculinity and then only where uncertainty avoidance is low. Table 1
shows that France ranks high on uncertainty avoidance (tied with six other countries in
spots 36-41 out of 50 total countries). Germany ranks near the middle (23). Thus, the
United States is the only country in our sample that might be viewed as ranking low on
uncertainty avoidance (11) and, according to Gray, the most likely of the countries we
examine to be affected by individualism and masculinity values. The United States also has
the highest individualism measure (50 out of 50) and a relatively high masculinity ranking
(36 out of 50). Since these are asserted to have an inverse relationship with conservatism,
we expect the United States to exhibit less conservatism than its uncertainty avoidance
score alone would suggest.
Our analysis of Gray's (1998) model does not detract fi-om our view that uncertainty
avoidance will be the dominant factor in driving estimated warranty amounts. In addition
to Gray, numerous other studies have established a link between uncertainty avoidance and
differences in national accounting systems.*^ Salter and Niswander (1995) test Gray's
Fechner and Kilgore (1994) note that Hofstede has acknowledged that uncertainty avoidance is significantly
correlated with the other three cultural dimensions, thus it may mirror the entire set to a degree.
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Table 1
Hofstede value indices by country related to Gray's conservatism accounting value and differences from France
(rank out of 50 nations; 1 = lowest) [difference from France]
Values Gray's conservatism^ France Germany United States
Individualism/Collectivism - 71 (40-41) [N/A] 67 (36) [4] 91 (50) [-20]
Uncertainty avoidance + 86 (36-41) [N/A] 65 (23) [21] 46 (11) [40]
Power distance ? 68 (37-38) [N/A] 35 (10-12) [33] 40 (16) [28]
Masculinity
-
43 (17-18) [N/A] 66 (41-42) [- 23] 62 (36) [-19]
Sources: Gray (1988) and Perera (1989).
" + Indicates a positive relationship between Gray's value and the measure of Hofstede's value index;
— represents a negative relationship; ? indicates that Gray did not opt for a differential impact.
framework at the systems level and report that uncertainty avoidance is most closely
related to Gray's model. Zarzeski (1996) reports that uncertainty avoidance is the most
important of Hofstede's variables in explaining differences in disclosure practices. Sim-
ilarly, Doupnik and Salter (1995) report that uncertainty avoidance is the foremost Hofstede
characteristic in explaining the diversity among countries' accounting measurement and
disclosure practices.
Table 1 indicates there are large differences in uncertainty avoidance among the three
countries in our study. This high degree of variance should provide a fertile setting for testing
the impact of uncertainty avoidance and its postulated accounting system characteristic,
conservatism, on individual accounting judgments. The values of uncertainty avoidance
presented in Table 1 lead to the expectation that French accountants will resolve estimates
more conservatively than German accountants who in turn are expected to be more
conservative than American accountants. We expect that American accountants will be even
more liberal in their judgments due to the very high score on individualism and the relatively
high score on masculinity (Gray, 1988). As suggested previously, the findings of Doupnik and
Salter (1995) regarding code-based law and the varying reliance on equity financing may also
have implications for our tests. Radebaugh and Gray (1997) cite France and Germany as their
sole examples of countries with code-based and nonequity-financed systems and the United
States as an example of a common-law-based country with predominantly equity financing.
Based on this discussion, we offer the following hypothesis (stated in the altemadve form):
Hypothesis 1: Given the same case facts, individual American accountants will resolve
warranty estimates at relatively lower dollar magnitudes than individual French and
German accountants.
2.2. Cultural effect on decision-making under uncertainty
Kahneman and Tversky (1979) formulated prospect theory, which accounts for many of
the anomalous findings from behavioral decision research. Prospect theory posits that
decisions turn on the potential for either gain or loss represented by probable outcomes —
not on the likely changes in total wealth. When individuals are faced with potential gain, they
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tend to underestimate it relative to the expected value of the gain. When potential losses are
considered, people tend to overestimate its actual expected value. Thus, when faced with the
task of estimating warranty expense (loss), prospect theory holds that accountants will
overestimate the expense.
Prior accounting research has found considerable support for the propositions of prospect
theory (Chang, 1984; Chang & Schultz, 1990; Jackson & Jones, 1985; Rutledge & Harrell,
1993). Framing is often used to demonstrate this effect. Framing refers to the way a
decision setting is presented to a decision-maker. For example, consider a decision about
whether or not to use an experimental vaccine to counter the effects of a mortal disease.
The positive frame will state that the use of an experimental vaccine may save 50 percent
of the people. The negative frame will state that use of an experimental vaccine will result
in 50 percent of the people dying. While both state the same probable outcome, research
finds that subjects tend to resist using the vaccine (act more cautiously) when the outcome
is framed negatively.
Although prospect theory is aimed at general behavior. Sharp and Salter (1997) posit that
cultural values may interact with the effects of this theory. In their study of differences
between Asian and Western cultures, they predict that the cultural attribute of uncertainty
avoidance and negative (versus positive) framing will interact to accentuate the overweight-
ing attributable merely to negative framing. They hypothesized that Asians (who are higher
on uncertainty avoidance than Westerners) would opt for more investment than Westerners
when the frame was negative. Sharp and Salter expected an observable outcome of the
following pattern:
Positive frame Negative frame
Asian More investment Much more investment
Western More investment Somewhat more investment
They acknowledge that Chow, Harrison, Lindquist, and Wu (1996), in a study testing
similar propositions, did not report an interactive effect. However, Chow et al. did report that
their student sample from Taiwan committed a greater amount than their American student
sample as predicted by cultural characteristics. Sharp and Salter's (1997) results are consistent
with those of Chow et al. They observe differences between the cultures with Asians
committing greater amounts than Westerners, but do not find significant differences
attributable to the interaction.
We do not explicitly manipulate a framing treatment in this study primarily due to the
number of subjects required and the limits on subject time (accessing highly experienced
professional accountants is costly). For that same reason, we use a within-subject manipula-
tion for both probability and monetary amount.^ We do, however, approximate a negative
' Monetary amount and probability level were manipulated in our experiment to study other potential
behavioral effects on judging estimated amounts (see Einhom & Hogarth, 1985; Hogarth & Einhom, 1989). These
variables had no significant results in our models and are not discussed further.
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frame in our low- and high-monetary amount manipulation. That is, when the lower (higher)
monetary amount is followed (preceded) by the higher (lower) monetary amount, the higher
(lower) amount is likely to be perceived as more (less) serious. Thus, when it appears that the
loss is becoming greater (smaller), the participants are expected to perceive it as a negative
(positive) frame. Based on the theoretical development of Sharp and Salter (1997) discussed
above, we offer the following hypothesis (stated in the alternative form):
Hypothesis 2: The warranty estimates of participants that were given a low to high order
of monetary amounts will be greater for French than German accountants and greater for
German than American accountants.
3. Research methodology
This section reviews the procedure, the participants, the instrument, and the variables
involved in the study.
3.1. Procedure
The experimental instruments were administered in a single practice office of the same
large international accounting firm in each of the three countries. Participants in the three
countries were native to their respective countries and obtained nearly all their experience
there. Each participant completed two cases involving a warranty expense scenario. One case
involved a high monetary amount, while the other involved a low amount (see Appendix A).
For each case, three probabilities with varying degrees of ambiguity were presented. The
participants were asked to follow their "normal guidelines" to assess the warranty expense
that should be recognized for two cases. Accounting rules governing such estimates are
similar in each of the three countries.'^
Instruments were in the language common to the participants' offices. Initially, the English
cases were constructed and reviewed by two partners in the participating firm. Following
modification, individuals familiar with business terminology, English, and local languages
franslated the instruments into French and German. Partners in the French and German offices
reviewed these versions, which led to the final instruments.
3.2. Participants
In order to assure that the participants had the requisite experience to provide
competent and reliable judgments, we used public accountants with an average of nearly
'° See the discussion in footnote 2 above. Additionally, Radebaugh and Gray (1997, Chapter 14) discuss major
differences among various national accounting systems. They do not include accounting estimates as a difference.
Also, Coopers and Lybrand ( 1 99 1 ), which discusses various national accounting systems, does not draw
significant differences among the three countries in this study in this area.
280 J.J. Schultz, T.J. Lopez / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 271-290
10 years experience as auditors. Each country (office) supplied 16 participants for a total
of 48. All of the participants were either a manager or partner with the exception of one
senior staff participant in the US office. The average ages of the French, German, and
American participants were 33, 38, and 30 years old, respectively. The average experience
in public accounting of the French, German, and American participants was 9, 1 1 , and 7
years, respectively.
3.3. Case construction
The objectives we sought to achieve in the construction of the experimental cases were to
make the two firms quite similar and to make each of them have a low-risk profile. Each case
involved similarly sized manufacturing companies that were involved in the distribution of
athletic equipment or outdoor furniture (see Appendix A). Both cases involved new products
that were believed to possess superior attributes to its competitors. In each case, the product's
unique attribute proved faulty at a rate higher than expected.
Characteristics that might influence the perceived risk of each firm were stabilized at a low
level. This is important because Wingate (1997) reports that the United States has a higher
litigation index than France and Germany (higher index is associated with greater litigation
risk). If auditors are concerned about litigation risk, then it would likely tend to work against
our hypothesis that French and German accountants would be more conservative in their
warranty estimations than American accountants. To address this issue, we imbued each firm
with good management, sound financial condition, and stable performance over time. To
further avoid extraneous accounting and auditing concerns, we indicated that all estimated
amounts were material and that evidence related to the estimate was reliable and objective.
Finally, we addressed potential problems associated with anchoring by avoiding the mention
of book values for the estimates.
3.4. Variables
The experimental design involved French, German, and American accountants making
judgments at three levels of probability and two monetary amounts. The probability levels
and the monetary amounts were within subjects' variables, primarily due to scarcity of
participants and because the task involved ordinary repetitive judgments not uncommon to
their practice environment (Pany & Reckers, 1987). The repeated measures necessitated the
use of two separate cases, which were administered in balanced order.
3.4.1. Ambiguous probability levels
The three probability levels chosen for testing were .06 (low), .25 (medium), and .75
(high). To establish ambiguity, each case scenario included two task forces consisting of an
"inside" and "outside" expert. The teams were constructed to lend reliability to the estimates
and to highlight the ambiguity inherent in trying to make a point estimate of the proportion of
new product that would be returned (Hirst, 1994). To provide a realistic setting within the
case, each team provided an explanation for the product deterioration (see Appendix A).
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Each team arrived at a common point in their estimated range of the proportion of product
to be returned. For example, for the medium probabiHty treatment level of .25, one team
reached a range of 18-25 percent estimated retum rate and the other a range of 25-32
percent. The common point being 25 percent. The range estimates for the low probability
teams were 2-6 percent and 6-10 percent, while the high probability ranges were 65-75
percent and 75-85 percent. Consequently, the intended manipulations of 6, 25, and 75
percent were always included in both "expert" teams. The different ranges between teams
provided a potential justification for those participants wishing to under- or overweight the
probability present in a specific judgment.
3.4.2. Monetaiy amount
Each set of cases involved a large monetary amount (US$2,500,000 or equivalent in FF or
DM) or a small monetary amount (US$50,000 or equivalent in FF or DM). All amounts were
explicitly stated to be material.
Participants were provided adequate information to perform all calculations. Each expert
team reported the same estimated per unit cost of satisfying the warranty (US$50 or
equivalent in FF or DM). To effect the manipulation, the unit sales data in the cases were
either 1000 or 50,000 units. This stabilized the monetary exposure so that no ambiguity
beyond that induced by the probability ranges would be present.
3.5. Dependent variable
For each combination of probability level and monetary amount, the participants calculated
and reported the amount of warranty expense they would recognize. This resulted in each
participant making six judgments over two cases. Warranty expense was chosen for four
reasons. First, it is familiar to all accountants in the study. Second, the accounting guidelines
in the three countries require that warranty expense be recognized, but leave a relatively wide
range of discretion common to other accounting estimates. Third, it is commonly used in
testing varying probabilities and ambiguities in behavioral decision-making (e.g., Hogarth &
Einhom, 1989). Lastly, it has been used in previous accounting studies (Main, 1994; Schultz
& Cordery, 1992).
4. Empirical results
To analyze the data, raw responses were transformed to deflate the effects of different
probability levels, ambiguity ranges, and monetary amounts. Transformation was necessary
to prevent an effect due simply to differences in these amounts. For example, if participants
indicated that US$15,000 should be recorded for the combination of .25 probability at the low
amount (US$50,000) and that US$750,000 should be reported for the high amount
(US$2,500,000), then differences are apparent but unrelated to the theory being tested.
However, when the two amounts are scaled by their expected values, there is no difference.
At .25 probability, the expected value of the low amount is US$12,500 (US$50,000 x .25)
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and the scaled amount is 1.20 (US$15,000/US$ 12,500). For the large amount, the expected
value is US$625,000 (.25 x US$2,500,000) and the scaled amount is also 1.20 (US$750,000/
US$625,000). A larger (smaller) scaled value indicates a more (less) cautious reaction to the
ambiguous probability level, the size of the potential warranty loss, or the national forces.
Using a proportionality transformation is also consistent with the language used in the
experimental hypotheses.
Since the ambiguity ranges around the three probability levels varied in relative terms, a
further transformation was also employed. For example, the 2-10 percent range around the
low probability of 6 percent allows for a variation in expected values of up to 67 percent (i.e.,
10 — 6 = 4 and 4/6 = 0.67) On the other hand, the high range of 65-85 percent around the
high probability of 75 percent provides for a potential variation of only 13 percent in the
expected value (i.e., 85 — 75 = 10 and 10/75 = 0.13). Thus, an ordinal scale was developed as
follows: l=an adjusted amount less than expected value (EV); 2 = EV; 3 = an adjusted
amount between EVand the top of the range; 4 = an adjusted amount at the top of the adjusted
range; and 5 = an adjusted amount greater than the top of the range.
The ordinal nature of the dependent variable dictates that a nonparametric method be used
for the empirical analyses. In this case, the most powerfiil model available is CATMOD
(SAS, 1992). This method, while statistically appropriate, does not provide the same power
afforded by parametric methods, such as ANOVA, MANOVA, or ANCOVA, which rely on
intervally scaled dependent measures. The ensuing analysis limited the number of variables,
measures, and interactions that could be included in any one model. Consequently, no formal
tables related to Hypothesis 1 are included. The various models did not affect the findings of
significance or insignificance. That is, all the models estimated had consistent results.^'
4.1. Test ofHypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 predicts that US accountants will recommend recording estimates that are
lower (less cautious) than their European counterparts. The results support acceptance of
the hypothesis. The mean standardized warranty estimates are 2.875, 2.650, and 2.260 for
French, German, and American accountants, respectively. The estimates made by
American accountants are significantly less than both German and French accountants
(P<.01); however, the estimates made by the German and French accountants are not
significantly different.
^^
The mean values merit interpretation. An ordinal value of 2.0 would indicate that the
accountants were risk neutral and merely accrued the expected value of the estimate. ^ On
the other hand, a value of 3.0 would indicate that the participant estimated warranty
expense somewhere between the expected value and the maximum write-off suggested by
the expert teams. Thus, the 2.875 French mean places the typical French accountant well
above the expected value across all levels of probability and monetary amounts. Detailed
Representative statistical model results are available from the authors.
' Based on Bonferroni tests of differences between means.
'"^ The ordinal values refer to the ordinal scale transformations we discuss in Empirical Results.
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analysis of the data indicated that the French were indeed more cautious than those from
other nations. In fact, two French accountants opted to write off the cost of having the
entire product-hne sales returned.
4.2. Test ofHypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 predicts that for participants given a low to high monetary amount order, the
estimates of warranty expense will be greatest for French accountants, with German and
American accountants following in that order. Hypothesis 2 tests whether monetary order (our
proxy for framing) interacts with nationality in such a way that the participants from nations
higher on uncertainty avoidance (e.g., France) would react differentially to order than those
from nations lower on uncertainty avoidance (e.g., Americans). The negative framing (low to
high monetary amount) was expected to result in larger, more conservative warranty accruals
than the positive framing (high-low monetary amount) as the level of national uncertainty
avoidance increased.
To detect if order simulated negative and positive frames, we tested the main effect of
monetary order. It proved significant in the correct direction to support the framing notion
from prospect theory (P< .01; means: low to high, 2.791; high to low, 2.395). The interaction
with country, which specifically addressed Hypothesis 2, also proved to be significant
(P<.01). The results of the test of Hypothesis 2 are reported in Table 2 and reflect the
expected directional movement.
The mean differences by country between the negative and positive frames are reported in
Table 2 (right column). The French, who have the greatest aversion to uncertainty (86, see
Table 2
Mean warranty estimates by monetary order by country*^
Low to high mean High to low mean
(negative frame) (positive frame) Within-country difference
France 3.333 2.416 0.917*
Germany 2.875 2.416 0.459**
Difference 0.458 (2.41)'' [.1207f 0.000(0.00) [1.000]
France 3.333 2.416 0.917*
United states 2.166 2.354 -0.188
Difference 1.167 (14.09) [.0002] 0.062 (0.11) [.7383]
Germany 2.875 2.416 0.459**
United states 2.166 2.354 -0.188
Difference 0.709 (5.77) [.0163] 0.062 (0.10) [.7553]
^ The significance of the interaction between monetary order and country based on the Ftest being significant
at/'<.0001.
Chi-square statistics.
'^ P values.
* Significant at P<.01 based on Bonferroni tests of differences between means.
** Significant at P<.05 based on Bonferroni tests of differences between means.
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Table I), have a significant mean shift of 0.917 (P<.01) between the positive and negative
fi"ames. Thus, as they move fi"om a positive to negative frame, they opt to accrue significantly
more warranty expense. The Germans, who have a moderate aversion to uncertainty (65,
Table 1), also have a significant mean shift of 0.459 (P<.05) between the positive and
negative frames. While still significant and in the expected direction, the magnitude of the
shift is not as great as the French. The Americans, on the other hand, exhibit an insignificant
mean shift of — 0.188 between the two frames. Thus, Americans, who have a relatively low
level of uncertainty avoidance (46, Table 1), show a shift that is not only a lower magnitude
than the French and Germans, but also in a different direction (albeit not significant). Thus,
our results support acceptance of the hypothesis and also the proposition advocated by Sharp
and Salter (1997).
5. Summary and conclusion
Considerable research has demonstrated that national accounting systems result in
significant reporting differences among publicly traded companies (Gemon & Wallace,
1995; Pownall & Schipper, 1999; Prather & Rueschhoff, 1996; Saudagaran & Meek,
1997). The lASC has recently completed a set of uniform standards that are intended to
overcome these differences for companies domiciled in various countries. Some observers
(e.g., Tay & Parker, 1990; van der Tas, 1988; Van Hulle, 1997), however, contend that de jure
consistency will not necessarily result in de facto consistency in the application of these
standards across countries. Consistency in application among nations is a key acceptance
criterion of the US SEC (Pownall & Schipper, 1999). Our results suggest that uniform
international accounting standards may not result in de facto uniformity among nations,
particularly when the standards allow for significant discretion (ambiguity).
Our results also support the notion advanced by Sharp and Salter (1997) that national
cultural characteristics may interact with behavioral propositions. Findings show that
experienced accountants from countries high on uncertainty avoidance are more sensitive
to framing effects than accountants from low-uncertainty avoidance countries. Considering
estimates in a negative setting versus a positive setting resulted in disproportionate
differences for accountants fi-om high-uncertainty avoidance countries as compared to
accountants from low-uncertainty avoidance countries. This indicates that the phrasing of
international accounting standards or the way that accountants interpret those standards
may play an unintended role in accounting measurement across nations (Kinney &
Uecker, 1982).
The sample countries in the study had intense and subtle differences in the relevant
theoretical dimensions. For example, Radebaugh and Gray (1997) use all three as
representative of countries with different legal systems and sources of financing. They
note that France and Germany's history with Roman code-based law had an important
effect on today's environment. Doupnik and Salter's (1995) cluster analysis place the
United States at the extreme of their micro-based system category and Germany next to the
extreme of their macro-based category. France is also well ensconced in the macro-
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category. These strong and intense differences resonate with the guidance offered by
Harrison and McKinnon (1999) who argue that intensity is often missing or inadequately
considered in international studies. Expanding the analysis beyond mere culture to
environmental factors addresses another of their major concerns; namely, that cultural
differences often serve as too simplistic a tool for differentiating sample countries in
international studies.
Appendix A'"*
NUMBER:
Instructions
The following set of materials is designed to learn more about how accounting
judgments are made and the factors that contribute to differences in those judgments.
The accounting judgments in this study concern warranty expenses and their correspond-
ing liabilities. As you know, there is no one, precisely correct amount to be reported in
the company's financial statements. Some accounting guidelines and specific cases are
included in these materials. In addition, some of the materials ask for your feelings on
general issues.
There are three sections in the study. Some suggested time limits are provided at the outset
of each section in order to have everyone finish that portion of the study at about the same
time. The whole study should take about 1 hour.
Your conscientious effort is essential to the validity of this study. Please follow the
instructions careftally and respond to the best of your ability. Your responses will be
confidential. The above number is for coordination purposes. Please record it for later use.
For each accounting judgment task that follows, your audit client has asked you, as the
external auditor, to provide a judgment on the amount of warranty expense that should be
reported. Members of the client's staff are also working on this amount. Because the pertinent
information has only recently become available, they have not reached a conclusion.
Consider the amounts in each case material. From the standpoint of materiality, the
amounts constitute a significant though not dominant percentage of the relevant financial
statement bases.
This study involves two companies. Neither is in danger of going-concern problems (i.e.,
they do not have any significant prospect of bankruptcy). Both companies are approximately
the same size and have securities that are traded on several national security markets. Their
risk profiles are similar.
Follow your normal guidelines for reporting your judgments in the following warranty
expense cases. Essentially these guidelines require reporting an estimated expense and
liability in the same accounting period that the related revenue is reported. There will be
' The spacing on the actual questionnaire was more generous; it is compacted here to conserve space.
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amounts reported in the financial statements for the revenues from the sale of the product and
for the warranty. Some amount of related expense and liability should be reported.
Judgments relating to the first company should take you about 10 minutes. Judgments for
the second company should take slightly less time.
The Birch Company
The Birch Company manufactures and distributes patio furniture to independent retailers
as well as regional chain stores. Its customers have a long, sound record of success. There is
no reason to suspect that this will change in the foreseeable future. Birch's performance is
regarded as reliable and consistent. Over the past 35 years, its record of on-time delivery of a
quality product has proved excellent.
Late in its fiscal year, Birch introduced a new line consisting of furniture sets with two
adjustable loungers and a small table. A unique aspect of this line is the fiber's ability to
withstand the most severe weather elements. Recently, however, a problem has developed
that has resulted in a return rate higher than expected. The principal problem has been with
deterioration of the fiber.
Upper management, which has established a good performance record, wants to secure a
detailed analysis of this matter for future decision-making as well as for assessing the amount
of warranty expense that should be recognized in the financial records. Sales data show that
50,000 of the sets were sold in the past year.
Management has asked you, the external auditor, to review the new product data to assist
them in arriving at the pertinent information. Management has established two teams, each
composed of an outside expert and one insider who is familiar with the production process
and the nature of the problem. Each of the two-person teams has proceeded independently of
the other. Your inquiry has led you to conclude that each team is reliable and objective. A
portion of each report appears below.
Task Force 1 Report: Concern for abnormal replacement expenditures associated with the
L476 lounge set is clearly justified. Based on the rigorous procedures described earlier, the
cause of the problem is the unanticipated reaction between chemicals found in certain yard-
care products and the fiber. Some uncertainty remains regarding the proportion that will be
returned. We believe that this figure will fall between 25 and 32 percent. Of those returned,
replacement will cost US$50. We are highly confident in the precision of this cost.
Task Force 2 Report: Based on the comprehensive testing as detailed above, we are
convinced that the unexpected chemical reaction led to the failure of the fibers in the L476
lounge set. This results in substantially higher failures than other models in this line. We
conclude that the cost of each replacement will be US$50. We have great confidence in this
amount. The rate of product return, however, is more difficult to estimate. Our analysis
indicates that the return rate will be in the 18-25 percent range.
What amount do you recommend to be recorded for warranty expense?
IT IS CRUCIAL THAT YOU SHOW YOUR COMPUTATIONS UNDERLYING THIS
AMOUNT. (SPACE PROVIDED IN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT)
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Assume that the facts were the same as above but that the first report indicated return
percentages approximately in the 65-75 percent range and the second in the 75-85 percent
area. What amount would you recommend in this case?
AGAIN, IT IS CRUCIAL THAT YOU SHOW YOUR COMPUTATIONS. (SPACE
PROVIDED IN ACTUAL INSTRUMENT)
Finally, assume the same facts except that the return percentages were estimated in the first
report in the 2-6 percent area and in the second in the 6-10 percent range. What amount
would you recommend in this case?
AGAIN, SHOW YOUR COMPUTATIONS. (SPACE PROVIDED IN ACTUAL
INSTRUMENT)
The Maple Company
The Maple Company manufactures and wholesales a complete line of athletic shoes
and clothing. The company has existed for four decades and has built a solid
reputation as a provider of quality products. It is managed by well-trained, competent
professionals. Maple's financial performance has been sound and no significant change
is expected.
To recognize trends in consumer tastes, the company periodically introduces new products.
One of these new products, an athletic shoe (known as the "float"), has been retumed at a
higher rate than normal.
To address the unusual return rate, management set up two teams. Management expects
this to result in highly reliable information both for future lines and for recording the warranty
expense related to the 1000 units sold this year. To provide for added independence, each
team was structured to have one outside, objective expert and one competent employee
familiar with the appropriate matters. The part of each report relevant to the warranty matter
appears below.
Management has asked you, the extemal auditor, to review the reports of the two teams
and arrive at a judgment regarding the amount of warranty expense to be recorded for this one
line. Each team worked separately. Your inquiry has led you to conclude that each team is
reliable and objective.
Team 1 Report: The Float line's air bubble deterioration is traceable to the unexpected
acidity levels that result from combination of the glue fastener and human perspiration. Users
who perspire heavily and possess certain pH levels of acidity in their perspiration are likely to
have accelerated wear problems. Based on a survey article in Medicine and Athletics, a highly
regarded medical journal, and on a user study by our marketing research department (see
Report 90-14), we conclude that 18-25 percent of the line will be retumed. This estimate is
somewhat subjective. However, we are confident that the cost per pair of shoes retumed will
be US$50.
Team 2 Report: Conclusions about Float are of mixed reliability. We conclude with
confidence that the cause of the air bubble collapse is the reaction between the perspiration
acidity referred to earlier and the glue compound. Also, we are confident that the cost of
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replacing each pair of shoes will be US$50. The failure rate is more subjective, however. Our
best estimate on the rate of return, after referring to available scientific evidence and Report
90-14, is that it will range from 25 to 32 percent.
What amount do you recommend be recorded for warranty expense?
IT IS CRUCIAL THAT YOU SHOW YOUR COMPUTATIONS UNDERLYING THIS
AMOUNT. (AS ABOVE, SPACE PROVIDED)
Assume that the facts were the same as above but that Team 1 's report indicated return
percentages as 6-10 and Team 2's report reflected the percentages to be in the 2-6 range.
What amount would you recommend in this case?
AGAIN, IT IS CRUCIAL THAT YOU SHOW YOUR COMPUTATIONS.
Finally, assume the same facts as above except that the replacement percentage in the first
report was 65-75 percent and in the second report was in the 75-85 percent range. What
amount would you recommend in this case?
AGAIN, IT IS NECESSARY TO SHOW YOUR COMPUTATIONS.
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Abstract
This study explores the effects of national culture differences on the behavioral consequences of
imposing performance evaluation and reward systems (PERS). It postulates that two cultural
dimensions — individualism/collectivism and power distance — can modify employees' decisions
under, as well as satisfaction with, imposed perfonnance evaluation and rewards aimed at modifying
their work-related behavior. In a laboratory experiment that focused on a teamwork setting, these
cultural attributes were operationalized via a comparison of US vs. Chinese nationals in Taiwan
(CNT). On the whole, the results were consistent with US nationals significantly changing the team
orientation of their decisions in response to imposed performance measures and rewards, but a
similar impact was not found for the CNT subjects. And, consistent with culture-based predictions,
US nationals had significantly lower satisfaction under imposed, rather than self-selected,
performance evaluation and reward structures, while their CNT counterparts did not have a similar
adverse reaction. These results are consistent with prior Anglo-American-based research that the
PERS significantly affects employee behavior. But they also suggest that this findmg may not be
directly generalizable to employees whose national cultures differ from those of Anglo-Americans.
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1. Introduction and overview
A central concern of organizations is ensuring that employees' decisions and actions
are aligned with their best interests (Merchant, 1985, 1989). A large body of research,
primarily conducted in Anglo-American contexts, has shown that the performance
evaluation and reward system (PERS) can significantly influence employee behavior
(Young & Lewis, 1995; Young & Selto, 1993). This finding is taken to imply by
both theorists and practitioners that organizations can use the PERS to ensure or
increase the congruence between employee behavior and their own objectives (Merchant,
1989, 1998).
Yet a question that arises in the current era of global markets is whether this
implication will hold across national boundaries. A growing body of research has
consistently observed that national culture affects employees' work behavior (see Erez &
Earley, 1993; Harrison & McKinnon, 1999; Hofstede, 1991; Trompenaars & Hampden-
Turner, 1998). More specifically, it has been observed that similar controls have different
effects on the work behavior of people fi-om different cultural backgrounds (Bimberg &
Snodgrass, 1988; Chow, Kato, & Merchant, 1996; Chow, Shields, & Chan, 1991; Daley,
Jiambalvo, Sundem, & Kondo, 1985; Harrison, 1992, 1993). The potential implication of
these findings is that the effectiveness and effects of PERS may differ across
nations, with attendant implications for global firms' design of management systems
and processes.
The objective of this study is to explore the effects of national culture differences on
the behavioral consequences of PERS. In a laboratory experiment involving a teamwork
setting, national culture dimensions hypothesized to be relevant to this phenomenon
were operationalized via a comparison of US vs. Chinese nationals in Taiwan (CNT).
We found that among CNT subjects, imposing PERS, which differs from individuals'
self-selected ones, only minimally affected the team vs. individual orientation of their
decisions. In contrast, and consistent with prior Anglo-American-based studies on the
effects of compensation contracts, there generally was a significant effect on US
subjects' decisions. And, as expected based on the cultural dimensions of individualism
and power distance, US nationals who worked under imposed performance-based pay
structures were significantly less satisfied than their compatriots working under pay
structures that they had self-selected. Also consistent with culture-based predictions, a
similar difference in satisfaction was not found among the CNT subjects. These results
caution against a direct extrapolation of research results and practices relating to PERS
across nations with significantly different cultures. They also may imply that the effect
of PERS on employee behavior and reactions may be less powerful than is gener-
ally conceived.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews related prior
literature on national culture, teamwork, PERS, and job satisfacdon. Then we describe the
empirical method, analysis, and results for the experiment. Section 4 discusses the limitations
of this study and offers suggestions for future research.
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2. Literature review and hypothesis development
This section is divided into three parts. The first part discusses why this study selects
teamwork as the focus, and the relation of teamwork to the individualism dimension of
national culture. The second part discusses how PERS may affect employee behavior and
reactions in teamwork situations. The final part addresses how individualism and another
dimension of national culture — power distance — may moderate the effects of imposed
PERS on employee job satisfaction.
2.1. Teamwork and individualism
Teamwork and related management approaches (e.g., total quality management, just-in-
time) have been given major credit for the Japanese firms' success as global competitors
(Hay, 1988; Schonberger, 1982), and Western firms increasingly are adopting team-based
work arrangement (Dertouzos, Lester, & Solow, 1989; Dumaine, 1994).
To be effective, teamwork requires cooperation and sharing among individual employees.
Consequently, employees' relative emphasis on self-interests vs. those of the collective can
significantly affect the success of teamwork initiatives. This work-related value has been
labeled individualism (or conversely, collectivism), and has been reported to differ system-
atically across nations (Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Ronen & Shenkar, 1985). In one operation-
alization of this construct, Hofstede (1980, 1991) has reported that workers from Japan and
the US have scores of 46 and 9 1 , respectively, on his scale for measuring individualism.
Consistent with Hofstede 's results, other students of US culture have isolated individualism
and the self-interest motive as being central to US management theories and practices
(Bellah, Madsen, Sullivan, Swidler, & Tipton, 1987; Harris & Moran, 1987; Locke &
Latham, 1984; Spence, 1985; Triandis, Bontempo, Villareal, Asai, & Lucca, 1988). On the
other hand, students of Japanese culture have stressed its emphasis on subjugating self-
interests to those of the collective (Befii, 1980; Kamata, 1982; Ouchi, 1981; Smith, 1983;
Yang, 1984).
Japanese and US cultural differences have been cited as possible explanations for many
US firms' failed attempts to implement Japanese management practices (Fucini & Fucini,
1990; Young, 1992). In the case of teamwork, its demand for subjugating one's self-
interests to those of the team may hinder firms that are from an individualistic culture, such
as the US, fi"om realizing the full potential of this work arrangement (Awasthi, Chow, &
Wu, 1998; Business Week, 1992; Chow, Kato, & Shields, 1994; Chow et al, 1991;
Dumaine, 1991, 1994; Lincoln & Kalleberg, 1990; Snell & Dean, 1992; Young, 1992;
Zipkin, 1991). Specifically, relative to their counterparts from a collective culture, employ-
ees fi"om an individualistic culture may be less inclined to make self vs. team tradeoffs in
favor of team.
From the perspective of global management, an important question that arises is whether
the behavioral implications of employees' national culture — such as those relating to
teamwork — have to be accepted as absolutes, or can be counteracted by feasible
management actions. In this regard, a substantial body of research has found that employees'
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behavior depends significantly on how their performance is evaluated and rewarded (Young
& Lewis, 1995; Young & Selto, 1993). This finding has been taken by both theorists and
practitioners to imply that it is possible for a firm to influence how employees behave through
its PERS (e.g., Kandel & Lazear, 1992; Weitzman & Kruse, 1990).
In the specific case of teamwork, the preceding finding suggests that a firm may be able to
shift employees' relative emphases on self vs. team performance by changing the weights
placed on these aspects of performance. Testing this possibility is one aim of this study. A
related, and more general, question is the relative impacts of PERS vs. national culture on
employee behavior. Because extant theory and empirical results on the effects of PERS are
primarily from individualistic Anglo-American settings, this question is left unanswered. To
focus the empirical tests on these two issues, we postulate the following:
Hypothesis 1: Individuals' tradeoffs between self and team performance can be
modified by an imposed performance evaluation and reward system.
Our study uses CNT subjects to represent a collective culture, and US nationals to proxy
for an individualistic culture. The use of CNT, rather than Japanese, subjects (despite the
literature's relative emphasis on Japanese management practices) is due to our lack of access
to the latter. However, this "substitution" is unlikely to be a problem because the study's
focus is on the theoretical implication of the individualism-collectivism cultural dimension,
rather than Japanese culture or Japanese practices per se. As in the case of the Japanese, an
emphasis on collective interests also has been identified as being a central Chinese cultural
value (Chinese Cultural Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Hui & Triandis, 1985;
Leung & Bond, 1984). Indeed, Hofstede (1980, 1991) has reported an individualism score of
1 7 for the CNT, thus suggesting that they would permit effective operationalization of the
individualism cultural dimension.
2.2. Job satisfaction effects ofPERS
Beyond being concerned with employees' job-related decisions and actions, organizations
also are interested in other aspects of employees' reactions to their PERS. One such aspect
that has received much attention is employee job satisfacfion, which has been defined as "a
pleasurable or positive emotional state resulting from the appraisal of one's job or job
experience" (Locke, 1976). Job satisfaction is based on several job-related features including
the pay and reward structure (Lincoln, 1989; Smith, Kendall, & Hulin, 1969), and has been
associated with absenteeism, turnover, and other employee problems (Muchinsky, 1990; Saal
& Knight, 1982; Schneider, 1985). As such, employee job satisfaction can significantly affect
a firm's long-term performance and costs (Bimberg, Turopolec, & Young, 1983; Hopwood,
1972; Weick, 1983).
Since an imposed PERS is unlikely to exactly match employees' personal preferences, it
can be expected to decrease the latter's job satisfaction even if it does induce the desired
acdons (increased emphasis on collecdve performance in a teamwork setting). While we
expect this tension to exist in all cultures, we expect the degree of dissatisfaction with an
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imposed PERS to vary with two specific national culture dimensions: individualism and
power distance.
Employees from an individualistic culture are expected to be more dissatisfied with
an imposed PERS, as one attribute of such a culture is an emphasis on individual
preferences and freedom of action (Erez & Earley, 1993; Triandis et al., 1988). "In an
individualistic culture, emphasis is placed on self-sufficiency and control in the pursuit
of individual goals, which may or may not be consistent with in-group goals" (Erez &
Earley, 1993, p. 79). Thus, individualists can be expected to prefer selecting PERS
themselves, and thus will be less satisfied with an imposed, rather than self-selected,
PERS. In contrast, people from a collective culture do not have as strong a preference
for individual control and choice, such that the difference in their satisfaction between
self-selected and imposed PERS should be smaller than for individuals from an
individualistic culture.
To the extent that the imposition of a PERS is involved, the power distance aspect of
national culture also is expected to be operant. This cultural dimension has been defined as
the degree to which people accept interpersonal inequality in power and the institutionaliza-
tion of such inequality (Hofstede, 1980, 1991). Relative to individuals from a low power
distance culture, those from a high power distance culture tend to accept more readily the
decisions and demands made by their superiors.
In comparing Chinese and US nationals, we see that the former have been identified as
being among the highest in power distance, whereas the latter have been classified as being
low on this dimension (Chinese Cultural Connection, 1987; Hofstede, 1980, 1991).
Numerically, Hofstede (1991) has reported power distance scores of 58 for the CNT vs. 40
for US nationals. Thus, relative to their CNT counterparts, US nationals are both higher in
individualism and lower in power distance. This combination implies that relative to the CNT,
US nationals would have a greater preference for pursuing individual goals, free of
interference from superiors.
The preceding discussion provides the basis for the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2: Individuals working under imposed PERS are less satisfied with such
systems than those working under self-selected systems. This difference is greater for
US nationals than for their Chinese counterparts.
3. Method
5.1. Subjects
The subjects were 150 business students from MBA and senior level undergraduate
classes. Half was from the US and half from Taiwan. All were volunteers who were told that
they would be paid cash based on their performance in the experiment, but not the nature or
objective of the exercise. All US subjects were Caucasians, and all Taiwanese subjects were
of Chinese ethnicity and spoke Chinese as their primary language. Prior to the experiment,
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the subjects were asked to form three-person teams based on how much they hked working
with each other. This was done because prior research has shown that collectivism is most
manifest in dealing with individuals considered to be in one's own "in-group" (Bond, 1991;
Earley, 1993; Triandis, 1989).'
3.2. Task
The experiment was conducted in two parts about 1 week apart. The US subjects were paid
a flat fee of US$10 to participate in Part I. The Taiwanese subjects were paid New Taiwanese
(NT) $100, which was equivalent to US$10 after adjusting for differences in starting salaries
and the prevailing currency exchange rate.^
In both parts of the experiment, subjects assumed the roles of product design engineers."^
Each subject was told that he/she and his/her two teammates were a stable team responsible
for the timely design of new products. All new products had potential total sales revenue of
US$900,000 and required three design stages: A, B, and C. Each design stage required 2
months, and assignment of design engineers to stages was random. Given that each design
stage took 2 months, every design team worked together on six new products per year and, on
average, each design engineer worked on design Stages A, B, and C of two of these products.
The company was described as computing two performance measures for each new
product that was designed. First was an individual performance measure for each design
engineer. This measure was obtained by assigning to each of the three design stages one third
of the product's potential sales revenue (1/3 US$900,000 = US$300,000), then deducting the
design engineer's actual design resource expenditure for his/her stage. The second measure
was team performance, which was the sum of the three design engineers' individual
performance measures.
3.2.1. Parti
Each subject first answered four questions relating to individualism- collectivism (Hof-
stede, 1980). Then he/she was asked to select a performance-based pay structure (i.e., relative
We acknowledge that our process of forming teams may not have created strong in-group feelings or identity.
If so, this would have weakened our ability to detect the effects of collectivism. However, Earley (1993, p. 321)
has suggested that an in-group is no more than "an aggregate of people sharing similar traits, and background
characteristics. In-group members may identify one another via common interests, values and beliefs, or heritage
(Hackman, 1976; Pfeffer, 1983; Triandis, 1988). This definition does not (even) require that in-group members
have direct contact with one another while working or that they work interdependently.
The ratio of US to Taiwanese subjects' cash pay was based on the assumption that beginning salary for the US
subjects is US$40,000, while that for the Taiwanese subjects is US$ 1 6,000. Applying the prevailing exchange rate of
US$1 =NT$25 at the time of the experiment, US$10 x (US$16,000/US$40,000) x NT$25 = NT$100. The same
approach was used to convert the dollar amounts in the US instrument into NT dollars, such that the magnitude of the
latter was 10 times that of the amounts in US dollars: US$1 x (US$16,000/US$40,000) x NT$25 = NT$10.
'* The Taiwanese instrument was administered in Chinese. First, a person not associated with the experiment
translated the English version into Chinese. Then a bilingual member of the research team edited it for equivalence
with the English original.
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proportions of individual and team performance) as the basis for how he/she and his/her
teammates would be paid for all products that their team designed. They were told that for
each product, each design engineer would be paid 10% of his/her chosen weighted average of
individual and team performance measures.
All subjects chose from among the same 1 1 pay structures, ranging from 0% team-based to
100% team-based in increments of 10% team-based pay (e.g., 100% team-based/0%
individual-based; 90% team-based/10% individual-based, etc.). Before making their choice,
the subjects worked through four detailed numerical examples. These examples involved
different mixes of actual resource expenditures in one design stage (some above and some
below original budget) and their impacts on subsequent stages' resource requirements. For
each mix, the subjects calculated each design engineer's pay under five pay structures that
spanned the continuum. They were given the correct computations and numerical answers
after completing each example.^
After choosing their pay structures, the subjects answered demographic and manipulation
check questions. The latter included a question on the perceived level of interdependence
among the team members. Then they were paid and dismissed.
3.2.2. Assignment to self-selected and imposed pay structures
In the interim, the subjects from each country were split into two subsets as follows. The
first subset consisted of 31 Taiwanese subjects matched with 31 US subjects. These 31 pairs
(labeled the SELF-SELECT group) were assigned to their self-selected pay structures in Part
II of the experiment.^
The second subset contained the remaining (unmatched) subjects from each country,
who were systematically assigned to pay structures that differed from those they had self-
selected. Within each national sample, these subjects were further subdivided into two
groups: one group with constant departures, and one group with increasing departures
from their self-selected pay structures. The numbers and distribution of subjects
^ Part I of the experiment had two levels of task interdependence to ensure salience of this teamwork attribute.
Eighteen subjects from each national sample made the pay structure choice under a low-task interdependence
(Low I) condition. The remainder did so under a high-task interdependence (High I) condition. Task
interdependence was operationalized as follows. The experimental scenario stated that after 1 month of each
design stage, the engineer who had been randomly assigned to that stage would obtain private information about a
range of resource expenditure options for the remaining month. The engineer's choice of expenditure level from
among these options would directly affect the monthly resource requirements for the subsequent design stages. All
of the Month 2 choices entailed a self vs. team tradeoff in that a higher (lower) expenditure for this month (which
directly affected the engineer's individual performance measure) typically would induce a more than offsetting
reduction (increase) in the subsequent stages' total resource requirements. For the US subjects under High I (Low I),
a US$5000 higher (lower) expenditure in Month 2 of Stage A typically would decrease (increase) monthly
resource requirements by US$5000 (US$1500) for Stages B and C. The Taiwanese experimental materials were
expressed in NT dollars. Their numerical values were 10 times those of the US version.
^ Only a subset of the Part II data from these subjects was used in this study. The remainder was used for a
separate study (Awasthi et al., 1998).
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obtained in Part I dictated the numbers and directions of these assignments within each
national sample.
Within the Taiwanese sample, 21 subjects were in group ASSIGNED- 1. These subjects
had self-selected Pay Structures 3, 4, 6, and 7 and each was assigned to a pay structure which
differed by four categories from their self-selected structures, i.e., to Categories 7, 8, 10, and
11, respectively. Another 16 Taiwanese subjects, all of whom had self-selected Pay Structure
5, were in group ASSIGNED-2. They were assigned to increasing numbers of categories
(starting with the adjacent category) away from their self-selected pay structures, i.e., four
each were assigned to Categories 6, 7, 8, and 9, respectively. Four other Taiwanese subjects
had self-selected Pay Structure 1 1 and could not be moved in the same direction as the other
subjects in either assigned group. These subjects were assigned to Category 7 for comparison
with four other subjects who had been moved up to the same category from their self-selected
Category 3. Table 1 summarizes these subject assignments.^
Within the US sample, 11 subjects were in group ASSIGNED- 1. They had self-selected
Pay Structures 8, 9, and 10 and were assigned to Categories 4, 5, and 6, respectively. Thirty-
one subjects who had self-selected Pay Structure 11 were placed in group ASSIGNED-2. Of
these subjects, 8, 8, 8, and 7, respectively, were assigned to Categories 10, 9, 8, and 7. The
one remaining unmatched US subject had self-selected Pay Structure 1. This subject could
not be assigned to any pay category for a meaningful comparison with others and was deleted
from Part II of the experiment.
3.2.3. Part II
In this part of the experiment, subjects made an expenditure decision based on either their
self-selected or assigned pay structures (depending on their assigned experimental treatment).
The US subjects were told that they would be paid cash at the rate of US$2.00 for each 1000
experimental dollars earned. The Taiwanese subjects' cash pay rate was NT$2 for each
NT$1000 in experimental earnings.
In making the expenditure choice, each subject was told to assume that he/she was the
engineer in his/her team working on design Stage A of a new product and that subsequently,
his/her teammates would take over Stages B and C. He/she has just completed the first month
of Stage A and the actual expenditure for this month had been US$100,000 as budgeted.
However, he/she has just obtained private information that the second month's resource
requirement would exceed the budgeted US$100,000 amount by at least US$20,000. The
subject was provided a range of Month 2 expenditure options (Table 2). He/she was told that
this infonnation was known only to him/her, and that nobody else in the company would be
able to gain access to it at any time.
Table 1 shows that US subjects preferred more team-based rewards as compared to their Taiwanese
counterparts in Part I of the experiment. This resuh may initially appear as surprising. However, as reported in
Awasthi et al. (1998), it was an indication that people can be resourceftil in responding to the demands of the task.
Many US subjects indicated that they had voluntarily selected a team-based pay structure so as to counteract their
own, and their teammates', individualistic tendencies.
V.N. Awasthi et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 291-309 299
Table
Pay structure selection (Part I) and assignments (Part II)
Panel A: Chinese Sample from Taiwan
Pay
structure
category
Self-selected Group Imposed Assignment Group
Subjects
selecting
each category
in Part I
Self-selected
subjects with
U.S matches
(SELF-SELECT)
Subjects who were each
moved down 4 categories
(ASSIGNED- 1)
Subjects who were
moved down from
1 to 4 categories
(ASSIGNED-2)
Self-
selected
category
Imposed
category
Self-
selected
category
Imposed
category
Other
subjects^
10
11
TOTAL
2
1
10
6
19
15
5
1
4
9
72
2
1
4
1
3
9
1
1
4
5
31 16
Panel B: U.S. Sample
Pay
structure
category
Self-selected Group Imposed Assignment Group
Subjects
selecting
each category
in Part I
Self-selected
subjects with
Taiwan matches
(SELF-SELECT)
Subjects who were each
moved down 4 categories
(ASSIGNED- 1)
Self-
selected Imposed
category category
Subjects who were
moved down from
1 to 4 categories
(ASSIGNED-2)
Self-
selected
category
Imposed
category
Other
subjects''
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
TOTAL
3
1
4
1
3
9
1
4
7
5
36
74
2
1
4
1
3
9
1
1
4
5
31 11
Moved down 4 pay categories to category 7.
Deleted from Part II.
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Table 2
Possible alternative choices of Month 2 resource expenditures and their effects on subsequent design stages'
resource requirements
Stage A Stage B Stage C Total
Month 1 Month 2 Project
(already spent). (available options), Month 1, Month 2, Month 1, Month 2, expenditure.
US$ US$ US$ US$ US$ US$ US$
100,000 120,000 126,750 126,750 126,750 126,750 727,000
100,000 125,000 125,400 125,400 125,400 125,400 726,600
100,000 130,000 124,050 124,050 124,050 124,050 726,200
100,000 135,000 122,700 122,700 122,700 122,700 725,800
100,000 140,000 121,350 121,350 121,350 121,350 725,400
100,000 145,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 120,000 725,000
100,000 150,000 118,650 118,650 118,650 118,650 724,600
100,000 155,000 117,300 117,300 117,300 117,300 724,200
100,000 160,000 115,950 115,950 115,950 115,950 723,800
100,000 165,000 114,600 114,600 114,600 114,600 723,400
Table 2 shows that all of the available options involved a self vs. team tradeoff For each
US$5000 expenditure above US$120,000 up to a total increment of US$45,000, the monthly
resource requirements for Stages B and C are reduced by US$1350 (total Stages B and C
savings of US$5400). Thus, for all subjects except those paid 100% based on team
performance, choosing the US$120,000 Month 2 expenditure level would yield the highest
personal pay. But at this expenditure level, performance and pay for the other two engineers
in the team, as well as for the team as a whole, would be at their lowest levels. As Stage A's
Month 2 expenditure increased, measured performance and pay for the subject decreased
while those for his/her two teammates as well as the team increased. The extent of this self vs.
team tradeoff was greater the higher the proportion of individual-based performance in the
subject's pay structure.
After writing down their choice of Month 2 expenditure, the subjects answered several
manipulation-check questions and an open-ended question on the reasons for their choice.
Then the experimental materials were collected and the subjects were dismissed. Pay was
dispensed later after each subject's eamings had been verified.
3.3. Results
In both parts of the experiment, subjects were kept only if they had answered at least "3"
to an exit question about the extent to which they had made their decisions in the simulation
as if engaged in a real-life situation (1 =very little and 5 = very much). Four subjects were
dropped from Part I due to this screening device.
One subject failed to return for Part II, and three others were dropped due to a below-3
response to the screening question for this part. One more subject was dropped due to deletion
of his/her cross-nation match. And, as was discussed earlier, one US subject was dropped
because he/she could not be assigned to a pay structure for a meaningful test. Thus, the final
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sample size for Part II was 140 subjects, 69 from Taiwan and 71 from the US. The average
response of these subjects to the "real life" question was 4.30.
3.3.1. Manipulation checks
The individualism scores for the Taiwanese and US samples were computed following
Hofstede (1980). Their values were 6.03 and 72.81, respectively. The numerical difference
between the two national samples was somewhat smaller than that reported in Hofstede
(1980, 1991), but in the same direction.^
3.3.2. Test of Hypothesis 1
Hypothesis 1 stated that individuals' tradeoffs between self and team performance can be
modified by an imposed performance-based pay structure. To focus on the effects of
imposition, the effects of the pay structure, per se, were controlled by means of matched
pairs. Within each pair, one subject had made his/her choice of Month 2 expenditure
(EXPENSE) under his/her self-selected pay structure (SELF-SELECT), whereas his/her
match had been assigned to that structure away from the one that he/she had self-selected
(ASSIGNED- 1 and ASSIGNED-2). Because the pay structure categories involved in these
matched-pair tests had almost no overlap between the CNT and US samples, separate tests
were performed for each national sample. Two different sets of matched pairs were formed
within each national sample.
3.3.2.1. CNT. In the first set of matched pairs, both members of each pair worked under the
same pay structure in Part II of the experiment. However, one member had self-selected while
the other had been shifted to that category from a less team-based pay structure. As shown in
Table 3, Panel A, a total of six such pairs were feasible: one in Category 7, one in Category 8,
and four in Category 11.^ The mean value of EXPENSE for the SELF-SELECT subjects was
US$154,000; that for their ASSIGNED- 1 matches was US$141,000. (Higher expense
indicated more team-oriented decisions.) Because of the small sample size, the Wilcoxon
matched-pairs signed-ranks test was used to compare EXPENSE between the two groups, so
as to control for non-normality and outliers. The result (Z= 1.826, P=.068) indicated that as
compared to the subjects who had self-selected these pay structures, the subjects who had
been shifted to them from more individual-based structures still had made expenditure
choices which relatively favored themselves over their teams.
In the second set of matched pairs, both members had originally self-selected the same
pay structure, but one member worked in Part II under his/her self-selected pay structure
while the other was shifted to a more team-based pay structure. There were 12 such
Our aim in collecting the subjects' individualism measures was to validate that our Chinese and US subjects
did differ culturally in the expected direction. We focused on individualism because it was implicated in both
hypotheses. In hindsight, collecting data on power distance could have fiirther strengthened the manipulation
checks of our study.
^ Where more than one subject was available for matching with a subject from the other group (e.g., Pay
Structure 11, where there were five subjects in the SELF-SELECT group but only four in the ASSIGNED-
1
group), selection was random.
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Table 3
Summary of Hypothesis 1 matched pair comparisons: Chinese sample from Taiwan
SELF-SELECT member of the pair ASSIGNED member of the pair
n of Self-selected categories
matched pairs that subjects were also assigned to
Pay categories that
subjects had self-selected
Pay categories that
subjects were assigned to
Panel A"
1 7
1 8
4 11
Panel B^
4 3
1 4
6 6
1 7
11
10
11
^ Both subjects in the pair were assigned to the same pay category, but one subject had self-selected that
category while the other was shifted to that from a less team-based one, four categories away. Thus, each matched
pair contained one ASSIGNED subject, who was matched for comparison with one SELF-SELECT subject in the
pay category the former was shifted to.
^ Both subjects in the pair had self-selected the same pay structure, but one subject was shifted to a more
team-based structure, four categories away. Thus, each matched pair contained one ASSIGNED subject, who
was matched for comparison with one SELF-SELECT subject in the pay structure category the former was
shifted from.
matched pairs possible (Table 3, Panel B): four in Category 3, one in Category 4, six in
Category 6, and one in Category 7. Mean EXPENSE for the 12 SELF-SELECT subjects
was US$135,833; that for their ASSIGNED-1 matches was US$132,083. There was no
significant difference between the two groups (Z= 0.968, P=.332). This means that the
subjects who had been assigned to more team-based pay structures still had made
expenditure choices similar to those of their SELF-SELECT matches who were working
under their original, less team-based self-selected structures. Thus, in both tests with the
CNT sample, imposing a more team-based pay structure did not induce individuals to shift
their expenditure decisions in favor of the team's collective interests. Yet attaining such an
outcome is the presumed objective of placing individuals in more team-based pay structures
than they would have selected for themselves.
3.3.2.2. US nationals. As with the CNT sample, two sets of matched pairs were formed. In
the first set, both members of a pair worked under the same pay structure in Part II of the
experiment, with one member having self-selected, and the other having been shifted to that
pay structure from a more team-based pay structure. As shown in Table 4, Panel A, a total of
nine such pairs were feasible: one in Category 4, three in Category 5, and five in Category 6.
Mean EXPENSE for the SELF-SELECT subjects was US$135,556; that for their
ASSIGNED-1 matches was US$137,778. The difference between the two groups was not
significant (Z=0.314, P=.753) using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. This
result is consistent with the imposed pay structure having shifted the decisions of US subjects
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Table 4
Summary of Hypothesis matched pair comparisons: US sample
SELF-SELECT member of the pair ASSIGNED member of the pair
n of Self-selected categories
matched pairs that subjects were also assigned to
Pay categories Pay categories that
that subjects had self-selected subjects were assigned to
Panel A""
1
3
5
Panel B^
1
3
9
10
^ Both subjects in the pair worked under the same pay structure, but one subject had self-selected that structure
and the other was shifted to that structure from a more team-based one, four categories away. Thus, each matched
pair contained one ASSIGNED subject, who was matched for comparison with one SELF-SELECT subject in the
pay structure category the former was shifted to.
^ Both subjects in the pair had self-selected the same pay structure, but one subject was shifted to a less team-
based pay structure, four categories away. Thus, each matched pair contained one ASSIGNED subject, who was
matched for comparison with one SELF-SELECT subject in the pay structure category the former was shiftedfrom.
to favor their self-interests relatively more than those of their teams, like those of their
compatriots who had self-selected these pay structures.
In the second set of matched pairs, both members had originally self-selected the same
pay structure, but one member worked in Part II under his/her self-selected pay structure
while his/her match was shifted away from that to a less team-based pay structure. Only
four such pairs were feasible (Table 4, Panel B). Mean EXPENSE for the SELF-SELECT
subjects in this matched set was US$143,750, while that for their ASSIGNED-1 matches
was lower— US$131,250 — as might be expected if the pay structure did produce the
anticipated effect. However, the difference between the two groups was not statistically
significant (Z= 1.342, P=.179) using the Wilcoxon matched-pairs signed-ranks test. This
finding is consistent with the imposed pay structure not having shifted the subjects'
decisions substantially from what they, as proxied by their matched subjects, would have
made under their self-selected pay structures. However, an important caveat about this
result is that it may be an artifact of the low statistical power from a very small sample
size. Thus, we interpret the preponderance of US results to be supportive of a significant
effect on teamwork behavior. In this case, imposing a more individual-based pay structure
induced expenditure decisions, which departed more from maximizing the team's
collective interest.
3.3.3. Test of Hypothesis 2
Hypothesis 2 stated that individuals working under imposed pay structures will be less
satisfied than those working under self-selected pay structures, and that the difference in job
satisfaction between such individuals will be greater for US than for Chinese nationals.
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These predictions were tested with a regression using all 140 subjects from Part II. The
dependent variable was the subjects' response to an exit question on satisfaction with the pay
structure (SATISFACTION). '° The independent variables were TEAMPROP (percentage of
team-based pay in the performance measure; 0-10, where = 0% team-based and 100%
individual-based pay, 1 = 10% team-based and 90% individual-based pay, \0 = 100% team-
based and 0% individual-based pay, etc.), COUNTRY (0 = Taiwan, 1 = US), ASSIGN
(0 = SELF-SELECT, \=ASSIGNED- 1 or ASSIGNED-2), and the interaction term between
COUNTRY and ASSIGN. The equation as a whole was highly significant (adjusted R^=.2\0,
F=10.26, P= .00001), neither TEAMPROP nor COUNTRY was significant (respectively,
/= 1.14, 0.451; P=.256, .653), but both ASSIGN and ASSIGN x COUNTRY were signific-
ant (respectively, / = 4.38, 3.55; P=.00001, .0005).
Both the coefficients for ASSIGN and ASSIGN x COUNTRY had negative signs
(respectively, — .402 and — .305). The former result is consistent with both CNT and US
nationals being less satisfied when they work under imposed pay structures. The latter is
consistent with the reaction to imposed pay structures being different between the CNT and
US subjects. To further elucidate the direction of this interaction, separate comparisons of
SATISFACTION were performed for each national sample. Within the CNT sample, subjects
under imposed pay structures had a lower mean than those under self-selected structures (3.15
vs. 3.43), though this difference was not statistically significant (/ = 0.705, P=.433). The US
subjects under imposed pay structures likewise were less satisfied (2.49 vs. 3.97) and in this
case, the difference in means was highly significant (t = 4.943, P=.00001).^' This contrast is
consistent with the prediction based on the CNT subjects' lower individualism and higher
power distance, that relative to their US counterparts, they would more willingly acquiesce to
the dictates of their superiors.
4. Summary and discussion
In the current era of global economic exchange, it is important to acknowledge that people
of different national origins can have different work-related cultures. These differences may
facilitate or impede the adoption of management practices that have worked effectively in
other national settings.
This study has investigated the behavioral effects of imposing performance-based pay
structures in a teamwork setting. It postulated that the effects of such imposition on employees'
decisions and satisfaction would depend on two work-related cultural values— individualism
and power distance. Subjects from the US represented a high individualism-low power
^^ The question was: "To what extent do you feel satisfied with the pay arrangement you worked under?" The
five-point response scale was anchored by 1 =very little and 5 = very much. We did not include other questions,
such as satisfaction with the nature of the task interdependence and the total amount of pay, because they were less
sharply focused on the performance-based pay structure part of the employment relationship.
'
'
We also conducted comparisons using various subsets of the sample (e.g., the matched pairs used to test
Hypothesis 1 ). The results were not qualitatively different and are not reported here.
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distance culture, while CNT represented a low individualism-high power distance culture.
The findings indicated that imposing a more team-based pay structure on the CNT subjects did
not induce behavior that was more in favor of collective interests, while imposing a more
individual-based pay structure on the US subjects did tend to shift behavior away from
maximizing the collective interest. In other words, imposing a PERS was effective in
shifting behavior away fi^om the collective interest, but not in the opposite, and presumably
desired, direction.
However, it is important to note two caveats relating to this finding. First, because the
US and CNT subjects had systematically different distributions of self-selected pay
structures, the experiment was restricted to shifting the US and Chinese subjects in
different directions away from these structures (towards more individual-based for the
former and towards more team-based for the latter). The results on the subjects' decisions
may have been, at least in part, driven by these different directional shifts.'^ Since the data
and sample sizes in this study did not permit isolating the potential confounding effects of
this factor, future studies — especially ones with much larger sample sizes — are needed to
resolve this issue. The second caveat relates to the choice of parameter values. In the
experiment, the size of the self vs. collective interests conflict, as translated into pay, was
relatively small. Different results might have been found if the divergence between the two
were larger.
In addition to impacts on decisions, this study also found that US nationals working
under imposed pay structures were significantly less satisfied than their compatriots
working under self-selected structures. Again, and consistent with culture-based expect-
ations, their Chinese counterparts from Taiwan did not exhibit similarly significant differ-
ences in satisfaction.
Taken as a whole, this study's findings can provide useful insights for the design of PERS
across national boundaries. For example, they indicate that among US nationals —
representatives of an individualistic national culture — imposing a PERS can significantly
affect employees' behavior, though this effect may have to be traded off against decreases in
employee satisfaction. The thrust of these findings would seem to accord with the focus on
PERS in the primarily Anglo-American theories and practices. But for CNT— representing a
more collective national culture — imposed PERS was more readily acquiesced to, though
there also was less impact on employee behavior. Since these are potentially significant
implications, it would be important to test the reproducibility, robustness, and boundaries of
this study's findings. Below, we discuss four limitations of this study as the basis for offering
some suggested directions for future research.
'^ A reviewer has suggested the possibility that our different results between the US and CNT subjects could
be due to the two samples not having similar understanding of the experiment, and/or not being equally willing to
play the "game" as if for real. Such a concern applies to all experimental studies and we are unable to definitively
dismiss it. However, a priori, we are unable to discern a reason to expect such a systematic difference, especially
because (as reported in the Results section) all of the subjects indicated that they had acted in the experiment with
a high level of realism.
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First, the laboratory experiment in this study has assumed a Hnear type of interdependency
where one team member's decisions affect only downstream operations, and both individual
team members' personal performance and their effects on the team are known with certainty.
Many cases of teamwork have more complex interdependencies where effects are recursive
and uncertain, with synergies among team members that may only be measured with error.
How altemate modes of performance evaluation and rewards affect employee behavior in
such more complex team-based work settings is worthy of study.
Second, this study has used a one-period experiment, even though it did make explicit the
multiperiod nature of the team relationship and task. In an ongoing work relationship, factors
such as social pressure, mutual monitoring, and the potential for future retaliation/cooperation
may affect each team member's decisions and actions. Expanding the scope of investigation
to include these other control and motivational mechanisms in a multiperiod setting would
be worthwhile.
Third, this study has used only one performance measure for each team member.
Increasingly, firms are moving towards the use of multiple performance measures, including
both financial and nonfinancial yardsticks. How the use of such combinations (e.g., the
"balanced scorecard") affects individual employees' ability to undertake self-interested
actions is worthy of investigation.
Finally, new management practices, such as teamwork, often are implemented in tandem
with other methods (e.g., total quality management, just-in-time, employee empowerment).
These management packages may affect the nature of the individual vs. collective interest
conflict, and at the same time involve multiple cultural values (e.g., power distance in the
case of employee empowerment). Concurrent with performance evaluation and rewards,
organizations also can use mechanisms like recruitment, selection, indoctrination, training,
mentoring, and career ladders, to influence employees' behavior and acceptance of their
systems (Chatman, 1989; Pascale, 1985; Van Maanen & Schein, 1979). It would be
desirable, though admittedly also challenging, to extend empirical testing to these more
complex settings.
Acknowledgments
The authors are indebted to C.F. Koo Cultural and Educational Foundation and Seattle
University's SeaFirst Volpe Fellowship for providing financial support for this study. The
many helpful suggestions of two anonymous reviewers also are gratefully acknowledged.
References
Awasthi, V., Chow, C, & Wu, A. (1998). Performance measure and resource expenditure choices in a teamwork
environment: the effects of national culture. Management Accounting Research, 9, 119-138.
Befu, H. (1980). A critique of the group model of Japanese society. Social Analysis, 29-43 (December).
Bellah, R., Madsen R., Sullivan W., Swidler A., Tipton S. (Eds.) (1987). Individualism and commitment in
American life. New York: Harper and Row.
V.N. Awasthi et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 291-309 307
Bimberg, J., & Snodgrass, C. (1988). Culture and control: a field study. Accounting. Organizations and Society,
13^ 447-464 (September).
Bimberg, J., Turopolec, L., & Young, M. (1983). The organizational context of accounting. Accounting, Organ-
izations and Society, 111-129 (July).
Bond, M. (1991). Beyond the Chinese face. Hong Kong: Oxford University Press.
(1992). The 21st century corporation: paradigms for postmodern managers. Business Week (Reinventing America
issue), 62-63.
Chatman, J. (1989). Improving interactional organizational research: a model of person -organization fit. Academy
ofManagement Review, 14 (3), 333-349.
Chinese Cultural Connection. (1987). Chinese values and the search for culture-free dimensions of culture.
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 143-164 (June).
Chow, C, Kato, Y, & Merchant, K. (1996). The use of organizational controls and their effects on data manip-
ulation and management myopia: a Japan vs. US comparison. Accounting, Organizations and Society,
175-192.
Chow, C, Kato, Y, & Shields, M. (1994). National culture and the preference for management controls: an
exploratory study of the firm- labor market interface. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 381-400.
Chow, C, Shields, M., & Chan, Y (1991). The effects of management controls and national culture on manu-
facturing performance: an experimental investigation. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 209-226.
Daley, L., Jiambalvo, J., Sundem, G., & Kondo, Y (1985). Attitudes toward financial control systems in the
United States and Japan. Journal ofInternational Business Studies, 16, 91-109 (Fall).
Dertouzos, M., Lester, R., & Solow, R. (1989). Made in America — regaining the productive edge. Cambridge,
MA: MIT Press.
Dumaine, B. (1991). The bureaucracy busters. Fortune (June 17).
Dumaine, B. (1994). The trouble with teams. Fortune (September 5).
Earley, C. (1993). East meets west meets mideast: further explorations of collectivistic and individualistic work
groups. Academy ofManagement, 319-348.
Erez, M., & Earley, P. C. (1993). Culture, self-identity and work. New York: Oxford University Press.
Fucini, J., & Fucini, S. (1990). Working for the Japanese — inside Mazda's American auto plant. New York:
Free Press.
Hackman, J. (1976). Group influences on individuals. In: M. Dunnette (Ed.), Handbook of industrial and organ-
izational psychology (pp. 1455-1526). Chicago: Rand McNally (College Publishing).
Harris, P., & Moran, R. (1987). Managing cultural difference. Houston, TX: Gulf Publishing.
Harrison, G. (1992). The cross-cultural generalizability of the relation between participation, budget emphasis and
job-related attitudes. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 17, 1-15 (January).
Harrison, G. (1993). Reliance on accounting performance measures in superior evaluation style— the influence of
national culture and personality. Accounting, Organizations and Society, 18, 319-339 (May).
Harrison, G., & McKinnon, J. (1999). Cross-cultural research in management control system design: a review of
the current state. Accounting, Organizations, and Society, 24, 483-506.
Hay, E. (1988). The just-in-time breakthrough. New York: Wiley.
Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences: international differences in work-related values. Beverly Hills, CA:
Sage Publications.
Hofstede, G. (1991). Cultures and organizations: software of the mind. Berkshire, England: McGraw-Hill.
Hopwood, A. G. (1972). An empirical study of the role of accounting data in performance evaluation. Journal of
Accounting Research, 156-182 (Supplement).
Hui, C. H., & Triandis, H. C. (1985). Measurement in cross cultural psychology: a review and comparison of
strategies. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 131-152 (June).
Kamata, S. (1982). Japan in the passing lane. New York: Pantheon Books.
Kandel, E., & Lazear, E. (1992). Peer pressure and partnerships. Journal ofPolitical Economy, 801-817 (August).
Leung, K., & Bond, M. (1984). The impact of cultural collectivism on reward allocation. Journal ofPersonality
and Social Psychology, 47, 93-804.
308 f^'A^. Awasthi et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 291-309
Lincoln, J., & Kalleberg, A. (1990). Culture, control and commitment. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Locke, E. (1976). Nature and causes of job satisfaction. In: M. D. Durmette (Ed.), Handbook of industrial and
organizational psychology. Chicago: Rand McNally.
Locke, E., & Latham, G. (1984). Goal setting: a motivational technique that works. Englewood Cliffs, NJ:
Prentice-Hall.
Merchant, K. (1985). Control in business organizations. Marshfield, MA: Pitman.
Merchant, K. (1989). Rewarding results: motivating profit center managers. Boston, MA: Harvard Business
School Press.
Merchant, K. (1998). Modern management control systems. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Muchinsky, P. M. (1990). Psychology applied to work (pp. 327-337). Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Ouchi, W. (1981). Theoiy Z. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley Publishing.
Pascale, R. (1985). The paradox of "corporate culture": reconciling ourselves to socialization. California Man-
agement Review, 27, 26-41 (Winter).
Pfeffer, J. (1983). Organizational demography. In: L. Cummings, & B. Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational
behavior, (5, pp. 299-357). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Ronen, S., & Shenkar, O. (1985). Clustering countries on attitudinal dimensions: a review and synthesis. Academy
ofManagement Review, 435-454 (July).
Saal, F. E., & Knight, P. A. (1982). Industrial/organizational psychology: science and practice (pp. 312-322).
Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.
Schneider, B. (1985). Organizational behavior. Annual Review of Psychology, 36, 573-611.
Schonberger, R. (1982). Japanese manufacturing techniques — nine hidden lessons in simplicity. New York: The
Free Press.
Smith, P. C, Kendall, L., & Hulin, C. L. (1969). The measurement of satisfaction in work and retirement.
Chicago: Rand McNally.
Smith, R. (1983). Japanese society: tradition, self, and social order. Cambridge, England: Cambridge
University Press.
Snell, S. A., & Dean, J. W. (1992). Integrated manufacturing and human resource management: a human capital
perspective. Academy ofManagement Journal, 3, 467-504.
Spence, J. (1985). Achievement American style: the rewards and cost of individualism. American Psychologist,
1285-1295 (December).
Triandis, H. (1988). Collectivism vs. individualism: a reconceptualization of a basic concept in cross-cultural
social psychology. In: G. Verma, & C. Bagley (Eds.), Cross-cultural studies of personality, attitudes, and
cognition (pp. 60-95). New York: St. Martins Press.
Triandis, H. (1989). The self and social behavior in differing cultural contexts. Psychological Review, 506-520.
Triandis, H., Bontempo, R., Villareal, M., Asai, M., & Lucca, N. (1988). Individualism and collectivism:
cross-cultural perspective on self-ingroup relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
323-338 (February).
Trompenaars, F., & Hampden-Turner, C. (1998). Riding the waves of culture. New York: McGraw-Hill.
Van Maanen, J., & Schein, E. (1979). Toward a theory of organizational socialization. In: L. Cummings, & B.
Staw (Eds.), Research in organizational behavior (pp. 209-264). Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.
Weick, K. (1983). Stress in accounting systems. Accounting Review, 350-369 (April).
Weitzman, M., & Kruse, D. (1990). Profit sharing and productivity. In: A. Binder (Ed.), Payingfor productivity.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution.
Yang, C. (1984). Demystifying Japanese management practices. Han>ard Business Review, 173-182 (November-
December).
Young, M., & Lewis, B. (1995). Experimental incentive contracting research in accounting. In: R. Ashton, & A.
Ashton (Eds.), Judgment and decision making research in accounting and auditing (pp. 55-75). Cambridge,
England: Cambridge University Press.
Young, M.. & Selto, F. (1993). Implementing performance measures and new management and manufacturing
V.N. Awasthi et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 291-309 309
practices in a just-in-time manufacturing environment. Journal of Management Accounting Research,
300-326 (Fall).
Young, S. M. (1992). A framework for successfiil adoption and performance of Japanese manufacturing practices
in the United States. Academy ofManagement Review, 17 (4), 677-700.
Zipkin, P. H. (1991). Does manufacturing need a JIT revolution? Hai-vard Business Review, 40-50.

The
_ International
Pergamon journal of
The International Journal of Accounting Accounting
36(2001)311-327 ^^^^^=^=
Accounting and management controls in the classical
Chinese novel: A Dream of the Red Mansions
K. Hung Chan^ Albert Y. Lew^ Marian Yew Jen Wu Tong'''*
^Department ofAccounting and Finance, Lingnan University, Tiien Mun, Hong Kong, China
School ofAccountancy. The Chinese University ofHong Kong, Shatin, Hong Kong, China
Abstract
This study presents a systematic documentation of Chinese accounting and management control
practices in two eminent family households of the early Qing Dynasty. There is a lack of information
on management control during this period (during the 18th century) and a scarcity of empirical
evidence on the control practices of family institutions in ancient China. We attempted to address these
problems by analyzing the accounting and management control practices described in the popular
novel A Dream of the Red Mansions. Further analyses were made to ensure that the control practices
thus observed were in harmony with the social and cultural settings of the early Qing Dynasty. Pairing
the control practices observed in the novel with a definite set of cultural and social values led to several
empirical conclusions. Big family households of the early Qing Dynasty clearly recognized the
importance of, and made distinct achievements in, accounting and management controls. They
mastered the segregation of duties, the control of cash, the use of budgets for planning, the
containment of costs, and the efficiency of operations. However, social and cultural factors that were
prevalent during the Qing Dynasty impeded the effectiveness of such practices. The obsession with
preserving harmony in society and the family system eventually led to excessive power distance and
rigid rules, at the expense of flexibility and professionalism. As history is often indicative of the future,
the research results should facilitate our understanding of the management of family-owned businesses
in Chinese communities. © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
Keywords: Accounting history; Accounting and management control; A Dream ofthe Red Mansions; Cultural and
social perspective of control
* Corresponding author. Tel.: +852-2609-7833; fax: +852-2603-5114.
E-mail address: marian@baf.msmail.cuhk.edu.hk (M.Y.J.W. Tong).
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
PII: 80020-7063(01)00105-4
312 K.H. Chan et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 311-327
1. Introduction
This study investigates Chinese accounting and management controls among big family
households of the early Qing Dynasty. Our approach is to analyze descriptions of the control
systems of two eminent families in A Dream of the Red Mansions. In the remainder of this
section we provide historical details that will facilitate an understanding of this unusual
approach. Then we will elaborate on our research objectives and their significance. Finally,
biographical information on the novel's author is presented in Appendix A.
1.1. The novel in historical perspective
A Dream ofthe Red Mansions {Hung Lou Meng in Chinese) was authored by Tsao Hsueh-
chin (Tsao, 1792),' and is acclaimed as one of the four greatest classical Chinese novels: the
other three being Journey to the West, Romance of the Three Kingdoms, and Outlaws of the
Marsh. Using the criteria of mass and academic appeal, it has been widely acknowledged as
one of the world's masterpieces (Levy, 1999; Lin, 1935). The novel consists of 120 episodes,
the first 80 of which are accepted as the authentic writing of Tsao, whereas the last 40
episodes are alleged to be the contribution of Kao Ngo (Lin, 1966). Although Kao's name has
never appeared in any published Chinese version, well-informed readers have been aware of
this coauthorship.^ The inclusion of Kao as a coauthor in translated editions merely serves to
inform readers outside China of his contribution.
Whatever the provenance of the last 40 episodes, it is clear that Tsao intended the novel
to faithfully represent the rise and fall of two related eminent families, the Jung and the
Ning Houses, during the early Qing Dynasty. The clue to the eminence of these families
stems from the use of red mansions in the novel's title. In imperial China, mansions with
' The novel is known by several titles, with the more common being A Dream ofthe Red Mansions, A Dream
of the Red Chamber, The Story of the Stone, The Story of A Monk with Passion, and The Twelve Ladies of
Nanking. The novel has been translated into languages other than Chinese, including English, French, German,
Hungarian, Italian, Japanese, Korean, Spanish, Russian, and Vietnamese (Hu, 1993; Wang, 1988), which has led
to extensive research in Japan, Korea, and the United States, apart from continuous research in China. Popular
English versions include, among others, translations by Hawkes (1987) and Yang and Yang (1994). The Yang and
Yang translation is based on the 120 episodes and thus presents a complete narrative with an acceptable ending. It
matches the essence of the 120-episode Chinese version. However, Hawkes' translation includes only the first 80
episodes of the novel.
" Kao himself claimed not to have completed the novel. Instead, he took credit for rediscovering the missing
parts of the manuscript after a relentless search of about 30 years. This admission was made in his capacity as
editor, and printed in the preface to the 1792, 120-episode publication. In the same light, some modem researchers
doubt Hu Shih's insistence that Kao wrote the last 40 episodes. These researchers include, among others, Chao and
Chen (1975), who accepted Kao's admission of finding the missing manuscript as a reliable statement. It is
noteworthy that before 1792, circulated copies of the novel contained only the first 80 episodes. These were all
hand-copied versions with substantial errors and omissions. Hand-copied versions were costly, thus limiting mass
circulation. However, the 1792 version was published using movable character printing. This facilitated the
production of about 300 copies in a single edition for wider circulation.
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red-plastered outer walls were symbolic of wealth, grandeur, and power. Hence, all
palaces, temples, and courthouses had red walls, whereas habitations of commoners were
mostly gray. Tsao urged his readers to ponder this distinction, and consider the lives lived
behind red walls as part of a dream. Tsao himself had been raised in a fabulously
luxurious home before his life was blasted into nothingness. In middle age, as a bankrupt
scholar who lived in a decrepit hut, only his imagination could help him relive that dream-
like past.
Moreover, Tsao used the dream motif because the tale that he narrated was politically
sensitive in the repressive environment of the early Qing Dynasty. He wrote of family
misfortunes extending over 20 years, piled on reflections of ancestral glory, and set
amidst a desperate awareness of the gradual erosion of social status. Most pointedly, he
described the confiscation of family properties through an imperial decree. To ftirther
distance his own experience from those narrated, Tsao devoted substantial passages to
explain how he supposedly obtained the manuscript. Readers were told that a Taoist
monk found the story inscribed on a huge rock which is nestled in some far-off
mountains. The mythical quality of this conceit was strengthened by Tsao's absurd
references to the rock measuring 120 feet high, and 240 feet wide. Unbelievably, the
Taoist monk was said to have copied the story from the rock inscriptions and delivered
the manuscript into Tsao's care.
Only after having established this alibi did Tsao admit that he then worked on the
manuscript for 1 years, revising it five times, and dividing it into episodes. Finally, he wrote
the following verse to commemorate the effort (Lin, 1935, p. 270):
These pages tell of babbling nonsense,
A string of sad tears they conceal.
They all laugh at the author's folly;
But who could know its appeal?
Tsao's rhetorical soliloquy demanded no answer, but his tale's rich humanity and touching
sense of personal tragedy has long been a talking point. Episodes from the novel have been
the basis for innumerable tales, operas, and movies. To appreciate the novel's position in
Chinese society, we must imagine a work with the scope and popular appeal of Margaret
Mitchell's Gone with the Wind (Levy, 1999). Scholars, however, look beyond the novel's
literary merits alone, and towards Tsao's enigmatic relation to the events about which he
wrote. They are inclined to reject his claim of writing babbling nonsense, and consider the
novel as a thinly disguised biographical account of historical, social, and economic events.
Over the last century, the search for historical evidence to support this hypothesis has led to
the development of a science commonly known as redology in Chinese literary circles
(Alexander, 1976; Chao & Chen, 1975; Cooper & Zhang, 1993; Edwards, 1994; Hu, 1993;
Hu, Wu, Tsai, & Li, 1961; Knoerle, 1972; Levy, 1999; Lin, 1966; Lu, 1992; Minford, 1980;
Tsai, 1930; Yu, 1957, 1978; Zhou, 1989). Such scholastic pursuits both inside and outside
China are comparable in dignity and volume to commentaries on the works of Shakespeare or
Goethe (Lin, 1935; Yang & Yang, 1994).
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1.2. Objectives of this study
We are not interested in determining whether yi Dream ofthe Red Mansions is pure fiction
or thinly disguised biography. What is more important is that Tsao created a Hterary piece
embedded with concrete traces of historical evidence. The novel was written during the reign
of Emperor Chien Lung (1736-1795), a period that has often been heralded by Chinese
historians as a "Golden Age." Tsao's writing covered most walks of life, with extensive and
in-depth personal attestation to the prevailing culture, politics, economics, social structure, and
management practices of the time (Li & Li, 1995). Therefore, we take the position that the
novel has historical significance, and is relevant to the study of accounting and management
controls in 1 8th century China, especially as alternative documentary evidence is nonexistent.
Based on this premise, we undertook to draw generalized conclusions on accounting and
management control practices of the early Qing Dynasty by referring to various episodes of
the novel. Since accounting and management control principles inductively derived might
have been conceptually falsifiable, either through the imagination of the author or by our own
selection bias, analyses were made to ensure that generalizations drawn fi-om the novel were
consistent with the social and economic environment of the early Qing Dynasty. It was
expected that pairing the observed system of accounting and management controls with both
time and environment would eventually lead to reasonable explanations, not only for the
unique characteristics of the system, but also its deficiencies fi^om a historical perspective.
The results of this study add to the literature, which lacks a reasonable part of the picture
on accounting and management control of family institutions in imperial China. Traditionally,
research studies on the accounting history of China have focused on the developments of
bookkeeping and accounting in ancient dynasties, with the first single-entry bookkeeping
system dating back to the Zhou Dynasty (1100-771 bc) (Aiken & Lu, 1993a, 1993b, 1998;
Fu, 1971; Lin, 1992). In the last two decades, most research on Chinese accounting has been
occupied with developments since the economic reform of 1979 (Abdel-khalik, Wong, & Wu,
1999; Chen, Jubb, & Tran, 1997; Chow, Chau, & Gray, 1995; Davidson, Gelardi, & Li, 1996;
Graham & Li, 1997; Lefebvre & Lin, 1990; Skousen & Yang, 1988; Winkle, Huss, & Chen,
1994; Xiang, 1998; Zhou, 1988). These studies have revealed, to an important extent, that
China was then on the verge of rapidly adopting or "importing" Western accounting and
control measures, because pre-reform accounting and management methods were incapable
of coping with the changed post-reform environment. Our examination of the accounting and
control systems employed under the Qing Dynasty, based on A Dream of the Red Mansions,
showed a similar atrophy. However, Chinese family-owned institutions of the 1 9th and 20th
centuries managed to maintain some traditional methods while adopting Westem manage-
ment control measures. Blending traditional control measures with Westem management
controls has assured the success of many business institutions in modem Taiwan and Hong
Kong. These success stories beckon to Chinese state-owned enterprises as potential models
for improvement in the post-reform era.
The research results, therefore, should also provide a better insight into current manage-
ment practices among Chinese enterprises, particularly entities controlled by families.
Family-owned businesses have been, and still are, the overwhelming norm in Chinese
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communities. For example, in Hong Kong, the Hang Seng Index contains 33 blue-chip
companies, and at least 22 of them are controlled by families (Shi, 1998). In Taiwan, the
situation is similar. Forty-five out of the 100 largest corporations are family-owned (China
Credit Information Service, 1998, 1999). The percentage of family-controlled corporations in
Taiwan would be over 62 percent if both firms with state ownership and foreign subsidiary
multinationals were excluded. In this light, our study of the accounting and management
control of big family households has special relevance for enhancing our understanding of
management practices in contemporary Chinese enterprises.
Finally, this paper encourages the use of insights from an earlier time and different
environment to help develop innovative teaching materials for management accounting.
Currently, the study ofA Dream of the Red Mansions, accessible through translated versions
in many major languages (see footnote 1), is a compulsory part of the curriculum for classical
Chinese literature in most universities around the world. We suggest that new perspectives on
the accounting and management control procedures described in the novel might develop.
Most importantly, analytical results might provide not only the needed insight for new system
design, but also the rationalization for explaining control systems as they were, or how they
could otherwise have been. The study of management control through literature can help
motivate the education process by instilling enthusiasm in students.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Accounting and management control
procedures and practices directly observable in the novel are presented in the next section.
This is followed by analyses of the strengths and weaknesses of these controls, relative to the
social and cultural environment of the time. The final section provides a summary of
implications and conclusions.
2. Accounting and management controls
A Dream of the Red Mansions presents multiple aspects of the leisurely life of two related
households during the early Qing Dynasty. The Jung and Ning families each owned mansions
where several generations of masters and mistresses were attentively cared for by supporting
layers of maids and servants. Bondservants numbered in the hundreds in each household and
were kept to ensure the comfort of members. As expected in any business enterprise involving
multiple functions, there arose the need for the division of labor. People were assigned to work
in such positions as domestic assistants, seamstresses, gardeners, purchasers of supplies and
other amenities, custodians, bookkeepers, rent collectors, messengers, security officers, and
supervisors. Capable and loyal members from the lower hierarchy of the families were often
recruited to help with special ad hoc projects. Under such circumstances, there inevitably
emerged the need for control and coordination, to ensure efficient and effective operations.
The coexistence of a leisure class with a working class in the Jung and Ning Houses allows
us to view each as a society in miniature (Cheng, 1980). Furthermore, the hierarchical
structure of the two households allows us to analyze the social and cultural dimensions of
control practices. While concepts of accounting and management control are manifest in the
novel, their application is most prominent in two major events. First, they are accessible in the
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descriptions of preparations for, and the supervision of, a month-long fiineral in the Ning
House in Episodes 13 and 14. Second, they are easily recognizable in the revision of then
existing management policies and practices for the improvement of operations in the Grand
View Garden of the Jung House in Episodes 55 and 56.
2.7. Episodes 13 and 14
Chia Chen was supreme master of the Ning House. When his daughter-in-law died after a
sudden illness, a long period of mourning was immediately declared. Recalling her filial
attitude to elders and genuine kindness to others, Chia Chen decided, against customary
practice for handling young death, to hold a grand funeral. Such a funeral was consistent with
the religious belief that honoring the dead would eventually save the soul. Under Chinese
fiineral rites that had often been tainted with Buddhist and Taoist conventions, the corpse was
to lie mildly embalmed in the coffin, and remain in-house for 49 days before the funeral.
During the declared period of mourning, rites were to be performed by 108 monks, 99
Taoists, 50 high bonzes, and 50 Taoist chiefs. Prayers were to be lavished at fi-equent intervals
to invoke all the divinities to show compassion, so that the departed could be delivered from
sin and absolved from retribution. Guest mourners at the fiineral were expected to include
nobles and hereditary officials and their kin.
Chia Chen was troubled by the fact that his wife was stricken with grief over the loss of her
daughter-in-law and unable to oversee the process. He was especially concerned that
unexpected breaches of etiquette might occur while nobles were present. Therefore, he
decided to invite his able cousin, Ms. Wang Hsi-feng, to take charge of the Ning House
during the mourning period. Hsi-feng loved to show off, and looked forward to having a
chance to fully convince others of her management ability.
Once in transitional command of the Ning House, Hsi-feng wasted no time in studying the
system of controls and identifying the problem areas before taking corrective actions. She
considered the absence of discipline arising from the lack of segregation of duties among
servants as an obstacle that prevented the household from moving toward effective
coordination and control. She was, therefore, determined to deal with the management
problems at their root.
2.2. Episodes 55 and 56
In Episodes 55 and 56, Tan-chun (Hsi-feng's cousin) was recruited to manage the Jung
House when Hsi-feng fell ill. A major part of her responsibility in managing the Jung House
included the supervision of the Grand View Garden, an extension of the main complex with
numerous residences set aside for the young masters and mistresses. The garden derived its
splendor from imposing pavilions, towers, and lodges with views of hills, streams, lakes,
pools, rocks, trees, and cultivated flower patches below. In each residence, the supporting staff
included two nurses, four maids, a nanny, and other personal attendants of each young master
or mistress. There were, in addition, supporting groups of servants whose duty was to perform
the common functions needed for maintenance and other general up-keep of the garden.
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The funeral setting in the Ning House, and the daily supervision of the Grand View
Garden in the Jung House, provided stages for Hsi-feng and Tan-chun to demonstrate their
skills in applying management and control concepts. We have structured our observation of
such demonstrations around six major analytical dimensions: (1) establishment of duties
and responsibilities, (2) supervisory control, (3) internal accounting control systems, (4)
bookkeeping and accounting analysis, (5) control for efficiency, and (6) strategic planning
and control.
2.2.1. Establishment of duties and responsibilities
In revamping the existing assignment of duties in the Ning House when preparing for the
49-day funeral, Hsi-feng appointed 20 people to work in alternate shifts as ushers for
attending guest mourners. Similar arrangements were made for servants whose duty was to
serve meals and tea. Forty people, divided into two shifts, rotated among jobs such as burning
incense, keeping lamps filled with oil, hanging up curtains, keeping watch by the coffm,
offering sacrificial rice and tea, and comforting mourners. Four people were responsible for
the custody of cups, plates, and tea sets, while four others were in charge of dinner sets and
wine vessels. All members of the same shift within each group were collectively responsible
for any mishaps. Eight servants were to receive sacrificial offerings, while another eight were
to distribute ritual supplies. Thirty people performed night duty in turn as security. These
arrangements released approximately 100 servants to work for different residences in the
Ning House. Apart from the main ftinctions, Tsai-ming, a personal maid brought along from
the Jung House, performed centralized bookkeeping. Finally, three individuals in each
residence, with the support of several assistants, were placed separately in positions of
subsidiary bookkeeping, storeroom custodian, and cashier. It is noteworthy that duties did not
overlap, and the segregation is summarized in Table 1
.
Table 1
Establishment of duties and responsibilities in the Ning House in 1 8th century China
Team of servants or maids Respective duties and responsibilities
20 people divided into two shifts
20 people divided into two shifts
40 people divided into two shifts
4 people
4 people
8 people
8 people
30 people
About 100 people
1 person with several assistants
1 person with several assistants
1 person with several assistants
serve as ushers for guests on their arrival and departure
serve meals and tea
handle burning of incense, keep lamps filled with oil,
hang up curtains, watch by the coffin, offer sacrificial rice and tea,
and comfort mourners
have custody of cups, plates, and tea utensils in the pantry
have custody of dinner sets and wine vessels
receive presents for sacrificial offerings
deliver lamps, oil, candles, and sacrificial papers to various places
inside the mansion
perform night duty in turns as security officers
work in different residences and in different funcdons
do bookkeeping and filing of transaction records
storeroom custodian
cashier
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The benefits of segregated duties are recognizable in this situation. Changes in manage-
ment brought changes in attitude among the servants. During the mourning period, no servant
could choose to do easy jobs and leave those more difficult undone. Most importantly, they
could concentrate on their own work without unnecessary interruptions, or being called upon
to perform work outside the normal call of duty. Evidently, the appropriate establishment of
duties and responsibilities is a precondition for sound management and efficient operations,
irrespective of whether a business or family operation is involved.
2.2.2. Supei-visoiy control
Hsi-feng recognized the importance of discipline in control. In announcing the new
assignments to servants of the Ning House, she was emphatic that her supervision of
operations would not be confined to the old way of doing things. Any violation of rules
would be punished publicly. To enforce her new rules, she would personally review all staff
on the assignment list each morning by calling a roll with the assistance of a trusted maid.
She also arranged to have the wife of the chief steward report to her directly and
immediately any cases of slackness or other misbehavior. Should there be any cover-ups,
the steward's wife would be deprived of a month's allowance. The catchword was
compliance. Jobs, no matter how large or small, were to be done according to established
schedules. For example, roll calls were made at half-past six in the morning, and servants
were allowed to have meal breaks at ten. Operational reports and applications for supplies
were to be presented before half-past eleven. To show her own commitment, Hsi-feng would
not delegate the overall duty of supervision to others. On a daily basis, she made a final
inspection of the Ning House before issuing keys to security officers and other supporting
supervisors on night duty.
Once these operational guidelines for coordination were established they became the
benchmarks for compliance. There was low toleration for carelessness and inadvertence in the
system. For instance, one morning a female usher was late for roll call but asked forgiveness,
considering that she had only offended once. Hsi-feng's posifion was unequivocal. The usher
was punished with 20 strokes, and was also docked allowance for 1 month. Hsi-feng used the
occasion to reiterate her position and warned that accelerated punishment might be
forthcoming for any lateness in the future. The means of control were rigid, but strict
enforcement alleviated the problem of prior mismanagement in the Ning household.
2.2.3. Internal accounting control systems
The prevention of fraud and forgery depends upon an accounting system based on proper
authorization. In both the Ning and the Jung Houses, procedures that featured modem-day
internal control concepts were built into daily operations. In all phases of operation, the proof
of having proper authorization in any business transaction was the presentation of a tally. For
unity of command, only one tally was used and placed under the control of the individual in
charge of each house. For example, when Hsi-feng agreed to manage the funeral for the Ning
House, Chia Chen immediately passed the tally to her, thus signifying the delegation of his
authority. Henceforth, the holder of the tally was presumed to have the delegated authority to
give or carry out orders in any business transaction.
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Incidences requiring proper authorization for business transactions occurred with relative
frequency in the novel. In Episode 14, there are detailed descriptions of processing
requisitions for supplies. For example, when the chief steward's wife presented a written
request for silk cord for making funeral carriage trimmings, Hsi-feng first verified the
quantities requested and then instructed the maid to record the requisition. She then approved
the transaction by tossing the tally to the chief steward's wife. However, Hsi-feng rejected
another requisition, because two out of the four items requested involved amounts that were
significantly more than those in past transactions.
Perhaps the most comprehensive descriptions of control in Episodes 13 and 14 are
reserved for cash. The key procedures for the control of cash have been reconstructed and
presented in Fig. 1 . For instance, a tailor orally requested compensation for his services. This
request only formalized upon the preparation of a written requisition slip by the chief
steward's wife. Upon seeing the written requisition, the first thing that Hsi-feng did was to
verify its nature and content through comparison with past accounting records and budgets.
After this validity check, she ordered the delivery of the requisition to the purchasing agent
for another verification. At the same time, she instructed her bookkeeper to enter the
transaction in the book. No payment could be made until the performance of the service was
fully completed and verified. Authorization for disbursement of cash was finally given by
Vendor,
e.g. Tailor
Requester,
Steward's Wife
Authorization
(Hsi-feng)
Purchase Agent
Bookkeeper,
Maid
(Tsai-ming)
Receive
payment
Prepare Requisition
Form called "Order
Slip"
Present Tally and
Requisition Form to
cashier to get cash
Verify the
Requisition
according to pnor
records or budget
Check the Amount
The Requisition
not approved
Not
Correct
Instruct bookkeeper i
record the t Record the
transaction
Approve the
Requisition and toss
the Tally and
Requisition Fomi to
requester after
verifying the receipt
for services
Pay cash to vendor
and return the Tally to
approver. Hsi-feng
Pay cash according
to the Requisition
Tally to requester
the
Keep the Tally for
next approval
Fig. 1. System of control for cash in the Grand View Garden of the Jung House in 18th century China.
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tossing (literally, throwing on the floor) both the tally and the requisition form to the chief
steward's wife. Upon inspecting the tally and the approved requisition, the cashier then paid
the tailor through the steward's wife. Finally, the tally was returned to Hsi-feng to signify the
completion of a cash transaction.
The control procedures described above contain important elements of sound internal
control. In most instances, effective control in the Ning House was maintained by requiring
proper authorization, segregation of duties, adequate records, and independent verification of
transactions. This level of sophisticated control could be explained partly by the inherent
nature of cash. After all, cash is the most liquid of all assets easily susceptible to defalcation
(high inherent risk). Also, in the absence of a banking industry in 18th century China, it was
very likely that large amounts of cash were kept on hand in big households. The volume of
cash as well as the level of risk associated with keeping it naturally required greater
expenditure of effort for its control.
2.2.4. Bookkeeping and accounting analysis
Maintaining accountability with steadfast reliance on bookkeeping was emphasized in both
households. In Episode 13, for example, Hsi-feng's first task related to planning for improved
operations in the Ning House was to review the accounting books. Likewise, in making
decisions of a financial nature, she relied on Tsai-ming to record all transactions in
chronological order.
Accountability apart, the insistence on recording every transaction of a financial nature
served to establish benchmarks for the uniformity of practices in decisions associated with
specific events. Hsi-feng used past accounting records to determine the reasonableness of
infrequent requests for supplies. She also used those records to plan the timing of requisitions.
For instance, a woman was late in making a requisition for incense and oil for lamps. When
she finally showed up, she was greeted by Hsi-feng with this statement: "I knew it was time
for you to come today but thought you had forgotten."
Tan-chun practiced the same reliance on past accounting records in Episode 55. Upon the
death of a relative, she had to decide the appropriate amount of condolence money for
dependents of the deceased. For various reasons, the chief steward's wife tried to distance
herself from Tan-chun in this situation, as did the other staff. However, Tan-chun wisely dealt
with the decision by checking and analyzing past accounting records for similar events.
2.2.5. Control for efficiency
Efforts to improve the efficiency of operations in the Jung household were shown by the
use of monthly budgets for the allocation of allowances, the revision of past practices in
containing costs, and the generation of ne\y^revenue via subcontracting to conserve resources.
Such efforts are mainly described in Episodes 55 and 56.
These episodes provide concrete evidence that budgets were used for controlling costs.
Presumably, an operating budget featuring expenditures for each residence in the Jung House
existed. However, the amounts budgeted were not as specific as in the monthly allowance
budget. As shown in the monthly budget for allowances, the amount allocated to the Lady
Dowager was 20 taels, and for Hsi-feng it was 5 taels. Young ladies or masters were entitled
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to 2 taels per person, while a maid received 1 tael or less, depending on her status within each
residence. A lump sum allowance of 8 taels was available for each young master to cover
peripheral expenses.
This lump sum particularly incensed Tan-chun as she examined the existing budget for
allowances in the Grand View Garden. It was simply a waste of resources because this item
should have been adequately covered by the operating-expense allowance of each
residence. Tan-chun was aware that closing the loophole in the budget was a necessary
step for cutting costs, but not a sufficient condition for achieving efficiency. She was also
concerned that waste might result from other dysfunctional operations. The accepted
practice of obtaining cosmetics through centralized purchasing was an example of this
sort of waste. Admittedly, this practice had been initiated with good intentions. Its sole
purpose was to avoid the necessity of sending out maids from each residence to buy
cosmetics whenever they were needed. Based on personal experience, however, Tan-chun
had reason to believe that the system was not ftinctioning as intended. In particular,
cosmetics obtained from centralized purchasing were of such poor quality that subsequent
replacements were often necessary. Accordingly, the practice was abolished. The abolition
signified the importance of taking corrective actions whenever an operation is not
functioning consistently with its original purpose.
Tan-chun 's inspiration for generating new miscellaneous revenues to contain costs came
directly from her personal observation, and from comparison of her own operational practices
with those of others. For instance, Steward Lai Ta's garden was known to have been
contracted out at a price of 200 taels of silver a year on the condition that his house be
adequately supplied with the resultant produce. Inspired by this practice, Tan-chun decided to
work out a similar plan for the Grand View Garden. Certain remote areas of the garden were
contracted to a few reliable elderly female servants.
Instead of charging the elderly women a normal rent, they were asked to provide the Jung
House with certain necessities. They were required to supply hair oil, rouge, powder, scent,
etc., for young mistresses and maids, brooms, dustpans, and dusters for cleaning, and food for
the poultry and pets. With these necessities being supplied either from produce of the garden
or bought with revenue from the project, the total savings in a year amounted to more than
400 taels of silver. Any remaining profit from the new project was to be kept by the elderly
women as reward for their hard work. The family was thus adequately supplied with what
they needed, without any additional expenditure of effort and resources.
2.2.6. Strategic planning and control
Strategic planning in an institution requires the simultaneous identification of goals and
feasible alternatives to achieve those goals. Evidence of strategic planning and control in A
Dream ofthe Red Mansions appears in Episode 13, when Hsi-feng is advised by the departing
ghost of Chia Chen's deceased daughter-in-law to plan for the family's future. In traditional
Chinese society, this was considered something similar to a "revelation" from God. The
advice was preceded by the following philosophical admonition: "Fortune follows calamity
as disgrace follows honor. This has been true from time immemorial. How can anyone
prevent it?"
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The advice for strategic planning and control was then laid out in specific operational
terms. First, the Jung and the Ning Houses should start setting aside some of the return from
their investment in farms near the family cemetery to secure a stable source of funds for the
future provision of education to the young and seasonal sacrifice to ancestors. Second, the
family school should be relocated to estates close to the family cemetery as a precautionary
measure, so that the facilities might be exempted from possible confiscation by the state.
Third, rotation of management should be implemented for the suggested investments. This
rotation of duties would make it difficult for anyone to conceal potential embezzlements or
illegitimate uses of the land for personal benefit.
Essentially, the advice was a family plan for soothing the pain of bankruptcy. This
observation is consistent with Hofstede's (1991) classification of Chinese culture as being
long-term-oriented. However, given the political environment of the early Qing Dynasty,
there were simply too many uncontrollable factors that obviated strategic planning and
control in family institutions whose future depended on the favor or disfavor of the Emperor.
3. The social and cultural environment
We noted earlier that accounting and management control systems inductively derived might
be conceptually falsifiable. It is therefore important that we address this issue to show that the
accounting and management controls thus observed are inexorably linked to cultural, social,
and accounting or management control values ofthe early Qing Dynasty. Our addressing ofthis
issue represents a concurrence with Littleton (1966), who viewed the development of
accounting as an evolutionary process in harmony with its surrounding environment.
The social culture of the early Qing Dynasty was not one of the truly indigenous cultures
of the world, and as such would offer many interesting points of comparison with Western
social culture. While the literature is replete with cultural models for making such
comparisons, we found the Hofstede model (Hofstede, 1980, 1984, 1991, 1998) and the
Gray model (Gray, 1988), remarkably befitting the purpose of this study.
Understanding Chinese culture is a prerequisite for understanding Chinese society and the
control system of the early Qing Dynasty. Hofstede's first "cultural dimension" — power
distance— is a culmination of cultural influences. According to Hofstede, power distance is
the extent to which members in a society, organization, or any other type of institution, accept
the unequal distribution of power. The existence of a greater level of acceptance is indicative
of a society with a larger power distance. Using this definition as a criterion for classification,
we would put Qing China under the list of societies with a very large power distance.
Under the early Qing Dynasty, Chinese society placed a great deal of emphasis on the
family system, from which all social characteristics were seen to derive (Lin, 1935, p. 175).
Within the context of the Confucian social philosophy, there was a direct link between family
organization and state effectiveness, as evidenced in the saying that "when the family is
orderly, then the state is peacefiil." Society was conceptually structured in a simple hierarchy,
with five cardinal relationships and one fundamentally important differentiation. The five
cardinal relationships were those between ruler and subject, father and children, husband and
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wife, between siblings, and between friends. The important differentiation related to the
relationship between superiority and inferiority. Social harmony was only achieved when
these six elements were individually balanced. The importance of social status is especially
noticeable as a result of the differentiation between constituents of society. Consistent with
the concept of control, social status gave every person a definite place or role in society. In
conformity with the humanistic idea of "everything in its place," the social ideal was also that
of "every man in his place" (Lin, 1935, p. 178). Simply stated, if constituents in society knew
their role and acted in accordance with their position, then social order was ensured.
The doctrine of social status cut through the idea of equality in a curious way. It is
important to see the interplay of power distance to understand accounting and management
controls of the early Qing Dynasty, as well as their social idiosyncrasies. For example,
understanding the social philosophy for the preservation of harmony leads to a further
understanding of why the tally was tossed each time a requisition was approved in A Dream
ofthe Red Mansions. The head of the family or his representative tossed the tally on the floor.
The steward or maid then knelt down, thanked their master, and collected the tally. In
essence, tossing helped emphasize the social distinctions at work in the control situation. It
symbolized obedience and the recognition of authority in the family, as well as the state. In
the best spirit of ConfLicianism, accepting a tossed tally was interpreted not as a form of
subjection, but as the indication of a harmonious relationship. However, when Hsi-feng
agreed to manage the funeral in the Ning House, the tally was passed onto her. Passing,
instead of tossing, signified another aspect of maintaining harmony: that is, the equality of
relationships between siblings.
The importance of the family system under Confucianism was not only reflected in its
vision of the family as the basis of the state (direct transition), but also in the number of
cardinal relationships pertaining to the family system. Of the five sets of relationships, three
concerned the family. Such emphasis on the family and on the preservation of social harmony
is really a negation of individualism. Put simply, this negation leads automatically to
collectivism, which has been defined by Hofstede (1980, 1984) as the existence of a
relatively higher degree of interdependence among individuals. A collective society is, in
essence, a communistic society. The Jung and Ning families very much captured the essence
of the communistic principle of "do what you can and take what you need." This unique
social feature was confirmed by the cohabitation of generations of family members and
servants in the same households. Mutual helpfulness developed to a very high degree. It was,
therefore, a part of common practice for management to focus on groups rather than
individuals. This is why Hsi-feng preferred to assign duties to groups of household servants
under her supervision during the mourning period before the Ning funeral.
3.1. Impact of social values on accounting and management control
The obsession with preserving harmony in society and within the family system eventually
led to rigid and uniform control at the expense of professionalism and flexibility. This
empirical development actually confirms the deductive reasoning of Gray (1988). According
to Gray's hypothesis, societies that tend to embrace collectivism, or accept a large power
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distance, are more likely to prefer statutory (centralized) control. They also prefer uniformity
to flexibility in the control of operations. The precise enumeration of duties and respons-
ibilities for simple supervisory tasks, the insistence on elaborate authorization for cash
disbursements and supply requisitions, the frequent reliance on past accounting records for
making decisions, and the intensive use of budgets in planning operations and containing
costs, are manifestations of the impact of these preferences in A Dream of the Red Mansions
.
Family institutions of the early Qing Dynasty in China undoubtedly recognized the
importance of accounting and management controls. This recognition was the basis for
several distinct achievements. It is fair to say that the accounting and management controls of
the early Qing Dynasty were as effective as modem control methods in certain aspects. These
include the segregation of duties, the control of cash and other transactions requiring proper
authorization, adequate accounting, independent verification of transactions, and the use of
budgets for planning and containing costs.
However, no refinement of language can conceal the fact that the system of control in big
family households of the early Qing Dynasty had several characteristic weaknesses. First,
elements that make democratic participatory management successful were conspicuously
absent. The system succeeded at best in controlling efficiency in the lower hierarchy of
operations, without necessary measures to control abuses by top management. Second, the
system was autocratic; punishment was immediate for nonperformance and noncompliance.
Fear in the workplace was rather widespread. In the spirit of Deming (1986), we suggest that
fear in the workplace is a barrier to pride in workmanship and ultimately to productivity. The
greatest source of fear within the Jung and Ning Houses was the evaluation of performance
on measures over which servants had little or no opportunity for appeal. Third, the
establishment of duties and responsibilities in most instances was not accompanied by
commensurate rewards. Hence, there was little incentive or reason for any servant to perform
higher than expectations. Whenever managers were too autocratic and rigid, the control
system deprived workers of initiative.
The greatest deficiency in the control of such family institutions and operations must be
reserved for the possibility of nepotism. Nepotism stemmed directly fi-om the differentiation
between superiority and inferiority, and also from communistic cooperation and mutual help
within management. Managers in big households were likely to give the best jobs to
members of their own family, and if there were not readily available jobs, then they could
create sinecures. This practice easily bred corruption and collusion, making it difficult to
effectively rotate duties or management at the top. Furthermore, there was no independent
evaluation of top management. This deficiency would have serious implications for many of
today's family businesses.
4. Implications and conclusions
There are redeeming values in many control systems, and even failures can offer lessons
for the future. In this respect, our study has important implications. First, it offers
considerable insight into the conditions and requirements that a successful control system
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should necessarily and sufficiently possess in a specific social and economic environment.
State-owned enterprises in China are said to be adopting Western methods to improve their
outdated systems of accounting and management control. Yet it is important to note that each
environment has its own unique cultural and social characteristics, and policy decisions
should be resolved according to those merits.
Finally, history should be studied for a better understanding of the present. The study of
past control systems is important for the improvement of our own systems. The major
concern of any control system should be efficient and effective operations. There is certainly
no such thing as the "one best way" or the "one best approach" to such ends.
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Appendix A. Biographical sketch of Tsao Hsueh-chin
Research on the exact identity of Tsao Hsueh-chin yielded few tangible results at first. A
breakthrough was made in 1917 when Hu Shih, leader of the Modem Chinese Renaissance
(also known as the May 4th Movement), succeeded in identifying Tsao as the grandson of
Tsao Yin. (The research materials covering this important breakthrough are available from
Hung Lou Meng: Research and Validations by Hu Shih et al. (1961), as included in the
Reference List.) According to the history of the Qing Dynasty, Tsao Yin was a versatile
scholar who had been a childhood playmate of Emperor Kang Hsi, the ruler of China from
1662 to 1722. Tsao Yin was also known to have served as Commissioner of the Chiangning
(Nanking) Textile Prefecture for 20 years from 1692 to 1712.
The Chiangning Textile Prefecture was an imperial enterprise with a workforce of
about 825 that was empowered to produce silk and other textile commodities for
consumption in the palace, as well as for international trade (Soong, 1999). As
Commissioner of the Prefecture, Tsao Yin supervised silk and textile production, and
unofficially gathered intelligence in the southern parts of the Qing Empire that still faced
racial, political, and military strife. This position of Commissioner, as well as his special
personal relationship with the Emperor, enabled Tsao Yin to shrink the Prefecture treasury
for semiofficial and private uses. Emperor Kang Hsi had made six inspection trips during
his reign to the South, and at least four of those territorial inspections (1699, 1703, 1705,
and 1707) were made during Tsao Yin's tenure as Commissioner. As it was customary
practice for the Prefecture to provide accommodation for the Emperor on those visits,
Tsao Yin seized the opportunity to construct a series of mansions with gardens to meet
the needs of the occasions. These mansions and gardens later became the dwelling place
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of the author, Tsao Hsueh-chin, who referred to them as the Grand View Garden in A
Dream of the Red Mansions.
Tsao Yin died in 1712. His grandson, Tsao Hsueh-chin, was bom in 1715, approximately 3
years after his father inherited the Commissioner's title, also as a special bestowal from the
Emperor. However, the Chiangning Textile Prefecture was audited in 1712 and found short of
263,000 taels of silver, for which Tsao's family was held accountable (Chao & Chen, 1975).
Acknowledging the contribution of his own lavishly catered visits to this debt. Emperor Kang
Hsi's lenient solution was to appoint the author's father as both Commissioner of Salt
Prefecture and Chiangning Prefecture, to expedite reparations. However, upon the death of
Emperor Kang Hsi in 1722, the Tsao family still owed the government 45,000 taels of silver.
The settlement date was later extended to 1728. When the due date expired without payment,
Emperor Yung Cheng ordered immediate confiscation of all the Tsao family properties.
Therefore, between 1715 and 1728, the author had about 14 years to enjoy the luxury and
honor of a large and powerful family, which he later spent 1 years of poverty recounting in
the manuscript of A Dream of the Red Mansions (Chao & Chen, 1975).
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Abstract
The results of a mailed survey designed to compare product-costing practices employed by
New Zealand (NZ) and United Kingdom (UK) manufacturing companies is reported. The study's
main findings are that, when company size is removed as an explanatory factor, there appear to be
few systematic differences in the product-costing practices of the two countries, although there is a
suggestion of marginally less sophisticated product-costing practices in NZ. Widespread use of
theoretically deficient costing practices in both countries adds to the growing evidence of a time
lag between the theory and practice of management accounting. © 2001 University of Illinois. All
rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The recent past has seen considerable criticism of management accounting practice
(Cooper, 1990; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987; Kaplan 1984, 1985, 1988, 1990). Critics' primary
concern is that management accounting has not responded to developments in the
technological and competitive environment, with the result that internal accounting informa-
tion is frequently inaccurate and misleading. Contemporaneously, many commentators
believe that a significant gap has developed between management accounting practices
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and the normative literature (Choudhury, 1986; Edwards & Emmanuel, 1990; Otley, 1985;
Scapens, 1985).
This critical commentary has sparked increased interest in the state of management
accounting practice. In the last few years, surveys of management accounting practice have
become fairly commonplace, e.g.. Bright, Davies, Downes, and Sweeting (1992) and Drury
and Tayles (1994) in the United Kingdom (UK); Cohen and Paquette (1991), Emore and Ness
(1991), Green and Amenkhienan (1992) in the United States; Joye and Blayney (1990) in
Australia; Yoshikawa, Innes, and Mitchell (1989) in Japan; Ask and Ax (1992) in Sweden.
Few research studies appraise international differences in product-costing practices (e.g.,
Blayney & Yokoyama, 1991; Kim & Song, 1990), however. Such an international compar-
ison provides the basis for gauging the relative sophistication of costing practices employed
in countries, thereby facilitating a consideration of whether the theory-practice time lag is
common across countries. Using a single survey instrument as the basis of data collection,
this paper compares UK and New Zealand (NZ) product-costing practices. The analysis has
been conducted primarily from a NZ perspective. The specific research aims are twofold:
(i) to gauge and analyse product-costing practices employed in NZ;
(ii) to compare such practices with those in the UK using a more rigorous research design
than that employed in prior work offering cross-country comparative comment.
While concerns over the state of management accounting practice may have provided the
impetus for the recent growth of empirical enquires into practice, a study concerned with NZ
product-costing practices appears to be particularly timely. In the recent past, there has been
considerable change in the NZ commercial and economic environment. Since 1984, the
government has treed prices, wages and interest rates, floated the exchange rate, progres-
sively removed tariffs and subsidies, deregulated the financial system, reduced income tax
rates, and encouraged overseas investment in NZ. Spicer, Bowman, Emmanuel, and Hunt
(1991) see these NZ developments as more radical than in any other industrialized country.
There is a widely held view that these changes have engendered a more competitive
commercial environment in NZ. One might expect this development to be manifested by
greater deployment of some of the more recently promoted, sophisticated approaches to
product costing such as activity-based costing (ABC).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of the
relevant literature. This is followed by Sections 3 and 4 that describe the research design and
the survey's findings. Section 5 comments on the study's most significant findings.
2. Literary context of study
It is widely acknowledged that product costing is necessary for financial accounting
purposes (to determine cost of goods sold and inventory), and for management accounting
purposes such as informing pricing decisions (Govindarajan & Anthony, 1983; Mills, 1988),
as well as decisions that derive from judgments of product profitability (Brignall, Fitzgerald,
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Johnston, & Silvestro, 1991). The importance of product-costing accuracy can be considered
in the hght of these different roles. As Cooper and Kaplan (1991) note, for financial reporting
purposes, all that is required of a costing system is that it achieves a reasonably accurate
allocation of total costs between total inventory and cost of goods sold. Achievement of this
objective, which relates to the accurate allocation of costs across time periods, does not,
however, signify the achievement of an accurate allocation of costs across products. The
objective of accurately allocating costs to products lies behind much of the management
accountant's costing endeavors. An inaccurate allocation of costs between products can result
in inappropriate pricing decisions, management ceasing production of a profitable product
line, and failing to recognize unprofitable product lines. With growing levels of competition,
the commercial costs of such shortcomings in managerial judgment can be expected to
become increasingly unforgiving. As a consequence, there would appear to be a growing
need for product-costing accuracy.
The achievement of product-costing accuracy is, however, becoming increasingly
difficult. The technology of production has evolved rapidly and in a manner that carries
significant implications for product-costing methods. Technological developments have
resulted in machine capital constituting an increasing proportion of total cost and direct
labor constituting a declining proportion of total cost. This development signifies that
overheads constitute an increasing proportion of total cost (Cooper & Kaplan, 1991). As a
consequence of the declining significance of processing costs (especially labor) in the
overall cost structure, using volume-related processing costs such as labor as the basis for
allocating overhead costs is becoming increasingly inappropriate. Exacerbating this over-
head-allocation problem is the increasing range of products to which the overhead cost is to
be allocated. Stimulated by the increased competition referred to above, manufacturers are
producing increasing numbers of product lines with a growing number of product features
(Johnson & Kaplan, 1987).
It would thus appear that, at a time of increasing demands for product-costing accuracy,
the pursuit of product-costing accuracy is becoming more, rather than less, challenging.
This new context for product costing in the manufacturing industry can be contrasted to
former times when there appears to have been a strong tendency for internal accounting
systems to adopt rather than adapt financial accounting standards imposed on the external
reporting process (Cooper, 1990; Johnson & Kaplan, 1987). The significant literature
promoting the application of ABC can be seen to have arisen as a resuh of this changed
manufacturing environment.
The recent expansion of interest in surveys of management accounting practice referred to
above should be placed in the context of our knowledge of management accounting practice
at the end of the 1980s. It was at this time that Anthony (1989) claimed that our knowledge of
management accounting practices used is "abysmally poor." He criticized the extent to which
unsupported claims such as "direct labor based overhead allocation is used by most
companies" are made. Given the recent interest in this area of academic enquiry, it can no
longer be said that our knowledge is "abysmally poor." In fact, we now have strong empirical
evidence that in countries surveyed, direct labor is the predominant method for allocating
overheads to products (Cohen & Paquette, 1991; Emore & Ness, 1991).
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3. Survey design and sample
Drury and Tayles (1995) have attempted to comment on the findings of surveys of
management accounting practice across countries. Other cross-country comparisons of
management accounting practices can be found in widely used textbooks (e.g., Homgren,
Foster, & Datar, 2000). Such comparisons are bound to suffer from several shortcomings,
however. First, different survey instruments have been used in the surveys. It is to be expected
that different product-costing issues have been addressed in the survey instruments and that
there would be differences in the way that product-costing terminology is used. Second, even
if the same product-costing issues were appraised, it would be a phenomenal coincidence if
the constructs appraised were measured using the same measurement scales (e.g., Likert
scales). The construction of such measurement scales necessitates the exercise of considerable
subjective judgment and choice with respect to wording. Third, samples of companies
surveyed across countries can be expected to differ with respect to size and type of company
surveyed. Fourth, response rates vary across surveys giving rise to the potential of varying
degrees of nonresponse in the data considered for each country. These shortcomings signify
that limited inferences can be drawn when conducting such cross-country comparisons.
This study addresses these shortcomings by:
(i) using the same survey instrument,
(ii) comparing NZ and UK companies matched by size,
(iii) minimizing the potential of nonresponse bias.
As the UK companies sampled tended to be larger than the NZ companies, the comparison
of product costing in the two countries has been conducted at two levels:
(a) large UK manufacturers and large NZ manufacturers,
(b) a subsample of those companies drawn from both countries satisfying a particular
size criterion.
The UK was adopted as the country against which to benchmark for two reasons. First, the
broadly similar professional and academic accounting training in the two countries would
suggest that the UK provides a reasonable basis for comparison. Second and more pragmat-
ically, here was an opportunity to extend an established survey instrument and database,
hitherto used exclusively in an appraisal of UK management accounting, to NZ. Drury,
Braund, Osborne, and Tayles (1993) received a research grant from the Chartered Association
of Certified Accountants to develop and administer a survey concerned with management
accounting practices in the UK. The extensive nature of the survey instrument and the quality
of the data collected in the UK provided an excellent opportunity for benchmarking NZ
management accounting practices to those employed in an overseas country.
Considerable care has been taken to replicate, as far as possible, the administrafion
procedures employed by Drury et al. (1993). Drury et al. developed an inifial sampling frame
comprising all companies identified in a CD-ROM database as having substantial manufac-
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Table 1
Summary of survey replies
Questionnaires mailed Responses Unadjusted response rate (%)
NZ 268
UK 1269
85
303
32
24
The subsample of companies matched on a size criterion comprises 48 NZ companies and 47 UK companies.
turing, producing, or processing activities and also a 5-year average sales turnover exceeding
£10 million. This sampling frame was then refined to include operating divisions and plants
with distinct activities and where the divisional accountant was a qualified member of one of
the main accounting bodies. This refined sampling process resulted in the identification of
1269 accountants, of whom 303 responded to the questionnaires mailed (an unadjusted
response rate of 24%). The 303 respondents represent 260 separate companies, i.e., 35% of
sampled companies.
The initial sample irame for theNZ sample comprises the top 500 manufacturing companies
identified by the New Zealand Manufacturer's Association. Following Drury et al.'s lead, the
criterion that all respondents hold a professional accounting designation was adopted. Two
hundred and sixty-eight accountants holding a senior position at the divisional or plant level
were mailed questionnaires, and only responses from qualified accountants were used in the
analysis (of the 85 completed questionnaires returned, 65 were completed by qualified
accountants). As part of an effort to secure a high response rate, the chief accountant of each
company was initially contacted by telephone in order to obtain a commitment to participate in
the study and also to verify mailing details. Data were collected in late 1995 and early 1996.
Table 1 summarizes the survey reply pattem in the two countries. In addition to the NZ
respondents recorded in Table 1 , nine further members of the sample responded indicating
that they were unwilling to participate in the study. None of the quoted reasons for
nonparticipation gave rise to a concern for nonresponse bias. As an indication of the sincerity
with which respondents treated the survey, 43% of the UK respondents and 35% of the NZ
Table 2
Industrial classification of respondents
NZ (%) UK (%)
Chemicals and plastics 21 26
Engineering/industrial 20 27
Textiles 18 4
Food 13 9
Building 12 6
Paper and packaging 10 5
Electrical 3 15
Motor vehicles 3 6
Tobacco 1
Oil and gas j_
100 100
n 61 303
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respondents indicated a willingness to meet with the research team to discuss issues raised in
the questionnaire.
Table 2 provides a breakdown of industrial groups represented in the two samples. A
degree of commonality exists across the two countries as chemicals/plastics and engineering/
industrial constitute the two largest industrial groupings in both samples. Differences in the
industrial nature of the two samples are also evident, however, as, for example, textile
companies comprise 1 8% of the NZ sample but only 4% of the UK sample, and electrical
companies comprise 3% of the NZ sample and 15% of the UK sample. These differences
should be borne in mind when interpreting the results of the study.
4. Survey results
As noted above, a two-tiered analysis of data collected has been made. The first level is
based on the entire data set collected in the two countries, and the second is limited to
companies of a similar size. Previous work (e.g., Drury & Tayles, 1994), provides a strong
suggestion that company size is positively related to greater product-costing sophistication.
As the bulk of the UK firms are larger than NZ firms, one would anticipate that a raw cross-
country comparison that fails to take into account company-size differences would result in
the potentially misleading finding of greater product-costing sophistication in the UK.
Size has been measured in terms of annual sales revenue. As the majority (80%) of the NZ
sample comprise companies or business units with an annual sales turnover less than NZ$75
million, this level of sales (£30 million') has been used as the qualifying upper threshold for
inclusion in the matched subsamples. In addition, a minimum annual sales criterion has been
employed. Four of the companies/business units sampled from NZ manufacturers had annual
sales levels below the smallest sales level of companies/business units sampled from the UK
manufacturers. These four companies/business units have not been included in the matched
subsamples. Following these matching criteria, cross-country analysis of the subgroups
matched by size is based on 48 observations drawn from NZ and 47 drawn from the UK.
Two types of statistical test have been employed when comparing across the two countries.
Chi-square tests have been used to analyse differences for those questions that called for the
provision of categorically defined data, and the Mann-Whitney U statistic has been
computed for data provided in connection with questions requiring a response on a five-
point ordinal-text scale. In addifion, the Wilcoxon matched pairs test has been used to
highlight significantly different, within-country, levels of usage of particular costing acfiv-
ities. This within-country test has been only conducted at the entire sample levels, as the
matched subsampling has been conducted for the sole purpose of facilitating improved cross-
country comparative analyses.
The results of the investigadons conducted are presented under the following seven
headings: (1) cost information used for decision-making, (2) plant-wide overhead rates, (3)
' The exchange rate at the time of the study approximated to NZ$2.5 to £1
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Table 3
Costs used for decision-making purposes (e.g., product mix/make-or-buy decisions)
Country Cases Mean S.D. Mann -Whitney U
Panel A: Entire sample
Variable/incremental manufacturing cost NZ 52 2.84 1.243 4780"
UK 275 3.55^^ 1.077
Total manufacturing cost as used for stock valuation NZ 54 3.85^ 1.053 5303**
UK 275 3.22 1.245
Total variable/incremental cost NZ 49 2.40 1.153 4951
(including nonmanufacturing variable costs)
Total cost (including fixed nonmanufacturing costs) NZ 52 2.92 1.453 6812
UK 268 2.94 1.207
UK 273 2.81 1.214
NZ 40 2.70 1.244
UK 42 3.35 1.265
NZ 42 3.73 1.106
UK 45 3.35 1.246
NZ 39 2.38 1.184
UK 42 2.21 1.240
NZ 41 2.90 1.446
UK 42 2.59 1.380
Panel B: Matched samples
Variable/incremental manufacturing cost 604''
Total manufacturing cost as used for stock valuation 78
Total variable/incremental cost 751.5
(including nonmanufacturing variable costs)
Total cost (including fixed normianufacturing costs) 759
** Difference between UK and NZ significant at 5% level.
^ Total manufacturing cost used statistically significantly more than any other cost classification in NZ
(Wilcoxon matched pairs: P<.01).
'
' Variable/incremental manufacturing cost used statistically significantly more than any other cost
classification in the UK (Wilcoxon matched pairs: P<.01).
use of direct labor as basis for overhead recovery, (4) treatment of service/support department
costs, (5) treatment of nonmanufacturing costs, (6) volume base used in determining the
allocation rate for fixed overheads, and (7) ABC.
4.1. Cost information usedfor decision-making
Table 3 provides an overview of findings concerning the degree to which four distinct cost
classifications are used for decision-making purposes (e.g., product mix/make-or-buy
decisions). Table 4 can be seen to complement Table 3, as it presents a summary of findings
concerned with the extent to which the same four cost classifications are used for pricing
decisions. For each of the four cost classifications, respondents indicated their degree of
usage on a five-point scale where never, rarely, sometimes, often, and always corresponded to
1-5, respectively."
All questionnaire items referred to in this study are presented as an Appendix in Drury and Tayles (1994).
336 D. Lamminmaki, C. Druiy / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 329-347
Table 4
Product costs used for pricing decisions
Country Cases Mean S.D. Mann-Whitney U
Panel A: Entire sample
Variable manufacturing cost NZ 47 2.95 1.459 4867"
UK 244 3.32 1.323
Total manufacturing cost as used for stock valuation NZ 54 3.88^ 1.269 5284
UK 245 3.42 1.384
Total variable cost (including nonmanufacturing NZ 46 2.41 1.203 4407''
variable costs)
Total cost (including fixed nonmanufacturing costs) NZ 50 3.32 1.504 6029
UK 232 2.80 1.313
UK 253 3.19 1.486
NZ 36 2.86 1.477
UK 42 3.00 1.379
NZ 43 3.88 1.366
UK 40 3.62 1.427
NZ 37 2.43 1.281
UK 39 2.20 1.218
NZ 41 3.34 1.559
UK 42 3.04 1.710
Panel B: Matched samples
Variable manufacturing cost 706
Total manufacturing cost as used for stock valuation 761
Total variable cost (including nonmanufacturing 649
variable costs)
Total cost (including fixed nonmanufacturing costs) 775
** Difference between UK and NZ significant at 5% level.
*** Difference between UK and NZ significant at 10% level.
^ Total manufacturing cost used statistically significantly more than variable manufacturing cost in NZ
(Wilcoxon matched pairs: P<.01).
In light of the widely held view that fixed costs should be treated as irrelevant to short-term
decision-making and that variable costing should be used,^ it is noteworthy that in NZ total
manufacturing cost is the most extensively used cost information for decision-making
(Wilcoxon matched pairs; P<.01), and it is used more extensively than in the UK
(P<.05). In the UK, the most extensively used costing classification for decision-making
purposes is variable/incremental manufacturing cost (Wilcoxon matched pairs; P<.0\), and
this is used significantly more than in NZ (P<.05). In addition, variable/incremental cost
(including nonmanufacturing variable costs) is used significantly more in the UK {P<.05).
The significance of these cross-country differences should be tempered, however, by the fact
that when the countries are compared at the matched-samples level, the only significant
difference concerns greater use of variable/incremental manufacturing cost for decision-
making in the UK.
^ A widely held tenet of the normative literature concerns the view that cost data relevant to decisions made in
a short-term context should exclude fixed costs, which are assumed to remain constant whatever the decision
outcome, and that variable (or incremental) costs represent the most appropriate cost information for short-run
decision making (e.g., Barfield et al., 1997, pp. 530-532).
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A similar picture emerges with respect to cost information used for pricing purposes (see
Table 4). In NZ, total manufacturing cost is used significantly more than variable costing for
pricing purposes (Wilcoxon matched pairs; P<.01). Total manufacturing cost is also used
significantly more and variable costing used significantly less for pricing purposes in NZ
compared to the UK. No significant cross-country differences appear, however, when the two
matched samples are compared. For this reason, it would be inappropriate to suggest a
systematic difference between the UK and NZ with respect to costing for pricing decisions, as
the differences noted in Panel A of Table 4 appear to be partially attributable to the
differences in average company size across the two countries.
4.2. Plant-wide overhead rates
Data were collected to determine the proportion of companies using:
• one plant-wide overhead rate,
• separate overhead rates for each department in the plant,
• separate overhead rates for each work center within a department.
While product costs derived from single plant-wide rates might be acceptable for valuing
stock, they can be deficient if the product cost information is used for decision-making
(Cooper & Kaplan, 1991; Drury & Tayles, 1995).
Table 5 presents the distribution of data with respect to the number of separate cost-center
overhead absorption rates employed in the typical manufacturing plant. More than 50% ofNZ
companies surveyed employ only one plant-wide overhead absorption rate. This is signific-
antly higher than the proportion of UK companies using one overhead absorption rate
(P< .01) and can be viewed as of concern if these NZ companies have multiple products that
pass through different production centers, and the products consume overhead resources in
differing proportions (see Barfield, Raibom, & Kinney, 1997, p. 165). For the matched
Table 5
Number of separate cost-center overhead absorption rates employed in typical manufacturing plant
One overhead rate (%)
Entire sample
NZ(/? = 62) 52*
UK(« = 279) 28
Matched samples
NZ(« = 48) 46
UK(/2 = 40) 32
Separate rate for each Separate rate for each center
department (%) within a department (%)
21 27***
32 40
23** 31
45 23
* Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.01).
** Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.05).
*** Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.\).
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samples, significantly more UK manufacturers use a separate absorption rate for each
department (P<.05).
Further analysis was conducted to ascertain the extent to which multiproduct companies
use a single plant rate and the extent to which these companies use the cost information for
decision-making (e.g., product mix/make-or-buy decisions) or for pricing. The questiormaire
called for the respondent to indicate the number of separate product ranges produced in their
company's typical manufacturing plant. In the analysis conducted below, a company has been
classified as "multiproduct" if its typical manufacturing plant produces more that one
product range.
It has been found that 48% ofNZ multiproduct companies employ a single plant-wide rate
(the equivalent figure for the UK sample is 26%; for the subsamples controlled for company
size, the figures are 42% and 32%, respectively). Of the NZ multiproduct companies
employing a single plant-wide rate, 85%) use total manufacturing costs in product mix and
make-or-buy decisions and 80% for pricing. In the UK, 52%) of multiple product companies
that use a single plant-wide rate use total manufacturing costs in decision-making and pricing.
The problem of potential inaccurate overhead cost allocations arising due to the use of a
single plant-wide rate would be mitigated if manufacturing overhead costs constituted a small
percentage of total costs. Further analysis has revealed, however, that of this multiproduct
subset of companies, 45% of the NZ sample and 59% of the UK sample have manufacturing
overhead costs that constitute 20% or more of total manufacturing costs.
4.3. Use of direct labor as basis for overhead recovery
It is widely acknowledged that more accurate product costing can result from using more
than one overhead allocation basis in a manner that allocates each category of overhead on the
basis of the primary factor that drives the particular overhead cost (e.g., see Homgren et al.,
2000, p. 117; Raybum, 1993, p. 105). For example, direct labor might be used to allocate those
overhead costs that arise due to the presence of labor (e.g., training), and machine hours might
be used to allocate those costs arising due to the presence of machinery (e.g., machine
depreciation). As Homgren et al. (2000, p. 117) point out, using more than one basis to allocate
overheads is justifiable so long as the benefits derived from increased costing accuracy exceed
the increased costs associated with maintaining a more complex costing system.
As a result of the growing capital intensity of production and the relative decline in labor
costs, there has been increased criticism of the use of direct labor (rather than other bases such
as machine hours) as the basis for overhead recovery. Drury (1992) explains this view in the
following way:
In machine-paced manufacturing environments such as automated plants, output is
determined by machines, and workers are, in effect, machine tenders and the speed of
production is determined by computer specialists and industrial engineers. . . If the direct
labour content is low then overheads bear little relationship to direct labour hours, and the
direct labour hour method of recovering overheads is inappropriate. Instead, overheads
should be recovered on the basis of machine processing time, with a separate machine hour
rate established for each machine or group of machines, (p. 85)
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Table 6
Breakdown of total manufacturing cost
Entire sample (%) Matched samples (%)
NZ UK NZ UK
Direct material 60 61 62 63
Direct labor 19 16 17 12
Manufacturing overhead 21 23 21 25
100 100 100 100
No statistically significant cross-country differences noted in this table.
Table 6 highlights the significance of direct labor cost relative to direct material and
manufacturing overhead. From this table, it can be seen that for both countries, direct labor
constitutes a smaller proportion of total manufacturing cost compared to direct materials and
manufacturing overhead. Following Drury 's (1992) rationale cited above, it might be
expected that this low significance of direct labor would result in the sample attaching
relatively low importance to direct labor as a basis for overhead allocation. From Table 7, it is
apparent that direct labor continues to be used extensively as a basis for overhead allocation,
however. In both countries, labor is used significantly more than any other basis for allocating
manufacturing overhead (P< .01). It should be noted that these findings do not appear to be
peculiar to NZ or the UK. Two independently conducted studies in the United States, Cohen
and Paquette (1991) and Emore and Ness (1991) found a similar high degree of direct labor-
based overhead allocation.
Table 7 is segregated into two panels. The first reports the overhead bases employed in
automated production activities and the second relates to nonautomated production activities.
From the first panel, it is evident that direct labor is used as a basis for overhead allocation by
around 80% of the responding companies. With respect to nonautomated production
activities, the percentage of NZ companies using direct labor is significantly less than for
UK companies at the entire sample level of analysis (P<.05).'^ The matched samples cross-
country comparison of overhead bases used in both the automated and nonautomated
production environments reveals no statistically significant differences.
4.4. Treatment ofservice/support department costs
The traditional method for allocating service/support department costs that is generally
espoused in the normative literature involves allocating costs first to production departments
(based on usage) and then to products, using an appropriate cost driver that reflects how
products consume these service/support resources. This approach signifies that in many
situations service/support department costs will be merged with manufacturing overheads and
"^ The percentage of NZ companies using direct labor as a basis for overhead allocation appears lower for
nonautomated production activities compared to automated activities. This observation is surprising as it is to be
expected that direct labor will constitute a more significant cost driver in a nonautomated facility compared to an
automated facility.
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Table 7
Types of manufacturing overhead rates used
Entire sample (%)
NZ UK
Matched samples (%)
NZ UK
Panel A: Automated production activities
Direct labor 84^
Materials consumed 44
Machine hours 53
Units of output 47
ABC 10
78^
40
60
55
.
15
79
41
53
45
11
81
40
50
48
5
Panel B: Nonautomated production activities
Direct labor 68 ** ^
Materials consumed 27
Machine hours 30
Units of output 32
ABC 11
83^
41
38
44
11
64
27
33
33
12
76
25
25
40
5
** Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.05).
^ Used statistically significantly more than any other overhead rates (chi-square; P<.01); test conducted at
entire sample level only.
allocated on a volume basis such as labor hours or machine hours (see Table 7). Arising out of
a concern that in many cases service department costs may be unrelated to direct labor or
machine hours, Drury (1989) and Shank and Govindarajan (1988) argue that more accurate
product costing may be achieved if an independent support department rate based on the
factor that gives rise to the support department cost is employed.
Respondents were asked what method of service department cost allocation was used in
their companies. Table 8 summarizes responses to this question.
The two most popular service cost allocation methods used by NZ manufacturers are: (1)
the two-stage process of allocating first to departments and then charging to products using
departmental rates and (2) use of a single plant-wide rate. Only 9% ofNZ manufacturers are
Table 8
Allocation of service/support department costs (e.g., material handling) to products
Allocated to production departments then charged to
products using departmental overhead rates
Costs of some service/support departments are charged to
products using a separate overhead rate
Charged to products within a single plant-wide rate
Other
* Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.01).
** Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; f <.05).
Entire sample Matched
NZ
samples
NZ UK UK
45% 45% 51% 49%
9%** 21% 9% 9%
46% * 27% 40% 37%
0% 7% 0% 5%
55 290 43 43
D. Lamminmaki. C. Dfury / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 329-347 341
using what Drury (1989) and Shank and Govindarajan (1988) see to be the preferred method
of service department cost allocation and this is significantly less than the 21% of UK
manufacturers using this method (P<.05). This apparent difference appears to be more
related to company size, however, than any systematic difference between the two countries.
When the two countries are compared based on the matched subsamples, one is struck more
by the similarity rather than the differences of the findings.
4.5. Treatment of nonmanufacturing costs
Actual practices adopted with respect to the allocation of nonmanufacturing costs to
products have received little attention in the literature. This might be because financial
accounting standards prohibit the allocation of nonmanufacturing costs to products and also
because they are irrelevant to many decision-making scenarios. Such costs are relevant to
pricing- and product-mix decisions, however (Drury, 1992). The recent literature concemed
with ABC has shown how improved product-costing accuracy can be attained through careful
identification of nonmanufacturing overhead cost drivers (e.g., Cooper & Kaplan, 1992).
Table 9 reports the bases used in the allocation of nonmanufacturing costs to products.
More than a fifth of the companies in both countries do not attempt an allocation of
nonmanufacturing costs to products (28% in NZ, 23%) in UK). There appears to be a greater
tendency not to allocate nonmanufacturing costs in NZ than in the UK (for the samples
matched by size, the proportion of NZ nonallocators is significantly greater than the
proportion of UK nonallocators; P<.\). The approach of not allocating costs where a
significant degree of subjectivity would be called for in the allocation process is supported by
Piperand Walley (1991).
Of those companies allocating nonmanufacturing costs to products, direct labor hours and
manufacturing cost are the two most popular approaches in both countries. Both these
approaches are subject to the criticism of being pure volume measures that may not capture
the underlying factor that drives the nonmanufacturing costs. It is unlikely that a convincing
rationale can be developed for allocating nonmanufacturing costs on these bases, and we are
left to conclude that no allocation is preferable to an arbitrarily conducted allocation exercise.
The fact that no NZ respondents indicated "other" for this question signifies that the ABC
Table 9
Methods used to allocate nonmanufacturing costs to products
Entire sample Matched
NZ
samples
NZ UK UK
Manufacturing cost 26% 32% 28% 34%
Direct labor hours 38% 25% 35% 37%
Total selling price 8% 13% 7% 7%
Not allocated 28% 23% 30%*** 15%
Other 0% 7% 0% 7%
n 50 249 40 41
Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.1).
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philosophy has yet to make an impact on the allocation of nonmanufacturing overheads
inNZ.
4.6. Volume base used in determining the allocation rate for fixed overheads
To facilitate the allocation of fixed overhead costs to products during an accounting period,
in addition to identifying the cost driver to be used as the basis for the allocation, the
estimated volume of that cost driver must also be determined in order to facilitate calculation
of the overhead allocation rate. In traditional systems, the volume of the cost-driver figure
used in calculation of the overhead allocation rate is the expected or budgeted level of activity
(Cooper & Kaplan, 1991). Where budgeted volume changes fi'om year to year, however,
budgeted volume can lead to volatile fixed overhead unit costs. A more appropriate base is
maximum practical annual capacity as this leads to consistent unit fixed overhead costs period
to period, and also highlights to management the cost of unused capacity (this can, however,
lead to undercosting, if full capacity is never achieved). Another preferred method is
estimated long-run activity. This second method also achieves consistent unit fixed overhead
costs and highlights some excess capacity. For a fuller discussion of these alternative
approaches, refer to Cooper and Kaplan (1992).
Table 1 presents the results of a question that asked respondents to indicate the basis for
calculating the denominator that is used in determining the fixed overhead allocation rate.
Only 2% ofNZ companies and 6% of the UK companies used maximum practical capacity as
the basis for volume in the denominator. Estimated long-run activity was used by a few more
of the sampled manufacturers, but still percentages are less than 15% (13% in NZ, 1 1% in the
UK). The most widely used method is budgeted annual activity (60% in NZ, 66% in the UK).
As noted above, this method can potentially result in misleading product costs. Actual
activity, however, the least preferred of the four approaches to denominator determination,
ranks second in terms of level of usage in both countries. The actual activity volume
denominator has been criticized on the grounds that costs derived can be even more volatile
and misleading than those derived when a budgeted volume rate is employed in the
denominator (Cooper & Kaplan, 1991).
Table 10
Denominator used in calculating fixed overhead allocation rate
Entire sample Matched
NZ
samples
NZ UK UK
Maximum practical capacity 2% 6% 3% 3%
Estimated long-run activity 13% 11% 10% 6%
Budgeted annual activity 60% 66% 66% 71%
Actual activity 25%**; * 13% 21% 11%
Other 0% 4% 0% 9%
n 52 258 48 35
Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.1).
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An overriding concern arising from this phase of the analysis is the fact that a large
percentage of companies in NZ and the UK (85% and 79%, respectively) are using
denominator bases that carry the potential to negatively impact on product-costing accuracy
(i.e., actual or budgeted activity levels).
4. 7. Activity-based costing
There are several key differences between traditional costing approaches and ABC. ABC
focuses on the allocation of costs to products in accordance with the activities attributable to
each product. Traditional costing allocates costs to departments and then to products, rather
than focusing on activities that consume costs. Traditional overhead allocation techniques
are based on volume-related cost drivers, whereas ABC extends the number of allocation
bases to include nonvolume drivers. As noted earlier, increased product variety and the
deployment of technologies that have resulted in a growth of overhead costs that are
unrelated to volume have increased the potential of traditional costing methods generating
misleading information.
The questionnaire asked respondents to indicate which of five statements reflected the
status of ABC in their companies. Results emanating from this question are presented in
Table 1 1 . At the time of the survey, just less than 60% of the NZ companies had held
discussions concerned with introducing ABC. Thirty-two percent had not progressed beyond
considering whether or not to use the method and only 17% indicated having either
introduced or an intention to introduce ABC.
At the matched samples level of analysis, it appears that NZ is more advanced in terms of
consideration and implementation of ABC. A greater proportion ofUK firms in the matched
sample have held no discussions on introducing ABC {P<.\). In addition, 17% of the NZ
matched sample intend to use, or have used ABC, as opposed to just 2% of the UK matched
sample. It is also noteworthy that a size effect appears to be in evidence. Only 44% of the full
sample ofUK firms have held no discussions on introducing ABC, compared with 63% of the
matched sample (i.e., smaller) UK firms. This finding is consistent with previous research
suggesting more sophisticated approaches to management accounting in larger firms (Bruns
& Waterhouse, 1975; Drury & Tayles, 1994; Merchant, 1981).
Table 11
Activity-based costing usage
Entire sample Matched sample
NZNZ UK UK
No discussions on introducing ABC 41% 44% 44%*** 63%
Decided not to introduce ABC 10% 5% 9% 7%
Considering ABC 32% 38% 30% 28%
Intending to use ABC 12% 9% 15%*** 2%
ABC introduced 5% 4% 2% 0%
n 61 289 46 46
Statistically significant cross-country difference (chi-square; P<.\).
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5. Conclusion
This paper has presented the results of a comparison of product-costing practices employed
by NZ manufacturers with those employed by UK manufacturers. Many of the shortcomings
that tend to undermine earlier cross-country comparative commentaries on management
accounting practices have been overcome by using the same survey instrument in both
countries and controlling for firm-size differences.
This study highlights the inappropriateness of drawing cross-country comparisons of
survey data while failing to control for company size. From the data provided above, it is
apparent that many of the cross-country differences appearing at the unmatched samples level
of analysis disappear when the two samples are matched by size. From this observation, we
conclude that inferences drawn from comparing cross-company data that fail to control for
company size are overly simplistic and potentially highly misleading.^
When a holistic view is taken of the two matched samples, one is struck more by the
degree of similarity rather than difference between the two countries' product-costing
practices. While more differences are evident when the unmatched sample sets are
considered, the only significant differences appearing when the matched subsamples are
compared are as follows:
• Variable costing is used significantly more in the UK than in NZ for decision-making.
• NZ manufacturers have a lower tendency to employ separate overhead absorption rates
across the typical manufacturing plant.
• NZ manufacturers have a greater tendency not to allocate nonmanufacturing costs
to products.
• NZ manufacturers appear to be more advanced in terms ofABC as a greater proportion
of manufacturers have held discussions on ABC and a greater proportion indicated an
intention to use ABC.
^ As already noted, the desire to control for organization size stemmed from the view that some of the
international differences in management accounting noted in earlier comparative works may be partially accounted
for by differences in the average size of organizations sampled from the countries under study. An enduring
finding of management accounting research indicates that larger firms use more sophisticated management
accounting practices (Bruns & Waterhouse, 1975; Drury & Tayles, 1994; Merchant, 1981). As many cross-country
differences apparent in the data reported herein disappear when the cross-country comparison is restricted to
similarly sized companies, it appears that some of the cross-country differences are due to a size effect rather than
some other systematic cross-country effect that is unrelated to company size. From this discussion, it should be
evident that the desire to control for size should not be construed as an inference that size can capture cross-
country cultural difference, however. The degree of similarity in NZ and UK product costing apparent from this
study suggests that when size is controlled for, management accounting practices applied in Western economies
may be more homogeneous than hitherto appreciated. In any subsequent international research designed to pursue
this question further, it is important that organization size be controlled for in order that a distinction can be made
between a simple cross-country size effect and a more profound cross-country effect arising from factors other
than company size.
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NZ's greater use of total costs in decision-making and the widespread use of a single plant-
wide rate for overhead recovery suggest a lower level of product-costing sophistication
compared to the UK. We are left to conclude that while the product-costing practices of the
two countries are largely similar, there is a suggestion of marginally greater product-costing
sophistication in the UK.
While it might be the case that there appears to be little systematic difference between
costing practices in the two countries, we should nevertheless recognize the preponder-
ance of potentially dysfunctional product-costing practices uncovered by this study.
These include:
• High use of a single, plant-wide, overhead recovery rate;
• High use of total product costs for decision-making (whether this is a desirable product-
costing practice depends on the time context of the decision to be made);
• High use of direct labor as a basis for overhead allocation;
• High use of arbitrary methods to allocate nonmanufacturing costs to products;
• High use of budgeted annual activity or actual activity as methods for calculating
overhead allocation rates.
In connection with the finding that more than half the surveyed NZ companies
employ only one plant-wide overhead rate, additional analysis was conducted in order to
gain further appreciation of the potential for any resultant adverse managerial implica-
tions. Use of a single plant-wide overhead allocation rate will not lead to potentially
misleading product cost information if a company produces one product or multiple
products are produced using similar resources. That around half (48%) of NZ's multi-
product manufacturers use a single plant-wide rate and that all of these companies use
product costs that include overhead absorbed for decision-making and pricing is reason
for some concern.
Another particularly noteworthy finding is NZ manufacturing's continuing reliance on
direct labor as the primary basis for overhead allocation. For both automated and
nonautomated manufacturers, direct labor has been found to be the most popular
allocation basis. This represents further evidence of an apparent reluctance among
Western world manufacturers to abandon costing practices that were more appropriate
in former times.
This study provides further support to the growing evidence of a continuing lag between
management accounting theory and practice. The strength of this evidence might now
signify that a fruitfial line of enquiry could result from moving the research agenda beyond
"What practices are employed?" to focus on the question of "Why are product-costing
practices lagging behind?" To pursue such a research question will necessitate a move away
from the survey method and the deployment of more qualitative research methods involving
the researcher in case studies, interviewing key players such as senior management and
accounting systems designers. Of particular interest is the pursuit of questions such as
"Why are firms continuing to use overhead allocation bases such as direct labor, rather than
ABC approaches?"
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Abstract
Transnational corporations (TNCs) regard transfer pricing as the most important tax issue confronting
them in the immediate fUture. Coupled with the increase in the number and type of cross-border transfers
of intangible property, concems arise about the adequacy of current transfer pricing regulations, and the
harmony, or lack thereof, ofsuch regulations when a TNG must address both host- and home-country tax
authorities. This study of TNCs domiciled in Canada, Germany, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the
United States (US) reveals a similarity in corporation approaches to valuing intangible property that
transcends national borders. This is in stark contrast to current practices regarding the transfer oftangible
goods, which vary by country, rather than by industry or nature of the transferred good. However, in
many cases, this agreement is reached because TNCs are using transfer pricing methods for intangible
transfers that do not follow the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and/
or US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) guidelines. © 2001 University of lUmois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
Transfer pricing remains a key international issue for multinational organisations and will be
the key issue facing them over the next two years. (Ernst & Young, 1999, p. 4)
The transfer of intangible assets is viewed in some analyses as providing more positive
impacts on a host's economy than capital transfers. (Govemment of Canada, 1996)
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The taxation of income from intangibles is perhaps the most important large case issue in the
intercompany transfer pricing world today ... In the case where a series of products are
highly profitable, there is almost always some key intangible property involved. (Mentz &
Carlisle, 1997, p. 50)
Given these declarations, the transfer pricing of intangible assets is a critical concern of
transnational corporations (TNCs). Transfer pricing is both a business strategy and a tax issue
because "decisions regarding products, location and supply-chain matters affect tax planning
and tax compliance in both home and subsidiary countries" (Ernst & Young, 1997, p. 4). As
more TNCs expand their foreign direct investment (FDI), conflicts among TNCs and the host
and home countries' transfer pricing legislation and the philosophies of their tax authorities
increase. These differences may also encourage some TNCs to shift income fi^om higher to
lower tax jurisdictions to minimize their total tax burden and maximize profits. Consequences
may include increased audits, litigation, double taxation, and penalty assessment, dampening
a TNCs enthusiasm for FDI, especially in developing countries and economies in transition.
The need for increasing FDI in these lesser-developed countries and economies is so
important that the United Nations (UN) is currently developing a multilateral framework
on investment for such countries. Among the key issues included in this framework are the
transfer pricing of tangible goods and intangible property (UNCTAD, 1999) and the transfer
of technology, including intellectual property rights (not yet released).
The "gross income tax gap" in the United States (US) attributable to transfer pricing was
in excess of US$2.8 billion per year for the 1996-1998 period. How much of this is due to
intangible property fransfers is not clear. However, it was the perception of the US Congress
about significant abuse involving the transfer pricing ofUS developed intangibles, which led
to the major 1986 revision by the US Internal Revenue Service (IRS) of Section 482 vis-a-vis
the transfer pricing of intangible property (Cole, 1999, Section 1.02). Continuing concems
with abuses and the magnitude of tax revenues associated with intangible property fransfers
led the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to revise its
transfer pricing guidelines in 1996 to include a chapter wholly devoted to intangible property
issues (OECD, 1996).
Past and recent activity of the US Tax Court is one indicator of both the importance and the
prevalence of the transfer pricing of intangible property in TNCs. Since the Section 482
revision in 1986, many Tax Court cases have involved very significant adjustments and
penalties attributable to the improper fransfer pricing and valuation of intangible property.
'
One estimate is that "nearly half of all adjustments proposed by the US IRS under Section
482 have involved the use or transfer of intangibles" (Cole, 1999, Section 8.01). In one recent
and ongoing case, DHL Corp. v. Commissioner,^ the TNC is appealing the assessment by the
US IRS of US$424.6 million in deficiencies and US$992.2 million in allocations from
trademark sales and royalties.
Another indicator is the number of advance pricing agreements (APAs) involving the
negotiation of transfer prices for intangible property. The APA program allows TNCs to
negotiate acceptable pricing methods for complex transactions for an extended time period to
radically reduce the risks of audit and penalty assessment. Since the US IRS began its APA
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program in 1992, 231 APAs have been completed, of which 64 deal with intangible property
and 1 1 1 with the performance of services (IRS, 2000).
In this study, of the 262 TNCs using transfer pricing, 61% (159 TNCs) used it relative to
intangible property. Of concern is how these 159 TNCs domiciled in different countries
transfer intangibles across borders, and the effect of these transfers on their audit status,
profitability, and relationship with host-country governments. Has the objective of globally
acceptable transfer pricing methods been achieved, as called for by the OECD and the UN?
Altematively, are transfer pricing methods determined by TNC for economic and envir-
onmental attributes rather than by the desire for harmony and a globally accepted transfer
pricing framework? Or, do the correlative objectives of tax minimization and profit
maximization eclipse all other concerns?
The study has two objectives, the first being a primer on intangible property and existing
transfer pricing legislation. The second objective is a two-pronged analysis to answer the
questions previously raised. The transfers of intangibles by US TNCs to host and home
subsidiaries are analyzed first. Then, US TNC transfer pricing behavior and characteristics are
compared to those of Canadian, German, Japanese, and United Kingdom (UK) TNCs with
subsidiaries in the US. Data for the study were collected through a mail survey of
intemational and tax vice presidents of TNCs domiciled in the five countries of interest.
Responses were elicited for both home- and host-country subsidiaries to allow for cross-
border comparisons of intangible transfer pricing and performance evaluation practices.
There is much more agreement among TNCs and their transfer pricing methods for
intangible property than their transfer pricing methods for tangible goods. Regardless of
country, significant differences in TNC demographics, and differences in the types of
intangibles transferred, there were no significant differences in the methods used to value
intangible property in cross-border transfers. The logical assumption is that this harmony may
be due in part to the relative concurrence of the OECD guidelines (followed by Canada,
Germany, Japan, and the UK) with the US IRS regulations regarding the valuation of
Some significant cases involving Section 482, transfer pricing, and intangible property include:
• Ciba-Geigy Corp. v. Commissioner, 85 TC 172 (1985), acquiesed 1987-2 CB 1 (1987).
• G.D. Searle & Co. v. Commissioner, 88 TC 252 (1987).
• Eli Lilly & Co. v. Commissioner, 856 F. 2nd 855 (1988), affirmed in part and reversed in part 856 F. 2nd
855 (7th Circuit 1988).
• Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Commissioner, 92 TC 525 (1989), affirmed 933 F. 2nd 1084 (2nd Circuit 1991).
• Sundstrand Corp. v. Commissioner, 96 TC 226 (1991).
• Merck & Co. v. United States, 24 CI. Court 73 (1991), 91-2 USTC 456 (1991)
• Perkin-Elmer Corp. v. Commissioner, 66 TCM 634 (1993).
• Seagate Technology Inc. v. Commissioner, 96 TC 226 (1991), 102 TC 149 (1994).
• Medieval Attractions N.V. v. Commissioner, 72 TCM 924 (1996).
• Compaq Computer Corp. v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-220.
• H Group Holding Inc. v. Commissioner, TCM 1999-334.
• DHL Corp. V. Commissioner TCM 1998-1122, under appeal (see endnote 2).
- 76 TCM 1122 (1998), TCM 461 (1998), currently under appeal (Docket Numbers 99-71592 and 99-71580,
9th Circuit US Court of Appeals, 2000).
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intangible property. With tlie recent issuance of the OECD's guideUnes on cost sharing, it
could be assumed that intangible transfer pricing practices may become even more aligned
across countries.
However, upon further analysis, the harmony is deceptive. Fully 25% of the responding
TNCs currently use a transfer pricing method to value intangible property that is not one of
the methods specifically defined by either the OECD or the US IRS. Even if the guidelines
and regulations were relaxed, 23% would still apply a nonspecified method. This study
provides possible explanations for this divergence of the TNCs' practices with the theoret-
ically preferred methods in the OECD guidelines and IRS regulations.
The results of this study show that TNCs differ much less across borders in the transfer
pricing methods used to value intangible property compared to wide disparity in their transfer
pricing choices when transferring tangible goods. However, although the TNCs agree on the
methods to be used for intangible property, those methods may not be in accordance with
those prescribed by the OECD guidelines or the US IRS regulations.
2. A comparison of transfer pricing regulations for intangibles
Intangibles are generally categorized using the following definitions set forth in ERC
Secfion 482-4(b) and OECD (1996) guidelines:
1
.
Patent, invention, formula, process, design, or pattern.
2. Copyright, literary, musical, or artistic composition.
3. Trademark, trade name, or brand name.
4. Franchise, license, or contract.
5. Method program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate,
customer list, or technical data.
6. Other intellectual property not listed above.
The international standard for developing transfer prices for intangible property transferred
between or among the parent TNC and its subsidiaries is the arm's-length principle. All
transactions involving intracompany transfers of intangibles must be valued at a price that the
TNC would have used when dealing with an external independent entity. One difficulty in the
valuation of unique intangibles is the lack of comparable transfers from which to develop an
arm's-length price. Another difficulty is the lack of incentives for TNC subsidiaries or
affiliates "to engage in arm's-length negodations and contract for an arm's-length royalty.
Furthermore, the government lacks the information needed to determine the arm's-length
royalty" (Halperin & Srinidhi, 1996, p. 62).
The OECD transfer pricing guidelines are voluntary and are meant to be used by countries
either as the basis for their own transfer pricing regulations, or as the starting point from which
their regulations are derived. Most countries use the OECD guidelines when developing
transfer pricing regulations. The US regulations, while similar in many respects to the OECD
guidelines, differ in several important procedural areas, and also dictate severe penalties for
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noncompliance. While both the OECD and the US tax authority maintain that the arm's-length
principle must be upheld when pricing intangible property, there is some disagreement on other
issues. The following summarizes one substantial difference between the two approaches:
hi the U.S., the burden of proof lies squarely with the taxpayer, who must prove that his
prices are charged at arm's length. In Europe, conversely, the burden of proof lies with the tax
administration, which must prove that the prices are not arm's length In the U.S., the
relationship (of TNCs with their respective tax authorities) is often adversarial, where in
Europe corporations are more used to working in close cooperation with tax authorities to
arrive at compromise solutions .... The OECD guidelines concentrate on how prices are set
(a subjective test that focuses on behavior), whereas U.S. regulations require an arm's-length
result (an objective test that focuses on taxable income) The IRS's main concern is whether
the tax base is correct. (Tax Analysts, 1996)
The burden-of-proofissue underlies the increasingly complex audits ofhost and home TNCs
by the IRS, many of which lead to costly and time-consuming litigation in the US Tax Court.
2.1. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The recently revised OECD (1996, 1997) guidelines for intangible property stress the use
of a transaction-based arm's-length transfer pricing method"^ such as the comparable
uncontrolled price (CUP) and resale price methods. In cases where comparables are difficult
to locate, profit-based methods such as the profit-split method and transactional net margin
method (TNMM) are appropriate only as methods of last resort. The comparable profits
method (CPM) is not acceptable. Pricing must take into account all relevant information
available at the time of the transaction, including "all the developments that were reasonably
foreseeable, without using hindsight" (VI- 12). This is in stark contrast to US Secdon 482
requirements that all information up to the time of filing must be reflected in the transfer price.
2.2. Canada
Canadian transfer pricing is regulated by Section 69 of the Canadian Income Tax Act
(enacted 1971), and interpreted by Information Circular 87-2, issued by Revenue Canada
^ These methods assume the arm's-length standard, so that the final transfer price between related (controlled)
subsidiaries would have been the same if the transfers had been between unrelated (uncontrolled) entities.
Generally, the CUP or comparable uncontrolled transaction (CUT) method uses the market price for the
transferred good. Resale price is the price at which the transferred good would have been resold to an unrelated
entity, less some gross profit percentage. The profit split divides profits between subsidiaries using some
economically valid basis that approximates the division of profits that would have occurred had the subsidiaries
been unrelated. The CPM uses profit measures (such as the return on assets or operating income to sales) to
determine a return that would equal that realized by a comparable-independent enterprise. There is some debate
over the arm's-length nature of CPM, in that it depends on profit comparisons rather than price and/or transaction
comparisons and functional analysis. Consequently, the OECD recommends the TNMM, which examines the net
profit margin that the TNC realizes fi-om a controlled transaction. For a detailed review of transfer pricing methods
and definitions, see US Section 482 (1994) and OECD (1995, 1996) guidelines.
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(1987).'* Transfers of intangible property must be made at an arm's-length price, with the
transaction-based CUP method emphatically preferred. Revenue Canada has proposed
changes to the Income Tax Act to reflect many of the new OECD guidelines, and will
allow the profit-split method to be used to value intangibles as an acceptable method,
but only as a method of last resort (Revenue Canada, 1997). Other revisions include
requirements for contemporaneous documentation of transfer pricing transactions, and the
imposition of increased penalties for noncompliance (Coopers & Lybrand, 1997). The
penalties do take into consideration reasonable effort by the TNC, which US regulations
do not. These changes are currently under consideration by the Canadian Parliament as
part of a larger tax package.
2.3. Germany
Germany's transfer pricing statutory provisions are contained in the Corporate Income Tax
Act (Section 8), the Fiscal Code (Sections 39-42), the Income Tax Act (Section 4), and the
International Tax Act (Section 1). The regulations are based on a flexible application of
OECD guidelines, and are interpreted by the Administrative Principles on Income Allocation,
Ordinance of the Federal Ministry of Finance (23 February 1983). Intangible pricing is
strictly transactional, using the CUP method whenever possible. No subsequent adjustments
based on profitability using the US' commensurate-with-income approach^ are allowed
unless the arm's-length principle has been violated.
2.4. Japan
In Japan, Article 66-5 of the Special Taxation Measures Law (enacted 1 April 1986) and
the National Tax Administration Agency (NTAA) address transfer pricing issues. They
provide an effective administrative structure that lessens income manipulation by non-
Japanese TNCs while minimizing the burden on the taxpayer and avoiding double taxation.
The arm's-length basis is preferred, using CUP, resale price, or cost-plus. If none are
appropriate only then are profit splits or TNMM acceptable.
2.5. United Kingdom
Transfer pricing regulations are set forth in Sections 110-11?) of the 1988 Income and
Corporation Taxes Act (Taxes Act, 1988). There are no detailed guidelines, and little case law
or judicial decisions, with most disputes settled out of court. Section 770 specifies an arm's-
length approach according to OECD guidelines, but the UK is subjective in its interpretation.
Transactions are analyzed according to the available evidence in order to arrive at an arm's-
For a detailed discussion of Canadian regulations, see Gelardi and Wong (1996). A general review of current
transfer pricing regulations of major trading nations is provided by Campos (1996).
The commensurate-with-income approach uses the principle of the arm's-length return, rather than the arm's
length price. Intangible property must be valued relative to the income derived from that intangible.
5
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length price using CUP, resale price, cost-plus, and, as a last resort, profit-based methods.
Section 773 defines the scope of transfer pricing transactions, but does not differentiate
between tangible and intangible transfers in the application of transfer pricing methods, and
does not permit commensurate-with-income approaches.
2.6. United States
Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code includes guidance on allowable transfer pricing
methods for intangible property using the arm's-length principle. Acceptable methods include
CUTs, profit-split, CPM, and other methods not specified. TNMM, as defined by the OECD
and as implemented by many countries, is not acceptable to the US tax authority. Any method
may be chosen without prejudice as the "best method," but the TNC must be prepared to
defend its choice with contemporaneous documentation if challenged by the tax authority. All
information, including that after the transaction has occurred, must be taken into account
when the final transfer price is calculated. OECD guidelines require only that all information
up to the time of the transfer be incorporated into the transfer price.
Unique to the US regulations is the commensurate-with-income requirement. Section 482-
4(a) states that the valuations of the transferred intangible property must "be commensurate
with the income attributable to the intangible, i.e. a subsidiary may earn the same return as a
competitor who does not have the intangible" (Halperin & Srinidhi, 1996, p. 63). The CUT
method is based on the traditional arm's-length price comparison, while the CPM and profit-
split approaches use the arm's-length return.
2. 7. Cost-sharing arrangements
Cost-sharing (or cost contribution) arrangements allow TNCs to share the costs of
development of an intangible property in proportion to the anticipated benefits experienced
by each subsidiary from that intangible (US Section 482-7). This approach allows a TNC to
alternatively value self-developed intangibles rather than using a licensing agreement,
royalties, and compliance with the commensurate-with-income approach required by pre-
viously described arm's-length methods for pricing intangibles.
The OECD's (1997) cost-sharing guidelines are broader in their definition of a qualified
cost-sharing arrangement than US Section 482, but are in agreement with costs being shared
in proportion to the benefits received by the TNC entities. These guidelines reemphasize the
arm's-length nature of any cost-sharing allocations, and the requirement of quantifiable
prospective benefits in order to allow a subsidiary to participate in a cost-sharing arrangement.
3. Prior research
Transfer pricing research spans five decades, with the seminal article by Hirshleifer (1956)
marking the beginning of both academic and corporate concern with transfer pricing issues.
Research in this area has expanded from a strictly theoretical economic base addressing
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domestic transfers of tangible property to include the transnational transfers of both tangible
goods and intangible property; model building of transfer pricing systems; accounting, tax,
and management issues related to transfer pricing; and practical studies of transnational
corporate transfer pricing practices. For a review of the evolution of transfer pricing research,
see Borkowski (1996a), Grabski (1985), Leitch and Barrett (1992), and Tang (1993).
From the wealth of transfer pricing research, there are few studies addressing transfer
pricing vis-a-vis audit status and the transfer of intangible property. For fiscal year 1993,
12% (US$99 million) of the proposed Section 482 income adjustments resulting from US
IRS audits of TNCs were attributable specifically to royahies. For 1994, total income
adjustments, including those due to intangible property, reached US$3.5 billion (GAO,
1995). In its most recent study, the GAO (1999) found that 67% of non-US-owned TNCs,
and 61% of US-owned TNCs, paid no US income taxes in 1995. This translates into annual
losses in tax revenues of US$35 billion attributable to transfer pricing practices by these
TNCs (Nyhan, 1999).
There are few studies addressing either TNC audit experience or the transfer pricing of
intangible property. Ernst & Young (1997) expanded their prior surveys on multinational
transfer pricing practices to include intangible property and financial transfers, as well as
tangible transfers. In their sample of 393 TNCs, home-country audits were experienced by
75% of Canadian TNCs, 63% of German TNCs, 66% of UK TNCs, and 63% of US TNCs.
No responding Japanese TNCs were audited by the NTAA. Host-country audits affected 60%)
of Canadian TNCs, 63% of German TNCs, 100% of Japanese TNCs, 69% ofUK TNCs, and
79% of US TNCs.
In their most recent study, Ernst & Young (1999) found that audit activity continued to be
high, with the majority of TNCs in Canada (80%), Germany (79%), UK (71%) and the US
(70%) experiencing either a home- or host-country audit. Japanese TNCs again were the
exception: 48% were audited by the host country, while none were audited by their home-
country tax authority, the NTAA. It is expected that 80% of the TNCs surveyed "will face a
transfer pricing examination within the next two years" (Ernst & Young 1999, p. 32).
Borkowski (1996) found a different audit pattern across TNCs that fransferred tangible
goods and were domiciled in five countries. Fifty-six percent of US-based companies in the
sample had undergone an IRS audit within the last five years; of TNCs with subsidiaries in
the US, IRS audits affected 50% of UK-based TNCs, compared to TNCs based in Japan
(18%), Germany (11%), and Canada (4%). Of US TNCs with subsidiaries in Canada,
Germany, Japan, and the UK, 33% were audited by host-country governments. Only 29% of
UK TNCs were audited by Inland Revenue, 14% of Canadian TNCs by Revenue Canada, 6%
of German TNCs by the Ministry of Finance, and just 3% of Japanese TNCs by the NTAA.
Halperin and Srinidhi (1996) developed transfer pricing models that demonstrate that the
current US Section 482 regulations for pricing-transferred intangible assets encourage TNCs
to manipulate resource allocations and shift income. They suggest that the US government
should reconsider the regulations given the trade-offs between the "potential increases in tax
revenue and ... the cost to the government of collecting additional information on the value
of the intangible and the social cost of decreased production resulting" from the imposition of
rules for intercompany royalties for tax purposes (p. 69).
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In its first study, which included both tangible and intangible transfer pricing practices by
TNCs, Ernst & Young (1997) found that 35% of the 393 responding TNCs fi-om 12 countries
used the CUP/CUT method to price-transferred intangible property, 17% used one of the
three profit-based methods (CPM, TNMM, and profit split), and the remaining 48% used
some other methods. The follow-up study for intangible transfers (Ernst & Young 1999)
found the usage of CUT/CUP dropping to 28%, profit-based methods dropping to 15%, and
the usage of other methods increasing to 57%.
3.1. Variable selection and hypotheses
Given the lack of research on intangible transfer pricing methods used in practice, and how
they are chosen by TNCs, prior studies on tangible transfer pricing practices (Borkowski,
1997, 1997a; Tang 1993; and others) were used as the model for this study's survey, many of
the variables, and hypotheses. In order to assess the impact of organizational, environmental,
and financial characteristics on transfer pricing method choice, data were collected for each
respondent TNC, either archivally or through the survey instrument, as shown in Table 1 . The
survey questions are included in Appendix A.
Given the lack of research on intangible transfers, generally, variables were included if
they had been associated with tangible transfer pricing choice either in prior studies or
theoredcally in the literature (Borkowski, 1996a; Tang, 1993).
Organizational variables included types of intangible property transferred, size (sales
measured in US dollars), industry, and internal criteria considered when choosing a transfer
pricing method. Size and industry are factors that have been traditionally associated with
the choice of a tangible transfer pricing method (Borkowski, 1 996a), but with contradictory
findings. For example: larger firms use cost-based methods (Benvignati, 1985); cost-based
firms are smaller (Borkowski, 1992); no relationship (Tang, 1979). With industry as a
factor, similar conflicts exist. While certain intemal criteria, such as performance evaluation
and maximization of after-tax profit, have been consistently correlated with transfer pricing
method choice (for example, Borkowski, 1997, 1997a; Tang, 1993), others have yielded
inconsistent results, or have not been consistently included in the existing research.
Performance evaluation measures used for host- and home-country managers were also
assessed, given the importance attached to performance evaluation when choosing a
transfer price for tangible goods in prior studies (Borkowski, 1993; Klassen, Lang, &
Wolfson, 1993).
Among the environmental variables were the economic stability of the TNC, economic
stability of the subsidiary, relationship between the TNC and the host government, audit
history with host and home tax authorities, and external criteria considered when choosing a
transfer pricing method (Borkowski, 1997, 1997a; Tang, 1993). Financial variables (income,
return on equity (ROE), return on assets (ROA), and return on sales (ROS)) were included
due to prior studies finding profit differentials across borders, which have been linked to
transfer pricing (Hufbauer & van Rooij, 1992; Jacob, 1996). Data on the actual transfer
pricing method used, and the TNCs preferred method if not constrained by regulations, were
also collected.
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Table 1
Source of survey variables considered to have potential effect on transfer pricing choice
Organizational variables
Size (sales) by TNC (archival)
Industry (archival)
Performance evaluation criteria by US and non-US managers (Q7)
•Nonincome measures
•Segment profit
• Other profit measures
•Innovation measures
Transfer pricing method criteria — internal (Q8)
•Practical concerns (ease/cost)
•Usefulness in decision making
•Useftilness in performance evaluation
Type of intangible property transferred (Q3a)
Environmental variables
Economic stability — TNC and subsidiary (Ql)
TNC/subsidiary government relations (Q2)
Prior IRS/other tax authority audit experience (Q5, Q6)
Transfer pricing method criteria — external (Q8)
•Tax and trade regulations
• Other transnational concerns
TNC practices to counter effects of transfer pricing method (Q4)
Financial variables
Return on equity (archival)
Return on assets (archival)
Return on sales (archival)
Income by parent (archival)
Q# refers to the survey questions presented in Appendix A.
Given the similarity of the OECD guidehnes and the US regulations, the following
hypotheses (stated in the null) are tested:
Hypothesis la: There is no difference in transfer pricing methods used to transfer
intangible property by the home country of the TNC.
Hypothesis lb: There is no difference in transfer pricing methods used to transfer
intangible property between TNCs in OECD countries and TNCs based in the US.
Hypothesis 2: The choice of an intangible transfer pricing method is not affected by
organizational, environmental, or financial characteristics of the TNC.
If transfer pricing methods are related to the location of the parent TNCs, then the TNCs
audit status with their home and host tax authorities may also be related (Borkowski, 1996;
Ernst & Young, 1997, 1999; GAO, 1995). If transfer pricing methods are chosen to satisfy tax
authority requirements, they may distort a TNCs true operations and cause the TNC to
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undertake a course of action to address these distortions (Borkowski, 1992; Tang, 1981). The
final two hypotheses assess audit status, TNC location, and secondary actions to address the
effects of transfer pricing if chosen to satisfy tax requirements:
Hypothesis 3: Tax authority/IRS audit status is not affected by the location of the
parent TNC.
Hypothesis 4: Actions taken to counter effects of transfer pricing do not differ by the
home country of the TNC.
4. Methodology, analysis, and interpretation
US-based TNCs are included in the sample if they have at least one subsidiary in Canada,
Germany, Japan, or the UK. The listed TNC must also be included in the 1 996 Fortune 500,
Business Week WOO, or the Directory of Corporate Affiliates. TNCs based in Canada are part
of the sample if they have at least one US subsidiary and are part of the 1996 Canadian
Business Corporate 500 or the Directory of Corporate Affiliates. TNCs whose home
countries are Germany, Japan, and the UK were included if they have at least one US
subsidiary and were listed in the Directoiy ofCorporate Affiliates. The final sample included
TNCs from industries previously identified in prior studies as likely to use transfer pricing.
Initial and follow-up mailings were sent to the international or tax vice presidents of the
1288 TNCs, which met the aforementioned criteria. Of the 551 TNCs responding (for a 43%
response rate), 265 TNCs used transfer pricing for tangible goods and/or intangible property.
Of those 265 TNCs, 159 had cross-border transfers of intangible property, and comprise the
final sample. There were no significant differences between respondents and nonrespondents
in size or industry (Table 2).
Many of the survey questions elicited responses based on a five-point Likert scale. Given
the categorical nature ofmuch of the data collected in this study, the nonparametric Kruskal-
Wallis (K-W) one-way analysis of variance by ranks was used for the analyses. The K-
W
test is appropriate because most of the analyses compared responses by country, so that the
data were in five independent samples of unequal size.^
Two separate factor analyses were performed to discover any relationships among 45 items
concerning performance evaluation and transfer pricing choice. Four performance evaluation
factors were derived from a factor analysis of 14 items used to evaluate a TNCs subsidiary
managers (see Question 7 in Appendix A). Responses to these items were collected separately
for managers in the TNCs home-country subsidiaries and for managers in the TNCs host-
country subsidiaries. This factor analysis yielded four organizational evaluation dimensions:
nonincome criteria (PEl), financial ratios (PE2), subsidiary income (PE3), and innovation
(PE4), for both host and home managers. Similarly, there were 3 1 items relevant to the TNCs
Siegel and Castellan (1988) state that "when there are more than k=3 groups, and when the number of
observations in each group exceeds five, the sampling distribution ofK-W is well approximated by the chi-square
distribution with df=k— 1" (p. 208). This study has k=5 groups, with all groups exceeding five observations.
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Table 2
Composition of the final sample of TNCs in this study
TNCs in
original Total Response Use TP for Use TP for Do not Refused to
mailing responses rate (%) intangibles tangibles only use TP answer
Canada 126 71 56 10 20 41 -
Germany 113 45 40 8 10 25 2
Japan 241 105 44 18 21 64 2
UK 121 38 31 10 4 22 2
US 687 292 42 113 51 104 24
Total 1288 551 43 159 106 256 30
Composition of US (aggregate) sample by location of subsidiary
US (Canada) 261 106 41 45 18 38 5
US (Germany) 132 58 44 24 8 20 6
US (Japan) 126 56 44 17 12 20 7
US (UK) 168 72 43 27 13 26 6
Total 687 292 42 113 51 104 24
choice of a transfer pricing method (see Question 8 in Appendix A). A factor analysis loaded
on three internal organizational factors (ease and cost (TPCl), performance evaluation
(TPC2), and decision making (TPC3)) and two external environmental factors (tax and trade
(TPC4) and global issues (TPC5)).
Selected demographic information about the TNCs in the final sample is presented in
Table 3. The sample differs significantly by TNC home country in size (measured by
sales in US dollars), ROE, and subsidiary-government relations. Canadian TNCs are
considerably smaller and poorer performers than the rest of the sample, while
subsidiaries of Japanese TNCs have less favorable relationships with the host US
government. This is mirrored in the poorer relationships of US subsidiaries with the
host Japanese government.
An analysis of Table 4 reveals that patents and trademarks accounted for almost two-thirds
of the intangible assets transferred. Trademarks were disproportionately transferred by the US
relative to other countries and to other types of intangibles.
4.1. Hypotheses la and lb
Although there are many parallels between the OECD guidelines and US regulations
regarding transfer pricing, prior comparisons of transfer pricing methods for tangible goods
have shown differences among TNCs based in different countries (Borkowski, 1997, 1997a;
Tang, 1981). In this study, it was assumed that the transfer pricing methods chosen for
intangible property would also differ. As shown in Table 5, however. Hypotheses la and lb
cannot be rejected.
Both the comparison by country and the grouped OECD versus US comparison
show no significant differences in the methods chosen to value transferred intangible
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Table 4
Types of intangible property transferred by TNCs
Patent Copyright Trademark Franchise Method Total
Canada 5 1 5 3 7 21
Germany 6 4 1 4 15
Japan 9 7 1 9 26
UK 15 2 8 2 7 34
US 79 14 85 17 47 242
Totals 114(34%) 17 (5%) 109 (32%) 24 (7%) 74 (22%) 338 (100%)
K-W 0.2524 0.3621 0.0109* 0.5215 0.2348
Composition of US (aggregate) sample of 133 TNCs by location ofsubsidiary
US (Canada) 33 3 30 6 18 90
US (Germany) 15 5 18 3 9 50
US (Japan) 13 1 15 3 10 42
US (UK) 18 5 22 5 10 60
Totals 79 14 85 17 47 242
K-W 0.7178 0.2130 0.2786 0.9045 0.4756
Total types of intangibles transferred (338) exceeds total sample size (159) because some TNCs transferred more
than one type of intangible asset.
* Significant at a =.05.
property. When given their choice of a transfer pricing method unconstrained by
regulations, there were no significant intercountry differences. However, there were
significant intracountry differences between TNCs' current and their preferred transfer
pricing methods. TNCs based in Japan and in the US would significantly change the
methods currently used to transfer intangibles. For Japanese TNCs, there was no
pattern: Some TNCs currently using CUP would switch to other methods, while some
TNCs using non-CUP methods would switch to CUP. US TNCs would change from
the CUT and other methods to the profit-split method or cost sharing. When evaluated
by type of intangible, the CUP/CUT method was the most common for patents,
copyrights, and trademarks, while other methods were more prevalent in valuing
franchises and method transfers.
Although there are no significant differences among the countries, fiilly 25% of the
responding TNCs currently use a transfer pricing method to value intangible property that is
not one of the methods specifically defined by either the OECD or the US IRS. There are
several reasons contributing to this divergence from the recommended methods, but it is
difficult to determine which has had the most impact on a TNCs decisions.
First, the most recent biennial Ernst & Young (1999) transfer pricing study found "a
disturbing reliance on pure historical practice as opposed to acceptable and endorsed
methods" (p. 5). Prior to 1996, there was effectively no guidance on the pricing of intangibles
for OECD countries except that of the US IRS. As a result, many non-US TNCs may have
felt unfettered in their choices of a method. Once the OECD (1996, 1997) guidelines were
issued, some TNCs may not have felt compelled to change methods since the OECD has
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Table 5
Actual and preferred intangible transfer pricing methods
Canada Germany Japan UK US Totals
Actual method currently used by TNCS
CUP or CUT 3 (30.0%) 5 (62.5%) 8 (44.4%) 1 (10.0%) 54 (47.8%) 71 (44.6%)
Profit split (0.0%) (0.0%) 1 (5.6%) 3 (30.0%) 5 (4.4%) 9 (5.7%)
Comparable profits orTNMM 2 (20.0%) 1 (12.5%) 4 (22.2%) 1 (10.0%) 8 (7.1%) 16 (10.1%)
Cost sharing 3 (30.0%) (0.0%) 2 (11.1%) 2 (20.0%) 17 (15.0%) 24(15.1%)
Other 2 (20.0%) 2 (25.0%) 3 (16.7%) 3 (30.0%) 29 (25.7%) 39 (24.5%)
Totals 10 (100%) 8 (100%) 18 (100%) 10 (100%) 113 (100%) 159 (100%)
K-W chi-square
approximation = 0.2 1 52
OECD versus US: K--W == 0.6771
Method preferred by tncs if unconstrained by' regulations
CUP or CUT 3 (30.0%) 4 (50.0%) 8 (44.4%) 2 (20.0%) 46 (40.7%) 63 (39.6%)
Profit split (0.0%) 1 (12.5%) 1 (5.5%) (0.0%) 16 (14.2%) 18(11.3%)
Comparable profits or TNMM (0.0%) 1 (12.5%) 3 (16.7%) 1 (10.0%) 7 (6.2%) 12 (7.6%)
Cost sharing 1 (10.0%) 1 (12.5%) 3 (16.7%) 1 (10.0%) 24 (21.2%) 30 (18.9%)
Other 6 (60.0%) 1 (12.5%) 3 (16.7%) 6 (60.0%) 20 (17.7%) 36 (22.6%)
Totals 10 (100%) 8 (100%) 18 (100%) 10 (100%) 113 (100%) 159 (100%)
K-W chi-square
approximation = 0.5543
OECD versus US: K-W = 0.3484
Actual versus preferred
Canada Germany Japan UK US
0.2615 0.2156 0.0025** 0.1246 0.0001**
Actual method associated with the type of intangible
Patent Copyright Trademark Franchise Method
CUP or CUT 48(42.1%) 8 (47.1%) 50 (45.9%) 9 (37.5%) 23 (31.5%)
Profit split 7(6.1%) (0.0%) 6 (5.5%) 1 (4.2%) 3 (4.1%)
Comparable profits or TNMM 13(11 .5%) (0.0%) 10 (9.2%) 1 (4.2%) 11 (15.1%)
Cost sharing 16 (14.0%) 3 (17.6%) 14 (12.8%) 2 (8.3%) 8 (10.9%)
Other 30 (26.3%) 6 (35.3%) 29 (26.6%) 11 (45.8%) 28 (38.4%)
Totals 114(100%) 17 (100%) 109 (100%) 24(100%) 73 (100%)
Significant at a =.01.
always stressed the voluntary nature of its guidelines, which have never been described as
either mandatory or as regulations.
Second, as the OECD transfer pricing guidelines are adopted in varying degrees by more
countries, and as pressure increases for conformity across the borders of European Union
countries, the US transfer pricing regulations are no longer automatically accorded primacy in
a TNC's decision-making process. Many TNCs may choose an altemative method and
internally document that choice in case of an audit, pointing both to the lack of specificity
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regarding "other" methods, and to the OECD's concern with how prices are set (a subjective
test focusing on behavior), not the US's concern with a result that is arm's length (an
objective test focusing on taxable income).
Third, "fiscal authorities worldwide seem to be competing to wield the biggest, best and
hardest-hitting transfer pricing rules and regulations," with the "strict US-initiated transfer
pricing model (with accompanying documentation requirements, penalties, and enforce-
ment) ... spreading quickly to other nations" (Cooper, 2000, pp. 13-14). More juris-
dictions have increased their transfer pricing audit activity, while others have instituted
severe penalties for noncompliance. Although the arm's-length principle underlies the vast
majority of existing transfer pricing legislation, "the ways in which the principle is applied
in practice and the requirements for documenting its adherence can vary substantially by
country. As a result, MNCs are increasingly caught in a tug-of-war among competing tax
jurisdictions, each trying hard to maintain its 'fair share' of taxes collected from MNCs"
(Cooper, 2000, p. 13). This possibility, coupled with the relative decrease in importance of
US regulations, may be leading TNCs to choose a method that optimizes operating
performance, after a cost/benefit analysis in which the TNC is fully aware of the risk of
an audit from one country but not fi-om others. For example, Japanese TNCs are confident
that they will not be audited by their home-country tax authority, the NTAA (given the
history of the NTAA auditing non-Japanese TNCs almost exclusively), so these TNCs may
be more willing not to comply with Japanese transfer pricing regulations.
Finally, due to the responses of TNCs to the almost geometric pace of globalization and
technological innovation, the resulting "new structures and technologies that change the
internal business organization often introduce conflicts with the diverse tax and regulatory
fi-ameworks applicable in different jurisdictions" (Durst, Stone, Rolfe, & Happell, 1999, p.
5). There is also a concomitant increase in the number and complexity of cross-border
transactions with transfer pricing implications. Perhaps the TNCs are experiencing some of
these conflicts regarding the pricing of the more innovative types of recently developed
intangibles. Given the uniqueness of some intangible property, it may be difficult to use a
prescribed method to value them, hence, the preference for other methods. Although the
OECD guidelines and IRS regulations are somewhat synchronized, they are obviously out of
step with the TNCs' environment. Whatever the reasons motivating the TNCs, a quarter of
them do not "play by the rules."
4.2. Hypothesis 2
The hypothesis that the choice of an intangible transfer pricing method is not affected by
organizational, environmental, or financial characteristics of the TNC can be rejected only for
eight of the 25 characteristics, as shown in Table 6. Most of the tabular responses are the
overall means of the TNC responses to the specific items comprising each factor. The means
are based on a five-point Likert scale, where 1 = Very negative/unimportant and 5 = Veiy
positive/important.
Given the significance of ROE and ROA, the marginal significance of ROS, and the
relative size of ROS and income, the transfer pricing method chosen is related to a TNCs
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Table 6
Relationship of TNC organizational, financial, and environmental characteristics to TNC transfer pricing
method choice
Comparable
profits or K-W
Factors and means cup Profit split. TNMM, Cost sharing. Other, probability,
(where applicable) /7 = 71 n = 9 n=l6 n = 24 n = 39 .V=159
Organizational
Country 0.2152
Sales US$7258 US$11,406 US$6836 US$16,056 US$6858 0.2949
Industry 0.0316*
PEl nonincome 3.96 4.11 4.50 4.26 4.31 0.0093**
measures/home
PE2 income 3.39 3.89 3.81 3.65 3.80 0.0323*
measures/home
PE3 ratios/home 3.54 3.33 3.38 3.55 3.94 0.5084
PE4 irmovation/home 3.46 3.67 3.69 3.43 3.74 0.9023
PEl nonincome 3.90 4.00 4.44 4.30 4.34 0.0010*
measures/host
PE2 income 3.42 3.78 3.88 3.57 3.77 0.0936
measures/host
PE3 ratios/host 3.64 3.67 3.44 3.30 4.09 0.1144
PE4 innovation/host 3.25 3.22 3.75 3.17 3.49 0.6160
TPCl ease/cost 4.32 4.33 4.31 4.25 4.50 0.7733
TPC2 evaluation 3.29 2.89 3.88 2.83 3.32 0.3032
TPC3 decision making 3.03 3.11 2.63 2.63 3.34 0.0213*
Environmental
TNC economic 4.38 4.44 4.38 4.00 4.54 0.1097
stability
Subsidiary economic 3.52 3.56 3.75 3.96 4.03 0.2212
stability
Host government relations 3.52 3.22 3.50 3.83 3.54 0.1958
Audit status/home country 0.5443
Audit status/host country 0.1490
TPC4 tax/trade issues 3.37 3.33 3.50 3.25 3.63 0.4016
TPC5 global concerns 3.19 2.89 3.19 2.92 3.61 0.0486*
Financial
ROS 0.96 5.30 4.22 1.27 4.46 0.0647
ROE 1.35 16.49 11.15 3.61 12.55 0.0466*
ROA 13.31 7.19 5.84 18.67 5.64 0.0330*
Income -US$59.09 US$408.34 US$210.02 US$244.01 US$305.31 0.5847
Sales and income means reported in million US dollars.
Economic/government relations means use a five-point scale, where 1 = Very negative and 5 = Very positive.
The overall factor means are the sums of the items gathered under that factor, using a five-point scale, where
1 = Very unimportant and 5 = Very important.
* Significant at a = .05.
** Significant at a = .01.
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financial characteristics. Those TNCs using the profit-spht method are more financially
robust than TNCs using other methods. Seven of the nine TNCs using the profit-split method
were involved in the production of machinery and equipment— this mirrors the findings of
prior tangible pricing studies for TNC. However, many of the methods used are not in
accordance with OECD guidelines or US IRS regulations.
Overall, organizational measures were not significant. As expected, TNCs using either the
profit split, CPM, or TNMM considered income measures (PE2) to be more important in
evaluating both host and home managers than did TNCs using transaction-based or other
measures. TNCs using CPM or TNMM considered nonincome measures (PEl), such as
adherence to goals, as most important in the evaluation of managers. While not significant,
transfer pricing methods for intangible property were chosen by all TNCs first and foremost
based on cost and ease of implementation and usage (TPCl).
Environmental factors showed little relationship to transfer pricing method choice. Of
interest was that tax/trade issues (TPC4) were a distant second factor of the four factors
considered as affecting method choice. This is contrary to findings regarding transfer
pricing methods for tangible goods, where tax considerations are the driving force behind
the choice of a transfer pricing method (Borkowski, 1996; Jacob, 1996; Klassen et al.,
1993). As Halperin and Srinidhi (1996) note, all existing research regarding transfer pricing
and tax issues addresses only tangible assets, and may not be transferable to suppositions
regarding intangible assets. Additionally, the tax/trade factor (TPC4) is the result of a factor
analysis in which ten individual items related to tax, trade, and tariff issues loaded on this
particular dimension (see Question 8 in Appendix A). The specific item assessing the effect
of US Section 482 on a TNCs transfer pricing policy had an overall mean of 4.02 (on a
five-point scale, where 5 = most important), with individual country means ranging fi-om
3.60 (UK) to 4.56 (Japan). For the item assessing the impact of non-US tax regulations, the
overall mean was 3.38, ranging from 2.00 (Germany) to 3.61 (US). Perhaps the unique
character of intangible assets leads TNCs to use transfer pricing in the spirit in which it was
originally intended, rather than as a manipulative tool to subvert tax laws by shifting profits
across borders.
4.3. Hypothesis 3
The hypothesis that tax-audit status is not affected by the location of the TNC can be
rejected, given the results in Table 7. Tax-audit status vis-a-vis a country's tax authority
should not be confused with a TNCs financial audit status vis-a-vis its public accounting
firm. Audit experiences with host-country tax authorities are similar across countries with the
exception of the UK. It is with home-country tax authorities, and a comparison by the US IRS
and non-US tax authorities, that significant differences arise.
The audits with their own tax authorities were significantly higher for Canada
(Revenue Canada) and the US (IRS), and significantly lower for Japanese (NTAA)
TNCs. In fact, no Japanese TNC was audited by the NTAA (a finding that confirms that
of Ernst & Young, 1999), compared with 40% of Canadian and BriUsh TNCs and 62% of
US TNCs by their respective home tax authorities. In intra-TNC comparisons, both
4 (40.0%) 73 (64.6%) 106 (66.7%)
6 (60.0%) 40 (35.4%) 53 (33.3%)
10 113 159 (100%)
7 (87.5%) 18 (100.0%) 6 (60.0%) 43 (38.1%) 80 (50.3%)
1 (12.5%) (0.0%) 4 (40.0%) 70 (61.9%) 79 (49.7%)
8 18 10 113 159 (100%)
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Table 7
Audit status for host and home countries by country
Canada Germany Japan UK US Totals
TNC audit status with host-country tax authority^
No audit 9 (90.0%) 7 (87.5%) 13 (72.2%)
Audit 1 (10.0%) 1 (12.5%) 5 (27.8%)
Totals 10 8 18
K-W chi-square approximation = 0.1 061
OECD countries versus US: K-W = 0.3882
TNC audit status with home country tax authority
No audit 6 (60.0%)
Audit 4 (40.0%)
Totals 10
K-W chi-square approximation = 0.0001**
OECD countries versus US: K-W = 0.0001**
Host versus home country audit status by country
Canada Germany Japan UK US
0.2207 0.7055 0.9999 0.4533 0.0036**
Audit status of TNCs with the US tax authority (IRS) regardless of host/home status: K-W chi-square
approximation = 0.0003**
Audit status of TNCs with other tax authorities regardless of host/home status: K-W chi-square
approximation = 0.0254*
'^ Canadian, German, Japanese, and UK TNCs audited by the US IRS. US TNCs audited by the Canadian,
German, Japanese, and UK tax authorities.
'' Canadian, German, Japanese, and UK TNCs audited by their own tax authorities. US TNCs audited by
the IRS.
* Significant at a = .05.
** Significant at a = .01.
Japanese and US TNCs experienced different treatments from host and home tax
authorities, in the opposite direction. US TNCs and their subsidiaries are more hkely
to be audited by their home (IRS) authority, while Japanese TNCs had no fear of an audit
by their home (NTAA) authority.
4.4. Hypothesis 4
There are significant differences across countries in how TNCs counter the effects of
transfer pricing, leading to the rejection ofHypothesis 4. The data in Table 8 indicate that TNCs
domiciled in the UK and the US are more likely to keep two sets of books to isolate transfer
pricing effects from management decisions, and most likely not to be passive and do nothing.
Of Japanese TNCs, 39% do nothing to account for transfer pricing effects, compared to
only 7% of US TNCs. Interestingly, audit history reveals that UK and US TNCs have
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Table 8
Type and frequency of practices undertaken to counter effects of transfer pricing
Disregard
Keep two sets of Approximate transfer pricing Include transfer
books, one for conditions faced effects in pricing No
tax and another by independent performance adjustments in practices
for management market entity evaluation the budget used Totals
Canada 2 (15.4%) 4 (30.8%) 3 (23.0%) 2 (15.4%) 2 (15.4%) 13 (5.9%)
Germany 2 (20.0%) 3 (30.0%) 1 (10.0%) 1 (10.0%) 3 (30.0%) 10 (4.5%)
Japan 2 (11.1%) 6 (33.3%) 1 (5.6%) 2 (11.1%) 7 (38.9%) 18 (8.1%)
UK 5 (41.7%) 1 (8.3%) 3 (25.0%) 1 (8.3%) 2 (16.7%) 12 (5.4%)
US 72 (41.7%) 26 (15.4%) 33 (19.5%) 27 (16.0%) 11 (6.5%) 169 (76.1%)
Totals 83 (37.4%) 40 (18.0%) 41 (18.5%) 33 (14.9%) 25 (11.2%) 222" (100.0%)
K- W chi square approximations
0.0001** 0.3613 0.2397 0.6776 0.210*
Companies
using no
practices (%)
Companies
using only
one practice (%>)
Companies
using two or more
practices (%)
Totals (%)
Canada 20.0 60.0 20.0 100.0
Germany 37.5 50.0 12.5 100.0
Japan 38.9 61.1 0.0 100.0
UK 20.0 60.0 20.0 100.0
US 9.7 62.0 28.3 100.0
* Significant at a = .05.
** Significant at a = .01.
" Total number exceeds sample size due to some TNCs using more than one practice.
experienced more audits from both host and home tax authorities than the other TNCs.
Correlation analysis shows that the likelihood of an audit by the home tax authority is highly
correlated with both the use of two sets of book, and with choosing not to ignore transfer
pricing effects, i.e. using one or more practices.
5. Conclusions
There is much more agreement among TNCs and their transfer pricing methods for
intangible property than their transfer pricing methods for tangible goods. Regardless of
country, significant differences in TNC demographics, and differences in the types of
intangibles transferred, there were no significant differences in the methods used to value
intangible property in cross-border transfers. The logical assumption is that this harmony may
be due in part to the relative concurrence of the OECD guidelines (followed by Canada,
Germany, Japan, and the UK) with the US IRS regulations regarding the valuation of
intangible property. With the recent issuance of the OECD's guidelines on cost sharing, it
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could be assumed that intangible transfer pricing practices may become even more aligned
across countries.
However, upon further analysis, the harmony is deceptive. Fully 25% of the responding
TNCs use a transfer pricing method to value intangible property that is not "acceptable" to
either the OECD or the US IRS. Fully 25% of the responding TNCs currently use a transfer
pricing method to value intangible property that is not one of the methods specifically defined
by either the OECD or the US IRS. This noncompliance is due to any or all of the following:
a reliance on historical pracdce, the supplanting of US reguladons by OECD guidelines,
stronger country-specific transfer pricing rules and penalties, and/or the innovative intan-
gibles spawned by technological change and global expansion.
The choice of an intangible pricing method is not related to country, but to industry (and,
therefore, the type of intangible property transferred), TNC philosophy of managerial
performance evaluation, the need for information for decision making, and global factors
such as the economy, currency fluctuations, political stability, and cross-border compedtion.
In contrast, the choice of a transfer pricing method for tangible goods is definitely related to
where the TNC is domiciled, in addition to other factors. Perhaps intangible assets are more
global in nature and therefore receive a more universal treatment not constrained by national
borders when compared to tangible goods.
Audit experience among these TNCs does not seem to be driven by the type of
transfer pricing method utilized. Instead, both the country in which the TNC is
domiciled, and internal TNC practices, seem to increase the chances of an audit by
the home-country tax authority. It seems that tax authorities are honoring both the letter
and the spirit of the OECD guidelines and giving TNCs the discredon to choose the
method optimal for their given circumstances, and that it is other factors driving an audit.
An area of future research, either as a case or empirical study, is the audit status of
Japanese TNCs. Given the Ernst & Young (1997) and this study's findings, why are they
seldom audited by their own tax authority, the NTAA, yet, are very frequently audited by
the host countries' tax authorities?
Many studies on tangible transfer pricing conclude that (1) regulations need to be
revised to reflect a TNCs operating realides and (2) differences between OECD
guidelines and US regulations must be eliminated. In the case of intangible assets,
however, the guidelines and regulations are remarkably similar, with the majority of
TNCs using one of the specific approved methods for valuation, thereby satisfying both
host and home tax authorities. It is a pleasure to recommend the status quo regarding the
transfer pricing of intangibles, and to hope that the concurrence of TNC practice and
host/home regulations will be contagious, eventually affecting the more contentious realm
of tangible transfer pricing.
Appendix A. Selected survey questions
(1) How would you characterize the economic stability of your parent company? your
foreign subsidiaries? ( 1 = Very negative to 5 = Very positive)
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(2) How would you characterize your parent company's relations with the (insert country
of the foreign subsidiary) government? (1 = Very negative to 5= Very positive)
(3) A. Which of the following intangibles are transferred between your parent company
and its foreign subsidiary(ies)? Please check all that apply.
Patent, invention, formula, process, design, or pattern.
Copyright, literary musical, or artistic composition.
Trademark, trade name, or brand name.
Franchise, license, or contract.
Method program, system, procedure, campaign, survey, study, forecast, estimate,
customer list, or technical data.
Other intellectual property not listed above.
B. What is the most prevalent method used to determine the international transfer price
for intangible property in your company?
Exact comparable method.
Inexact comparable method.
Basic arm's-length rate of return method (BALRM).
Profit split basic arm's-length rate of return method (BALRM Plus).
Profit split method.
Contract manufacturer approach.
Functional analysis.
Commensurate standard (hybrid of profit split/fiinctional analysis).
Other (please describe).
C. Which transfer pricing method would your company prefer to use for intangible
assets if allowed to choose the "best method" for your company (rather than being
constrained by regulations)?
(4) Which of the following best describes your company's multinational practices? Please
check all that apply.
Using two sets of books, one for tax, finance, and local purposes, the other for
management and control purposes.
Approximating in the host-country subsidiary, as closely as possible, those
conditions what would be faced by an independent market entity.
Disregarding transfer pricing aberration effects when evaluating the performance of
host-country subsidiary performance.
Taking account of any transfer pricing adjustments in the budget, so subsidiary
managers are not evaluated on parent company usage of transfer prices to achieve
certain goals, such as tax minimization.
None of the above.
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(5) Has your company had an adjustment proposed by an IRS international examiner since
1990? If yes, please indicate the range of the proposed adjustment.
No. (Please go to next question.)
Less than US$100,000.
Between US$100,000 and US$499,999.
Between US$500,000 and US$1,000,000.
Greater than US$1,000,000.
(6) Has your company had an adjustment proposed by another country's international
examiner since 1 990? If yes, please indicate the range of the proposed adjustment in
US dollars.
No. (Please go to next question.)
Less than US$100,000.
Between US$100,000 and US$499,999.
Between US$500,000 and US$1,000,000.
Greater than US$1,000,000.
(7) In your company, how important are the following items in evaluating the performance
of subsidiary managers in your home country? In the host country? {\ = Very
unimportant to 5 = Very important)
Home country Host country
Very Very Very Very
unimportant Neutral important unimportant Neutral important
1 2 3 4 5 1 2 3 4 5
Company standards
Net income
Residual income
Return on investment
Return on sales
Return on assets
Market share
Cost reduction
Profit margin
Sales growth
Budget adherence
Goal attainment
Product innovation
Technical innovation
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(8) In your opinion, how important are the following in affecting the choice of the most
prevalent transfer pricing method? (1 = Very unimportant to 5 = Very important)
Very Very
unimportant Neutral important
1 2 3 4 5
Ease of understanding
Cost of administration
Evaluation of subsidiary profit
Evaluation of subsidiary management
Goal congruence
Profit maximizing decisions/parent
Profit maximizing decisions/subsidiary
Managerial motivation
Managerial autonomy
Efficiency in subsidiary
Optimal production decisions
Optimal purchasing decisions
Optimal product pricing decisions
Faimess in management evaluation
Better upper management control
Minimization of managerial disputes
US tax regulations (Section 482)
US tax penalries (Section 6662)
Other US tax regulations
Tax regulations*
Tariff regulations*
Competition in**
NAFTA issues
GATT Uruguay issues
Economic conditions in **
Exchange rates between * and **
Relations with ** government
Minimization of tax payments
Minimization of tariff/duty payments
Management of cash flows
* Name of TNC home country.
** Name of TNC subsidiary country.
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Transnational Accounting (TRANSACC) by Dieter Ordelheide and KPMG, Palgrave,
Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampsliire, UK, 2001, second edition, xxv + 3325 pp. (US$650).
This massive, three-volume reference work provides detailed and authoritative chapters on
the accounting norms for both individual and group accounts in 19 countries. Chapters are
also devoted to the European Union's (EU) rules and to International Accounting Standards.
Apart from Argentina, Australia, Canada, Japan and the United States, all of the countries are
European. Of the 1 5 EU countries, all but Greece, Ireland and Luxembourg are included. The
other European countries are Norway and Switzerland. Five countries are new to the second
edition: Argentina, Finland, Italy, Norway and Portugal.
The chapters contain a wealth of historical and institutional material, as well as an
extensive treatment of the governing measurement, format and disclosure norms. Two
"reference matrices," dealing with (1) the recognition and valuation rules and (2) the
principles of consolidation, provide a comparative analysis bridging the 19 countries and the
lASC's standards, with each item keyed to the pertinent section in a chapter. A two-part
glossary contains definitions of some 500 important terms in English and then displays their
equivalents in 1 1 other languages.
This book easily justifies the price of US$650.
The authors of the chapters are distinguished academics and practitioners, and both they
and the editors have done their jobs well. This treatise is a fitting memorial to Dieter
Ordelheide, one of the foremost academic leaders of European accounting, who died at age
60 in May 2000, following a long illness.
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IAS/UK GAAP Comparison: A Comparison Between IAS and UK Accounting Principles, by
the Financial Reporting Group of Ernst Young, International Accounting Standards
Committee/Ernst & Young, London, 2001, xxix + 793 pp.
This useful reference volume has been prepared along the lines of the two GAAP
comparison books that were reported in the Capsule Commentary section in Vol. 36, No. 2
of this journal. The core of the book consists of a detailed comparison of UK GAAP and
lASC standards on facing pages, and in an opening chapter, the regulatory background to UK
and lASC financial reporting is discussed. Almost one-fifth of the book is devoted to a
concluding chapter in which the principal differences between UK GAAP and lASC
standards are summarized.
The authoritative treatise appears at an opportune time, as the old lASC board has now
been replaced by the lASB.
Stephen A. Zeff
Jesse H. Jones Graduate School ofManagement
Rice University, P.O. Box 1892
Houston, TX 77251-1892, USA
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International accounting standards: survey 2000
by David Cairns, International Financial Reporting (www.caims.co.uk), Henley-on-Thames,
Oxfordshire, UK, 2001, xii+371 pp. (£250/US$370/-420)
This is the second edition of David Cairns' immensely valuable survey of the use of lASC
standards around the world. This edition is one third longer than its predecessor, yet it is
much more reasonably priced (£250 versus £650).
In this second edition. Cairns found that 102 (62%) of 165 companies that referred to the
use of IAS in their financial statements actually complied fiilly with the IAS. That compares
with 54% of the 125 companies he surveyed the previous year. He observes that "TAS lite' is
alive and well" (p. 2). He also found that the auditors of more than one third of the surveyed
companies did not report on compliance with IAS.
As he notes, by 2005, the European Union will require all listed companies to publish IAS
financial statements. Yet, he adds, only 20% of the FTSE's Eurotop 300 companies currently
uses IAS. Otherwise put, almost 250 of Europe's largest companies will have to change their
financial reporting in time for the deadline. "This is an immense challenge," he writes, "for
the companies, their auditors, and, indeed, the users of their financial statements" (p. 3).
Capsule commentaries 'ill
Cairns' survey is rich in detail and covers 26 countries (plus Hong Kong). Of the 165
companies included in the study, all but 22 are European. Introductory chapters deal with the
nature and role of the lASC, IOSCO, the SEC, and the EU, and also explain the sources of
national GAAP and its relation with IAS in each of the 27 jurisdictions as well as in others not
covered by the survey. Instances of noncompliance with IAS are analyzed both by company
and by the relevant LASC standard.
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Tel: +1-713-348-6066
Fax: +1-713-348-5251
E-mail address: sazeff@rice.edu
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Book review
Corporate governance, accountability, and pressures to perform: an international study
by Istemi S. Demirag, JAI Press, Stamford, CT, 1998, xv+395 pp.
Over the last decade, Istemi Demirag has been steadily and energetically contributing to
the debate on corporate governance, exploring how corporate governance systems introduce
bias into the investment decisions of the firm — the so-called short termism problem. Short
termism is a form of investment myopia— or, more rigorously, the tendency of firms to make
decisions on the basis of a discount rate that exceeds the firm's cost of capital. It implies
underinvestment in long-term, risky projects, and therefore it may undermine the long-run
competitiveness of a firm — or even of a whole economic system.
While the ghost of investment myopia has been haunting many debates on corporate
governance, "industrial renewal" and the competitive future of nations, an adequate
empirical picture of such a phenomenon is still missing. On these premises, the book edited
by Demirag is a welcome contribution, as it improves our understanding of short termism and
frames the issue in a proper international, comparative perspective.
This book stems from a research project coordinated by the editor and conducted
simultaneously in 1 1 countries: the UK, the US, Canada, Australia, the Netherlands, Sweden,
Denmark, France, Italy, Germany and Japan. (Austria and Switzerland are also considered in
the subproject on Germany.) The geographical breadth of this project makes it, in itself, a
remarkable exception in a research landscape dominated by studies on the Anglo-Saxon
institutional context.
Indeed, the research project is not aimed at comparing the actual nature and intensity of
short termism in such countries, but rather at investigating how pressures toward short-term
performance are perceived by key actors in the decision making process, and how such
pressures consequently affect the selection and evaluation of R&D projects — taken here as
paradigmatic examples of risky, long-term investments vital to the firms' future. The same
questionnaire has provided the ground for a survey that has been conduced in all 1 1 countries,
targeting the financial directors of listed (and exceptionally nonlisted) companies.
The book is organized by national systems. For every country, a chapter provides a
thorough introduction to the structure and recent evolution of its national corporate
govemance system, and reports the results of the survey research. An introductory chapter
sets a general framework for the research project; a final chapter indicates "emerging trends
and clusters," and discusses some comparative data.
The theoretical framework presented by Demirag is complex, but it still relies on the
accepted distinction between a market-oriented "outsider" model of corporate govemance
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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(such as that one prevaihng in the US and UK), and an "insider" model, where the role of the
banking system is much more emphasized. Examples of the latter are the European
"continental" model and the Japanese model. The outsider model is one in which unsatisfied
investors tend to resort more frequently to exit than to voice, and in which managerial reward
systems reflect more directly the short-run performance of the firm. As a result, one should
expect short termism to prevail within such a corporate governance model. Furthermore, such
pressures, once perceived, should be reflected in the selection and appraisal ofR&D projects,
with a stronger emphasis on short-term financial indicators of performance.
Chapters dedicated to single countries have the peculiar merit of showing that national
systems are evolving in directions that make the outsider- insider distinction increasingly
blurred, and produce an emerging picture in which nuances count more now than in the past,
and much heterogeneity can be found within each country.
The complexity of the emerging picture is reinforced by the surprising comparative results
of the questionnaire survey. Japanese firms confirm their relative immunity fi^om short-term
pressures. But the data gathered by Demirag and his coworkers strikingly disconfirm the
received wisdom that "continental" firms are shielded from short termism by an insider-
oriented governance system. In particular, finance directors in both Germany and Italy (two
archetypical examples of the continental governance system) actually exhibit a stronger
perception of "pressures to perform" fi"om shareholders and financial analysts than their UK
counterparts. On this ground, as well as in the light of other findings of the research, even the
very mild defense of the outsider- insider thesis attempted in the book's conclusions is not
entirely convincing. For example, the conclusion that "A majority of [the UK] group finance
Directors perceive strong bias against long term research. . .amongst analysts and share-
holders" (p. 86) requires one to stretch somewhat the interpretation of the questionnaire
responses, which show little concern for the effects of such bias, if any exists. (By the way,
Demirag and his coauthors are very careful to point to the most problematic evidence.)
Indeed, the most surprising and challenging result is that the conventional classification of
national governance systems is of little help in predicting the perception of pressures to
perform by corporate decision makers— a finding that, if confirmed by further research, will
force a substantial revision of many entrenched beliefs.
Given these unexpected results, which go against the stream of current thinking, the reader
may regret that little effort has been made to characterize groups of firms within each national
system. For example, one might argue that short termism affects the sample firms differently as
a result of major differences in their governance structure. Or, at least, it would be desirable to
know whether there is any systematic relation between different "short termistic" features
emerging from the questionnaires. Unfortunately, only a few of the chapters attempt to analyze
the main features of "high pressure" firms and test hypotheses about their "short termist"
behavior (This may be due to sample size problems in many of the national surveys.) In most
cases, only average responses and a few other descriptive statistics are reported.
Responses on the evaluation and management of R&D projects within the sample firms
provide additional, precious information on a subject on which systematic empirical research
is in short supply. It confirms that financial measures are still much in use in evaluating and
assessing innovation projects, although it is hard to establish their actual impact on the actual
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decision-making process (and finance directors might be quite biased respondents in this
respect). Since data gathered in the different countries come from the same questionnaire
format, it is really a pity that the results are not presented in homogeneous ways across
different chapters, thus making comparative assessments rather uneasy.
Despite a few missed opportunities in fully exploiting the comparative potential of data
collected, the book clearly stands as a major effort to place the debate on short termism in the
right international perspective. While evidence of short termism in the financial directors'
perceptions is found, apparently it does not meaningfully relate to conventional govemance
models. There must clearly be more than the insider/outsider distinction to the explanation of
investment myopia. After all, a banking system hungry for liquidity may be more myopic
than markets. And, as the recent dot-com craze suggests, markets in search of self-reinforcing
expectations may occasionally run into the opposite visual defect.
Massimo Warglien
Universitd Ca ' Foscari di Venezia
Venice, Italy
Fax: +39-41-520865
E-mail address: warglien@unive.it
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Book review
The convergence handbook: a comparison between international accounting standards
and UK financial reporting requirements
by David Cairns and Christopher Nobes, The Institute of Chartered Accountants of England
and Wales, London, December 2000, pp. v+ 108 (£25).
The purpose of this handbook is to compare the accounting requirements for UK
companies (UK GAAP) with the requirements of International Accounting Standards (lASs)
and make recommendations for improvements to both. A foreword by Sir David Tweedie,
then chairman of the UK Accounting Standards Board (ASB), explains that the work was
carried out at the request of the ASB. It was prompted by the European Commission's
proposal to improve the harmonization of accounting within the single market, which will
lead to the consolidated accounts of listed companies within the European Union being
required to comply with LASs by 2005. This proposal is significant for financial reporting in
the British Isles, and accordingly the ASB has given The Convergence Handbook the status
of an exposure draft in its own consultation process.
The authors, who need no introduction in the literature of intemational accounting, were
chosen for their close involvement with the work of the lASC: David Cairns as Secretary
General for 10 years to 1994 and Chris Nobes as one of the two UK board delegates to lASC
since 1993.
The major part of the text is an "inventory of differences," arranged by five sections
covering the context of reporting, assets and revenue, liabilities, group accounting, and
presentation and disclosures. Within each section there are topics, 28 in all. For each topic
there is a concisely structured and readable analysis of (a) incompatibilities, (b) items dealt
with in more detail by UK requirements, (c) items dealt with in more detail by IAS
requirements, (d) extra disclosures required by UK requirements, and (e) extra disclosures
required by IAS requirements.
This exercise has value in itself in bringing up to date a UK/IAS comparison. The authors
go fijrther in Chapter 4 in showing where recommendations for change must lie if
convergence is to be achieved, and linking these to the inventory of differences. The first
route is to improve existing UK GAAP by eliminating optional accounting treatments and by
adopting superior IAS treatments. The second route is to change company law, with the key
problem lying in the concept of "realized profits." Next come recommendations for
improvement in existing lASs by eliminating optional accounting treatments and by adopting
superior UK GAAP treatments, with the third route being the lASC Improvements Project
(suggestions include prohibifion of LIFO), and the fourth route being major lASC projects
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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(suggestions include replacing the cash flow standard IAS 7 with the UK standard FRS 1).
The fifth route is joint projects continuing work of the kind formerly undertaken by the G4 + 1
standard setters.
The remit of the Handbook necessitates what could be read as recommendations on
bilateral negotiation; the authors are aware that the UK's ASB is only one of the players
involved in convergence moves. The phrase "superior treatments," in places expanded to
"superior UK treatments," might be seen in a global context as a whiff of imperialism,
although again it is largely a consequence of the stated remit. No prioritization is offered in
relation to the five sets of recommendations, either across the categories or within each. The
foreword by the secretary general of the lASC asserts that the future success of the lASC in
achieving convergence will depend heavily on the maintenance of several strong national
standard setters to ensure that international decisions are tested in the context of excellent
national contributions. That assertion is written in a context of praising the ASB for its
distinguished record in setting domestic accounting standards and contributing strongly in the
international debate. However, it does admit continuation of what may become uneasy moves
to finding the balance of power in global standard setting. The authors warn that the IOSCO
endorsement of lASs must not be allowed to block continuing development of lASs.
The ASB should be congratulated for commissioning this work by two outstanding writers
and on using it as an early opportunity for consultation on the UK position. Given the
European Commission's target of 2005, it is important to understand the implications of
accepting lASs if that were to involve losing what could be regarded as "superior" UK
elements. The Convergence Handbook is a useful reference source that goes beyond technical
comparisons and toward proposing steps to convergence. It leaves the reader with scope for
thought-provoking analysis of the priorities and sequence of events. It gives no advice on the
negotiating stance that might be taken by the national standard setter. Should the domestic
situation be put in order, hoping that the LASC will reciprocate? Should the national body
make changes, but conditional on seeing the lASC match these concessions? Is any one of the
recommendations in The Convergence Handbook a step too far for either party? The
analytical basis of this book should be of interest well beyond its UK-specific context.
Pauline Weetman
Strathclyde University
Glasgow, UK
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Comparative issues in local government accounting
By Eugenio Caperchione and Riccardo Mussari, Kluwer Academic Publishing, Boston/
Dordrecht/London, 2000, xx+266 pp.
During the last two decades, there have been a number of significant reforms in local
government accounting practices around the world. A common factor driving all of these
changes is the increasing need for governments to measure the efficacy and efficiency of their
performance. This trend is particularly apparent at the local government level. The purpose of
this book, according to its preface, is to provide a comparative international perspective on
local govemment innovations, and it presents specific cases involving different economic,
political, and cultural conditions. Countries receiving extended treatment include Belgium,
China, France, Italy, Japan, Malaysia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Russia, Spain, UK, and
the US. The book contains 15 comparative papers written by 21 authors (including the
editors) that were presented at the Sixth Biennial Comparative Intemational Govemment
Accounting Research Conference, which was held at Bocconi University in Milan on June 5-
6, 1997. The authors updated their papers in order to investigate thoroughly the accounting
issues they had chosen to address during the conference.
The result is a remarkable overview of issues of topical interest concerning local
govemment accounting in many countries. The accounting reforms are part of far-reaching
and very complex processes of social change, which define new grounds for the relationship
between govemment and citizens. It is very difficult to identify and suggest one single key to
the interpretation of these changes. Differences can be found according to the following
variables: stage of economic development, the form of govemment, geographic size, history,
accounting traditions, legal stmcture, state and governmental models, the roles ascribed to
central and local govemment levels, and how accounting standards are set out and reviewed.
Nevertheless, at the level of local govemment, one notices a growing awareness of the need
for suitable accounting systems to generate information on the results produced in terms of
effectiveness, efficiency, and economy.
The paper on "Accounting and Accountability in Local Govemment: A Framework," by
Elio Borgonovi and Eugenio Anessi-Pessina (Italy), gives a short overview on current trends
in the role and stmcture of local govemment and their implications for local govemment
accounting. The integration of cash accounting with accmal accounting and the recognition,
control, and disclosure of economic performances are certainly the key factors in this
evolution. The authors state that "LG accounting should become a component of a wider
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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information system covering cash flows, costs and revenues, assets and liabilities, but also
activities, outputs, needs, customer satisfaction" and "what we need is no longer (or not
solely) 'government accounting' but rather 'accounting for governance'" (p. 9).
The following five contributions focus on a comparative analysis of similarities and
differences that characterize the accounting approaches adopted in various national contexts.
Based on general assumptions about economic and political significance, as well taking into
account the analytical significance of budget coverage, James L. Chan (US) describes the
transformation of the Chinese state budget during the reform period and illustrates how the
American federal government applies the unified budget principle. He identifies some
exceptions to the rule and draws some Sino-American comparisons.
Despite considerable similarities in societal, political, and administrative variables, the UK
and New Zealand have chosen different ways of reforming capital accounting in local
governments. Irvine Lapsley (Scotland) and June Fallot (New Zealand) report that in both
countries, there is an increasing belief that private sector accounting practices are equally
applicable to the public sector (as proposed by the Public Sector Committee of the
International Federation of Accountants). Nevertheless, several "accounting mutations"
occurred when aligning public sector accounting with that of the private sector. Furthermore,
it is not possible to understand fiilly accounting outcomes through an examination ofthe merits
of cash versus accrual accounting alone. Also, the determination ofproper accounting practice
inevitably reflects some significant contextual factors, including the history of past practices.
The study reveals a high incidence ofnoncompliance within local authorities in both countries.
A study about financial reporting practice in the UK and Malaysia (Hugh M. Coombs and
Mohamad Tayib) shows that the development of public sector accounting in the two countries
has been very much influenced by the level of interest expressed by central government and
professional bodies. The disclosure practices of local authorities are shaped by the complex
and dynamic environment in which their reporting practices originated.
In his paper, Eugenio Caperchione (Italy) brings out the reasons behind innovations in
govemmental accounting systems. His paper, which is written from a very interesting
methodological point of view, aims at analyzing the state of the art of govemmental
accounting systems in a number of market economy countries. The guidelines of the reforms
implemented, or under discussion, in the leading countries are presented and commented
upon, some degree of uniformity is pointed out, and the main trends are identified. One of the
most interesting results of his study is the fact that "there are no indisputable elements nor
objective findings to sustain that accrual accounting actually improves information that is
useful in making economic decisions and, consequently, the performance of public entities"
(p. 82). He writes, "No accounting system enjoys universal validity, as accountancy always
holds an instrumental function . . . [and] the more contextual the modernisation of account-
ancy is to the overall modernisation of the entire public administration of a country, the more
meaning and vigour it acquires. Whenever it is reduced to mere technicality, it hardly ever
produces the expected results" (p. 83).
The fifth of the comparative papers, presented by Jose Manuel Vela and Iluminada Fuertes
(Spain), deals with some methodological considerations about the comparative analysis of
local govemmental accounting systems in Europe. The present state of accounting systems
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reflects a high degree of heterogeneity. Differences among municipal organizations, in
accounting standard-setting organizations, and even in accounting systems are the main
factors why any comparability or harmonization of local govemmental accounting systems is
difficult to achieve. Nevertheless, the European Union should start with the implementation
of a process of convergence in government accounting systems. They write, "This process
has been developed at a business accounting level ever since the seventies and has offered at
this level, to date, clear encouraging results. We don't find objective reasons to argue that a
harmonization process of National Governments in Europe is not justifiable or convenient in
the European Union" (p. 99).
All of the other papers concentrate on highly important issues in the current stage of
accounting innovation, and their analysis is focused on individual countries. Johan R.
Christiaens highlights (with reference to the municipal accounting reform in Flanders) how
the introduction of accrual accounting often does not lead to a higher quahty of information
available to managers, especially when budgetary accounting systems continue to prevail
over business-like accounting. G. Jan van Helden's paper offers some interesting views on the
organizational difficulties when cost allocation systems are introduced in a Dutch municip-
ality. Kiyoshi Yamamoto expands Klaus Liider's contingency model into a multiprincipal and
agent model in terms of governance, which was useful for explaining plural reforms in the
Japanese public sector. Anatoli Bourmistrov and Erode Mellemvik give an impressive
analysis of the development of accounting systems in Russia, and they come to the
conclusion that the accounting reality does not change as fast as the rhetoric of politicians,
reflecting the ideas oi perestroika (p. 170).
When local authorities decided to adopt accrual accounting, one of the thorniest problems
to tackle lays in the measurement and recognition of long-term assets and, more specifically,
the infi-astructure assets and national heritage. The different solutions to this issue are shown
in the papers of Riccardo Mussari (Italy), Rita H. Cheng and Jean E. Harris (US), Amparo
Gimeno Ruiz (Spain), and Evelyne Lande (France). One paper is dedicated to the extemal
audit in Spain (Vicente Montesinos Julve).
The editors, in short, have produced a well-organized collection of revised papers, which
give a good and valuable insight into various aspects of activities to increase the performance
of local government accounting systems throughout the world. This makes the book suitable
both for scholars and practitioners. It can also serve as resource material for courses in public
sector accounting.
Reinbert Schauer
Johannes Kepler Universitdt Linz
Institutfur Betriebswirtschafts-lehre der Gemeinwirtschaftlichen
Linz-AuhofA-4040, Austria
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Abstract
Our study investigates the relative and incremental information content of earnings, operating cash
flows, and accruals in the emerging capital market of China. The issue is tested by regressing stock
returns on the levels of eamings and their components. Based on a sample of 1516 firm-years for
listed Chinese firms during 1995-1998, our results demonstrate that eamings have relative
information content over operating cash flows. The autocorrelations and cross-sectional correlations
also imply that eamings have greater persistence and predictability than operating cash flows. We also
find that discretionary accruals provide incremental information beyond that contained in nondiscre-
tionary accruals, consistent with the argument that discretionary accruals improve the relevance of
eamings in reflecting the fundamental values of the listed Chinese firms. Unlike prior findings in the
studies on developed markets, we find no strong evidence that the value attached to discretionary
accruals is lower than the value attached to nondiscretionary accruals. This is consistent with the
argument that managerial policy choices available for the listed Chinese firms were rather limited
during our sample period under relatively uniform People's Republic of China Accounting Standards
(PRC-GAAP), thus, producing fewer opportunities for eamings management. An alternative
interpretation could be that Chinese investors are functionally fixated on eamings. © 2001 University
of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The role of accounting earnings in pricing securities has been an important question in
accounting research (e.g., Ball & Brown, 1968). Prior evidence indicates that accrual earnings
play an important role in the valuation process because it mitigates timing and mismatching
problems inherent in cash flow measures of firm performance (Dechow, 1994). Meanwhile,
the reliability and usefulness of accruals have been questioned because managers can
manipulate them to alter reported earnings through the flexibility accorded under generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP). Managerial discretion could distort reported earn-
ings if managers manage income opportunistically, thereby garbling the reported earnings
(Watts & Zimmerman, 1986). On the other hand, managerial discretion could enhance
earnings informativeness by allowing communication of private information (Healy &
Palepu, 1993).^
Prior studies that focus on mature markets like the United States or United Kingdom
examine whether accruals add information to operating cash flows to improve earnings'
ability to explain returns and whether discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals are priced
differently. Some researchers document that both operating cash flows and accruals have
incremental information content over each other and they are priced differently by the market
(e.g., Bowen, Burghstahler, & Daley, 1987; Cheng, Liu, & Schaefer, 1997; Dechow, 1994;
Wilson, 1986, 1987). On the contrary, other studies find little evidence of either component
having incremental information content (e.g., Bernard & Stober, 1989). Recently, Subrama-
nyam (1996) finds that the market prices discretionary accruals, possibly because the
discretionary component improves earnings' ability to reflect fundamental value. Beaver
and Engel (1996) and Walhen (1994) report that discretionary accruals have incremental
information content in commercial banks' loan loss disclosures.
These studies focus on mature markets, such as in the United States. The role of accrual
accounting has yet to be studied in the emerging capital market of China. Privately owned
Chinese firms are at a young stage and are less known to investors. The accounting standards
and practices in China are evolving slowly. Financial reporting and capital market systems,
too, are relatively primitive and the quality of auditing is generally perceived to be low,
compared to the mature markets of the United States and United Kingdom (Abdel-khalik,
Wong, & Wu, 1999; Aharony, Lee, & Wong, 2000) where accounting systems are more
sophisticated and investors relatively well informed. Some critics argue that accounting
information in emerging capital markets like China may not be reliable or useftil to investors.
Managerial choices of accounting methods and estimates are limited because of China's
relatively uniform accounting methods and procedures (discussed more in the following
section). Thus, examination of pricing discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals is unlikely
to shed light on our understanding of the role of accruals in China's emerging capital market.
' Recent studies have also investigated managers' choice of accruals on compensation (DeFond & Park,
1997), political cost (Han & Wang, 1998), and auditor change decisions (DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). Some
studies examine whether transactions and discretionary accruals are executed to achieve regulatory capital,
earnings, and tax goals in the banking industry (e.g., Scholes, Wilson, & Wolfson, 1990).
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This study examines the relative and incremental information content of earnings,
operating cash flows, and accruals in the emerging capital market of China. The issue is
investigated by regressing stock returns on the levels of earnings and its components. The
coefficients and explanatory power of the regression models are compared to assess the
incremental and relative information content of earnings and its components. We estimate
discretionary accruals using the cross-sectional variant of the Jones model used in previous
studies (e.g., Han & Wang, 1998; Jones, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996).
Our analysis is based on a sample of 1516 firm-years for listed Chinese firms during
1995-1998. Our results show that the earnings coefficient is positive and statistically
significant, consistent with recent findings that earnings under the People's Republic of
China Accounting Standards (PRC-GAAP) are value-relevant to investors (Bao & Chow,
1999; Haw, Qi, & Wu, 1999, 2000). While earnings alone explains 5.8% of the variation of
annual returns, operating cash flows alone explains only 0.3%. The incremental adjusted ^
of earnings over operating cash flows is statistically significant, indicating that earnings has
greater relative information content. The autocorrelations and cross-sectional correlations also
imply that earnings have greater persistence and predictability than operating cash flows.
Regression results indicate that earnings has incremental information content over
operating cash flows, but not vice versa. Our results also demonstrate that both discretionary
and nondiscretionary accruals contribute to the value-relevance of earnings. Discretionary
accruals provide incremental information content beyond that contained in the nondiscre-
tionary component of eamings, consistent with the argument that discretionary accruals
improve the relevance of eamings in reflecting the fundamental value of the firm. Unlike
prior findings in the developed markets, however, we find no strong evidence that the value
attached to discretionary accruals is smaller than the value attached to the nondiscretionary
eamings component, even though there is some weak evidence indicating that discretionary
accruals have a lower multiplier than nondiscretionary accruals in the later years of our
sample period. The evidence is consistent with the argument that managerial policy choices
for the listed Chinese firms were rather limited in selecting accounting methods and making
accounting estimates under PRC-GAAP, thus, producing fewer opportunities for eamings
management. An altemative interpretation could be that Chinese investors are ftinctionally
fixated on eamings (e.g.. Hand, 1989; Sloan, 1996).
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the institutional background.
Section 3 presents the hypotheses and research design. Section 4 describes the sample.
Section 5 reports empirical findings, followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.
2. Institutional background
2.1. The emerging capital market of China
The growth rate of the PRC's economy has been among the highest in the world during the
last decade. One of the most important structural changes in the Chinese economy is the
reactivation of security markets to improve the operating performance of state-owned
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enterprises (SOEs) and promote a market-oriented economy. The history of the present
Chinese stock market system can be traced back to 1984 when the Shanghai Municipal
Government approved the first securities regulation in China. Subsequently, Feilo Electronics
issued China's first stock in 1984, which began trading in 1986 on the over-the-counter
market. However, the stockholding system did not become a significant vehicle for the SOE
reform until the reactivation of the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE) in December 1990 and
the establishment of the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) in April 1991. Total market
capitalization of A-shares (only available to domestic investors) in the two stock exchanges
accounts for more than 90% of the total market capitalization.^ Several large high-profile
Chinese companies are also listed on the Hong Kong and New York stock exchanges.
In July 1992, the Chinese Security Regulatory Commission (CSRC) was set up as the
Chinese equivalent of the US Securities and Exchange Commission to monitor and regulate
the stock market. Since then, the stock market has expanded rapidly. In 1991, there were only
eight and five stocks listed on the SHSE and SZSE, respectively. By the end of 1998, the
number of firms listed on these two exchanges had increased to 438 and 413. At the end of
1998, the total market capitalization of listed Chinese firms reached 1.93 trillion yuan
(equivalent to US$232 billion), up fi"om 10.9 billion yuan (equivalent to US$1.3 billion) in
1991. This was equivalent to 24% of China's GDP in the year, demonstrating that the stock
market had become to play an important role in China's economy.
2.2. The accounting system in China
Since 1993, China has required all domestic enterprises including SOEs to use accounting
standards as defined in the "Accounting System for Selected Shareholding Companies" and
"Enterprise Accounting Standards" issued by the Ministry of Finance.^ The A-share
companies prepare their balance sheet, income statement, and statement of changes in
financial posifion according to PRC-GAAP, while B-share (only available to foreign invest-
ors) companies are required to prepare financial statements based on International Accounting
Standards (IAS)."* By law, these financial statements have to be audited and released within 4
months after the fiscal year-end. All Chinese firms are required to use the same fiscal year-
end as of December 3 1
.
Two types of shares are traded on the two stock exchanges: A-shares denominated in Renminbi to Chinese
nationals in the SHSE and the SZSE and B-shares denominated in US dollars in the SHSE and Hong Kong dollars
in the SZSE for foreign investors. A-shares dominate share trading on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges.
At the end of 1998, 745 of the 851 listed firms only issued A-shares, 27 firms only issued B-shares, and 79 firms
issued both A- and B-shares.
The "Accounting System for Selected Shareholding Companies" was in effect until the end of 1997. In
January 1998, the Ministry of Finance revised it substantially and formalized it as "Accounting System for
Shareholding Companies." The Ministry has recently issued 39 exposure drafts of detailed accounting standards,
several of which have been formally promulgated. Currently, all listed Chinese companies prepare their financial
statements according to this new accounting system along with the promulgated detailed accounting standards.
"^ Cash flow statement has replaced statement of changes in financial position since mid- 1998. Thus, the listed
Chinese firms are required to disclose cash flow statement from the fiscal year 1998. The content of the statement
is similar to FASB No. 95 in the United States.
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For our sample period, significant gaps still existed between the accounting treatments
under PRC-GAAP and IAS, as PRC-GAAP tended to specify the accounting methods and
procedures instead of allowing managerial choices. For instance, inventories were stated at
cost under PRC-GAAP, whereas IAS allows the lower-of-cost or net realizable value.
Provisions for bad debts were required not to exceed 0.3-0.5% of total receivables per year
under PRC-GAAP, but they are discretionary by managers under IAS. Under PRC-GAAP,
only the straight-line method was allowed for the fixed asset depreciation with residual value
of 3-5% of the cost of a fixed asset. In sum, managers of the listed Chinese firms had less
degree of discretion in selecting accounting methods and making accounting estimates.^
3. Research design
3.1. Hypotheses
Previous studies (e.g., Bernard & Stober, 1989; Subramanyam, 1996; Wilson, 1986,
1987) examine the value relevance of cash flows and accruals in a regression where the
dependent variable is stock returns. Based on the US data, Subramanyam (1996) and
Wilson (1986, 1987), among others, report results consistent with both components having
incremental information content, while Bernard and Stober (1989) find little of such
evidence. Dechow (1994) reports that accrual-based earnings is a superior measure of firm
performance than cash flows. Given relatively primitive and incomplete financial reporting
systems and low quality of auditing in China, however, the value relevance of information
contained in accruals and operating cash flows remains to be an empirical issue. This study
investigates the relative information content of earnings and operating cash flows and also
examines whether accrual earnings provides incremental information beyond that contained
in operating cash flows in China's emerging capital market.
There is evidence that discretionary accruals have incremental information content in the
mature market of the United States (Subramanyam, 1996). However, the superiority of
accrual-based earnings critically depends on the availability of discretionary accounting
choices and quality auditing. Since accounting policy choices and estimates are generally
specified and less discretionary, compared to those in mature markets, the managers of listed
Chinese firms have fewer opportunities for earnings management. Thus, we also investigate
whether discretionary accruals provide incremental information content beyond that provided
by the nondiscretionary component of earnings in China's emerging capital market.
3.2. Research models
In order to test the hypotheses, annual market-adjusted returns are regressed on the
levels of earnings and its components, which is consistent with Dechow (1994) and
^ Since 1999, the new PRC accounting system and promulgated detailed accounting standards permit some
flexibility in selecting accounting methods and making estimates.
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Subramanyam (1996). We first develop the following linear regression models (Eqs. (1-
3)) to test relative and incremental information content of net income (NI) and operating
cash flows (OCF):
RET,v = a + PiNI,v + e,v, (1)
RET,, = a + [3iOCF,, + £,,, (2)
RET,, = a + 3iNI„ + (320CF,Y + £,,. (3)
We then fiirther decompose earnings to test incremental information content of total accruals
(ACCR), discretionary (DAC), and nondiscretionary accruals (NDAC), separately as below
(Eqs. (4) and (5)):
RET,, = a + (3iOCF„ + [32ACCR,, + e,,, (4)
RET,, = a + 3iOCF„ + PsNDAC,, + PsDAC,, + e„. (5)
All of the explanatory variables are scaled by lagged total assets for firm /, consistent
with prior studies. The dependent variable, RET, is annual market-adjusted stock returns
measured over a 12-month period ending 4 months after the fiscal year-end. In China,
listed firms have to release their annual financial statements within 4 months Irom the
fiscal year-end.
Whichever performance measure (OCF vs. NI) has a higher association (R^) with stock
returns is interpreted as more effectively summarizing firm performance or relatively more
value-relevant. Alternatively, the coefficients of earnings components are compared to
assess the incremental information content of the variables. We estimate the models in
two ways: (1) pooled both cross-sectionally and intertemporally and (2) cross-sectionally
by year.
3.3. Measurement of discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals
While nondiscretionary accruals are accounting adjustments to operating cash flows as
mandated by accounting standard-setting bodies, discretionary accruals are adjustments
subject to management discretion. Managers choose discretionary accruals irom an
opportunity set of generally accepted procedures defined by accounting standard-setting
bodies and, thus, discretionary accruals are often used as a measure of managers'
earnings manipulation.
We compute total accruals (ACCR) as consistent with previous studies of earnings
management (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, & Sweeney, 1995; Jones, 1991).^ Operating cash flows
(OCF) are measured as the difference between net income (NI) and total accruals.
'^ ACCR, = (ACurrent asset - ACash - AShort-term lending) - (ACurrent liability - AShort-term borro-
wing — AAccrued income taxes — ACurrent portion of long-term debt) — Depreciation — Amortization, where
the change (A) is computed between time / and /—I.
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Discretionary accruals (DAC) are determined using the Jones model used in previous studies
(e.g., Han & Wong, 1997; Jones, 1991; Subramanyam, 1996):^
ACCR/^„_i = Oi[\/A,.x] + (3[AREV,v/^,7-il + 7[PPE,7/^z7^i] + £/, (6)
where ACCR/, = total accruals in year t for firm /, AREV,7 = revenues in year t less revenues in
year t—\ for firm /, PPE,y = gross property, plant, and equipment in year t for firm z,
Ait- 1 = total assets in year t — \ for firm /, and £,> = error term in year t for firm /.
All variables are scaled by lagged total assets to reduce heteroscedasticity. The model is
estimated separately for each industry-year (using a two-digit industry code).^ Nondiscre-
tionary accruals (NDAC) are defined as the fitted value from Eq. (6):
NDAQ, = a[l/^,,-i] + [3[AREV,,/^„_il -f- 7[PPE,//^,,-i]
where a, 3, and 7 are ordinary least-square estimates. Discretionary accruals (DAC) are
defined as the residual:
DAQ, = ACCR,v/^,7-i - Oi[\/A,.,] - [3[AREV,,/^,-,_i] - 7[PPE,,/^.7-il.
As in prior studies, the level of gross property, plant, and equipment and the change in
revenues are included to control for changes in nondiscretionary accruals caused by the
change of economic conditions. The coefficient for AREV is expected to be positive because
changes in working capital accounts such as accounts receivable, inventory, and accounts
payable are part of total accruals and are positively related to changes in revenues. We expect
the coefficient for PPE to be negative because higher fixed assets are expected to lead to
higher depreciation expense, which reduces total accruals.
4. Sample and descriptive statistics
4.1. Sample
The sample selection starts with the entire population of listed Chinese firms with A-shares
on the SZSE and SHSE for 1995-1998. Years prior to 1995 are excluded from our sample
because the disclosure of depreciation and amortization expenses was not required until 1995
when the Statement of Changes in Financial Position was mandated. For each of 1995-1998,
annual financial statements and the monthly equity prices of the sample firms are obtained
from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) database.
Panel A of Table 1 reports the sample selection procedure. Starting with 3464 firm-year
observations available in the TEJ database, the final sample was reduced to 1516 firm-years.
^ We also used the modified Jones model proposed by Dechow et al. (1995) to estimate discretionary accruals.
The results are very similar with those using the Jones model.
^ We also estimated Eq. (6) using pooled cross-sectional and time-series regressions for each industry based
on two-digit industry code. The results are quite similar with those using the cross-sectional models for each
industry-year.
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Table 1
Sample selection and distribution
Panel A. Sample selection procedure
Number of firm-years
Total firm-years covered by the Taiwan Economic Journal
(TEJ) database, 1995-1998
Less firm-years:
with financial statement data missing
with stock price data missing at the end of April in each year
with fewer than 10 firms in each industry-year
Firm-years included in the sample
Panel B. Sample distribution by stock exchange and year
3464
(835)
(786)
(327)
1516
Exchange 1995 1996 1997 1998 Total (%)
Shanghai
Shenzhen
Total
128 148 218 339 833 (55)
85 99 192 307 683 (45)
213 247 410 646 1516
Panel C. Industry distribution by year
1995 1996 1997 1998 Total
Number of industries
Average number of firms in each industry-year
13
16.4
13
19.0
15
27.3
22
29.4
63
24.1
We excluded 1 62 1 firm-year observations because of the lack of either financial statement
data (835) or stock price data (786). We further exclude 327 firm-years because of the
insufficient observation available (fewer than 10 firm-years) in each industry-year to estimate
nondiscretionary accruals. Since complete financial and market data are not available for all
the sample firms for all the 4 years examined, the number of firms analyzed in the study
varies fi^om year to year.
Panel B of Table 1 summarizes the sample distribution by year and stock exchange. The
sample consists of 833 firm-years listed on the SHSE (55%) and 683 firm-years on the SZSE
(45%). Following the rapid expansion of listed firms in China, the number of sample firms
increases over time from 213 in 1995 to 646 in 1998. Panel C reports industry distribufion by
sample year On average, 24 observations are used in each industry-year for estimating
nondiscretionary accruals for a total of 63 industry-years.
4.2. Estimation of nondiscretionary accruals and descriptive statistics
We decompose total accruals into discretionary and nondiscretionary components using the
Jones model. For the 63 industry-years, the mean and median coefficients (not tabulated) on
AREVare 0.090 and 0.075, respectively, and are statistically significant at the .01 level. They
are similar with those in the US studies (e.g., Subramanyam, 1996). The mean (median)
coefficient on PPE is — 0.001 ( — 0.001), consistent with the predicted negative sign, but is
not significant at the conventional level. The lack of significance on the PPE coefficient might
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be due to smaller amount of depreciation expenses recognized under PRC-GAAP since it
requires the use of straight-line method and longer life period for estimating depreciation. The
overall results indicate that the Jones model appears reasonably applicable to the listed
Chinese firms.
^
5. Empirical results
5.1. Descriptive statistics
The means (medians) for the regression variables are reported in Table 2. Net income and
operating cash flows are positive. The means (medians) of total accruals (ACCR), discre-
tionary accruals (DAC), and nondiscretionary accruals (NDAC) are, in general, positive for
each of the 4 years and the pooled (full) sample. They are inconsistent with those for the US
accrual studies (e.g., Jones, 1991; Sloan, 1996), where total accruals are on an average
negative. These differences are mainly due to the small amount of depreciation expenses
recognized under PRC-GAAP. We also find that the standard deviation (unreported) of net
income is 0.081, which is lower than that of operating cash flows (0.149). Thus, net income is
less volatile than operating cash flows, which could indicate that inclusion of accruals in
reported earnings reduced its divergence. The results are similar with those in the US studies
(e.g., Subramanyam, 1996).
Table 3 reports contemporaneous Pearson correlation coefficients between various com-
ponents of net income. Net income (NI) is positively correlated with each of its components.
This is not surprising since net income is merely an aggregation of its components. Operating
cash flows (OCF) is negatively correlated with total accruals (ACCR), with mean
correlation coefficient of — .84, consistent with prior evidence in Dechow (1994), Dechow
et al. (1995), and Subramanyam (1996). This negative correlation could arise due to accrual
accounting or income smoothing. The correlation between operating cash flows and
discretionary accruals is — .75, in comparison to that of — .36 between operating cash
flows and nondiscretionary accruals. Thus, discretionary accounting choices explain a larger
portion of the negative correlation between operating cash flows and total accruals than
nondiscretionary accruals. While discretionary accruals (DAC) is negatively correlated with
nondiscretionary accruals (NDAC) with a mean coefficient of — .04, the correlation is not
significant at the conventional level. Thus, there is no evidence that listed Chinese firms
smoothen income.
To further examine the implications of income smoothing for the persistence and
predictability of earnings and operating cash flows, we compute the autocorrelations and
If the model erroneously classifies nondiscretionary accruals as discretionary, the coefficient on discretionary
accruals will be overstated. That is, discretionary accruals may be implied to be informative when they are actually
not. The misclassification problem, which is common to earnings management studies, will reduce the power of
the tests.
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Table 2
Descriptive statistics
1995 1996 1997 1998 Full sample
N 213 247 410 646 1516
RET 0.019 (-0.078) 0.020 (-0.288) -0.017 (-0.118) 0.005 ( - 0.077) 0.004 ( - 0.097)
NI 0.059 (0.050) 0.050 (0.046) 0.065 (0.064) 0.058 (0.062) 0.059 (0.060)
OCF 0.011 (0.017) 0.016 (0.014) 0.031 (0.022) 0.018(0.010) 0.020 (0.014)
ACCR 0.048 (0.025) 0.035 (0.011) 0.034 (0.014) 0.041 (0.032) 0.039 (0.024)
NDAC 0.039 (0.019) 0.089 (0.025) 0.028 (0.014) 0.032 (0.021) 0.032 (0.019)
DAC 0.008 (0.002) 0.003 ( - 0.007) 0.006 (0.002) 0.009 (0.006) 0.007 (0.002)
Reported are mean (median) values of regression variables.
RET is the cumulative annual market-adjusted stock returns measured over 12 months ending 4 months after the
fiscal year-end. NI is consolidated net income as defined in the TEJ Database. ACCR is total accruals. OCF is
operating cash flows calculated as the difference between NI and ACCR. DAC and NDAC are discretionary
accruals and nondiscretionary accruals obtained from the Jones model, respectively. All variables are scaled by
lagged total assets.
cross-correlations between the level of current and future net income and operating cash
flows. The higher the autocorrelations, the greater the persistence (Collins & Kothari,
1989). The results (not tabulated) indicate that current net income is more positively
correlated with 1 -year-ahead net income and operating cash flows than current operating
cash flows. The Spearman correlation coefficient between current net income and 1 -year-
ahead net income (operating cash flows) is .76 (.11), which is higher than the correlation
coefficient between current operating cash flows and 1 -year-ahead net income (operating
cash flows) of .20 (.10). This result indicates that net income is more persistent relative to
operating cash flows. The median correlation between 1 -year-ahead net income and
current net income (operating cash flows) is .76 (.20), which is higher than the correlation
between 1 -year-ahead operating cash flows and current net income (operating cash flows)
of .11 (.10). This result is consistent with higher predictability of net income vis-a-vis
operating cash flows.
Table 3
Pearson correlation coefficients of earnings components variables
OCF ACCR NDAC DAC
NI .2225 (.0001) .3360 (.0001) .2682 (.0001) .2229 (.0001)
OCF -.8435 (.0001) -.3583 (.0001) -.7513 (.0001)
ACCR .4939 (.0001) .8486 (.0001)
NDAC -.0408 (.1121)
^=1516.
Reported are Pearson correlation coefficients among the variables. The P values needed for the coefficients to be
significantly different from zero are presented in parenthesis.
NI is consolidated net income as defined in TEJ Database. ACCR is total accruals. OCF is operating cash flows
calculated as the difference between NI and ACCR. DAC and NDAC are, respectively, discretionary accruals and
nondiscretionary accruals obtained from the Jones model. All variables are scaled by lagged total assets.
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5.2. Regression results oj returns on earnings and operating cash flows
Table 4 summarizes the results of the pooled and cross-sectional regressions on the relative
and incremental information content of earnings and operating cash flows. Panels A and B
report results of the simple regressions for testing the relative information content. In Panel A,
with net income alone as the explanatory variable, the adjusted R~ for the full sample is 5.8%.
The coefficient on net income is 1.43 and significant at the .01 level. The annual regression
results present a similar pattern, but the coefficients appear unstable over time. The
explanatory power of net income is higher for 1996 (during the bull market) than for other
periods. Panel B presents the results with operating cash flows alone as the explanatory
variable. The adjusted I^ for the fiill sample is only 0.3%. The regression coefficient is .18,
significant at the .05 level. The coefficients in annual regressions are positive but not
significant at the conventional levels except for 1998. The explanatory powers of operating
Table 4
Relative and incremental information content of earnings and operating cash flows^
Full sample 1995 1996 1997 1998
A^ 1516 213 247 410 646
Panel A. Regression results of ma)ket-adjusted returns on net income
Intercept -0.08 -0.08 -0.41 -0.08 - 0.025
(-2.15)** (-2.25)** (-6.71)*** (-3.37)*** (-1.58)
Net income 1.43 1.58 6.55 0.76 0.36
(9.54)*** (3.64)*** (9.96)*** (3.63)*** (2.53)**
Adjusted R~ .058 .055 .285 .029 .008
Panel B. Regression results of market-adjusted returns on operating cash flows
Intercept 0.01 0.001 - 0.09 -0.03 -0.01
(0.18) (0.22) (-1.51) (-1.40) ( - 0.46)
Operating 0.18 0.19 0.65 -0.02 0.14
cash flows (2.00)** (0.90) (1.52) (-0.19) (1.65)*
Adjusted R^ .003 -.000 .005 -.002 .003
Panel C. Regn3Ssion results ofmatf-ket--adjusted returns on net income and' operating cash flows
Intercept -0.08 -0.09 -0.41 -0.08 -0.02
(-2.15)** (-2.28)** (-6.72)*** (-3.36)*** (-1.53)
Net income 1.43 1.57 6.50 0.82 0.32
(9.32)*** (3.61)*** (9.81)*** (3.81)*** (2.16)**
Operating -0.00 0.17 0.24 -0.14 0.09
cash flows ( - 0.06) (0.82) (0.66) (-1.17) (1.01)
Adjusted R^ .057 .053 .284 .030 .008
Annual dummy variables are included in each regression for the fiill sample but their coefficients are not reported
in the table for parsimony.
'^ Reported numbers are regression coefficients (/ value).
* Indicates significance at the .10 level.
** Indicates significance at the .05 level.
*** Indicates significance at the .01 level.
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cash flows in the cross-sectional regressions are quite low. In sum, the regressions on earnings
alone (Panel A) exhibit substantially higher explanatory powers and coefficients relative to
the models with CFO alone (Panel B).
We conducted a likelihood ratio test suggested by Vuong (1989) to determine which model
explains more of the dependent variable/ ° The Z statistics for the comparison between
regressions in Panels A and B indicate that the incremental explanatory power of net income
relative to operating cash flows is statistically significant at the .01 level. This evidence is
consistent with the hypothesis that net income explains a greater portion of contemporaneous
returns than operating cash flows. Consistent with Dechow (1994) and Subramanyam (1996),
our results suggest that earnings are more value-relevant than operating cash flows due to the
inclusion of accruals in China's emerging capital market.
Panel C tests the incremental information content of net income and operating cash flows
in the same muhiple regression. The results demonstrate that while the coefficients on net
income are positive and, on average, significant at the .01 level, the coefficients on operating
cash flows are not statistically significant at the conventional levels. This indicates that net
income has incremental information content beyond that provided by operating cash flows,
but not vice versa.
5.3. Regression results of returns on earnings and its components
Table 5 examines incremental information content of earnings components in multiple
regressions. In Panel A, earnings are decomposed into operating cash flows and total
accruals. The coefficients on operating cash flows and total accruals are quite similar for
the fiill and cross-sectional samples. For the full sample, both the coefficients of operafing
cash flows and total accruals are 1.43 and significant at the .01 level. Their annual coefficients
are significantly positive but not statistically different from each other. The evidence suggests
that both earnings components are significantly associated with stock returns and that total
accruals have incremental information content beyond that provided by operating cash flows.
Moreover, the weight attached to the accrual component is similar to the weight attached to
operating cash flows. The adjusted R^ of the model for the full sample is 5.7%, which is
substantially higher than 0.3% (Panel B of Table 4) when returns are regressed on operating
cash flows alone. Our results are consistent with earlier US studies (Subramanyam, 1996).
Panel B decomposes net income into three parts: operating cash flows, nondiscretionary
accruals, and discretionary accruals. For the fiill sample, the coefficients on operating cash
flows, nondiscretionary accruals, and discretionary accruals are 1.40, 1.59, and 1.35,
respectively (all are significant at the .01 level). These results suggest that in addition to
operating cash flows, both nondiscretionary and discretionary components of accruals
contribute to the value relevance of earnings and discretionary accruals provide incremental
information over that contained in the nondiscretionary component of earnings. Moreover,
See Dechow (1994) for a discussion of the merits and technical details regarding the Vuong's likelihood
ratio test.
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Table 5
Incremental information content of earnings and its components"
Full sample 1995 1996 1997 1998
N 1516 213 247 410 646
Panel A. Regression results of market-adjusted returns on operating cash flows and total acci•uals
Intercept
'
-0.08 -0.09 -0.41 -0.08 -0.02
(-2.15)** (-2.28)** (-6.71)*** (-3.36)*** (-1.53)
Operating cash flows 1.43 1.73 6.74 0.68 0.41
(8.96)*** (3.65)*** (9.36)*** (3.11)*** (2.71)***
Total accruals 1.43 1.57 6.50 0.82 0.32
(9 31)*** (3.61)*** (9.81)*** (3.81)*** (2.16)**
Adjusted R" .057 .053 .284 .030 .008
Panel B. Regression results of market-adjusted returns on operating cash jlows, nondiscretionary accruals and
discretionary accruals
Intercept -0.08 -0.08 -0.40 -0.09 -0.03
(
-
2.28)** (-2.25)** (-6.43)*** (-3.81)*** (- 1.94)*
Operating cash flows 1.40 1.82 6.80 0.60 0.38
(8.73)*** (3.72)*** (9.40)*** (2.77)*** (2.46)**
Nondiscretionary accruals 1.59 1.47 6.13 1.34 0.60
(8.23)*** (3.26)*** (7.76)*** (4.66)*** (3.00)***
Discretionary accruals 1.35 1.75 6.75 0.60 0.21
(8.10)*** (3.47)*** (9.36)*** (2.60)*** (1.30)
Adjusted R^ .057 .051 .283 .045 .013
Annual dummy variables are included in each regression for the ftill sample but their coefficients are not reported
in the table for parsimony.
^ Reported numbers are regression coefficients {t value).
* Indicates significance at the .10 levels, respectively.
** Indicates significance at the .05 level.
*** Indicates significance at the .01 level.
the market, on average, does not value differently the discretionary and nondiscretionary
components of accruals. For example, the coefficient of discretionary accruals is not
statistically different from those of operating cash flows and nondiscretionary accruals for
the full sample and for each of 1995 and 1996. On the other hand, while the coefficients of
discretionary accruals for 1997-1998 are not statistically different from those of operating
cash flows, they are significantly smaller than those of nondiscretionary accruals at the .05
level. Therefore, there is some weak evidence that the weight attached to the discretionary
accruals is lower than the weight attached to the nondiscretionary components of earnings in
the later years of our sample period. The adjusted I^ of the model for the full sample is 5.7%,
which is similar to that in Panel A with total accruals and operating cash flows as the
explanatory variables.
In summary, the results in Table 5 reveal that in China's emerging capital market, accruals
have incremental information content beyond that contained in operating cash flows and the
market attaches rather similar value to both operating cash flows and accruals. Both
discretionary and nondiscretionary components contribute to the value relevance of total
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accruals. Discretionary accruals provide incremental information over that provided by
nondiscretionary accruals and operating cash flows, but they are priced rather similarly.
Our results imply that China's capital market may be functionally fixated on earnings. We
examined this issue further in a manner similar to Sloan (1996). We estimate a pooled
regression of current net income on lagged operating cash flows and lagged total accruals
(each scaled by lagged total assets). Because of the short history of listed Chinese firms and
the use of lagged data, our sample is reduced to 860 firm-years. The coefficients on lagged
operating cash flows and lagged total accruals are 0.68 and 0.66, respectively, and both are
statistically significant at the .01 level. However, they are not statistically different from each
other (P=.\2), indicating that the persistence of operating cash flows and accruals are
similar.'^ Such findings suggest that Chinese investors may be correct in attaching similar
weights to operating cash flows and accruals. However, such an inference needs to be made
cautiously since our sample size is much smaller than those used in prior US studies (e.g.,
40,679 firm-years in Sloan, 1996). Results from a larger sample could have indicated that
operating cash flows are more persistent than accruals, thus, supporting the functional
fixation hypothesis.
6. Conclusion
While earnings is related to security returns of the firm, there is mixed evidence about the
usefulness of the accrual components of earnings for firm valuation. On the one hand, the
Financial Accounting Standards Board maintains that accruals are usefiil for assessing share
values. On the other hand, some financial analysts question the reliability and relevance of
eamings because of its accrual components. They argue that managers tend to manipulate
accruals to alter reported eamings through the flexibility accorded under various GAAP.
Prior research (e.g., Dechow, 1994; Subramanyam, 1996) examines the relation of stock
returns with accruals and cash flow performance measures. Although they find that the two
components of eamings provide different information to the market about fiiture cash flows,
their results are consistent with accmals having incremental information content over
operating cash flows. These studies are based on findings in mature markets, such as in
the United States. There is no empirical evidence based on how the accmal components of
eamings are priced in China's emerging capital market. Unlike the case in mature markets,
accounting mles in China have no room for discretion in selecting accounting methods and
making accounting estimates. Furthermore, China's market is less sophisticated and Chinese
investors have limited access to firm-specific information.
Based on a sample of 15 16 firm-years for 1995-1998 starting with the entire populafion of
A-share listed Chinese firms, our study examines the relative and incremental information
content of accmals in China's emerging capital market. The simple regression results
'' We also run the pooled regression by each industry based on two-digit industry code. Results based on the
mean and median of the coefficients are similar with those using the pooled sample.
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demonstrate a greater explanatory power when the stock returns are regressed on earnings
relative to operating cash flows. While earnings alone explain 5.8% of the variation of annual
returns, operating cash flows alone explains only 0.3%. This finding suggests that earnings
have greater relative information content over operating cash flows because accruals are
included. Our result also indicates that earnings has incremental information content over
operating cash flows, but not vice versa. The autocorrelations and cross-sectional correlations
suggest that earnings have greater persistence and predictability vis-a-vis operating cash flows.
Multiple regression results show that accruals add information to operating cash flows. We
find that discretionary and nondiscretionary accruals have incremental information content
over operating cash flows, and, therefore, contribute to the value relevance of earnings.
Consistent with the prior studies of the developed capital markets, discretionary accruals are
priced in China's emerging market and provide incremental information beyond that
contained in the nondiscretionary component of earnings. Unlike the findings in prior studies
on mature markets, we find no strong evidence that the value attached to discretionary
accruals is lower than the value attached to the nondiscretionary earnings component, even
though there is some weak evidence indicating that discretionary accruals have a lower
multiplier than nondiscretionary accruals in the later years of our sample period.
Our results imply that domestic investors in China's emerging capital market rely on
earnings information more than operating cash flow information in the valuation process.
This evidence is consistent with the argument that Chinese investors may not be able to
accurately estimate operating cash flows when the cash flow statement was not readily
available and hence are functionally fixated on earnings (e.g.. Hand, 1989; Sloan, 1996). An
alternative interpretation could be that managerial policy choices for the listed Chinese firms
are rather limited in selecting accounting methods and making accounting estimates under
PRC-GAAP, thus, producing fewer opportunities for earnings management.
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Abstract
Previous research has documented a positive relation between variation in audit fees across
countries and specific macroeconomic factors such as a country's level of litigiousness and the level of
required disclosure. Such studies have focused on the supply of auditor services using single-equation
models. This study examines not only the supply of but also the demand for large-firm auditors across
20 different countries using the simultaneous-equations approach. This approach is used to account
for the endogeneity between choice of auditor and audit fees. The results indicate an association
between greater disclosure requirements and the choice of a large-finn auditor. They also indicate that
increased litigation and regulation are associated with higher audit fees. © 2001 University of Illinois.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
This paper examines the demand for auditor reputation across international markets for
audit services. To address this issue, we examine a sample of audit fees across 20 countries that
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vary in their disclosure, litigation, and regulatory environments. We specifically examine the
association between country-specific measures of disclosure, litigation, and regulatory burden
with the level of audit fees and the demand for auditor reputation. The choice of a large-firm
auditor is of interest because previous research has linked auditor size and auditor quality
(Colbert & Murray, 1998; Reed, Trombley, & Dhaliwal, 2000). Consistent with some previous
studies, the choice of a large-firm auditor is a proxy for auditor reputation (e.g., Simunic,
1 980). If it is assumed that clients trade off auditor reputadon and agency costs, net of audit
costs, then the study of auditor reputation potentially provides information about the factors
influencing purchase of large-firm auditors. One potential factor influencing agency costs is
the level of disclosure. By considering a large international sample with diversity in disclosure,
we are able to consider the impact of disclosure on the choice of a high-reputation auditor.
A considerable amount of research addresses understanding the microeconomic under-
pinnings of the markets for audit services in individual countries (e.g.. Firth, 1985; Simon,
1995; Simon & Taylor, 1997; Simunic, 1980; Taylor, 1997; Taylor, Simon, & Burton, 1999).
The vast majority of these studies examine fees from audit engagements conducted in a single
country. These studies have not, for the most part, considered the extent to which fees are
determined by macroeconomic and other environmental factors that vary across countries.
A few previous studies have examined macroeconomic and other environmental factors
that differ across countries. Clarkson and Simunic (1994) utilize differences between
Canadian and US legal environments to test the hypothesis that new issuers of securities
are more likely to choose a high-quality auditor as firm-specific risk increases. Taylor and
Simon (in press) find that increased litigation pressures, institutional traditions of increased
disclosure, and increased regulation are associated with higher audit fees using data from
20 countries. Wingate (1994) finds a positive relation between a country's level of litigious-
ness and audit fees, and between the level of required disclosure and audit fees using a study
of data from 10 countries.
This study extends this research by considering the demand for auditor reputation in a
global context. Copley, Doucet, and Gaver (1994) and Copley, Gaver, and Gaver (1995)
documented the simultaneity between the supply and demand for auditor reputation for the
US audit market. This paper considers the simultaneity between the supply and demand for
auditor reputation using international data. This approach provides further insight into the
effects of litigation pressures, institutional traditions of increased disclosure, and regulation
on audit fees using the simultaneous-equations approach.
The results also indicate that the higher the disclosure level for a country, the more likely
the choice of a large-firm auditor By simultaneously estimating the demand and supply of
audit services, our results confirm two previous studies of audit fees that indicate higher
litigation propensities and higher levels of regulation are associated with higher audit fees.
Unlike Copley et al. (1994), we do not find an inverse relation between audit quality and
audit fee once endogeneity has been explicitly considered in this context. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews previous literature. Section 3 develops
the expectations underlying the expected relationships between auditor reputation, audit fees,
and the political/economic variables of interest. Section 4 outlines the sample and methodo-
logy. Section 5 discusses the results. Section 6 concludes the paper.
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2. Previous research
Beginning with Simunic (1980), a number of studies have examined the market for
auditing services in specific countries. Studies have covered the more developed countries
such as the US (e.g., Francis & Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1986), the UK (e.g., Brinn, Peel, &
Roberts, 1994; Chen, Ezzamel, & Gwillam, 1993), Australia (e.g., Francis, 1984; Francis &
Stokes, 1986), and Japan (Taylor, 1997). More recently, researchers have also examined the
market for audit services in other countries including India (Simon, Ramanan, & Dugar,
1986), Hong Kong, Malaysia, and Singapore (Low & Koh, 1990; Simon, Treo, & Trompeter,
1992), New Zealand (Firth, 1985), Canada (e.g., Anderson & Zeghal, 1994; Chung &
Lindsay, 1988), Pakistan (Simon & Taylor, 1997), and Bangladesh (Karim & Moizer, 1996).
The majority of these earlier studies have served to establish the association between audit
fees and variables related to auditee size, risk, and complexity. All of these studies were based
on single-country models of audit fees and ignore between-country variation in the
accounting environment.
Two recent studies combined observations from different countries in order to assess
country-specific effects on audit fees. Wingate (1994) considers the effects of litigation and
disclosure policies on audit fees from approximately 600 engagements from 10 countries
during the period 1986-1989. Wingate argues that there is evidence of differences in
production functions across countries. Taylor and Simon (in press) extend the analysis to
consider a more heterogeneous sample with fee data from 20 countries over the period 1990-
1995. Taylor and Simon find that higher audit fees are associated with increased litigation
pressures, institutional traditions of increased disclosure, and increased regulation. Neither
Taylor and Simon nor Wingate considers the demand for audit services or the simultaneity
between supply and demand. We extend this line of research to consider the simultaneous
estimation of the supply and demand of differentiated audits.
3. Motivation
Previous literature has described the audit as a differentiated product traded in a non-
arbitrageable market.^ Simunic argues that the principal characteristic of the audit is the
identity of the supplier, with the auditor's brand name or reputation being one differentiating
attribute (Simunic & Stein, 1987). Unfortunately, existing theory does not provide sufficient
insight to allow us to identify either the complete set of endogenous variables that are jointly
and simultaneously determined with audit quality, or the exogenous variables which underlie
them (Clarkson & Simunic, 1994). A general conceptual model that has been used as a
Cross-sectional variation in audit and auditor attributes is assumed by Copley et al. (1995), Dopuch and
Simunic (1982), Simunic (1980), and Simunic and Stein (1987), among others, and relates to the work on
hedonistic markets by Rosen (1974).
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representation of the audit market has been expressed in the following form (Copley et al.,
1994, p. 247) (Eqs. (1) and (2)):^
Quality =/ [client — demand characteristics, fee] (1)
Fee =/ [client complexity, competition, audit bid factors, quality] (2)
The advantage of this model is that it explicitly considers the endogeneity of audit quality
and audit fee. The slopes of the demand and supply functions, as captured by the audit quality
variable in the demand model and the audit fee variable in the supply model, are pertinent to
the debate concerning the competitive nature of audit services. If price competition prevails,
the expectation is that the demand for quality with respect to price is downward sloping,
while the supply function is upward sloping. Findings of this nature are consistent with a
competitive market for a differentiated product. Copley et al. (1995) point out that ignoring
endogeneity of audit fees and audit attributes engenders problems of parameter identification
and estimation bias, which prevents meaningful interpretation of variable coefficients. In the
system of audit-fee and audit-quality equations, the dependent variables fee and audit quality
are also independent variables. The basic econometric issue is that in a single-equation fee
model that includes the endogenous variable audit quality as an independent variable, that
endogenous variable is not independent of the error term.^
A disadvantage of this type of model is that little theory is available to identify specific
client-demand characteristics or client-complexity characteristics. Further, little guidance is
available to unambiguously separate demand characteristics from supply characteristics. That
is, many audit-client characteristics could be considered common to both the demand and
supply equations. The choice of variables included as client-demand characteristics and the
choice of variables to be included in the auditor's cost function are relatively arbitrary. To
estimate the equations, it is necessary to include at least one identifying characteristic in the
demand equation. Consistent with previous studies using simultaneous models of audit fee
and audit quality, our proxy selections are relatively arbitrary and the results must be
interpreted with respect to this limitation.
3.1. Demandfor auditor reputation
Models of the demand for auditing services focus on the demand for auditor reputation
(e.g. Copley et al., 1995) or quality (e.g. Copley et al., 1994) as a differentiating attribute.
Copley et al. (1995) focus on the client's need to purchase the services of an independent
auditor and assume that the level of auditor reputation demanded is determined by the
reduction in agency cost. That is, audit clients have characteristics that create cross-sectional
variation in the demand for auditor reputation. Thus, the client trades off auditor reputation
Consistent with previous work, we use quality and fees as the dependent variables, though we readily
acknowledge that this line of research has abstracted considerably from the standard economic formulation of the
analysis of prices and quantities that would suggest the analysis of marginal fees.
Refer to Kennedy (1989, p. 126) for a description of the general problem.
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and agency costs net of audit costs. Consistent with other studies of auditor reputation, we use
the choice of a large-firm auditor as a proxy for auditor reputation.
The empirical tests of these models use client-specific variables to control for differences
in agency costs. Copley et al. (1994) model audit quality as a function of firm size, audit fee,
and specific governmental variables. For auditee size, we use ln(Assets), the natural log of the
client's assets. Copley et al. (1995) focus on variables that mitigate a firm's agency costs. For
example, interest costs can be reduced and credit ratings increased by enhancing the
credibility of financial statements. Leverage, auditee total long-term debt divided by total
assets, is used as a proxy for the extent of auditee debt.
The data also allow us to consider factors that vary across countries and that could account
for shifts in the demand for audit quality. One such factor is variation in disclosure level
across countries. Audit clients in countries requiring relatively more disclosure are expected
to choose a high-reputation auditor. That is, audit clients needing higher levels of disclosure
would also demand a higher level of assurance regarding those disclosures. However, to the
extent that auditor reputation can substitute for high-quality disclosure, this prediction might
not hold and, hence, an empirical test is required.
Another factor that can potentially influence the demand for auditor reputation across
countries is the level of development within each country. To the extent that countries have a
developed economy, we would expect that complex legal and regulatory requirements have
evolved. Demand for high-quality audits is expected in more developed countries because of
the sophistication of audit procedures required. We therefore expect that countries with more
developed economies would tend to have a higher proportion of audits conducted by large,
international audit firms. We use gross domestic product (GDP) per capita to capture this
effect.^ To the extent that this proxy captures a variety of influences that vary between more
and less developed countries, our results must be interpreted with respect to this limitation.
3.2. Fee model
Following previous research, we control for individual client characteristics through the
following variables. For auditee size, we use ln(Assets), the natural log of the client's assets.
The principal audit-complexity variable, Invrec, represents the proportion of auditee total
assets in inventory and receivables. SqSubs, the square root of the number of the client
subsidiaries is used as an audit-complexity variable (Simunic, 1980).
Loss, an indicator variable whose value is one if an auditee experienced a loss in the
current or previous year and zero otherwise, is utilized as a measure of risk. In addition to the
size, complexity, and risk variables, we also employ variables that previous research has
determined are systematically related to audit fees and that control for the industry in which
the client operates. Financial, Utility, and Mining are indicator variables whose value is one if
the auditee 's SIC is in the financial institution, utility, or mining industry, respectively, and
' We also considered measures of labor costs (from World Bank statistics) but we found labor costs to be
highly correlated with per capita GDP (Spearman correlations of approximately .80) and provided no additional
explanatory power beyond the inclusion of GDP.
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zero otherwise.^ Finally, we include an indicator variable, Big6, which has a value of one if
the audit was performed by a Big 6 (now Big 5) firm and a value of zero otherwise.
We expect the coefficients on In(Assets), Invrec, SqSubs, and Loss to be positive. For
example, ceteris paribus, larger auditees (as measured by total assets) will require more audit
effort and result in higher fees. In addition to these size and risk factors, certain assets require
more audit effort and hence, lead to higher audit fees; in particular, receivables and inventory
typically require more effort for a given level of dollars to be audited than other assets.
Auditees that have relatively more subsidiaries are also expected to have higher fees. Based
on research that has determined that fees are lower for financial institutions, utilities, or
mining operations (e.g., Simon, 1995; Simunic, 1980; Turpen, 1990), we expect the
coefficients on Financial, Utility, and Mining to be negative. Finally, as previous research
has shown that the large international audit firms are able to command a fee premium fi'om
clients engaging their services (see, e.g., Simon & Taylor, 1997; Simunic, 1980), we expect
the sign of the Big6 coefficient to be positive.
Following Taylor and Simon (in press), we include three macroeconomic variables:
litigation propensity, disclosure, and regulation. Other things equal, more intense litigation
pressures are expected to lead to higher audit fees. To measure the extent of litigation pressure
in a given political/economic environment, we obtained a litigation index provided by a
leading insurance brokerage firm, which maintains the litigation index for purposes of pricing
insurance premiums for large international accounting firms in countries across the world.
The index (Lit) is based on several environmental and political factors, which affect the
likelihood of litigation against audit firms. The index has a range of 0-10, is calculated
individually for a portfolio of about 110 countries, and is updated annually.^
Loss exposure can be expected to increase the greater the complexity of the financial
reporting system. One indication of that complexity is the average relative extent of
disclosure that accompanies firms' financial statements in a given political/economic system.
Previous research has shown that different accounting regimes have varying intensity and
extent of disclosure of "notes to financial statements." (e.g., CIFAR, 1995). We expect that in
financial reporting environments in which disclosure is relatively more extensive, audit fees
would increase accordingly. The Center for International Financial Analysis and Research
(CIFAR) has developed an index of international financial disclosure by examining annual
reports for approximately 1000 companies from 44 countries with respect to the companies'
reporting or nonreporting of 90 items subdivided into seven categories. The index, which we
label Disc, is a continuous variable with a potential range from 1 to 90. We expect the sign on
this variable to be positive.
^ Auditees with SIC codes in the ranges 1000-1299, 4900-4999, 6000-6999 are assigned a value of one to
the MINING, UTILITY, and FINANCIAL indicator variables, respectively.
The premium distribution formula does not include an observation for the US. However, based on
discussions with the project administrator, a value of 10 has been assigned to the US. Sensitivity analysis indicates
that the results are robust with respect to alternative values (all at the upper end of the range) assigned to the US.
We also estimated litigousness using the number of lawyers per 10,000 of population (as used by August, 1993)
and the results were consistent with those reported here.
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Another potentially important environmental factor that may affect audit fees is the overall
extent of regulation of the process of financial reporting and audit services. Typically,
regulation imposed by authoritative bodies increases the cost of the activity being regulated
and the intensity of that regulation varies depending on the poHtical and economic
environment in which the activity is being conducted. We employ Reg, a measure of the
intensity of such regulation as developed and reported in Cooke and Wallace (1990). Reg is a
continuous variable ranging from to 4.
3.3. Empirical model
Based on the foregoing, we specify the auditor reputation and fee functions as follows:
Big6 = a + 3iln(Assets) + (32Leverage + 6iDisc + 62GDP + 63ln(Fee) + £1 (3)
In(Fee) = a + 3iln(Assets) + [32lnvrec + 33L0SS + 34Financial + 35Utility
+ PgMining + PySqsubs + &i Disc + &2Lit + bsReg + 64Big6 + zj (4)
where the variables are as defined in Table 1.
Table 1
Definition of variables
Big6 An indicator variable taking the value one if the auditor is a Big 6 auditor, and zero otherwise.
ln(Fee) Natural log of annual audit fees (in millions) from Global Vantage, proxy statements, or
Moody's International manual.
In(Assets) Natural log of total assets (in millions) from annual reports.
Leverage Auditee financial leverage calculated as the total book value of long-term debt divided by total
book value of assets from the financial statements.
Lit A litigation index provided by a leading insurance brokerage firm, that maintains the litigation
index for purposes of pricing insurance premiums for large intemational accounting firms in
countries across the world. The index has a range of 0-10, is calculated individually for a
portfolio of about 1 1 countries, and is updated annually.
Disc The CIFAR index of intemational financial disclosure. The index is continuous with a range
from 1 to 90.
GDP The per capita GDP for the country.
Loss An indicator variable for a current-year financial-statement loss.
Financial An indicator variable taking the value one if a firm is a financial institution, and zero otherwise.
Utility An indicator variable taking the value one if the firm is a utility, and zero otherwise.
Mining An indicator variable taking the value one if the firm has mining operations, and zero otherwise.
Subs The number of subsidiaries is reported in Table 2. The square root of the number of
subsidiaries is used in the subsequent analysis. Hence, the variable in Eq. (4) is labeled Sqsubs.
Leverage Financial leverage ratio. A single leverage ratio above 2.0 was set to 2.0 to mitigate the
potential impact of this outlier on the analysis.
Invrec Represents the proportion of auditee total assets in inventory and receivables. Two ratios above
2.0 were set to 2.0 to mitigate the potential impact of these outliers on the analysis.
Reg Measures the intensity of such regulation as developed and reported by Cooke and Wallace
(1990). REG is a continuous variable ranging from to 4.
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Fee and Big6 are jointly determined endogenous variables. Ordinary least squares (OLS) is
inappropriate for estimating these equations because In(Fee) and Big 6 are correlated with £i
and c2 leading to inconsistent estimates. To avoid these biases, we used a two-stage procedure
described below.
4. Sample
The sample comprises 796 observations from audit engagements in 20 different countries
for the year 1994. Approximately half of the observations on fees in our sample came from
Standard and Poor's Global Vantage (SPGV) database. This data source was first augmented
by observations obtained from annual reports for countries where audit fees are required
disclosure but were not included in the SPGV database. For the seven countries in our study
in which audit fees are not required disclosure, fee data were obtained from proxy statements
(US) or questionnaires (Canada, Chile, Japan, Korea, Mexico, and Spain).
One of the problems associated with combining observations on financial statement items
from individual countries into one data set is differing monetary units. To address this
problem, we converted all monetary figures to US dollars. Income statement items were
converted using a 12-month moving average exchange rate; balance sheet items were
converted using the exchange rate as of the date of the respective item being converted.
Exchange rates were obtained from the SPGV database.
Table 2 presents descriptive statistics for the variables used in this study. Significant
variation is evident for most of the variables in Table 2. The distributions of the size and
audit-fee variables are highly skewed. To reduce the impact of outliers on the residuals, the
Table 2
Descriptive statistics
Standard
Variable Mean Median deviation Minimum Maximum
Fees 0.725 0.146 1.674 0.001 18.200
Big6 0.741 1.000 0.438 0.000 1.000
Litigation 5.416 4.240 2.616 1.270 10.000
Disclosure 70.694 72.000 6.693 52.000 79.000
GDP per Capita 1.340 1.473 1.106 0.025 3.680
Regulation 2.819 2.98 0.442 0.700 3.450
Assets 3,298 325 14,876 0.110 250,489
Leverage 0.149 0.080 0.508 2.0
Invrec 0.293 0.281 0.236 2.0
Loss 0.148 0.355 1
Financial 0.165 0.371 1
Utility 0.289 0.167 1
Mining 0.020 0.140 1
Subsidiaries 3.360 3.0 2.809 22.36
The sample consists of 796 audits across 20 countries. Log of fees and log of assets are used in all subsequent
analyses. Fees and assets are in millions of US dollars.
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Table 3
Mean of key variables by country''
GDP
Country Number Fees Big6 Disc per capita Reg
Australia'' 74 1.08 0.81 78 1.85 2.45
Canada'^ 15 0.46 1.00 70 1.86 3.27
Chile' 10 0.01 0.90 65 3.34 2.51
Great Britain'' 90 0.58 0.67 79 1.75 3.24
Hong Kong'' 58 0.39 0.79 73 2.26 2.98
India 43 0.01 0.30 52 .03 2.48
Ireland'' 25 0.56 0.96 74 1.47 3.24
Japan'^ 52 0.34 0.77 70 3.68 2.54
Korea*^ 39 4.90 0.77 68 0.85 3.04
Malaysia'' 64 0.14 0.73 74 0.36 2.49
Mexico'^ 8 0.29 0.63 65 0.40 3.19
New Zealand'' 22 0.39 0.95 71 1.47 2.60
Nigeria 17 0.04 0.53 64 0.04 2.80
Pakistan 58 0.01 0.41 61 0.04 3.01
Singapore'' 60 0.26 0.95 73 2.36 2.98
South Africa^ 77 0.48 0.75 72 0.28 3.03
Spain*^ 14 0.12 0.93 65 1.32 0.70
Sri Lanka 29 0.01 0.66 65 0.07 2.09
United States'^ 35 3.01 0.97 72 2.55 3.45
Zimbabwe 6 0.68 1.00 66 0.05 3.03
Overall mean 796 0.73 0.74 70.69 1.34 2.82
^ The litigation index cannot be reported by country due to a confidentiality agreement with the provider of
that index.
'' Source of fee data is SPGV Software.
"^ Source of fee data is responses to questionnaires sent by the authors to a sample of firms in countries which
were listed in Moody's International Manual.
Source of fee data is voluntary disclosures of audit fees by US firms in proxy statements filed with the U.S.
Securities Exchange Commission.
log of size and the log of audit fees are used in the subsequent analysis. Consistent with most
prior studies of audit fees (e.g. Craswell & Francis, 1999; Simunic, 1980), we use the square
root of the number of subsidiaries to capture the nonlinear relation between the number of
subsidiaries and fees. Table 3 presents the descriptive statistics of the macroeconomic
variables by country.
5. Results
Table 4 presents single-equation estimates of the auditor-reputation model (Eq. (3)) and the
audit-fee model (Eq. (4)). These initial estimates ignore the endogeneity between the two
equations, but facilitate a more direct comparison to previous research. Panel A of Table 4
presents the results estimating the auditor reputation model using a single-stage Probit
estimation. The overall model is significant with a pseudo R" of 9.56%. The coefficient on the
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Table 4
Single-equation estimation of the demand ftinction for auditor reputation and the auditor-fee function
Panel A: Probit estimation of the demand equation
Big 6 = Q + (3iln(Assets) + |32Leverage + 6, Disc + 62GDP + 63 In(Fee) + e
,
P value,
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient \~ statistic Pr>Chi
Intercept -.944 -1.598 .2062
ln(Assets) + .064 3.472 .0624
Leverage + .066 0.050 .8228
Disclosure + .019 4.116 .0425*
GDP + .093 2.775 .0958
In(Fee) - .090 7.833 .1199
n 796
Pseudo R^ 9.56
Panel B: OLS estimation of the audit-fee equation
In(Fee) = a + 3 1 ,nln(Assets) + Psinvrec + pjLoss + 34LTDebt + pjFinancial + pgUtility + 37Mining + 38Sqsubs + 6iLit
+ &2Disc + &3Reg + 38Big6 + £2
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t statistic P value
Intercept - 13.869 -18.144 .0001**
ln(Assets) + 0.626 21.532 .0001**
Invrec + 1.827 7.952 .0001**
Loss + 0.183 1.311 .1902
Financial — - 0.742 -5.252 .0001**
Utility - -0.855 -2.882 .0041**
Mining - -0.718 - 2.047 .0410*
Sqsubs + 0.077 3.572 .0004**
Litigation + 0.137 4.594 .0001**
Disc + 0.064 5.386 .0001**
Reg + 0.669 5.855 .0001**
Big6 + 0.276 2.377 .0177*
Adj. ;?- 66.3
n 796
* Significant at the alpha level of 5%, one-tailed test.
** Significant at the alpha level of 1%, one-tailed test.
disclosure index is positive and significantly greater than zero. The choice of a large-firm
auditor is positively related to the amount of disclosure. The coefficient on GDP per capita is
positive but only significant at the 10% level. The coefficients on assets and fees are not
significantly different from zero at conventional levels. This lack of significance could
potentially be explained by the high correlation between size and fees, and the resulting
multicollinearity. The impact of multicollinearity in the data is discussed below.
Panel B of Table 4 provides estimates of the audit-fee function using the OLS estimation
typically used in previous research. The fee model explains approximately 66% of the
variation in fees. Consistent with previous research, we find that fees are an increasing
fianction of auditee size, inventories and receivables, number of subsidiaries, and large-firm
N. Fargher et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 407-421 All
auditors. Also, fees are significantly lower for utilities, financial, and mining firms. We also
find that fees are higher for countries with higher disclosure requirements, higher perceived
incidence of litigation, tendencies toward more regulation, and the choice of a Big 6
auditor. These results are consistent with the findings of Taylor and Simon (in press) and
Wingate (1994).
We estimated the simultaneous model using a two-stage model (Heckman, 1978; Maddala,
1996). This method utilizes a two-stage approach to account for the endogeneity between
audit fees and the choice of auditor. The exogenous variables are used as instruments in the
Table 5
Simultaneous estimation of the demand fiinction for auditor reputation and the auditor-fee function
Panel A: Demand equation^
Big 6 = a + |3iln(Assets) + (32Leverage + feiDisc + 62GDP + 63ln(Fee) + e
,
P value
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient Z statistic (one-tailed)
Intercept - 1.191 -1.078 .1405
In(Assets) + 0.073 1.420 .0778
Leverage + 0.081 0.275 .3916
Disclosure + 0.021 1.801 .0358*
GDP + 0.093 1.550 .0605
hi(Fee)'' - 0.074 1.176 .1199
n 796
Pseudo R^ 8.86
Panel B: Audit fee equation
ln(Fee) = a+3nnln(Assets)+(32lnvrec+|33Loss+[34LTDebt+|35Financial+l36Utility+j37Mining+(38Subs+fe Lit
+62Disc+&3Reg+08Big6+e2
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t statistic P value
Intercept - 16.004 - 6.666 .0001
In(Assets) + 0.721 7.668 .0001**
Invrec + 1.968 7.416 .0001**
Loss + 0.405 1.604 .0546
Financial - - 0.824 - 5.093 .0066**
Utility — - 0.767 -2.486 .0194*
Mining - -0.729 - 2.070 .1966
Sqsubs + 0.597 2.199 .0141*
Litigation + 0.150 4.616 .0001**
Disc + 0.086 3.619 .0002**
Reg + 0.589 4.293 .0001**
Big6 + 1.506 0.890 .1868
Adj. R~ 66.5
n 796
* The simultaneous-equation probit model, using a two-stage least-squares estimation procedure. Statistics are
calculated using the asymptotic standard errors. The covariance between the residuals of the two equations is 0.06.
^ The value of In(Fee) predicted by the first-stage model. See Table 1 for description of other variables.
** Significant at the alpha level of 1%, one-tailed test.
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first stage to predict the probability of a large-firm auditor and fees, respectively. These
predicted variables are then used in the second stage.
Table 5 provides estimates using the simultaneous-equations model. The results are
generally consistent with the single-equation estimates. Panel A of Table 5 presents the
estimates for the auditor reputation model. The overall model is significant with a pseudo R"
of 8.86% for the two-stage model. The coefficient on the disclosure index is positive and
significantly greater than zero at a 5% level of significance. The coefficient on GDP per
capita is positive but only significant at an alpha level of 10%. The finding that the choice of a
large-firm auditor is positively related to the amount of disclosure in the country of interest is
robust to adjustment for the endogeneity of fees and quality.
Panel B of Table 5 provides estimates of the audit-fee function. The fee model explains
approximately 66% of the variation in fees. Consistent with previous research, we find that
fees: (a) are an increasing fijnction of auditee size, inventories, receivables, and the number of
subsidiaries and (b) are significantly lower for utilities and financial firms. We also find that
fees are higher for countries with higher disclosure requirements, higher propensities for
litigation and regulation. The results do not support the conclusion that fees are an increasing
function of large-firm auditor or financial statement loss. With the exception of the results
associated with the large-firm auditor, these results indicate that the simultaneous-equations
specification does not generally alter the findings obtained by OLS Taylor and Simon
(in press) and Wingate (1994). Unlike the Copley et al. (1995) findings using US data, we do
not find that audit fees are inversely related to audit quality once the endogeneity between
fees and quality is explicitly modeled.
5.7. Sensitivity analysis
We also estimated the single-stage models using a fixed-effects specification. Indicator
variables were included to capture a separate intercept for each of the countries. Indicator
variables cannot be included for all 20 countries because the country-specific rankings and
the country dummies can be combined to result in a variance-covariance matrix that is not of
full rank and therefore only 16 indicator variables were included. The coefficient on
disclosure was not significantly different from zero with inclusion of the country indicator
variables. This result indicates that the country-disclosure score cannot be readily separated
from the country differences per se in explaining choice of large-firm auditor.
We also considered litigation as a possible determinant of the choice of a large firm.
Previous analytical research (e.g., Schwartz, 1997; Smith & Tidrick, 1997) suggests that legal
liability can induce a higher audit quality. If greater legal liability results in a higher quality of
audit, this suggests that the Big 6 firms have a competitive advantage in litigious environments.
On the other hand, other things equal, more intense litigation pressures would be expected to
lead to lower participation by auditors with deep pockets. We did not find the litigafion or
regulation indexes to be significant in explaining variation in the choice of a Big 6 auditor.
The inferences reported above are somewhat conservative in that the high correlation
between variables in our sample potentially result in inflated variances and understated test
statistics for the explanatory variables due to multicollinearity. Kennedy (1985) indicates that
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a condition index greater than 30 indicates strong collinearity. Linear models of the choice of
large-firm auditor (Panel A of Tables 4 and 5) yield condition indexes greater than 30. The
insignificant test statistics on the total assets, GDP, and fee (predicted fee in Table 5) variables
could potentially be attributed to multicollinearity. While multicollinearity can potentially
lead to inflated variances and therefore a lack of significance with respect to some test
statistics, the multicollinearity cannot account for the significant test statistics reported.
5.2. Limitations
Concerns persist that highly competitive markets for audit services could result in impaired
auditor independence, audit quality, and auditor credibility. Deis and Hill (1998) point to two
particular issues regarding the related research: the unavailability of measures of ex post audit
quality, and the general failure to model both the demand and supply sides of the market for
audit services. We have attempted to mitigate the bias by simultaneously estimating both the
demand and supply sides of the market for audit services. Future research is needed, however,
to consider better measures of audit quality in an international context. Just as studies in the
US evolved to use more specific proxies for audit quality (e.g., Copley et al., 1995; O'Keefe,
King, & Gaver, 1994; O'Keefe & Westort, 1992), there is a similar need for development of
these studies in a global context.
6. Conclusions
Previous research examining cross-country variation in audit fees has not explicitly
considered the endogeneity between the demand and supply of audit quality documented
using US data by Copley et al. (1994). We extend previous research comparing audit fees
across countries to consider both the demand and supply of audit quality. We explicitly
consider that audit quality and audit fees are mutually determined by the interaction between
the client's demand for, and the audit firm's supply of, audit quality.
We find that disclosure characteristics are an important determinant of the choice of large-
firm auditor. The choice of a large-firm auditor is positively related to the amount of
disclosure in a given country. Our results also confirm previous findings that audit fees are
higher in countries with higher litigation propensity and more extensive regulation. In
particular, we find that these previous results are unchanged when simultaneity of fees and
auditor reputation is considered.
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"The demand for auditor reputation across international
markets for audit services"
Rajib Doogar
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Multicountry studies of audit markets are potentially a valuable source of insights into the
efficacy and efficiency of alternative institutional arrangements governing the production and
exchange of audit services. Consequently, I approached the Fargher et al. (2000) (hereafter
FTS) paper with a fairly sympathetic attitude. Since there is now a large body of research
literature in the area of international audit markets, it is useftil to review the challenges and
opportunities for the area as a whole before assessing the contribution this study makes.
1. Audit markets and industrial organization economics (lO) research
The size and scope of the literature FTS review suggests international audit-markets
research has reached a relatively mature phase. Consequently, research choices that sufficed
in the early days when less was known or understood may no longer be palatable. Over the
last 30 years, lO, the mother discipline for much of audit-markets research, has faced similar
challenges.^ In response, economists have learned to pay close attention to institutional
differences across markets and to the often subtle impact of rules of the game on game
outcomes. The increasing use of formal theoretical modeling and careful structural estimation
methods in 10 research reflects the need to address potential threats to the reliability of
inferences that may be drawn from empirical work.
' Schmalensee (1982) provides a useful perspective on the evolution of10 research (see also Jacquemin,1987).
The roots of empirical audit-markets research can for the most part be traced to a handful of papers (a partial list
would include: Danos & Eichenseher, 1982; Dopuch & Simunic, 1980; Simunic, 1980; Zeff& Possum, 1967). The
industrial organization connection in these early papers on audit markets is reflected not only in the tenor of the
exposition in these studies but also from citations to key works of modem industrial organization thought:
Bain (1956), Lancaster (1966), Rosen (1974), Stigler (1958, 1964, 1968), and Weiss (1972, 1974).
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I believe the recent history of lO has important parallels to and lessons for audit-markets
research. Audit markets are complicated and diverse institutions. While audit-markets
research faces many of the same challenges as 10 research in general, both the nature of
auditing and the complexity and variety of institutional arrangements affecting audit markets
make international research in audit markets particularly challenging.^
Like other service outputs, the quantity of auditing demanded by a client is in some
fundamental sense, essentially binary. Audit hours or audit firms' input utilization choices are
not publicly visible except in a highly aggregated form. Demand is often indivisible because
regulators and exchanges formally restrict the responsibility for the audit to a single provider
(e.g., in the United States). Audit fees are unobservable in some countries. Auditors'
obligations and auditor liability rules, the effectiveness and speed of the legal process by
which auditors are held responsible for audit failures, the ability to settle cases out of court,
and the stringency with which capital market regulators scrutinize auditor conduct all vary
considerably across countries as well.
Each of these factors potentially affects auditors' incentives and (therefore) managers' and
financial statement users' demand for audit quality. The capacities of audit firms and rules on
clientele sizes affect market outcomes as well.^ These differences in institutional settings and
rules mean that the information content of auditor switches and, therefore, the nature of
auditor- client relationships probably varies a lot across countries and most likely depends on
client characteristics, the age of the relationship, and competitive conditions as well as
macroeconomic factors."*
In sum, the complexity of audit markets certainly calls for statistical methods that can
handle the simultaneity between various market outcomes (fees, quality, labor hours). Hence
the use of two-stage regression approaches in data analysis (as in FTS) is an excellent
approach. However, a satisfactory structural approach also requires that the equations being
estimated be derived from some well-specified picture of how the world works. In other
words, without careful model specification, it is not possible to make reliable causal
inferences even when the appropriate statistical fi^amework is used.
2. FTS's contribution
FTS examine the determinants of the demand for auditor reputation based on 1 994 data
from 796 audits conducted across 20 countries. I agree with FTS that intuitively, macro-
What follows is best read as only a partial characterization of the complexity of the audit environment.
^ For example, how does the rule prohibiting members of the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India from
having more than 30 publicly traded clients affect the mix of clients in an Indian audit firm?
"* For example, supplier concentration and hence the base rates at which one would expect large firms in
different countries to hire large firm auditors varies enormously across economies. In addition, firms represented
in Global Vantage or similar databases tend to be of greater interest to international investors and may have
different base rates than a more representative sample of firms from those countries. Hence confroUing for base
rates is essential for identifying reputation effects in the demand for large auditors.
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economic factors such as litigation burdens, regulatory burdens, and disclosure burdens ought
to influence investors' demand for audit quality and auditor reputation. If so, it seems to make
a lot of sense to add an auditor-choice equation to the basic fee model studied in Taylor and
Simon (TS, 1999) and reestimate a simultaneous-equation model for fees and auditor choice
using the same or closely similar data. Initially, therefore it seemed there was little for me to
say. A closer reading of the paper, however, raised a few concerns which I have grouped
together in two lists, one on expository matters and the other on research design.
2.1. Exposition issues
In general, I would have liked to see a more careful development of the key contributions
of the paper, a richer motivation of key explanatory variables, and greater discussion of
crucial research choices. Specifically, the authors could be much more explicit about
1. The precise contribution of this study: the introduction claims that the paper will extend
prior knowledge but leaves unspecified how.
2. The link between key explanatory variables (disclosure level, litigiousness, and
regulatory burden) and the dependent variable. For instance, FTS motivate the inclusion
of disclosure levels, a key variable in Eq. (3), as follows:
Audit clients in countries requiring relatively more disclosure are expected to choose a higher
reputation auditor. That is, clients needing higher levels of disclosure would also demand a
higher level of assurance regarding disclosure. However to the extent that auditor reputation
can substitute for higher quality disclosure this prediction might not hold, hence an empirical
test is required.
It would have been very helpful and instructive for the authors to explain at greater length
the link between disclosure levels and demand for levels of assurance. Given the two
possibilities identified in their exposition, it is not immediately obvious to me why I would
expect the same relationship to hold for all countries. If, for instance, disclosure and
reputation are complements in half the countries studied and substitutes in the other half, a
regression model that does not distinguish between the two groups of countries might find no
significant results even when there are in fact strong (but not unidirectional) links between the
explanatory and dependent variables. Even if we were to find statistically significant resuhs,
absent a theory that led us to expect homogeneity among the 20 countries, what economic
meaning would we attach to the results?^
3. Why they (the authors) used only 1 year ofdata (in contrast to TS who used 5) and whether
these results would be replicated if they had used some other year or years of data.
4. How one should relate or contrast their conclusions based on a study of audits of
publicly traded corporate entities to conclusions from prior research based on studies of
federal or municipal audits (Copley et al., 1994, 1995).
Similar arguments apply to the other key variables that the authors tested but did not find to be significant.
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5. How their results can be reconciled or contrasted with prior results suggesting
alternative explanations for the hiring of large-firm auditors (e.g., Doogar & Easley,
1998; Willenborg, 1999).
2.2. Research design issues
1. FTS operationalize the demand for audit reputation as the choice to hire a large-firm
auditor. The literature offers multiple competing explanations for such a choice. The
most commonly cited hypotheses are that (1) large audit firms provide higher quality
audits (DeAngelo, 1981), (2) consumers desire a branded product (Klein & Leffler,
1981), (3) large audit firms enjoy economies of scale and can pass on to clients cost
savings from industry specialization (Dopuch & Simunic, 1980), (4) larger audit firms
have deeper pockets and therefore provide greater insurance (DeAngelo, 1981;
Willenborg, 1999), (5) capacity constrained price competition precludes smaller firms
from cost-effectively auditing larger clients (Doogar & Easley, 1998) and (6) a little bit
of any or all of the above. Consequently, unlike FTS, I have some difficulty in
concluding that the hiring of a large-firm auditor represents a demand for audit quality.
2. The authors conclude the hypothesis-development section with the caveat that there is
little theory available to guide them and the variables chosen are essentially arbitrary
(FTS, p. 5). I believe their remark could also be stated as "Audit markets are complex
objects and a multitude of factors can reasonably be expected to affect market outcomes
and conduct." In other words, instead of there being too little theory, there is too much
theory: too many things can reasonably be conjectured to affect the demand for auditor
quality and reputation. Such complexity does pose a challenge to the researcher and it
therefore seems reasonable to control for as many factors as possible in estimating
Eq. (3). The next two points relate to this issue in greater detail as well.
3. In Eq. (3), the dependent variable is probability of selecting a large-firm auditor. This
probability is simply the market share of those auditors in the sample. We know fi*om
prior work that (a) capacity commitment and price competition do matter in determining
large-audit-firm market shares (at least they do in the U.S. market), (b) firm shares are
sticky, and (c) clients change auditors infrequently. In light of these empirical
regularities, I am not sure what to make of Eq. (3), which, as specified, seems to suggest
that neither auditor tenure nor past Big 6 market shares matter in determining Big 6
market shares today.
4. The authors are silent on factors that could mediate the relationship between their
macroeconomic variables of interest and the choice of a more (less) reputable auditor.
Without considering mediating factors, FTS do not give their hypothesized variables a
fair shot at explaining auditor choice. Mediating factors and controls using publicly
available data that could be added to Eq. (3) to address some of the concerns raised in
points 2 and 3 above might be:
a. Types of legal regimes (common law or code law),
b. Types of liability regimes (loser pays vs. each party bears its own costs),
c. Sources of domestic GAAP (tax law or capital market reporting),
R. Doogar / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 423-428 427
d. Degree of openness of the capital market sector of the economy as measured say by
the size of foreign direct investment,
e. The level of noninstitutional stock ownership,
f The relative ability of nonequity sources of capital to monitor managers,
g. Transparency indices for capital markets,
h. Indices of political and bureaucratic corruption,
i. Indices of legal system credibility,
j. The permissibility of joint audits,
k. Restrictions on advertising and solicitation,
1. Market shares of Big 6 firms in preceding years in the sample.^
FTS conclude (p. 15) "We find that disclosure characteristics are an important
determinant of the choice of large-firm auditor." However, they also note (p. 13) "The
coefficient on disclosure was not significantly different from zero with the inclusion of
the country indicator variables. This result indicates that the country disclosure score
cannot be readily separated from the country differences per se in explaining choice of
large-firm-auditor." Similarly, on p. 14, FTS note that litigiousness and regulatory
burdens provide no explanatory power in explaining the hiring of reputable auditors.
An alternative interpretation of the FTS results is that while the probability of hiring a
reputable auditor varies irom country to country, none of the macroeconomic factors
FTS introduce do in fact matter. The authors do not suggest reasons why their
preferred interpretation (i.e., disclosure levels matter in the choice of auditor type) is
the right one.
3. Summary and conclusions
Viewing audit markets through the lens of modem lO suggests significant gaps in our
current understanding of global audit markets. The challenge in this area, as with 10 in the
1970s, is the need to move beyond simple cross-sectional regressions and tackle head-on the
daunting complexity of audit-market institutions and rules. Hand in hand, better theory as
well as more sophisticated empirical tools capable of reliably distinguishing between
competing explanations both have valuable contributions to make.^ In short, the field of
international audit-markets research is ripe for a wave of innovative and careful studies that
combine good theoretical reasoning with carefiil data analysis to overcome the serious
confounds facing research in this area. While FTS have made an interesting attempt to
untangle determinants of the demand for auditor reputation, their methods give rise to some
^ Strictly speaking, to identify the impact of reputation, an even better design would be to run the analysis on
auditor changes only or on auditor choices during IPOs (cf Willenborg, 1999). Since this approach might lead to
severe sample attrition, including the base rate of Big 6 shares in the economy in past years may help control for
the unobservable factors at work in that country.
I use "theory" here in the sense of closely reasoned arguments linking antecedents to consequents.
428 R. Doogar / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 423-428
significant concerns. Future research in international audit markets must address these
concerns to progress beyond the point where the FTS study leaves us.
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1. Introduction
The study by Fargher, Taylor, and Simon (2001) examines both the supply of, and the
demand for, large-firm auditors in 20 countries using a simultaneous-equations methodology.
This approach is used to control the reciprocal relationship between a firm's choice of auditor
and its audit fees. Consistent with previous research that used single-equation models, the
results of this study indicate a positive association between disclosure requirements and the
choice of a large audit firm. This research also found that increased litigation and regulation
are associated with higher audit fees.
While the study makes a number of contributions to the extant literature, the current paper
(and/or future extensions of this stream of research) could be strengthened by more fully
developing the discussion of the background theory and by providing better documentation of
the theoretical support for the model used in this research. Each of these points is more fully
discussed in the following sections.
2. Contributions
On the demand side, the authors hypothesize that disclosure-requirement differences across
countries lead to agency cost differences; these differences, in turn, create cross-sectional
variation in the demand for audit quality. On the supply side, the authors posit that in addition to
audit quality, country-specific differences in disclosure requirements, litigation characteristics,
and governmental reguladon drive audit fee differences. Although many of these relationships
have been documented in previous research, and are intuitive, this study's contribution to our
* Tel.: +1-309-438-7166.
E-mail address: dllindb@ilstu.edu (D.L. Lindberg).
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understanding of the supply and demand for audit quality is from its explicit consideration of
the endogeneity, or interrelationship, of audit quality and audit fees in an international context.
3. Background theory
3.1. Agency theory
The link between the demand for audit services and large-firm audits is based on agency
theory and the previously documented link between audit quality and auditor size. While the
authors of the paper briefly discuss selected agency theory concepts in the introduction of their
paper, they do not provide an overall discussion of agency theory. It would assist readers in
making the connection between agency theory and the model used in this research ifthere was a
brief discussion ofagency theory before the assumed connections between the research and the
theory are discussed. For example, it would be helpful to include a discussion noting that the
separation of firm ownership from the management of an organization frequently leads to
asymmetric information, which, unchecked, may lead to suboptimal behavior on the part of
managers. Therefore, asymmetric information creates the need for monitoring mechanisms of
both management and the financial reporting process. As such, the most common external
monitoring mechanism at the company level is the firm's external auditors (DeAngelo, 1981).
At the market level, governmental regulation serves as a monitoring mechanism, which, in
turn, results in higher levels of regulation being associated with relatively higher audit fees. In
sum, the authors could more readily make the connection between agency costs and firms'
country-specific levels of disclosure with a more fully developed discussion of agency theory.
3.2. Reputation capital theory
The link between audit fees and audit quality is based on reputation capital theory. This
concept should also be briefly explained, perhaps by simply stating that the theory holds that
if the information covered by the opinion of a more reputable (large-firm) auditor is
considered to be more precise, then it follows that the more prestigious audit firms can
command higher audit fees due to the market value of their audit opinion (e.g., Simunic &
Stein, 1996; Tomczyk, 1996). Reputation capital was first discussed by DeAngelo (1981),
who hypothesized that since the larger audit firms have more clients, they have potentially
more to lose if their reputation is damaged by failing to report a breach in a client's records.
4. Methodology
4.1. Simultaneous equations
The study uses a simultaneous-equations approach to acknowledge the endogeneity
between auditor choice and audit fees. To describe the endogeneity, the authors use Copley,
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Doucet, and Gaver's (1994) conceptual audit market model in which the level of audit quality
demanded is a function of audit fees and audit fees are a function of the level of audit quality
supplied. The paper (and readers) would benefit from a more complete discussion of the
advantages of using simultaneous equations for this research. While the authors note: (1) the
endogeneity between the choice of auditors and the resulting audit fees, and (2) using
ordinary least squares (regression) is inappropriate because two of the variables (ln[Fee] and
Big 6) are correlated with the error terms {z\ and £2)^ they need to better explain why using
simultaneous equations results in stronger methodology than using separate single equations.
4.2. Gross domestic product (GDP) variable
The authors use a per capita GDP variable in their auditor-reputation (demand) model.
However, the authors should have considered using the natural log (In) of GDP in order to
transform the GDP data to fit a normal curve, given the wide variation in GDP across
countries. For example, Table 3 of Fargher et al.'s (2001) paper indicates that per capita GDP
ranges from 0.03 for India and Spain to 3.68 for Japan. If the authors did consider using the
natural log of GDP, but dismissed it for some reason, then the authors' reasoning should be
discussed in the paper.
5. Results
In the auditor reputation model, the positive coefficient on the audit fee variable, although
insignificant, is of at least moderate concern from the standpoint that it may suggest that the
model is misspecified. Further, the results indicate that once the endogeneity of audit fees and
audit quality has been controlled for, the demand for audit quality has no impact on audit fees.
Unlike previous research, this finding suggests that large audit firms do not receive fee
premiums. The authors provide no explanation or additional analyses to further our
understanding of these anomalous findings, diminishing the contribution of the study.
The results also show that variation in disclosure requirements is important in explaining
both auditor choice and audit fees. However, sensitivity tests indicate that cross-sectional
variation in disclosure requirements cannot be differentiated from other nonspecified cross-
country differences. Thus, the concern is that the disclosure variable is simply picking up the
effect of a correlated, but omitted, variable.
6. Future research
The study clearly suggests that further research is needed. Our understanding of the
supply of, and demand for, audit quality in the international market appears to be quite
limited. The lack of a positive coefficient on the audit quality variable in the supply model
may suggest that auditor size may not be an appropriate proxy for audit quality on an
intemational level. Thus, as the authors suggest, there is a need for better proxies for audit
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quality. The lack of a negative coefficient on the audit fee variable in the demand model may
suggest that a more comprehensive theory of the demand for audit services is needed within
an international context.
7. Summary
This paper uses international data from 20 countries to model the simultaneity of supply
and demand for auditor reputation, using the choice of a large-firm auditor as a proxy for
auditor reputation. The link between the demand for audit services and large-firm audits is
based on agency theory and the link between audit quality and auditor size. The link between
audit fees and audit quality is based on reputation capital theory. This study's contribution to
the literature is that it extends the work of Copley et al. (1994) and Copley, Gaver, and Gaver
(1995), by the explicit consideration of the endogeneity of audit quality and audit fees in an
intemational context.
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The discussants have given a great deal of consideration to the paper and have made
numerous points that need to be considered in relation to this paper and future research in this
area. As many of the reviewers' comments focus on methodological issues, our response to
the discussants will focus on these concerns.
Both discussants are concerned with the possible misspecification of the simultaneous
equation models including the possibility (in our view the near certainty!) that potentially
important variables may be missing from one or both equations. Clearly, more refinement
(and/or expansion) of the country-specific environmental variables is worthwhile. For-
tunately, both give some specific suggestions, several of which will be useful in future
research. Among the most substantive suggestions are:
1. Lindberg's suggestions that transformation of the gross domestic product variable be
considered due to the wide variation in the variable. In response, we used a log
transformation of both the GDP and Disclosure measures to mitigate the potential
impact of extreme values on the distribution of residuals. The results and inferences for
the audit fee model are qualitatively similar. In the simultaneous equations, estimation
of the demand for Big Six reputation, the significance of the coefficient on Disclosure
becomes somewhat less significant with a P value of .08 when both log Disclosure and
log GDP are used. It should be noted, however, that the Condition Index (for a linear
specification) is 1 96, substantially exceeding the rule of thumb that a condition index
greater than 30 indicates strong coUinearity (Belsley, Kuh, & Welsch, 1980). We
speculate that the Disclosure index captures aspects of disclosure in a very broad sense,
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and that disclosure cannot be readily separated from other country characteristics such
as stage of development as reflected in GDP per capita.
2. Doogar's extensive list of "mediating factors" that could serve to sharpen the analysis
of environmental factors. Recent research (e.g. Ball, Kothari, & Robin, 2000) has
focused attention on differences in legal regimes and other environmental factors across
countries. Future research might consider how these factors relate to each other and to
the market for audit services. Considerable thought is required, however, as to how
these variables are to be incorporated into models of audit services. For example,
Freidman, Johnson, Kaufman, and Zoido-Lobaton (2000) model corruption as a
function of economic institutions such as the strength or weakness of the legal system. It
is not clear whether corruption is an input to a model of auditing services or a result of
the extent of auditing. Clearly, additional research is needed to refine the country-
specific variables of interest in the market for audit services.
The incorporation of these and other of the suggestions of Lindberg and Doogar will not,
however, address a serious weakness in this and many other papers: the lack of a continuous
measure of the important, but elusive, concept of "audit quality." As in most other papers, we
discuss this but wind up using the simple large-firm/small-firm dichotomy. This has been used
in the past, but we acknowledge that it is a crude measure of audit quality. Further progress
demands a better variable, but no one has yet been able to develop a more appropriate substitute.
With respect to some of the econometric issues raised, the two-stage model estimated
provides a relatively simple simultaneous system taking into account the endogeneity
between audit fees and auditor reputation. More complex relations between error terms of
the equations can of course be considered. Similarly, we model a cross-section for a single
year to mitigate the potential impact of the very high correlations of the variables through
time. Future research might consider longer time periods; however, such research must have
measures available for all metrics in all years and must overcome the potential overstatement
of test statistics when using data pooled over several years where the measures are highly
correlated through time. Future research could employ more powerful tests of the determi-
nants of either audit fees or audit reputation where the context allows a study of changes in
some aspect of the international market for audit services.
Again, we thank the discussants for their insightful comments and suggestions, which will
be useflil in extending and expanding research in international markets for audit services.
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This paper reports a comparative analysis of the experience of introducing minimum tax legislation
in the US and India. Given the differences in the economic and market settings in the two countries,
one would expect the impact of the regulation and the corporate response to its introduction to be
different. Our empirical analysis, however, indicates that the response to the minimum tax legislation
in India is very similar to that in the US. The evidence indicates that the minimum tax legislation is not
the best means of achieving horizontal equity among taxpayers, given its significant administrative and
compliance costs and the manipulative reporting response it generates from the corporate sector.
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was needed and whether it has succeeded, the corporate sector has viewed MAT as a
retrograde step and has reportedly attempted to minimize the MAT burden by changing
accounting pohcies. This paper draws upon evidence gathered on similar legislation in the US
to help assess the impact of MAT and corporate response to its introduction.
Comparative analyses of similar policy initiatives in different market settings help the
international professional and academic communities to better understand whether and to
what extent similar legislation would succeed in other settings. Bailey (1999) has identified
cross-country comparative taxation as one area deserving more attention even though relevant
theory is limited and extensive data are difficult to obtain. The well-documented US
experience with minimum tax legislation and the Indian evidence presented in this paper
are instructive to other countries considering similar legislation.
It is often claimed that the policy measures in emerging countries are based on scanty
evidence because electronic databases are unavailable. In India, anecdotal evidence indicating
that profitable corporations paid little or no taxes, or that MAT has not resulted in significant
revenue enhancements, has frequently appeared in the popular business press. However,
empirical assessment of such evidence is largely unavailable. Using a comprehensive
database on more than 6000 companies, we provide results of such an assessment.
In addition, we examine whether tax policies influence management's choice of financial
reporting policies. While this issue has received considerable research attention in the US,
empirical studies based on international experience, especially in the developing countries,
are extremely sparse. Finally, as noted by Schipper (1989), specialized forms of earnings
management in response to regulatory settings may potentially extend our understanding of
earnings management. The evidence of earnings management presented in this paper
contributes to such a body of literature.
The objective of the paper is to compare and contrast in the two market settings the (1)
justification for introducing the minimum tax legislation by assessing tax avoidance by the
corporate sector prior to such legislation, (2) the impact of minimum tax legislation in
alleviating the problem of tax avoidance by profitable companies, and (3) the corporate
response to minimum tax legislation through changes in financial reporting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the evolution of
minimum tax legislation in India and describes the current MAT provisions. Minimum tax
legisladon in the US and its similarity with the MAT provisions is described in Section 3.
Section 4 provides a briefdescription ofthe Indian economy and the accounting standard setting
process in India, especially for income taxes. The extant literature on minimum tax legislation
in the US and the corporate response to it is summarized in Section 5. Section 6 presents the
empirical findings and Section 7 discusses the results. We then note in Section 8 study limitations
and indicate avenues for ftirther research. Section 9 provides summary and conclusions.
2. Minimum tax legislation in India
Minimum tax legislation in India started with the introducfion of Section 80VVA of the
Income Tax Act. The secdon, effecfive from April 1, 1984 to March 31, 1988, stipulated that
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the total deductions admissible under the various incentive sections be restricted to 70% of
preincentive total income. The objective was to ensure that at least 30% of the preincentive
total income would be subject to tax. The deductions retrenched (i.e., disallowed) in a given
year could be carried forward and claimed in subsequent assessment years.
The clerical work involved in tracking retrenched deductions and carrying them forward
for subsequent deductions was complex. Section 80VVA was therefore replaced by Section
115-J on April 1, 1988, which levied a tax on notional book profits. Book profits were
defined as the net profit shown in the profit and loss account prepared in accordance with
Schedule VI of the Companies Act and were increased or reduced by various items specified
by the new section. The appropriateness and the extent of these adjustments were
controversial issues that the government chose not to resolve. Section 115-J was operative
for 3 assessment years: 1988-1989, 1989-1990, and 1990-1991. The Central Board of
Direct Taxes abolished Section 115-J via circular 572 on August 3, 1990, citing rationaliza-
tion of tax structure as the reason.
Despite government's minimum tax initiatives described above, the ratio of corporate tax
payments/profits before tax (PBT) had been steadily declining (Rao, 1996). In reaction to
companies that reported significant book profits but paid little or no taxes, MAT was
introduced in the 1996-1997 budget. It applied to corporate entities for financial years ending
on or after December 31, 1997. MAT differed significantly from the Section 115-J provisions
because no adjustments to the book income were now required.
The MAT rule stipulated that when corporate taxable income is less than 30% of book
income, 30% of book income was deemed taxable. The provision can be expressed as
follows: Deemed taxable income = max [Reported taxable income, 30% of Book income].
As an illustration, assume that corporation X has book income of US$100 and taxable
income of US$40. It would not be affected by the MAT provision since its taxable income
exceeds 30% of book income. In comparison, if corporation Fs book income is US$100 and
taxable income is US$20, the MAT rule stipulates that the 30% of book income (US$30) is
deemed taxable. Thus, the incremental amount subject to tax would be US$10.
At the prevailing 43% statutory tax rate, the MAT provision made the effective corporate
tax rate (ratio of income taxes paid/pretax book income) 12.9% (43% x 30%). The effective
tax rate for some corporations could be lower because of operating loss carry forwards and
because the profits arising from exports and operations in the infrastructure sector (such as
generation and distribution of power) were exempt from the MAT provision. The 1997-1998
budget stipulated that companies could treat MAT payments as tax credits to be carried
forward for 5 years.
3. Minimum tax legislation in the US
Very few countries worldwide have resorted to an alternative minimum tax (AMT). Price
Waterhouse (1996) examined tax systems in 115 countries and found that, worldwide, only
five other countries (Colombia, Mexico, Pakistan, the US, and Venezuela) imposed some
form of AMT. However, the minimum tax in all these countries, except the US, was only
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recently introduced and is expressed as a percentage of assets or sales. In comparison, the
AMT in the US, spanning three decades, had a feature similar to MAT, the book income
adjustment (BIA).
Minimum tax legislation in India had the same objective as the AMT in the US to limit
profitable entities' tax preference use and to ensure horizontal equity among taxpayers. The
AMT is calculated by applying a tax rate to a tax base called AMT income (AMTI)
determined by modifying regular taxable income through adjustments (outlined in Sections
56 and 58 of the Internal Revenue Code) and preferences (outlined in Code Section 57).
The MAT provision resembles the US BIA. The BIA applied to corporate entities for
taxable years 1987, 1988, and 1989. In an attempt to ensure that profitable corporations paid
at least some federal tax, the BIA required a corporation's AMTI to be increased by 50% of
the excess of corporate book income (as shown in financial reports filed with SEC or other
regulators) over AMTI.
For taxable years after 1989, the BIA no longer applies. Instead, corporate entities are
required to use the adjusted current earnings (ACE) to ensure that the mismatching of book
income and taxable income will not produce inequitable results (Hoffman, Raabe, Smith, &
Maloney, 2000). For the ACE adjustment, AMTI is adjusted (up or down) for different items
such as exclusions and disallowed items. An amount equal to 75% of the difference between
the accumulated adjusted earnings and the unadjusted AMTI is then added to (or subtracted
from) the unadjusted AMTI to get adjusted AMTI. The MAT provision appears to closely
resemble not only the BIA that existed during 1987-1989 but also the ACE adjustment
currently used. This similarity ofMAT with the minimum tax legislation in the US provides a
rationale for a comparative examination of the two.
4. Indian economy and accounting standards
India is the world's largest democracy and 14th largest country measured by Gross
Domestic Product (US$382 billion in 1997). The economic reforms undertaken since 1991
have unleashed the tremendous growth potential of the economy. There has been a rapid yet
guided move towards deregulation and liberalization that has resulted in India becoming a
major destination for foreign investment. The 6.9% growth rate in real GDP in the 90s is
appreciably higher than the 5.5% that occurred during the 80s. Agriculture's contribution to
GDP is declining, while contributions of the manufacturing and the services sectors have
been increasing.
Accounting standards in India are promulgated by the Accounting Standards Board, a
21
-member body sponsored by the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India (ICAI).
Although the standards do not have the authority of law, they are followed by entities that
want their financial statements audited."
" This is similar to the US situation where nonpublic companies comply with the accounting standard in order
to get their financial statements audited by CPAs.
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India does not have a mandatory accounting standard for income taxes. However, ICAI
(1991) issued a guidance note on income taxes suggesting the use of the liability method very
similar to SFAS 109 in the US.^ The note stated that "It will take some time to develop the
necessary awareness and expertise for the application of this method among the prepares of
financial statements. Therefore, until the time such awareness and expertise are developed, it
will be permissible for an enterprise to follow the tax payable as an alternative." The tax
payable method ignores interperiod allocations and records income tax expense equal to the tax
payable to the revenue authorities. Nearly all companies in India use the tax payable method.
5. Extant literature
The accounting and tax literature in the US has examined the minimum tax legislation for
its success in increasing horizontal equity among taxpayers, its cost effectiveness, and its
effect on financial reporting by corporations.
The impact of minimum tax legislation has been a subject of continuing debate in the US
(Anderson, 1988; Dworin, 1987; Jones, 1994; Mclntyre, Kelly, Fisher, Wilhelm, & Dorrier,
1989; Mclntyre & Wilhelm, 1985; Omer & Zeibart, 1993; United States General Accounting
Office, 1995). Mclntyre et al. (1989), in their survey of 250 profitable companies, reported
that the free ride was over for a vast majority of the companies, thanks to AMT. Using the
Monte Carlo simulation model, Dworin (1987) demonstrated that firms with higher book
incomes will be unable to avoid taxes with the introduction of AMT. A 1995 GAO report
stated that ". . .in every year from 1987 through 1992, at least 6000 corporations with positive
book income that paid no regular tax paid some AMT and at least 9000 corporations with
positive book income subject to regular tax paid an additional AMT amount."
The increase in the horizontal equity among taxpayers is not unequivocal, however. The
1995 GAO report noted that AMT did not reach all corporations with positive book income.
Omer and Zeibart (1993) noted that while taxes paid increased after AMT implementation,
the incidence of new law did not necessarily fall on those firms expected to pay the new tax.
The costs of administering AMT and the compliance costs incurred by the taxpayers are
also significant. The AMT was cited by all the corporations interviewed as among the
provisions in the Intemal Revenue Code with the largest record keeping and compliance cost
burden (United Stated General Accounting Office, 1994). A survey by Slemrod and
Blumenthal (1996) noted that firms subject to the AMT spent 18% more on compliance
costs than others. US corporations also claim that the reduced profits caused by AMT resulted
in a higher cost of capital and that the AMT adversely affects their global competitiveness. A
Wall Street Journal report (December 14, 1992) stated that the corporate AMT taxpayers
encounter capital costs that are 15-20% higher than the capital costs of companies that are
not subject to the AMT. AMT also results in a disincentive to invest (Norton, 1993) and might
Guidance notes, recommendatory in nature, provide guidance to members on matters, which may arise in the
course of their professional work and on which they may desire assistance in resolving difficult issues.
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also prompt decisions that might hurt the corporate sector and national economy in the long
run. For instance, the AMT considerations might prompt leasing equipment rather than
buying it, even when leasing may not be the most cost-effective decision in the long run.
The impact of tax regulations on corporate financial reporting practices also received
considerable research attention in the US. The empirical evidence indicates mixed results.
While some studies (Guenther, 1994; Guenther, Maydew, & Nutter, 1997; Maydew, 1997)
suggested that managers tend to reduce book income to save taxes, some other studies
(Beatty, Chamberlain, & Magliolo, 1995; Hunt, Moyer, & Shevlin, 1996; Scholes, Wilson, &
Wolfson, 1990) concluded that managers forego tax savings to avoid reducing book income.
AMT has affected corporate financial reporting practices by inducing US companies to
engage in earnings management. To minimize the effect of BIA, companies needed to either
increase the taxable income or report a lower book income or a combination of both. Since
increasing the taxable income involved real cash outflows, many companies reduced the
book income through accounting choices or changes. Several critics, including members of
the Financial Accounting Standards Board, the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants, and the Securities and Exchange Commission, expressed concern that the
BIA prompted earnings management by companies, which in turn hurt the reliability of their
financial statements.
The literature also supports the proposition that firms subject to the AMT adopted more
income-decreasing strategies than firms that are not subject to AMT. Gramlich (1991) found
that firms most likely to be affected by AMT made income-decreasing accruals relative to a
control group. Similarly, Boynton, Dobbins, and Pleasko (1992) concluded that firms that
were unable to reduce their AMT exposure using net operating losses managed their earnings
by taking unusual income-decreasing discretionary accruals. Dhaliwal and Wang (1992)
offered additional evidence that firms that were likely to be affected by AMT manipulated
timing and permanent differences in response to the BIA provision. Focusing on depreciation,
amortization, and depletion, Manzon (1992) concluded that earnings were managed in
response to the BIA component of the AMT. More recently, Northcut and Vines (1998)
provided evidence indicating a posifive association between political scrutiny and higher
income-decreasing discretionary accruals for "corporate freeloaders."
6. Analysis
6.1. Rationale for the introduction ofMAT
To examine the potential tax avoidance by profitable companies prior to MAT's
introduction in 1997, we obtained data on PBT and tax expense'* for all the corporations
Without required reporting of deferred taxes, the income tax expense in the financial statements is the same
as income tax payable in India.
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Table 1
Incidence of tax avoidance prior to MAT introduction
Item 1995 1996
No. of firms with PBT>0
No. of firms with tax rate < 12.9% of PBT
Percentage of low-tax firms (tax rate< 12.9%; %>)
Total PBT of profitable firms
Total PBT of low-tax firms
Percentage of profit subject to low tax rates (%)
Aggregate tax paid by low-tax firms
Effective aggregate tax rate for low-tax firms (%)
4466
3036
67.98
Rupees 504 billion
Rupees 288 billion
57.14
Rupees 4.86 billion
1.69
4338
2963
68.30
Rupees 613 billion
Rupees 309 billion
50.41
Rupees 6.84 billion
2.21
listed on the stock exchanges in 1995 and 1996 from the Center for Monitoring Indian
Economy (CMIE) database.
Since the MAT provision targets profitable companies with low tax rates, we first
removed all the corporations with zero or negative profits from the CMIE corporate
database. This reduced the sample to 4466 companies in 1995 and 4338 companies in
1996. For this sample of profitable firms, we computed the proportion of firms that paid
taxes at a rate lower than the 12.9% that is mandated by MAT. The results presented in
Table 1 indicate that both in 1 995 and 1 996 more than two-thirds of the corporations paid
taxes at a rate lower than 12.9%.
These large proportions of low tax rate firms would not be a concern to policy makers if
such firms together represented a small percentage of the total corporate profits. We
calculated the proportion of total profits of the firms in the low tax category. In each of
the 2 years, over half of the aggregate corporate profits were accounted for by the low tax
corporations (Table 1). The effective tax rates for these corporations averaged 1.68% and
2.21% in 1995 and 1996, respectively, well below the rate of 12.9% mandated by MAT.
These results strongly support the government's rationale for MAT introduction.
6.2. Impact ofMAT
To investigate whether tax avoidance continued in 1 997 (the year after the introduction of
MAT), we recomputed all the items in Table 1 for 1997. Of the 3262 profitable firms in
1997,^ only 1479 paid taxes at a rate less than 12.9%. Thus, compared to over two-thirds in
the preceding 2 years, only about 45% of the profitable firms paid taxes in 1997 at a rate
lower than that mandated by MAT. The aggregate PBT of these firms in 1997 was Rupees 179
billion, out of the total PBT for all the profitable firms of Rupees 62 1 billion. Thus, the
proportion of profits subject to low tax rates declined to about 29% from over 50% in each of
the preceding 2 years. The total tax paid by the low tax-paying firms in 1997, at Rupees 8.7
billion, resulted in an effective tax rate of about 4.8%. This rate was more than twice the rate
The reduction in the number of profitable firms fi-om 4338 in 1996 to 3262 in 1997 is reflective of the
changes in economic conditions in the country and their effect on corporate profitability.
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in each of the preceding 2 years. Overall, therefore, there appears to be a substantial reduction
in tax avoidance.
We also compared the tax rate distributions for profitable firms for 1996 (the year before
MAT introduction) and 1997 (the year after). The distribution of the number of firms in
different tax categories is presented in Table 2. A chi-square test was used to test for
differences in the distributions. The resuhs indicate that the proportion of firms paying taxes
at a higher rate in 1997 (compared to 1996) was statistically significant at .01 level.
As stated earlier, differences in the proportion of companies in different tax brackets
may not necessarily imply differences in terms of proportion of profits taxed at different
rates. Therefore, the tax rate distribution for 1996 and 1997 based on profit proportion
was computed. These results are presented in Table 3. The plot of these distributions
(Fig. 1) demonstrates a complete stochastic dominance of the 1996 distribution over the
1997 distribution. The proportion of firms paying taxes at a rate lower than the rate
implied in MAT (12.9%) was far lower in 1997 compared to 1996 for the entire tax
rate range.
The analyses presented so far are based on different sample sizes each year. Whether the
average effective tax rate changed because of changes in the sample or as a result ofMAT is
not answered. We, therefore, identified profitable companies that paid lower (than 12.9%)
taxes in the year before (1996) and the year after (1997) the MAT introduction. This
eliminated from the sample all companies that (1) were profitable in 1 year but not in the
Table 2
Distribution of companies in tax brackets for 1996 and 1997
1996 1997
Tax rate less than No. of No. of
or equal to (%) companies Cum freq Proportion companies Cum freq Proportion
0.0 2320 2320 0.535 833 833 0.255
1.0 106 2426 0.559 27 860 0.264
2.0 76 2502 0.577 35 895 0.274
3.0 71 2573 0.593 18 913 0.280
4.0 60 2633 0.607 34 947 0.290
5.0 38 2671 0.616 23 970 0.297
6.0 66 2737 0.631 34 1004 0.308
7.0 45 2782 0.641 28 1032 0.316
8.0 38 2820 0.650 27 1059 0.325
9.0 40 2860 0.659 27 1086 0.333
10.0 48 2908 0.670 57 1143 0.350
11.0 26 2934 0.676 38 1181 0.362
12.0 30 2964 0.683 103 1284 0.394
12.9 30 2994 0.690 195 1479 0.453
15.0 74 3068 0.707 496 1975 0.605
20.0 184 3252 0.750 244 2219 0.680
25.0 158 3410 0.786 168 2387 0.732
30.0 131 3541 0.816 145 2532 0.776
>30.0 797 4338 1.000 730 3262 1.000
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Table 3
Distribution of profits subject to different tax rates in 1996 and 1997
1996 1997
Tax rate less Cumulative profits Cumulative profits
than or equal No. of of companies No. of of companies
to (%) companies (million Rupees) Proportion companies (million Rupees) Proportion
0.0 2320 207,900 0.338 833 62,940 0.101
1.0 106 221,580 0.361 27 66,270 0.107
2.0 76 229,330 0.373 35 70,810 0.114
3.0 71 234,390 0.381 18 93,330 0.150
4.0 60 238,980 0.389 34 113,290 0.182
5.0 38 250,000 0.407 23 116,890 0.188
6.0 66 257,640 0.419 34 119,510 0.192
7.0 45 261,320 0.425 28 121,050 0.195
8.0 38 262,720 0.427 27 122,810 0.198
9.0 40 266,080 0.433 27 124,580 0.201
10.0 48 277,180 0.451 57 127,300 0.205
11.0 26 281,920 0.459 38 131,010 0.211
12.0 30 305,340 0.497 103 142,300 0.229
12.9 30 309,870 0.504 195 171,170 0.276
15.0 74 314,110 0.511 496 240,460 0.387
20.0 184 347,600 0.566 244 296,760 0.478
25.0 158 382,330 0.622 168 357,100 0.575
30.0 131 447,840 0.729 145 400,670 0.645
>30 797 614,620 1.000 730 621,270 1.000
Other and (2) were in the low tax rate category (under 12.9%) in 1 year but not the other.
The remaining 1769 companies paid Rupees 6.19 billion in taxes on a total PBT of Rupees
247.13 billion in 1996, for an effective tax rate of 2.51%. The same 1769 companies paid
Rupees 42.67 billion in taxes on PBT of Rupees 259.45 billion in 1997, for an effective tax
rate of 16.37%. Stated differently, while the PBT in 1997 increased by a mere 4.98%) over
1996, the income taxes increased by 589%. This provides stronger evidence that the firms
with low tax rates before MAT introduction were, in aggregate, subjected to higher tax rates
after MAT introduction.
The US literature indicates that larger companies tend to be the bigger tax avoiders
(Mclntyre & Wilhelm, 1985). To examine if tax rates for large corporations in India changed
with MAT, we compared effective tax rates for the largest (ranked by sales revenues) 100
companies in our sample for 1996 and 1997. In both years, the effective tax rate was zero for
29 firms. For the remaining 71 companies, the effective tax rate went up for 52 companies
and down for 19. It is interesting to note that the effective tax rate for the 100 large companies
increased from 2.49% in 1996 to only 5.66% in 1997. This increase is far lower than the
increase (from 2.51% to 16.37%) in the tax rate for the overall sample of 1769 companies
noted earlier. Thus, compared to the small companies, it appears that the larger corporations
benefited more from the legislative provisions that excluded certain incomes (e.g., exports
and infrastructure activities) from being subject to MAT. Their large size apparently allowed
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them the financial flexibility to diversify into the parts of their business profits (such as
infrastructure) that were exempted from MAT.
6.3. Earnings management
To reduce the BIA and the AMT burden, US firms had an incentive to manipulate their
financial reporting numbers {Tax Notes, November 17, 1986; Manzon, 1992). Similarly, MAT
provisions in India provided an incentive for the firms to report lower book income.
Economic Times (May 13, 1997) reported that the MAT liability had prompted corporations
to post lower profits by changing accounting policy to avoid taxes.
The popular business press in India frequently noted that companies changed their
depreciation policy to escape MAT. Economic Times (May 13, 1998) stated that "a popular
option followed is changing over from the straight line method to the written-down value
(i.e., declining balance) method to account for depreciation." In reviewing the corporate
performance in the first half of 1997, Shirsat and Korgaonkar (1997) note "In a bid to escape
the MAT, most companies have made higher provision for depreciation." This suggests that
companies changed their depreciation policies to reduce book income for external reporting
(but not for taxes), reducing the gap between the book and tax income to a level where MAT
provisions were not invoked.
To examine if companies likely to be affected by MAT managed their earnings, we
compared the proportion of companies reporting higher depreciation (as a percentage of gross
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fixed assets) in the year after MAT introduction to the year before, when incentives to report
higher depreciation did not exist.
Investigation ofthe corporate reporting response to MAT requires identification offirms that
have an incentive to manage reported figures. Limitations of many US studies (for example,
Dhahwal & Wang, 1992; Gramlich, 1991) include incorrect identification of firms affected by
AMT and the assumption that all firms subject to the AMT had an equal incentive to reduce
book income. Identifying firms that were affected by the MAT provision is even more difficult
in the Indian context because the reporting requirements are less stringent than in the US. We
therefore adopted an approach that ensures that while some MAT-affected firms might be
excluded from the sample, those included in the sample were indeed affected by MAT.
The MAT-affected firms were defined as the profitable firms that paid low taxes (below
12.9% of PBT) in 1997 and in either 1995 or 1996. The number of companies that met this
criterion was 1301. However, incentives for income manipulation would be lower for firms
with carry-forward operating losses or for firms in the infrastructure and export sectors since
their profits are exempt from MAT. Therefore, we eliminated the 833 firms that paid no taxes
from the sample of MAT-affected firms. This reduced the sample size from 1301 to 468.
To compare the reporting behavior of MAT-affected and non-MAT-affected firms, we
needed a control group that was unlikely to manipulate income because of MAT. Such a
group would have an effective tax rate much higher than 12.9%. We used 20% as the cut-off
tax rate for identifying firms less likely to manipulate earnings, resulting in 220 firms in the
control group.
The corporate response to MAT in terms of depreciation rates charged in the year before
MAT imposition (1996) and the year after MAT imposition (1997) is presented in Table 4.
Table 4
Corporate reporting response to MAT
MATi
1997
companies
1996
Non-MAT
1997
companies
1996
Total
1997 1996
Panel A: Overall analysis
Number of companies 468 468 220 220 688 688
Number of companies reporting higher 285 182 131 123 416 305
rate of depreciation
Proportion (%) 60.9 38.9 59.5 55.9 60.5 44.3
Panel B: Companies with higher profits than preceding year
Number of companies 151 266 108 133 259 399
Number of companies reporting higher 76 105 62 68 138 173
rate of depreciation
Proportion (%) 50.3 39.5 57.4 51.1 53.3 43.4
Panel C: Companies with lower profits than preceding year
Number of companies 317 202 112 87 429 289
Number of companies reporting higher 209 77 69 55 278 132
rate of depreciation
Proportion (%) 65.9 38.1 61.6 63.2 64.8 45.7
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Panel A of Table 4 indicates that the difference in the proportion of firms increasing their
depreciation rate changed from 55.9% in 1996 to 59.5% in 1997 for the non-MAT-affected
firms. This change is not statistically significant. However, for the MAT-affected sample, the
proportion of firms increasing their depreciation rate changed from 38.9% in 1996 to 60.9%
in 1997. This difference is significant at .01 level, suggesting that the reporting response to
MAT was very different for the two groups. The MAT-affected firms reduced reported income
to save tax outflows by increasing their depreciation charges.
One interesting issue is whether the reporting response was different depending on whether
a firm experienced an increase or a decrease in profits. Firms with a decrease in profits may not
be as likely to increase the depreciation charge as would be the firms with an increase in
profits. The samples ofMAT and non-MAT companies were therefore split into two categories:
companies whose profits (before depreciation) increased over the previous year and companies
whose profits (before depreciation) decreased over the previous year. Of the 468 MAT
companies, 266 reported profit increases in 1996 over the previous year and 202 reported
profit decreases. For 1997, the numbers were 151 and 317, respectively, for profit-increasing
and profit-decreasing MAT companies. Similar distribution of 220 non-MAT companies into
profit-increasing and profit-decreasing categories was 133 and 87, respectively, in 1996 and
108 and 112, respectively, in 1997. For both MAT and non-MAT companies, we examined the
proportion of companies reporting higher rates of depreciation in each of the 2 years for the
profit-increasing and profit-decreasing categories. The results are presented in Panels B and C
of Table 4 for profit-increasing and profit-decreasing firms, respectively.
For the non-MAT firms that experienced increased profits in 1997, the proportion of firms
reporting higher rate of depreciation changed from 51.1% to 57.4%. This result is significant
only at 17%. A similar proportion for the MAT-affected firms, however, changed from 39.5%
to 50.3%, which is statistically significant at .02. For the MAT-affected firms experiencing
lower profits (Panel C), the proportion of firms reporting higher depreciation went up from
38.5% in 1996 to 65.9%, which, too, is significant at .01. Such firms were able to benefit
from lower tax consequences than they would have been without the increased depreciation.
In comparison, the proportion of non-MAT firms that reported higher depreciation in the
presence of lower profits went down marginally from 63.2%) in 1996 to 61.6% in 1997. This
result (significant only at the 59% level) confirms that non-MAT firms with increased book
income did not increase depreciation rates possibly because there were no tax advantages
resulting from such an action.
7. Discussion of the results
A significant reducdon in the proportion of non- and low tax-paying companies and in the
proportion of profits of such companies to the total corporate profits after MAT introducdon
indicates that the legislation has produced the impact intended by the government. The
percentage of Indian companies not paying taxes prior to the introduction of MAT was 53.5.
This percentage declined to 25.5 after MAT was introduced, suggesting that MAT was a
successful policy inidadve.
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However, the success of the minimum tax legislation has not been unequivocal. In terms of
tax revenue generated, the results have been mixed in both the US and India. While the
expected AMT revenue in the US for the first 3 years was US$14 billion, actual revenues
were only US$7.8 billion. In India, although the revenue secretary estimated MAT collections
at Rupees 16-18 billion, the actual collections reported by the union finance minister were
only Rupees 9.1 billion {Economic Times, July 26, 1996). Moreover, since MAT is applicable
only to the corporate entities, these revenue collections amount to only 0.07% of the total
revenues of the govemment. This could partially be attributed to the fact that many
corporations were still able to escape MAT by reporting income from activities such as
exports and infi^astructure that are exempt from MAT provisions.
The less than expected revenue collection so far is disconcerting and the limited prospects
for tax generation in the future are clearly disappointing for the govemment. Since the MAT
payments can be treated as a tax credit that can be carried forward for 5 years, a significant
portion of the MAT collection might be revenue acceleration (which will allow govemment
the benefit of the time value of money) rather than enhancement. If most companies use the
tax credits, the only benefit to the govemment is the time value of money. The MAT
payments would be revenue enhancements only for companies that are currently profitable
but are likely to incur losses over the next few years, thereby being unable to benefit from tax
credit. This unintended consequence of the MAT provision exacerbates the tax burden on
firms that are least able to bear it.
The costs of administering the minimum tax legislation and the compliance costs incurred
by the taxpayers are also significant. Since no research on this issue is available in the Indian
context, the US experience is instructive for policy makers in India and other countries
considering the introduction of minimum tax legislation. The policy makers must decide
whether the benefit of time value of money resulting fi-om the accelerated revenues is worth
the cost of minimum tax legislation borne by taxpayers and the govemment.
In the US context, Northcut and Vines (1998) conclude that polifical scrufiny of effective tax
rates provides incentives that influence accounting policy choices and that management
considers the impact of taxes on financial reporting. In India, too, the corporate response to
the MAT introduction has been to manage eamings to minimize the tax burden. Regardless of
the effect on the reported profits, Indian managers appear to maximize shareholder value by
minimizing tax outflows.
However, the reduced profitability of Indian companies can adversely affect their
attractiveness to the global capital markets. At a time when many Indian companies are
trying to tap international debt and equity markets, the MAT legislation could be considered
undesirable because it ostensibly resulted in many companies reducing their book profits.
8. Limitations and future research
The limitations of this study need to be noted in interpreting its conclusions. Our approach
to identifying MAT-affected companies to investigate eamings management behavior does not
guarantee the inclusion of exclusively minimum tax firms because the effective tax rate should
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be no less than 12.9% if the MAT really works. Secondly, a careful review of the business
press and our research design has attempted to control the confounding variables. However, it
is possible that other changes in the economy in the year of MAT introduction, or additional
concurrent changes in the 1996-1997 budget, have partially driven the results of the study.
We studied depreciation changes to examine the evidence of earnings management. An
interesting extension would be to study what other earnings management tools have been
used by companies to minimize the effects of MAT. Another interesting extension would be
to examine the stock market reaction to earnings management. From the prebudget levels, the
drop in the market capitalization was Rupees 589 billion (approximately 11%) within 1
month following the budget. While the causality between stock market decline and MAT
introduction is difficult to establish, the business press seemed to suggest a link (Nagpal,
1999; Nair, 1999). It would therefore be interesting to examine whether the stock market
response was significantly different for MAT-affected and non-MAT-affected companies.
9. Conclusions
In conclusion, MAT legislation appears to have increased horizontal equity among taxpayers
in India. However, the prospects of such legislation for revenue enhancement appear limited,
given its restricted scope and applicability only to the corporate entities (Gujarathi & Barua,
1998). The legislation also results in income manipulation by corporations, which adversely
affects the reliability of financial statements. Such unreliability in developing countries with
fledgling capital markets can create distortions in valuations and capital allocations. The MAT
effectiveness is especially contentious if the administrative costs incurred by the government
and compliance costs incurred by the taxpayers are taken into account. In India, because of the
existing loopholes, companies are able to limit their tax liability by paying only a marginal
amount under MAT (Padmakshan, 1999). As a result, one proposal under consideration for the
MAT revision is to tax corporations on the basis of their total assets rather than their economic
profits. While such a system promotes better utilization of existing capacity, the faimess and
legality of taxing a corporation with significant assets but little or no income will be a
contentious issue. Mexico's Supreme Court held its system of AMI based on asset size
unconstitutional on the grounds that income tax can be levied only on income.
The US literature suggests that the only viable long-term solution for correcting the
corporate abuses of tax code preferences is their elimination, rather than introducing
minimum tax legislation. As aptly noted by King (1988), "Congress insists on giving tax
incentives for favored activities then falls over itself trying to prevent big businesses from
using these incentives." This thinking is also shared in India where some experts have said
that "the best course would be to do away with the MAT provision in the next 4-5 years by
eliminating tax preferences in the Act" (Pandey, 1996). However, the vested interests and
lobbying efforts will test the political will to repeal such tax incentives and preferences.
Policy makers in other developing countries contemplating minimum tax legislation would
benefit greatly from examining the recent Indian experience and the extended US experience,
both of which indicate that the results from such legislation are mixed, at best.
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Abstract
In this study, the authors investigate imposing a minimum alternative tax (MAT) on Indian
corporations during the 1996-1997 budget years. The authors have two objectives: to assess the new
legislation's impact on tax revenue, and to determine how corporations responded to its imposition
because of its explicit link to financial reporting. They first assess whether, on average, firms with low
estimated tax rates before the imposition paid higher taxes after imposition and find, overall, that
corporations paid, in total, a greater amount of their income in taxes. They also find that the largest
firms in their sample experienced a smaller increase in their effective tax rates than smaller firms did.
Next, they assess whether MAT-affected firms altered their financial statement reporting to reduce
exposure to the MAT. Specifically, they assess whether a greater portion of MAT-affected firms
changed their financial statement depreciation policies than non-MAT-affected firms. They report that,
for their sample, a significant number of MAT-affected firms increased their depreciation rate after
MAT imposition. The proportion of non-MAT-affected firms changing depreciation rates after
imposition was not significant. They also partition MAT- and non-MAT-affected firms on increasing or
decreasing book profit and find that MAT-affected firms made proportionally more changes. The
authors conclude that the MAT appeared to have increased horizontal equity among taxpayers in India,
but its tax revenue enhancement potential is limited by its scope, limited applicability, and avoidance
behavior by affected corporations. My comments are directed at what I perceive to be motivational and
methodological issues in the paper and the conclusions we can draw fi^om the current representation.
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1. Motivation issues
Research on the impact of, and reaction to, alternative minimum tax (AMT) poHcies in the
US has been extensive. The authors provide an adequate review of AMT research in the
United States and extend the hterature by looking at a similar issue for a sample of Indian
corporations. The authors state as one motivation for the extension: "Given the differences in
the economic and market settings differences between the two countries, one would expect
the impact of the regulation and the corporate response to its introduction to be different."
The authors support their line of inquiry using Bailey (1999) and the notion that this research
line has instructional benefits to countries considering similar legislation.
This research issue is potentially interesting, but I believe that the authors' justification
for the extension needs additional support. Regardless of the country in which the analysis
is conducted, imposing a new tax policy on profit-seeking corporations that increases their
tax liability is likely to generate avoidance behavior. Consequently, the authors need to be
specific about the Indian political, economic, and market settings that might foster a reaction
different fi-om the experience with the AMT in the United States. It is not sufficient to
indicate that the Indian political, economic, market, or regulatory climate is less developed
than that of the United States because such an argument applies to many other countries as
well. Unless paying more taxes is culturally more acceptable in India than in the United
States, the onus is on the authors to provide the basis for their expectation that the India
reacdon would be different. In particular, I would be interested in whether differences
between US GAAP and Indian GAAP, or differences in public financial statement
regulation between the United States and India, would contribute to different reactions to
imposing minimum alternative tax (MAT). Their arguments could address why they believe
that reactions by Indian corporations might be more or less than corporate reactions to the
AMT in the United States. Currently, the authors' result is consistent with outcomes
obtained in the United States and a clear picture of how this study extends the current
literature is missing.
2. Methodology issues
2. 1 . Rationale for MAT
The authors begin by providing evidence supporting India's rationale for imposing an
MAT. They calculate effective tax rates for profitable corporate samples from 1 995 and 1 996
and present results suggesting that profitable corporations, in substantial numbers, had
effective tax rates less than the expected minimum MAT rate, and these same firms were
responsible for a substantial percentage of total sample profits. The resuhs are helpfiil for
setting the stage to determine whether the corporate tax burden changed after MAT
imposition and provides at least indirect evidence of India's concerns about the tax burdens
of profitable Indian corporations. The authors could strengthen their contribution by
addressing the following three concerns.
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First, the study by Mclntyre and Wilhelm (1985) was controversial, in part, because its tax
burden measure failed to consider deferred taxes and the industry composition in their
sample.^ The current study authors point out that, in India there is no formal or mandatory
accounting standard for income taxes and suggest that nearly all firms use the "tax payable"
method for reporting taxes on the financial statements. The authors should provide
information about the extent to which they believe their sample firms reflect the population
norm for tax reporting. Without knowing something about the percentage of corporations
likely to be using the "tax liability" ahemative to the tax payable method, it is difficult to
determine the validity of any comparisons among the sample firms. While determining the
tax reporting method at this stage of the analyses may be implausible, it is critical in later
analyses where sample sizes are much smaller. Checking a random sample of their firms at
this stage would reduce concerns that inferences drawn here and later in the paper are not the
result of different financial reporting policies.
The second concern is that the authors use an effective tax rate measure to discriminate
between MAT-affected firms and those that are not. Studies by Dworin (1987) and Omer and
Ziebart (1993) suggest that the type of industry is an important determinant of the tax burden
in the United States. Thus, comparing sample firms using only a ratio of taxes paid to book
income ignores any explicit differences in industry taxation. Estimating tax burdens for
sample firms, without industry controls, may inadvertently suggest widespread tax avoidance
that is the result of explicit programs favoring targeted industries. It would be helpful here and
in later analyses to also provide some evidence indicating whether the low tax rates presented
in the paper are due to a general decline in tax payments by corporations or to industry
differences in the sample. Firms in the same industry are more likely to share the same tax
incentives and deductions and the extent to which profitable corporations with low tax rates
are evenly distributed across industries is suggestive of a larger tax avoidance problem, at
least, in this sample.
The final concem with the rationale results is the extent to which reported profits and low
tax payments is problematic in this sample. Assuming that the correlation between taxes paid
and profitability, although not necessarily high depending on industry and economic
conditions, is positive, the authors provide only weak evidence that their low tax sample
is representative of firms the Indian government considers problematic. They support their
contention with results that indicate that overall profits earned by the low tax sample
accounted for over half of the aggregate corporate profits in each of the two sample years.
However, because the proportion of low tax firms in their sample is large in both years and
assuming the correlation between reported profits and tax payments is positive, their low tax
sample likely includes low tax, low profit firms. The extent to which low tax, low profit
firms contribute to the aggregate profit measure weakens the argument that this is a
representative sample.
' Mclntyre and Wilhelm included a substantial number of regulated utilities in their sample, which are
generally removed from most samples because in the rate setting process taxes are passed on directly to consumers.
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One alternative is to segregate the low tax firms into two groups, for example, with profit
above and below the median profit for the low-tax group or above and below the median
profit for the total sample. The additional segregation by profit will provide better segregation
of the low tax sample firms and stronger evidence that the sample is representative of
problematic firms.
2.2. Impact ofMAT
The authors perform three analyses to determine if the MAT altered the tax burden
distribution of sample firms. In the first analysis, similar to that in the previous section, they
compare sample firm effective tax rates, ignoring sample differences, and find that, in
general, taxes increased fi-om 1996 to 1997 after MAT imposition. The authors appropriately
reduce their sample to firms with observations in both 1996 and 1997 and note that total taxes
paid to total profits increased fi*om 1996 to 1997. Thus, the authors have correctly reduced
concerns that their initial results were related to changes in the sample. The authors also
consider the largest firms in the reduced sample and note that effective tax rate increases for
these firms were lower than for the total sample.
There are several concerns with these analyses. First, I believe that the paper is better
served by considering the change in taxes paid by industry as compared to the total sample, as
I reasoned earlier.
The second concern is the authors' statement about firms chosen for their "own-firm"
control group analysis.^ The authors' select firms with effective tax rates less than 12.9% in
1996 and find that indeed the total taxes paid to total profits increased after 1996. One
problem with this approach is the absence of a comparative analysis for firms in the 1 996
sample that had effective tax rates in excess of 12.9%. By ignoring these firms, we are unable
to infer whether the MAT raised taxes in general, or whether it was effective in raising the tax
liabilities of target firms. If taxes paid for the non-MAT firms increased in much the same way
as MAT-affected firms, the conclusion that the MAT was effective in increasing the horizontal
equity of taxpayers in India would be suspect.
Finally, the authors' size analysis is not well integrated in the research design. Including
this analysis would be appropriate if the authors had previously discussed a political climate
in India suggesting that large firms were subject to greater government scrutiny, (i.e., the
political cost hypothesis; Zimmerman, 1983) and is a testable hypothesis in India as it is in
other economies. As presented, the result is descriptive of the apparent outcome but a
meaningfijl interpretation of the result or discussion of what this adds to the authors' overall
objectives is missing.
In addition, there appears to a misstatement regarding the sample selection procedure. The authors indicate
that firms chosen had effective tax rates lower than 12.9% in both 1996 and 1997 for their own control group
analysis. They then indicated that the tax rate for these firms increased to 16.37%. For purposes of this discussion,
1 am assuming the sample had low tax rates in 1996 only.
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2.3. Earnings management
The authors' present results from two analyses as evidence of the earnings management
reaction to MAT imposition. Their results indicate that a greater proportion of MAT-affected
firms reported higher depreciation expense to gross asset ratios. They suggest this is
evidence that MAT-affected firms increased their reported depreciation in order to lower
book income. This is consistent with the anecdotal evidence provided regarding the expected
corporate reaction to MAT. However, these analyses have numerous weaknesses that should
be addressed.
First, the two limitations I discussed above, tax reporting choice and industry type, are
particularly important to the validity of these results. With the smaller sample, the authors
should provide some assurance that reporting for taxes is the same across firms in their
sample and that firms identified as MAT-affected are not dominated by one or two industry
groups that generally have lower taxes. The authors' sample selection criteria clearly points to
the importance of industry membership because they eliminate, from this final sample, firms
in the infrastructure and export sectors.
Second, the authors' acknowledge the difficulty in detecting non-MAT- and MAT-affected
firms and I concur with their concerns but have two suggestions regarding these groups that
may sfrengthen their results. The first suggestion is to provide some assurance that the cutoff
between MAT- and non-MAT-affected firms (i.e., effective tax rates greater than 20%) did not
influence their results. I suggest a sensitivity analysis to determine whether the results are
robust to various cutoff levels. The additional analysis is especially important when one
considers imprecision of the instrument for determining whether firms are affected. The
second suggestion is to consider the nontaxpaying firms dropped from the sample as an
additional control group. This set of firms also represent a sample unaffected by the MAT
provision either because they are exempt from tax or have a net operating loss carry forward
that eliminates their 1997 tax liability. Thus, the proportion of firms changing depreciation
rates (methods) in this sample should mimic the authors' non-MAT-affected firms. This
additional sample provides some assurance that the method for discriminating between MAT-
and non-MAT-affected firms was reasonably successful.
Third, the authors selected change in depreciation expense to gross fixed assets as their
earnings management measure but ignored a more explicit change measure. The explicit
measure is the footnote disclosure indicating that firms' depreciation methods were changed.
The authors cite reports indicating that firms changed their depreciation method to escape
MAT. Thus, at least under United States GAAP,"^ a footnote disclosing the reason for the
change and an auditor report indicating the auditor's concurrence with the change should
exist. The authors should indicate the extent to which Indian firms have the flexibility to
change depreciation methods or estimates without concerns that auditors would not concur
with the reason for the method or estimate change. In addition, the change measure used is
subject to many factors that are unrelated to the MAT. For example, the asset life mix for
Discussions with colleagues suggest that India's GAAP would also require a footnote statement.
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financial and tax puq3oses will alter the depreciation to fixed asset ratio. Thus, firms adding
new fixed assets with shorter or longer asset lives will change this ratio reducing its
reliability as a measure of earnings management. In light of this problem, checking the
footnotes for depreciation method changes might be a better indictor of attempts to avoid
the MAT.
Better identification of earnings management firms might be accomplished by estimating
the reduction in reported book income resulting from the depreciation change. By providing
this estimate, the authors can fiirther segregate sample firms into groups that likely engaged in
earnings management. For example, using the median effect on reported book income, the
authors could segregate sample firms above and below the median with firms above the
median being more likely to have engaged in earnings management. Although the authors'
analysis suggests that firms with higher profits before depreciation also reported higher
depreciation, there is no evidence that the higher depreciation perceptively reduced firms'
exposure to MAT. The estimated effect on reported income may suggest whether the change
sufficiently reduced MAT exposure. The estimated effect on reported income could also be
used to make comparisons between MAT- and non-MAT-affected samples.
Fourth, the authors split their non-MAT- and MAT-affected sample firms into profit
increasing and decreasing subsets to determine whether the incentive to change rates was
greater when profits were increasing. Their results for the income increasing MAT-affected
firms and income increasing non-MAT-affected firms are consistent with the notion that firms
increased depreciation rates to avoid the new MAT.
However, the results for income decreasing MAT-affected firms indicate that proportion-
ally more income decreasing MAT-affected firms changed depreciation rates than income
increasing MAT-affected firms. There are many possible explanations for this result,
including the authors', but no effort to eliminate any of the alternative explanations
(e.g., poor discrimination of ETR measure, industry concentration) is conducted. Eliminating
some or all of these alternative explanations would give greater support to arguments that the
changes were MAT related.
Finally, the authors do not discuss the extent to which nontax factors might limit firms'
incentives to reduce book income. This may be beyond the scope of the current study but is
certainly an issue that should be discussed, especially in light of the evidence that US
managers and markets are sensitive to downward revisions in reported financial numbers
even when the change results in positive cash flows to the firm (e.g., LIFO Choice).
3. Conclusion
In conclusion, I would like to say that the authors have a potentially interesting study
because it deals directly with the differences in reporting incentives between book and tax.
That said, there are additional steps that the authors must take before concluding that the
horizontal equity of the tax system in India was improved and that the MAT may be
limited because of its scope and the earnings management of firms potentially affected by
its imposition.
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Abstract
The research examines the differences in materiality estimates for a sample of 181 experienced
auditors from Big-Six firms located in Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Spain, Sweden, The Netherlands, and
the UK. We asked each auditor to estimate materiality for a client whose integrity his/her firm rated as
either high or low [Ir. Account. Rev. 1 (1994) 1.]. The research found that low client-integrity ratings
resulted in lower materiality estimates for the European auditors. The research also indicates that as the
cultural construct of Uncertainty Avoidance [Hofstede, G. (1980). Culture's consequences. Beverly
Hills: Sage.] increased, materiality estimates also increased. Although one might have anticipated that
materiality would decrease with the level of litigation, it, in fact, increased. We also compared the data
from the western European countries with the estimates from a group of 83 auditors from the same
Big-Six firms located in the United States.' © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The Accountants International Study Group (1974) compared the existent practices and
examined materiality concerns in financial reporting. The report not only enumerated the
arguments in favor of setting materiality guidelines (par. 28) but also the arguments against
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the prescription of guidelines on materiality (par. 29). The International Accounting Standards
Committee (lASC) endeavored to create a set of standards that will lead to "the improvement
and harmonization of regulations, accounting standards and procedures relating to the
presentation of financial statements" (lASC, 1999a). Another possibility is mutual recog-
nition. Unlike harmonization, mutual recognition does not require a country to change its
rules. Rather, each country agrees to accept the accounting rules and regulations of other
countries. However, before a country adopts a policy of mutual recognition, it should be
confident that, even though specific audit procedures may vary, the level of audit precision is
constant between the two countries. Consequently, culture (Hofstede, 1980, 1991) might
influence an auditor's decision-making process and thus influence materiality estimates.
To date, there is no empirical evidence to support the premise that implementing
intemational standards provides comparable statements of equal precision. This research
examines the effects of client-integrity ratings (Bemardi & Arnold, 1994; Estes & Reames,
1988), culture (Hofstede, 1980, 1991), and the level of litigation within a country (Wingate,
1997) on materiality estimates from an intemational perspective. The research also compares
the European materiality estimates with the estimates fi*om a group of US auditors (Bemardi
& Amold, 1994). The European sample includes 181 auditors (25 partners, 67 senior
managers, and 89 managers) with Big-Six auditing firms from Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
The Netherlands, Spain, Sweden, and the UK. The US sample includes 83 auditors (3 1 senior
managers and 52 managers) fi-om Big-Six firms (Bemardi & Amold, 1994). The research
questionnaire (Appendix A) was developed with the assistance of representatives of Big-Six
firms located in the United States; representatives of the European firms participating in this
research validated the questionnaire.
2. Theory development
2.1. Overview
In selecting the countries to investigate auditors' determination of materiality, we carefully
considered each country's accounting system and culture. A system of mles and regulations
such as an accounting system does not develop in a vacuum. Rather, the system is the result
of the interactions and compromises between various environmental factors. These factors
include the type of economy, the stage of economic development, the nature and development
of capital markets, the management and ownership of corporations, the main providers of
corporate capital, the regulatory framework, and cultural attitudes (Radebaugh, 1975). There
are several key differentiating factors that led to the selection of the westem European
countries in the sample. Of specific interest were the providers of corporate capital, type of
tax system, legal systems, and legal and regulatory stmcture.
Historically, European countries have been financed primarily using debt or equity. For
instance, German firms primarily use debt financing and firms in the UK use equity
financing. This suggests different disclosure requirements because of creditors' and invest-
ors' ability to bargain for specific accounting disclosures. Nobes and Parker (1988) suggest
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that legal and regulatory systems are important to the extent that countries can be
differentiated on the basis of their development from either common law (i.e., UK and
Ireland) or codified Roman law (i.e., France, Italy, Spain, and The Netherlands). The final
variable used in the selection process was national culture (Hofstede, 1980). Some may
contest any one or all of these factors. For instance, Nobes (1998) argues with traditional
lists of factors that influence international differences. Instead, he offers two explanatory
variables that split the accounting systems into classes: culturally self-sufficient countries
and culturally dominated countries.
The differences in financing sources cited above play a significant role in the preparation
of financial statements. For instance, while continental Europe has relied on debt financing,
the United States and UK have traditionally relied far more heavily on equity fiinding. On the
continent, creditors typically are represented on the board of directors and thus have access to
information not in the financial statements. Clearly, this is different from the United States
and UK where agencies such as the Securifies and Exchange Commission (SEC) mandate fiiU
and fair disclosure for stockholders. Additionally, regulatory and litigation (shown in Fig. 1
)
are greater in these countries.
Initially, firms from nine western European countries (underlined or italicized in Fig. 1)
agreed to participate in the study. These countries were selected because their Uncertainty
Avoidance scores (Hofstede, 1980) and Litigation indices (Wingate, 1997) provide a
sufficient range of values for the study. Of the countries that agreed to participate, the
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Underlined countries are part of this research. Italicized countries: German firms declined to participate. French sample removed due to experience differences.
Fig. 1 . A comparison of litigation and uncertainty indices.
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German firms declined to participate just prior to beginning the data-collection process. The
French data were not used because of experience differences between it and the remaining
samples; however, the final model would not have substantially changed had the sample from
France been included in the analysis. For the seven remaining countries, there are six unique
Uncertainty Avoidance scores (the UK and Ireland have identical scores) with a range from
23 to 86, and three litigation scores that range from 4.22 to 10.00.^ The seven remaining
countries represent three of the five "cultural areas" that make up Europe:
1
.
More-developed Latin (Belgium, France, Italy and Spain);
2. Near Eastern (Greece);
3. Germanic (Austria, Germany, and Switzerland);
4. Anglo {Ireland and the UK)\ and
5. Nordic {Denmark, Finland, The Netherlands, Norway, and Sweden).
2.2. Materiality
Recent pronouncements by the national and international accounting and auditing boards
do not require disclosure of materiality estimates. Within the European community, the lack
of specific guidance could imply that the standards already in place ensure an acceptable level
of comparability. The lASC defines the concept of financial statement materiality in the
Intemational Accounting Standards as (lASC, 1999b):
Information is material if its omission or misstatement could influence the economic
decisions of users taken on the basis of the financial statements . . . Thus, materiality provides
a threshold or cut-off point . .
.
While the establishment of such a cut-off is a common auditing procedure throughout the
world, the judgment of the individual auditor or audit team is the basis for determining the
size of materiality within a specified audit. Various factors indigenous to a specific audit are
the basis for this judgment; these factors include, but are not limited to, the quality of the
internal control system and the auditor's perceptions of management's integrity. Although
successful completion of the attestation service requires a materiality cut-off level, the size of
the materiality esdmate is not stadc; client-specific factors, the culture, and the level of
litigation in the country could influence it (Gray, 1988).
De Matinis and Burrowes (1996) note that Australia, New Zealand, Canada, Fiji, and
South Africa include examples of rules of thumb for materiality in their standards. However,
Bemardi and Pincus (1996) note that most European countries have not taken this step
towards formalizing materiality estimates. In their statement in 1995 on the "Interpretation of
Materiality in Financial Reporting," the Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and
Wales (ICAEW) cautions auditors to consider the implicafions of "Published Guidance." For
^ The problem of a limited litigation range (i.e., 4.82-10.00) is not unique to Europe. For South America,
there are only four indices (i.e., 1.65, 2.42, 3.61, and 4.82) with a spread of 3.17 points.
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instance, fully diluted earnings per share must be disclosed when there is a 5% or more
difference between it and basic earnings per share, which is the UK's one explicit materiality
rule. Another materiality inference concerns acquisitions and mergers where material
minority interests are defined as 10%. The interpretation ends with rules of thumb on
materiality ( par. 34c) cited from the SEC of the United States.
The staff of the US Securities and Exchange Commission has an informal rule of thumb that
items and errors of more than 10% are material, those between 5% and 10% may be
material and those under 5% are usually not material. These percentages are applied to gross
profit, net income, equity and any specific line item in the financial statements that is
potentially misstated.
2.3. Client integrity
The intemational framework for financial statements (lASC, 1999b) indicates that both
quantitative and qualitative factors influence materiality and that materiality "provides a
threshold or cut-off point." The Intemational Standards on Auditing of the Intemational
Federation of Accountants (IFA) state that audits should consider "the risk of material
misstatement in financial statements resulting from fraud or error" (IFA, 1999a). To begin
with, the integrity of a client's management is a consideration in acceptance and retention of
clients (IFA, 1999b). The Intemational Auditing Standard on Fraud and Errors also associates
risk with client integrity (IFA, 1999a). This standard says that "conditions or events which
increase risk of fraud or error include: Questions with respect to the integrity or competence
of management.
"
The issue of client integrity falls back on the basic legal premise that additional precautions
should be taken when dealing with an accident-prone individual (Harper & Fleming, 1956).
Ponemon and Gabhart (1993) found that audit-risk assessments relate to client integrity.
Bemardi (1994a) found that US auditors provided with background data that client integrity
was low examined significantly more data about this rating than auditors provided with
background data that client integrity was high or client-integrity data was not available.
Anderson and Marchant (1989) found that low integrity had a greater effect than high
integrity in decision making. Low integrity ratings also increased auditors' probability of
fi-aud estimates (Bemardi, 1997). The intemational standards indicate that audit risk should
vary inversely with both client integrity and materiality (IFA, 1 999c) and that client integrity
varies inversely with audit risk. Anecdotal evidence indicates a reduction in materiality due to
client integrity (Estes & Reames, 1988, p. 291):
[0]ne audit client was infamous throughout the staff for trying to . . . understate current
payables, to improve the current ratio and thereby satisfy the bank that held the company's
notes. Our materiality threshold was generally lower on this engagement than on others.
Cobert (1996) found that materiality should decrease when client integrity decreases audit
risk increases. Therefore, when compared to the level of materiality for a high-integrity client,
auditors performing an audit for a low-integrity client should decrease materiality to
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compensate for increased audit risk. Hypothesis 1 tests this relationship on a sample of
European auditors.
Hypothesis 1: Auditors will establish lower materiality cut-off levels in situations where
the auditor perceives the client to be at a lower level of integrity.
2.4. Cultural differences
Gray (1988) suggests that external and ecological factors, institutional consequences, and
the societal values of a culture (Hofstede, 1980) influence the process that produces
accounting values and systems. Gray maintains that accounting values and Hofstede's
constructs are interwoven. Using Hofstede's cultural areas (i.e., those used in this research
are Anglo, Nordic, and more-developed Latin), Gray introduces two-dimensional frames that
combine his accounting values of professionalism with uniformity and conservatism with
secrecy. Given Gray's (p. 12) accounting values of professionalism and uniformity, one
would expect more flexibility and professionalism to be associated with the Anglo and
Nordic countries and more uniformity and a movement towards statutory control in the more-
developed Latin countries. Likewise, Gray's (p. 13) accounting values of conservatism and
secrecy lead us to expect that optimism and transparency are associated with the Anglo and
Nordic countries and secrecy and conservatism to be associated with the developed Latin
countries. These expectations fit the descriptions of code versus common law countries in
Meek and Saudagaran (1990).
Agacer and Doupnik (1991), Arnold and Bemardi (1997), Cohen, Pant, and Sharp (1995),
Doupnik and Saker (1995), Kachelmeier and Shehata (1997), Lampe and Sutton (1995), and
Siegel, Omer, and Karim (1997) note that cultural differences have explanatory properties in
accounting research. Collins and Bloom (1997) posit that the development of accounting
systems may be a function of a country's culture. Zarzeski (1996) notes that more investor-
oriented information findings are associated with countries that are more open in their
business and financial relationships. Users of financial statements should be interested in
nonaudit client variables. These variables could indicate that audits performed by different
auditors throughout the world might be different in teiTns of their inherent level of accuracy.
Culture is a system of shared values and beliefs that represent a "set of likely reactions of
citizens with a common mental programming . . . reactions need not be found within the same
persons, but only statistically more often in the same society" (Hofstede, 1991, p. 112).
Uncertainty Avoidance suggests a cultural difference in the amount of tolerance for
uncertainty of a specified people (Hofstede, 1980). It represents the collective willingness
of a society to tolerate ambiguous outcomes (Cohen et al., 1995). Hofstede (1980, p. 116)
maintains that "[ajccounting . . . absorbs uncertainty to such an extent that it absorbs all of the
usable information as well."
Salter and Niswander (1995) conducted a test of Gray's theorized relationships between
accounting values and Hofstede's (1980) four cultural constructs. They found that, of
Hofstede's four cultural constructs, only Uncertainty Avoidance was significantly related to
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all of Gray's accounting values. Salter and Niswander (p. 391) found that "other culture-
based variables do not appear to be as closely related to accounting values as anticipated by
Gray." These authors also note that Uncertainty Avoidance correctly predicts Gray's
professionalism, uniformity, conservatism, and secrecy for a country 80% of the time.
Hofstede's choice of the term Uncertainty Avoidance for his construct may bias our
perceptions. For example, we might assume that to avoid uncertainty, auditors from high
Uncertainty Avoidance countries would increase the level of disclosure in financial state-
ments. However, this has not been proven to be the case. In a study of 39 countries, Wingate
(1997) examined the association between the inclusion or omission of 90 suggested
disclosure requirements used in the Center for International Financial Analysis and
Research's disclosure index (Bavishi, 1991) and Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance construct.
She found that financial-statement disclosures of major companies within each country were
negatively associated with Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance construct, so that the higher the
Uncertainty Avoidance score for a country, the lower the level of disclosures.^ Doupnik and
Salter (1995) also found that countries with higher Uncertainty Avoidance scores tended to
have lower levels of accounting disclosures.
Doupnik and Salter's and Wingate 's finding of a negative association between Uncertainty
Avoidance and disclosures in financial statements challenges our preconceived notions about
the actual meaning of the term Uncertainty Avoidance. While auditors would assume that as
Uncertainty Avoidance increases materiality would be lowered to perform a more precise
audit, Wingate 's research leads to the opposite hypothesis. Doupnik and Salter's and
Wingate 's research lead to the premise that materiality estimates will increase as Uncertainty
Avoidance increases. The second hypothesis deals with the association between Hofstede's
Uncertainty Avoidance construct and materiality. This hypothesis uses the average materiality
estimate for each country as a parallel construct to Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance score
because both represent the most probable response of their society.
Hypothesis 2: Materiality estimates are associated with a country's Uncertainty
Avoidance construct.
2.5. Litigation
Gorelik (1994) maintains that legal factors played an important role in the historical
development of accounting and auditing standards. In recent years, the increase in contingent
fees and class action suits fueled the litigious environment whose outgrowth is the level of
specificity required in accounting and auditing disclosures (Collins & Bloom, 1997). These
disclosure requirements mark a country's legal system (e.g., code vs. common law), which
predicts the emergence of two classes of accounting systems (Doupnik & Salter, 1995).
The associations between materiality and the independent variables of Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede,
1980) and litigation (Wingate, 1997) may not be the same as posited in Hypotheses 1 and 2 because disclosure
(Wingate) and materiality related to inventory balances are not the same.
466 D.F. Arnold Sr. et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 459-483
Over the past few years, there has been a decrease in the profession's public image
(De Matinis & Burrowes, 1996) and a corollary increase in the litigation against auditors
(Collins & Bloom, 1997) because of their failure to meet investors' needs (i.e., the
expectations gap). De Matinis and Burrowes suggest that firms implement alternate measures
and reports to narrow the expectations gap and in the process reduce litigation against
auditors. Jennings, Kneer, and Reckers (1996) believe that the profession should provide
quantitative guidance for materiality because of inconsistencies in materiality judgments.
One might expect that a lower precision audit (i.e., higher materiality) has a higher
likelihood of failure and litigation than a more precise audit (i.e., lower materiality). It can be
argued that less precise audits (i.e., using higher materiality levels) might contribute to
litigation against auditors. One could then argue that as rational individuals, auditors in that
country would start to use more stringent (i.e., lower) materiality estimates if the cost of
litigation exceeds the cost of additional audit work. However, meeting the public's expect-
ations is a "moving target." After auditors lower their materiality to provide a more precise
audit, the question then becomes: "Did they lower them sufficiently to produce an audit that
meets the public's needs?" If the litigation rate continues to increase or remains the same,
then the public is saying in effect that audits need to be even more precise. If this is the case,
the relationship between materiality (audit precision), the auditing environment, and the audit
report is an iterative process. Auditors should continue to reevaluate the auditing environment
for indications that the investing public is satisfied with their product or until the cost of the
additional audit work exceeds the costs of litigation. One would anticipate that countries with
higher (lower) litigation rates use higher (lower) materiality levels that result in less (more)
precise audits.
An interesting contrast in Wingate's (1997) study of 39 countries is that, while Uncertainty
Avoidance was negatively associated with the disclosure of financial information, high-
disclosure countries were more likely to have high litigation rates. Therefore, withholding
information from investors appears to benefit companies in high Uncertainty Avoidance
countries through lower litigation. The third hypothesis deals with the association between
the litigation index used by Wingate (1997) and materiality. This hypothesis also uses the
average materiality estimate for each country as a parallel construct to Wingate's litigation
index because both represent an average for their society. Wingate's litigation index will be
explained more fully later in the study.
Hypothesis 3: There will be a positive association between the average materiality
estimate for a country and that country's level of litigation.
2. 6. Differences between the United States and European countries
The Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the Financial Accounting Standards
Board (FASB) do not believe that it is in the best interest of investors to increase the
globalization of capital markets at the expense of the quality of financial reporting. The SEC
and FASB insist that high-quality disclosure rules and professional standards protect investors
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(Levitt, 1998). However, the passage of the Litigation Rehef Act (1995) in the United States
reduced the extent of damages that can attach to public-accounting firms so far as public
companies annual statements are concerned. This factor, coupled with a movement to
strategic auditing and some peoples' beliefs that financial statements are not as important
in analyzing companies' prospects as they were in the past, generally suggests that litigation
may have lessened in the United States. It also suggests that materiality measures today may
differ in a more relaxed direction. SEC Staff Accounting Bulletin (SAB) No. 99 (1999) may
actually be an effort to counter this relaxation. Society (in the form of the SEC) had to step in
with SAB 99 and force more stringent materiality levels on US auditors where their clients'
may intend to manipulate earnings.
National accounting communities are developing comparable approaches to harmonization
of auditing standards, such as include the determination and disclosure of materiality
standards (Pratt & Van Peursem, 1996). The compelling argument for specific materiality
guidance is that without this guidance "auditor judgments may lack consistency due to
differing judgments about the magnitude of an error or omission considered to be material"
(Bemardi & Pincus, 1996, p. 2). However, emphasizing quantitative materiality thresholds
could result in ignoring qualitative considerations that should also influence materiality
(Bemardi & Pincus, 1996). The Accountants International Study Group (1974, par. 28)
argued that users of financial statements might benefit from knowing specific quantitative
materiality thresholds:
Guidelines would facilitate comparability and eliminate greatly diverse results under similar
circumstances ... It is an obligation of the accountant to all users of financial statements to
narrow areas of diversity and encourage meaningful comparisons.
The harmonization of European accounting standards (Collins & Bloom, 1997) should
lead to comparable financial statements for the countries in the European Community
(Turner, 1983). Audits conducted in Europe to reflect the "true and fair" standard of the
Fourth Directive should be of similar precision as reflected by materiality estimates. If
this were the case, one would anticipate that US and European materiality estimates
should be similar.
Hypothesis 4: European materiality estimates will be similar to those from the
United States.
3. Research design
S.l. Subjects
The intent of the study was to use only subjects with at least 5 years of audit experience
(i.e., managers or above). This precaufion was taken because both Bemardi (1994b) and
Bemardi and Amold (1994) found that, while managers, including senior managers, were
sensitive to cues on integrity, seniors were not sensitive to these cues. When the data were
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collected, we noted that all but one auditor from France was a senior, and that the samples
from Sweden and the UK included only one senior. Additionally, seniors from two of the four
participating firms were not responsible for materiality computations. Given these experience
differences, all seniors were dropped from the sample (i.e., its original intent), which
eliminated France from the sample.^ The final sample includes 181 auditors from 16 European
offices of four Big-Six firms located in Denmark, Ireland, Italy, The Netherlands, Spain,
Sweden, and the UK. There were 25 partners (13.8%), 67 senior managers (37.0%), and
89 managers (49.2%) in the sample. The audit experience of the participants was between 5.0
and 25.0 years (mean of 9.9 years).
The US sample came from offices located in most major cities within an area enclosed by
Boston, Philadelphia, Indianapolis, Detroit, and Buffalo (Bemardi & Arnold, 1994). We
reduced this sample of 152 managers and senior managers to 83. Of those eliminated, 30 were
from a firm that did not participate in this study; the other 39 did not receive an integrity
rating (i.e., Bemardi and Arnold's "no information" group). There were 3 1 senior managers
(38.6%) and 52 managers (61.4%)) in the sample. The audit experience of the remaining US
auditors was between 5.0 and 13.0 years (mean of 8.1 years).
3.2. Research instrument
The research instrument consisted of an audit case scenario with selected quantitative and
qualitative information on the client. The client-specific quantitative data commonly used to
estimate materiality (Pany & Wheeler, 1989) provided in the case study included: total
assets, total inventory, total equity, total revenue, gross profit, pretax income, and an
evaluation of client integrity (Appendix A). Using Pany and Wheeler's (1989) 10 rules of
thumb for materiality estimates, the data provided in the research instrument (Appendix A)
generated a range of materiality estimates of US$122,333 to US$286,380 with a mean of
US$198,037. Because of time limitations, Bemardi and Amold (1994) and Bemardi and
Pincus (1996) used the materiality range developed from Pany and Wheeler to create nine
materiality "bins" (i.e., US$0-50,000, US$50,001 -100,000, . . . US$350,000-400,000, and
Over US$400,000). The "Over US$400,000" category was established by doubling the
mean for the mles of thumb. We discussed the case and materiality issues with managers and
partners from Big-Six firms prior to the original study; these US auditors doubted that an
auditor would estimate materiality above US$400,000. One of the limitafions of Bemardi
and Amold (1994) and an area they suggest for future research was to ask auditors to
estimate materiality as an open-ended quesfion. In this research, the audit scenario used by
the European auditors was the same as the one used by Bemardi and Amold (1994) and
Bemardi and Pincus (1996); however, we asked the auditors to estimate materiality as an
open-ended question:
How large must an error in the inventory account be before it is considered material (smallest
size to be material)?
The model would not have substantially changed had seniors been included in the analysis.
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We sent the scenario and questionnaire to the contact person (i.e., usually the director
of human resources or office managing partner) for each of the 16 offices. They were
asked to read the questionnaire and determine whether it was still meaningful. These
individuals indicated that the questionnaire and scenario were clearly written and their
intent was still valid. We also asked each office's contact person to determine whether the
questionnaire (Appendix A) should be presented in the country's language. Only the
offices in two of the seven countries (Italy and Spain) requested that their country's
language be used. For these two countries, a person first translated the survey question-
naire into that country's language. Then a second person translated the questionnaire back
into English to ensure that the initial translation correctly reflected the exact intent of
the survey.
The financial data part of the questionnaire was always presented in the local currency. We
took the exchange rates used to translate the original data from the Wall Street Journal about
2 months prior to the lead author's travel date. To guard against possible exchange rate
fluctuations, we translated the data on the returned questionnaires back to dollars using the
exchange rate for the day of the lead author's visit to each office.
3.3. Procedures
The lead author delivered the surveys to each of the European offices. These visits
established a positive contact and insured a consistent explanation of the survey. The
contact person at each office was asked to distribute the surveys at random to managers,
senior managers, and partners. The lead author requested that anyone who had
experienced an extended assignment outside his/her home country should not be part
of the sample. To preclude problems, we also included a background questionnaire as
part of the survey instrument. This questionnaire requested information on staff level,
experience, age, gender, and nationality. Part of the experience response included a
question conceming whether the participant had been assigned to an office outside their
country for a year or more. The purpose of these questions is to ensure that the sample
is representative of that country. As mentioned previously, several offices from various
countries gave seniors the research instrument; these seniors and three auditors who
were on an extended exchange program outside their country were eliminated from
the sample.
3.4. Dependent variable
Even though there were differences in the staff levels responding to the survey by
country, multiple comparison tests indicate that materiality estimates did not vary by
staff level (P=.76) or by firm (P=.22). Because these two factors did not differ, we
collapsed the data by staff level and firm for the remainder of the research (Table 1).
Because Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance index is the average reaction of individuals
from each country, materiality estimates were averaged to produce a most likely estimate
by country and client-integrity type. This procedure produced 14 unique materiality
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Table 1
Data and indices on dependent and independent variables
Country Materiality Client Litigation Uncertainty Sample
(group) estimate integrity indices Avoidance size Experience
Denmark 252.5 High 4.82 23 14 9.2
215.9 Low 4.82 23 15 8.5
Ireland 322.9 High 6.22 35 13 10.7
275.2 Low 6.22 35 10 10.4
Italy 496.9 High 6.22 75 21 10.7
422.5 Low 6.22 75 18 10.4
The Netherlands 464.0 High 6.22 53 8 8.4
285.2 Low 6.22 53 13 8.7
Spain 497.0 High 4.82 86 5 9.2
302.1 Low 4.82 86 6 8.5
Sweden 383.5 High 4.82 29 9 7.4
313.1 Low 4.82 29 14 9.4
United Kingdom 448.2 High 10.00 35 19 7.9
409.5 Low 10.00 35 16 10.3
European mean 408.2 High na na 89 9.6
323.5 Low na na 92 10.2
United States 232.3 High 15.00 46 41 8.0
201.2 Low 15.00 46 42 8.2
European mean uses the 89 (92) auditors in the high (low)-integrity client groups.
estimates (i.e., two for each country) that we used as the dependent variable for
Hypotheses 1-3. Table 1 shows the means of the data; for all countries, the high-
integrity estimates were larger than the low-integrity estimates. The overall mean
materiality for the 181 European auditors was US$408,200 (US$323,500) for the high
(low)-integrity group.
Given the nine materiality "bins" from Bemardi and Arnold (1994) and Bemardi and
Pincus (1996), we used the average of each range as the materiality estimate for the auditors
from the United States. For example, US$25,000 was used for the "US$0-50,000" bin,
US$75,000 for the "US$50,001 -100,000," and US*$125,000 for the "US$100,001-
150,000" bin.To be consistent, we used US$425,000 for the "Over US$400,000" bin; there
were only six auditors from the sample of 83 who estimated materiality over US$400,000.
The US auditors estimated materiality at US$232,300 for the high-integrity client (a? ==41) and
US$201,200 for the low-integrity client (« = 42).
3.5. Independent variables
The only actual difference in the case study materials that the auditors received was the
evaluation of client integrity (Appendix A). About one-half of the subjects received cases that
indicated a relatively high level of perceived integrity for the client (i.e., a ranking of "2").
We provided the other subjects with cases that indicated a relatively low level of client
integrity (i.e., a ranking of "8"). The integrity rating was purposely given twice on the
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research instrument— initially and immediately before the research question. While some
may believe that this repetition created a demand effect, we do not believe this to be the case.
We repeated our rating because representatives of the participating firms said that an
evaluation of low integrity would be signaled throughout the client's work papers. The
format for client-integrity evaluation was shown to representatives of all participating firms in
both the United States (Bemardi & Arnold, 1994) and Europe. These representatives said that
its intention was clear and approximated what their firm used, hi fact, it nearly replicated the
format used by one of the firms.
Uncertainty Avoidance is a "set of likely reactions of citizens with a common mental
programming" (Hofstede, 1991, p. 112). Hofstede's (1980) Uncertainty Avoidance scores
(Table 1) were the resuh of sampling over 100,000 employees from the 53 countries of a large
multinational corporation. The only significant association in our European sample {n = 7)
was between Uncertainty Avoidance and Power Distance. Uncertainty Avoidance and Power
Distance are nearly perfect surrogates for each other in our sample (i.e., a .96 correlation).
However, while the range on Power Distance for our sample was 18-57 (i.e., a spread of 39),
the range for Uncertainty Avoidance was 23-86 (i.e., a spread of 63). We used Uncertainty
Avoidance in the analysis because it has wider range, which should provide greater
discriminatory power.
The litigation index used in the research evolved because a Big-Six firm had been billed
one premium for all of its international operations. In an effort to allocate the premium
equitably among the individual country partnerships, the firm hired an insurance under-
writer to develop a measure of litigation for countries where they had offices (Table 1).
The litigation indices "represent the risk of doing business as an auditor in a particular
country" and range from 1 to 10 (Wingate, 1997, p. 140). The indices were developed
fi"om data that included:
1. all intemational audit firms' claims experience;
2. other professional firms (i.e., lawyers, engineers, etc.) claims information;
3. legal and regulatory environments;
4. polidcal and economic environments; and
5. the professional accounting environment in the country.
Wingate (p. 140) cautions that the data (and therefore the indices) only contain publicly
available informafion on claims and other costs. Consequently, if audit liability claims in a
specific country were settled privately, they would not be factored into the computation,
which results in a downward biasing for that country.
The seven European countries provide two sets of contrasts. There are two countries with
identical Uncertainty Avoidance scores (i.e., 35 for Ireland and the UK); each has a different
litigation index. This is also true for the litigafion; there are two indices (i.e., 4.82 comprising
Denmark, Sweden, and Spain, and 6.22 comprising Ireland, Italy, and The Netherlands) with
no duplication of Uncertainty Avoidance scores in either group.
An examination indicates that, while we correlated all three independent variables to
materiality, none of the variables significantly correlate to each other (i.e., multicoUinearity is
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not a problem). Wingate found that the Htigation scores developed by the insurance
underwriter for the 49 countries in her study related significantly to Hofstede's Uncertainty
Avoidance score. While these two variables correlate to each other for the 14 European
countries (P=.08), these factors were not related (P=.61) for the seven countries in the
current sample.
4. Analysis
4.1. Hypotheses
Table 2 shows the regression model for the materiality estimates for the high- and low-
integrity clients of the seven European countries. The average materiality estimates of the
European auditors decreased by US$91,640 between the high- and low-integrity clients
(Hypothesis 1). This difference was significant (P= .01) and explained 25.6% of the variation
in materiality estimates. This finding confirms the inverse relationship between risk and
materiality (IFA, 1999c).
Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance was also a significant variable (Hypothesis 2) in
estimating European materiality (P=.004). Uncertainty Avoidance was the most powerful
explanatory variable; it accounted for 28.1% of the variation in materiality estimates.
Table 2
Regression model for materiality for the seven European countries
df SS MS F Significance F
Regression
Residual
Total
3
10
13
85,623.4
29,258.8
114,882.2
28,541.2
2925.9
9.75 .0026
Coefficients Standard error t Statistic P value
Intercept
Integrity
Uncertainty
Litigation
140.74
-91.64
2.42
24.70
68.76
28.91
0.65
8.62
2.05
-3.17
3.72
2.86
.0679
.0100
.0040
.0168
Regression statistics
Multiple R
R'
Adjusted R'
Standard error
Observations
.863
.745
.689
54.09
14
Integrity: for high-integrity client; 1 for low-integrity client.
Uncertainty: Uncertainty Avoidance (Hofstede, 1980).
Litigation: litigation index (Wingate, 1997).
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Wingate's finding, using Hofstede's (1980, 1991) work, supports an increase in materiality
for higher Uncertainty Avoidance scores. The model (Table 2) indicates that, as Uncertainty
Avoidance increases by 10 points, the average materiality estimate would also increase
by US$24,200.
Table 2 also shows the regression coefficients and significance for the litigation variable.
As anticipated (Hypothesis 3), the litigation variable was significant (P= .017) and explained
13.7% of the variation. Litigation increased by US$24,700 for a one-point increase in the
level of litigation. The coefficients of the litigation and Uncertainty Avoidance variables
reflect their ranges; the difference in the magnitudes of the two scales is significant. While
Uncertainty Avoidance goes from 23 to 86, litigation is from 4.82 to 10.0 (i.e., uncertainty is a
factor of about 10 higher than litigation). Had we scaled Uncertainty Avoidance by
multiplying it by 10, the coefficients would have been 24.20 for litigation and 24.70 for
Uncertainty Avoidance.
Hypothesis 4 was tested using a variation of the Dunn multiple comparison procedure
that treats the materiality estimates from the United States as a control group and compares
the European countries to it. Significant differences were found (Hypothesis 4) between the
materiality estimate for the high-integrity client between the estimates of auditors from
the United States (US$232.3) and Ireland (US$322.9, P^ .08), Italy (US$496.9, P= .001), The
Netherlands (US$464.0, P=.02), Spain (US$497.0, P=.005), Sweden (US$383.5, P=0.04),
and the UK (US$448.2, ^=.001). For the low-integrity client, significant differences exist
between the United States (US$201.2) and Ireland (US$275.2, P=.10), Italy (US$422.5,
P=.02), The Netherlands (US$285.2, P=.06), Sweden (US$313.1, P=.08), and the UK
(US$409.5, P= .001).
4.2. Possible interactions
Fig. 2 shows the range of materiality estimates for the high- and low-integrity ratings
for Uncertainty Avoidance and litigation. The plots show that the range materiality
estimates narrows for both Uncertainty Avoidance and litigation for the low-integrity
client. In both cases, the materiality estimates decrease, which indicates a sensitivity to risk
information. However, materiality increased for countries that are classified as more
conservative (i.e., with Uncertainty Avoidance) and for countries with increased risk of
doing business as an auditor.^
The data indicate that whether litigation or Uncertainty Avoidance was the major
factor in materiality estimates may depend on client integrity. For example, Uncertainty
Avoidance was the major factor (r^ = .41) with high-integrity clients. This supports
^ The data in Fig. 2 show dramatic adjustments for low-chent integrity for Spain and The Netherlands.
Without Spain and The Netherlands, the model has an adjusted r^ of .74 for Denmark, Ireland, Italy,
Sweden, and the UK. If the model includes the United States and the seven European countries, the adjusted
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Panel A: Materiality and Uncertainty Avoidance
10 20 30 40 50 60 70
Uncertainty Avoidance
Panel B: Materiality and Litigation
80 90
5 6 7
Litigation
10
UPPER CASE Materiality estimates for the High Integrity Client (000)
Lower Case Materiality estimates for the Low Integrity client (000)
Fig. 2. Materiality, Uncertainty Avoidance, and litigation.
Wingate's results showing that disclosure decreased as Uncertainty Avoidance increased.
For the low-integrity client, the data indicate that litigation was now the primary factor
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(r'' = .65) and that the relationship is in a positive direction, which agrees with our
premise that countries with higher Htigation rates perform less precise audits. However,
interactive terms were not analyzed because of our limited sample size.
5. Discussion
5.7. Users' needs
Financial statements ftilfill different roles on the European continent when compared to
the United States and the UK. For instance, Saudagaran and Meek (1997, p. 131) note that
continental European countries (the UK and United States) have a code (common) law legal
system that dominates the environment and are usually (less) uncertainty avoidant and rely
less on (have strong) stock markets. Meek and Saudagaran (1990, p. 150) note that when
banks (capital markets) dominate the financing environment creditor (shareholder) protec-
tion is emphasized. Wingate (1997, p. 141) finds that Uncertainty Avoidance, which is
associated with countries that rely more on debt financing, is negatively associated with the
level of actual disclosure by corporations within specific countries. Doupnik and Salter
(1995) find that lower levels of disclosure associate with countries with higher Uncertainty
Avoidance scores.
The requirements for inflation accounting also differ for the countries in this research.
While Denmark, Italy, Spain, and Sweden have no requirements for additional disclosures,
The Netherlands, Ireland, UK, and the United States allow optimal supplementary current
cost information (Coopers & Lybrand (International), 1993). Salter and Doupnik (1992)
studied the relationship between legal and accounting systems and found similar country
groupings. Finally, Biddle and Saudagaran (1991) note that disclosure requirements influ-
enced management's choice of stock exchanges.
Consequently, one might expect that primary users of financial statements in debt-financed
countries have information other than that contained in the financial statements. One might
also expect auditors in these countries to be less concerned about the accuracy of the
financial-statement information (e.g., less stringent materiality standards) than auditors from
equity-oriented countries. On the other hand, auditors and societies that rely on equity
fiinding are likely to have different views of how stringent materiality should be. If this is the
case, then it may not be surprising that the United State, UK, and Ireland, which were the only
common-law countries with equity-oriented financing arrangements, were the countries that
provide specific quantitative materiality guidelines.
5.2. Uncertainty Avoidance
The view of reducing materiality may not apply to auditors from high Uncertainty
Avoidance societies because their views may not be consistent with what others in their
society believe in terms of rigidly set materiality standards. Thus, setting materiality
476 D.F. Arnold Sr. et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 459-483
artificially high will serve to create a level of pseudo certainty. To illuminate our Uncertainty
Avoidance result, we sent Hofstede an explanation of materiality's role in auditing and our
results. In his response, Hofstede (1998) suggests that auditors' "self-protection is behind the
rules of the profession." Cyert and March (1963, p. 119) support this view, noting that
organizations avoid uncertainty by:
[A]void[ing] the requirement that they anticipate the future reactions to other parts of their
environment by arranging a negotiated environment. They impose plans, standard operating
procedures, industry tradition, and uncertainty-absorbing contracts on that situation by
avoiding planning where plans depend upon prediction of uncertain future events, and by
emphasizing planning where the plans can be made self-confirming by some control devise.
Meek and Saudagaran (1990) and Saudagaran and Meek (1997) note that in statutory
countries (e.g., continental Europe) the thought process believes that what is not forbidden is
therefore allowed. Thus, for our sample of continental auditors, we might expect them to wish
to be right. If this is the case, then these auditors would expand materiality estimates so that
any remaining errors are not material (and therefore not errors). For example, KPMG's
Business Measurement Process (Bell, Marrs, Solomon, & Thomas, 1996) implies the
deemphasizing of traditional materiality limits in today's US practice environment. Using
Hofstede's (1980) rationale, this process assures audit effectiveness but also "absorbs all of
the usable information as well" (p. 116).
5.3. Specific materiality guidelines
The difference in the scales used in this research and the US data may limit the
validity of our findings. The data for the US sample used a nine-bin scale that may have
created a demand effect. The midrange of US$200,001 -250,000 includes the US
estimates for the high (low)-integrity client of US$232,300 (US$201,200). The European
samples had an open-ended response, which they most likely used to reach higher means.
However, the data indicate that the auditors from the United States, UK, and Ireland
followed the specific materiality guidelines in their accounting standards. The US data
used in Bemardi and Arnold (1994) and Bemardi and Pincus (1996) were gathered in late
1990 to mid 1991. At this time, the accounting standards in the United States included a
3% materiality guideline (APB Opinion No. 15, par. 15, 1969) for diluted earnings per
share. When the current data were gathered in 1997, the Published Guidance from the UK
cited earlier in effect indicated that "errors of more than 10% are material, those between
5% and 10% may be material and those under 5% are usually not material. These
percentages are applied to . . . any specific line item in the financial statements that is
potentially misstated."
Given the "Published Guidance" section of the UK's standard on materiality, auditors
from the UK could have estimated materiality between US$328,607 (5% of inventory) and
US$657,214 (10% of inventory) from the questionnaire data (Appendix A). The actual UK
estimate for the high-integrity client was US$448,200 (6.8%). Using the US rule of 3% for
diluted earning per share as a guideline for materiality, the expected US estimate would
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Table 3
Materiality levels in relation to rules of thumb for the high-integrity client
European sample
United With Without
Range of Rules of thumb for
estimating materiality
Dollar
amount
States guidelines
Number Percent
guideline
Number
s
estimate Number Percent Percent
US$50,000 1 2.5 0.0 3 5.2
or less
US$50,001- 2 4.9 0.0 1 1.8
100,000
US$100,001- 1.0% of total equity US$122,333 4 9.7 0.0 5 8.8
150,000 0.6% of gross profit
0.27 X (net income)""^'
US$140,899
US$147,415
US$150,001- 0.5% of total assets US$178,850 6 14.6 3 9.4 3 5.2
200,000 Leslie's blend US$188,077
US$200,001- 3.9% X (revenue)"-^^ US$206,521 14 34.2 4 12.5 1 1.8
250,000 5.0% of pretax income
KPMG audit gauge
US$211,921
US$237,881
US$250,001- 14.7% X US$259,173 8 19.5 0.0 9 15.8
300,000 (pretax income)""'^
0.5% of total revenues US$286,380
US$300,001- 1 2.5 6 18.8 7 12.3
350,000
US$350,001- 0.0 5 15.5 4 7.0
400,000
Over 5 12.1 14 43.8 24 42.1
US$400,000
Totals 41 100.0 32 100.0 57 100.0
Highlighted area contains the materiality estimates arrived at by using the 10 rules of thumb in Pany and
Wheeler (1989).
Materiality ranges (i.e., US$50,000 or less) are the bins used by Bemardi and Arnold (1994).
Average materiality for Pany and Wheeler's 10 rules of thumb is US$197,945.
The countries that have (do not have) materiality guidelines are the United Kingdom and Ireland (Denmark, Italy,
The Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden).
Adapted from Bemardi and Pincus (1996).
have been US$197,164. This is close to the average estimate of US$216,700 (3.3%) for
managers and senior managers from the United States. For Ireland, the Ryan Commission
recommended "the Irish accounting profession should realign itself formally with the US"
(McHugh & Stamp, 1992, p. 429). Consequently, the average materiality estimate for the
high-integrity client for Ireland should be within the same 5-10% range computed for the
UK. The actual average estimate for the Irish accountants was US$322,900 (4.9%), which
was at the low end of the expected range. The data in Table 3 show that the estimates for
the United States (34.2%) center not only on the mid value but also on a value that
approximates the average for the 10 rules of thumb (US$197,945) and the 3% materiality
estimate in the US standards at that time. For the UK and Ireland, the majority of their
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estimates (43.8%) are in the "Over US$400,000" bin that includes the 10% rule of thumb
from their Published Guidance.
Table 3 shows the materiality estimates for the United States and European counties. The
data indicate that having quantitative materiality guidelines does not ensure a higher level of
conformity in materiality estimates or more conservative materiality estimates. In fact, the
average materiality estimate for the UK and Ireland (e.g., those countries with quantitative
guidelines) ofUS$397,300 was not substantially lower (P= .72) than the average estimate for
Denmark, Italy, the Netherlands, Spain, and Sweden of US$414,400. Given this evidence, the
data do not support the call for including quantitative materiality guidelines in accounting and
auditing standards.
While the 3% materiality guideline for diluted earnings per share was in effect during
Bemardi and Arnolds' (1994) and Bemardi and Pincus' (1996) data gathering, this guideline
no longer exists in the United States. The SEC has added SAB No. 99 (1999) on materiality,
which occurred after our data gathering. SAB No. 99 requires auditors to consider other
qualitative factors that would make errors of less than 5% materiality; a similar interpretation
in the UK has not occurred.
6. Conclusions
The research provides four conclusions. First, European auditors lowered their estimates
when told they were auditing a low-integrity client. Second, European materiality estimates
are a fiinction of Hofstede's (1980) Uncertainty Avoidance. Third, European materiality
estimates are positively associated with Wingate's (1997) litigation indices. Fourth, European
materiality estimates are higher than US estimates.
The sensitivity to client integrity noted in the findings should be encouraging given the
growing concern of financial-statement users for auditors to detect fraud. The methodology
used to gather the data supports this finding. Rather than ask each auditor to estimate
materiality for two types of clients (i.e., one low integrity and one high integrity), the
methodology asked experienced auditors (i.e., mean experience was 9.4 years) to estimate
materiality for only one type of client. This prevented the participants from comparing their
materiality estimates for the two client types; any comparison would ensure that the low-
integrity client always received the lower materiality estimate. This sensitivity to a client risk
factor should be of some consolation to those in the profession of public accounting due to
the increased cost of defending against litigation.
There is an interesting implication of the finding on materiality varying with Uncertainty
Avoidance. Most believe that harmonization would alleviate many of the problems experi-
enced by international financial-statement users who attempt to compare financial statements
from more than one country. However, the finding on Uncertainty Avoidance suggests that,
even if international bodies harmonize or standardize the financial regulations and standards
without explicit inclusions requiring the disclosure of materiality estimates, financial state-
ments may still not be comparable to users. The differences in materiality estimates associated
with each country's Uncertainty Avoidance (Power Distance) score, as well as other national
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factors, in effect limit the standard-setting bodies' purpose of achieving a harmonized set of
financial statements.
The analysis indicates that the profession's concern should increase given the findings with
respect to litigation. While the level of materiality set in an environment of lower litigation
may be an accurate representation of the level of risk desired by the audit firm, the level of
materiality set in a higher level of litigation is clearly not. This point raises the concern that a
movement by European countries towards more equity-based financing or uniform standards
of auditor liability might create a more litigious atmosphere than when the original litigation
indices were calculated.
Limitations of the research include using only one case study involving an inventory
account and one situation-specific factor (client integrity). The scope of the sample (i.e.,
only western European auditors) also impairs the generalizability of the findings. Other
geographical areas (i.e., the Pacific Rim countries or South America) would be appropriate
research areas for this topic. The findings also support further research into the effect of
multiple scenarios and situational factors. The cultural indices used were those that relate
to the cultural environments of 1975-1978 (Hofstede, 1980). This study assumes that
people in western Europe have remained the same culturally since 1979. Allowing for
these limitations, the relative diversity of the sample with respect to Uncertainty
Avoidance (Hofstede, 1980) and litigation (Wingate, 1997) provide support for the
research findings.
Two other limitations should also be noted. First, a source of concern is that, while
Wingate's 1997 sample of the entire European Union showed that Litigation index and
Uncertainty Avoidance score are highly correlated, ours do not show a significant correlation.
Although this is good in a statistical sense, it is not in a sampling sense because two major
European continental countries (i.e., France and Germany) were not included in the sample.
Second, the theory development relies on papers that primarily deal with the US setting and
few papers that deal with the international setting. While this is understandable, as there is so
little information about auditor judgments in an international setting, studies set in the United
States (Bemardi & Arnold, 1994; Bemardi & Pincus, 1996; Pany & Wheeler, 1989) may not
be completely universal.
Future research should attempt to validate the hypothesis that European auditors are
significantly different from the general population for the Uncertainty Avoidance. Research
should also try to replicate the finding with respect to litigation to determine at what level
the cost-benefit considerations prevail and materiality is lowered. Another possible
extension would be to examine the countries that already have written quantitative
guidelines for materiality in their standards to determine whether this actually affects the
level of materiality.
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Appendix A. Materiality questionnaire
Assume that your firm has a policy of evaluating potential clients in several critical areas
prior to accepting a new client. One of these areas is Management Integrity. Your firm
believes that the entire population of potential clients can be described on a scale from 1 to
20. Your firm's standard for an acceptable client is a rating from 1 to 10.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20
-^
ACCEPTABLE
RANGE OF CLIENTS
UNACCEPTABLE
RANGE OF CLIENTS
ENTIRE POPULATION OF POTENTIAL CLIENTS
A. 1
.
Entire population ofpotential clients
In your firm, this evaluation is an ongoing process for all clients. Clients who do not
maintain a rating within the acceptable range (1-10) are carefully evaluated for continuation
as clients. Client Five's rating (circled value) has been stable since becoming a client and
currently reflect the following evaluations.
Management Integrity
\dr 3 4 5 6 7 9 10
Assume that you are the engagement manager for Client Five. As part of your ongoing
audit planning process, you are computing the level of materiality for this client's
INVENTORY account, which is 18.3% of total assets. Assume that you compute your
materiality estimate on a financial statement basis. The relevant financial statement data for
this client are:
Amounts are in the currency of (country's name)
Total assets US$35,770,004 Total revenue
Total inventory US$6,572,135 Gross profit
Total equity US$12,233,341 Pretax income
US$57,275,966
US$23,483,146
US$4,238,422
D.F. Arnold Sr. et al. / The International Journal ofAccounting 36 (2001) 459-483 481
Recall that the client has an integrity rating of 2 (where 1 is the highest integrity rating).
Question: In your opinion, how large must an error in the inventory account be before it is
considered material (smallest size to be material).
Your Materiality Estimate
Note: The client-integrity rating in this appendix is given for the high-integrity client (the
low-integrity client would have been rated an "8"). While all of the financial statement data
are expressed in US dollars, they were expressed in whatever the country's currency was if
the country asked for local currency to be used rather than US dollars.
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1. Introduction
Arnold, Bemardi, and Neidermeyer (2001) examine the differences in materiality-thresh-
old estimates among auditors from seven European countries, and also compare their
estimates with those of a group of auditors from the US. An investigation of this nature is
important, in general, for at least two reasons. First, the Intemational Accounting Standards
Committee (lASC) has set forth as one of its goals, "the improvement and harmonization of
regulations, accounting standards and procedures relating to the presentation of financial
statements" (lASC, Sect. 9000A, para 2, 1992). Accounting research suggests that one likely
factor that precipitates differences in accounting practices across countries is the culture of the
country in which the practitioner operates (Wingate, 1 997). Thus, the study of materiality
estimates among auditors in different economic-accounting regimes of the world provides
insight into likely inconsistencies accountants should consider if they are to proceed towards
this stated goal of the lASC. Second, such an examination enhances the profession's ability to
recognize generally accepted accounting and auditing practices of different economic-
accounting regimes across the world.
More specifically, it is important for us to understand two different things: (1) how
materiality-threshold judgments and decisions are affected by personal characteristics of
auditors such as their risk preferences, accounting conservatism, professional skepticism,
knowledge, cognitive ability, and information-processing biases, etc., and environmental
factors such as incentives, disincentives, frequency of litigation, and accounting regulation,
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etc.; and (2) how any of these personal characteristics and environmental factors tend to differ
among different cultures and subcultures that produce the auditors (who make these
materiality-threshold judgments on companies they audit).
This paper is an interesting attempt at studying some of these impacts on Big Six auditors'
materiality-threshold estimates. It would appear at first glance that the authors try to operate
within the first of the above two lines of inquiry. We say this because they have relied on
previous research (primarily Hofstede, 1980, 1991; Wingate, 1997) to make assumptions on
how personal characteristics of auditors and environmental factors tend to differ among
different cultures and subcultures. However, if their research objectives have to do with the
impact of different personal characteristics and cognitive abilities on materiality-threshold
judgments and decisions, then the appropriate experiment seems to be to manipulate or
measure these personal characteristics directly and study their impact on materiality thresh-
olds. Either materiality-threshold-related judgments or the threshold-estimate decisions could
then be studied, depending on the aspect of the decision-making process upon which the
researchers wished to concentrate.
As it stands, the authors have conducted an experiment on the impact of low and high
client integrity on materiality-threshold estimates in seven European countries (with the
United States as a benchmark). In doing so, they have assumed that personal and
environmental characteristics measured in previous cross-cultural research generalize to
auditors studied in the current experiment. Thus, the authors have effectively conducted a
single experiment collapsing across the two lines of inquiry outlined above.
2. Theory and design
Of course, joint tests sometimes do suffice, but in the case of this study, they raise
concerns on the validity of different cause-effect relationships. To understand these
concerns, let us first begin with a summary of the design. The authors presented experienced
auditors from different countries with a questionnaire in which these subjects had to make
an estimate of how large an error in the inventory account needed to be before it was
considered material (i.e., the smallest size to be material). The subjects were asked to make
this materiality-threshold estimate after reading a short analysis of the client's integrity level
as compared to the entire population of potential clients of the firm. The hypotheses
(relating to the impact of culture on materiality-threshold judgments) were then tested
essentially by running regression models with the materiality-threshold estimate as the
dependent variable and the following three explanatory variables: (1) client integrity (2)
uncertainty avoidance in the culture, and (3) litigation. The client integrity variable was
manipulated at two levels: high or low. This was between subjects. That is, each subject got
a questionnaire describing the client either as being of high integrity or as being of low
integrity, and no subject was presented with both conditions sequentially. Uncertainty
avoidance and litigation measures for the different countries were obtained fi"om previous
research or independent measurement. We discuss our concerns with these two variables in
detail below.
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Uncertainty avoidance was a variable measuring the average amount of "intolerance for
uncertainty" of a certain people. The uncertainty avoidance scores for the seven different
countries in this study were actually obtained by sampling employees of one multinational
corporation by Hofstede (1980), a cultural psychologist, in a previous study. The reliability of
Hofstede's measure among populations not working in multinational corporations, and
specifically among auditors, is an unstated and untested assumption. Hofstede's measure
seems to have been developed largely on the basis of three major questions asked of the
subjects, two of which were "How long do you think you will continue to be working for this
company?" and "How often do you feel nervous or tense?" The incorporation of these
measures in the context of avoidance of uncertainty in the financial statements of a third
(auditee) party is therefore an experimental design decision that needs support. We found the
paper lacking convincing arguments providing such support.
Litigation (or the Litigation Index, as the authors called the variable interchangeably in the
version of the paper available to us) was similarly measured from previous unrelated work.
The construct that this variable represents seems to be the exposure to litigation or the risk of
doing business, measured objectively. We are told that the measures were developed by one
Big Six firm for their own business purposes. An insurance underwriter developed this
"index" on behalfofthe firm as a measure ofthe firm's "risk ofdoing business as an auditor in
a particular country." Although all international audit firms' experiences were reportedly
incorporated in the measure, only publicly available claims and cost information were used.
Thus, settlements of disputes not in the public record were reportedly omitted (Wingate, 1997,
p. 140). This raises some concerns about the reliability of this measure fi*om an objective
standpoint. Further, the objective risk of doing business in a particular country is not
necessarily the same as (or equal to) the subjective perception of the risk. Since environmental
variables such as exposure to litigation are likely to influence materiality-threshold judgments
only via the intermediary perception of risk, we are concerned with lack of evidence
suggesting that the subjects indeed perceived the litigation risk in the same way as the
objective reality of the risk. (This is without prejudice to our earlier-stated concern about
whether the insurance underwriter did indeed measure the risk reliably.)
The authors report no elicitation procedures to measure the "uncertainty avoidance" and
"perceived litigation risk" of the subjects, although these should have been easy to collect in
postexperimental procedures. In fact, such postexperimental elicitation procedures are
standard design features in experimental research. Our concerns over the reliability of the
uncertainty avoidance and litigation measures were heightened by eyeball inspection of the
distributions of these two variables. Fig. 1 in the authors' paper shows, for example, that
Pakistan and Thailand are clumped together with Germany and Taiwan in the same
"uncertainty avoidance" category (at a median score of 65), while India (which can be
argued to share a largely common sociocultural heritage with Pakistan for over 4000 years)
was 25% of the scale away at an approximate score of 35. Similarly, anecdotal evidence argues
against the classification ofJapan, Belgium, Mexico, and Brazil as representing about the same
amount of exposure to litigation risk. (Not all of these countries have been looked at in this
study; however, these counterintuitive measures cast doubts on the generalizability of these
measures.) This is not to suggest that these measures are necessarily incorrect. However, their
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being appropriate in the context of the original measurement task does not automatically make
them reliable for the authors' purpose. The authors use measurements from studies conducted
on specific nonrandom subsets of the population. Since these studies have not been replicated
and because anecdotal business-culture relationships could suggest other relationships, we are
skeptical about the robustness of these measures.
In addition to the measurement of variables, we are concerned with the internal validity of
the cause-effect relationships theorized in the paper. The authors hypothesize several
relationships between cultural variables and the materiality-threshold estimates, but the
auditors' cognitive processes that lead from one to the other remain in a black box. The
use of empirical evidence from Wingate (1997) to argue that greater uncertainty avoidance
would lead to higher materiality thresholds is unconvincing. What Wingate does report is
some empirical evidence that a negative relationship exists between the amount of required
accounting disclosure and the level of uncertainty avoidance. Even assuming that this finding
turns out to be robust, the authors' theory that this somehow leads to an unambiguous
prediction about materiality-threshold estimates is difficult to follow. One might argue that
decreases in disclosure requirements leave less room for error. But does that mean that
auditors worry about only the larger errors (i.e., higher materiality thresholds) or do they now
need to be careful about even the smaller errors to ensure overall reliability of the financials
(i.e., lower materiality thresholds)? Thus, the cognitive path from uncertainty avoidance to
materiality-threshold estimates remains unclear and untested in the paper.
The link between litigation (or litigation risk) and the materiality-threshold estimates is
more strongly argued, but equally confiising. The authors go through an extended discussion
of how low-precision (i.e. higher materiality threshold) audits might lead to more litigation
against auditors, and how auditors try to restrict the cost of additional audit work to the cost of
litigation and somehow predict that "countries with higher litigation rates use higher
materiality levels that result in less precise audits." This argument seems tenuous at best,
and the consistency of the results with the hypothesis does not, in our opinion, elevate the
quality of the argument to the status of a theory. Moreover, it is important to reiterate that it is
the perception of litigation exposure and not the objective exposure level that is the
immediately relevant intermediate construct. (As will be discussed later, the counterintuitive
results may well be due to this inappropriate identification of the relevant construct.)
The authors also examine differences between materiality-threshold estimates of auditors
in the United States and those in Europe. The research hypothesis is one of no difference. The
authors do not explain why any other possibility could be expected.
3. Analysis
It is not clear why the authors used two levels of client integrity if the research question is
limited to whether uncertainty avoidance and litigation made a difference in materiality-
threshold estimates. Ceteris paribus, the impact of client integrity in itself as a determinant of
materiality thresholds is somewhat obvious. Thus, the real issue of interest seems to be that
the impact of client integrity levels (independent variable) on the materiality-threshold
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estimates (dependent variable) may differ based on the levels of the two other independent
variables: uncertainty avoidance and litigation (or, more accurately in our opinion, perceived
litigation risk). Thus, what the authors are trying to examine in addition to the main effects is
perhaps a set of interaction effects, and an analysis of variance model (perhaps with the two
continuous explanatory variables converted to categorical levels) seems ideally suited for the
purpose. However, the authors run regression models with no specified interactions.
Therefore, they tested only for main effects and not for any significant interactions.
The client integrity variable is statistically significant, although this tells us little more than
that the client integrity manipulation worked. In addition, the uncertainty avoidance and
litigation variables were also significant. Increases in uncertainty avoidance seem to predict
increases in materiality-threshold estimates. This finding is consistent with the authors' stated
hypothesis in this regard, but the lack of a clear theoretical development (as discussed earlier)
together with lack of process data on the auditors' cognitive processes rules out an analysis of
why and how.
The authors claim that the litigation variable was significant "as anticipated". That is,
materiality-threshold estimates tend to increase with the litigation measure. We have already
expressed our disagreement (in a previous paragraph) with this "anticipation." The key to
these counterintuitive results lies perhaps in the fact that the relevant independent variable is
the subjective perceived litigation risk, while the variable that the authors used was an
objective measure.
The authors also report statistically significant differences in the materiality-threshold
estimates between auditors in the US and several European countries. Since no difference
was hypothesized, and since there is no theoretical discussion as to why a difference might
have been expected, it is difficult to interpret the importance of these differences,
collectively or separately.
4. What do we learn?
So what do we learn from this study? We are assured that auditors assign lower materiality
thresholds to clients with lower integrity levels. It seems also that we learn that if countries
are different in terms of the Hofstede measure of uncertainty avoidance, then there are some
specific impacts on materiality-threshold estimates. We are not sure of the cognitive or
psychological paths that lead to these effects, so we cannot say for sure how we could control
or modify these effects. Also, we do not know the reliability of the Hofstede measure across
different countries and different strata of auditors, so we cannot say whether it is uncertainty
avoidance itself or some other correlated variable (e.g., risk tolerance or level of accounting
regulation) that is the real driving factor. We also learn that an objective measure of litigation
risk does not reliably predict the materiality threshold estimates, but we do not know whether
a measure of perceived litigation risk might. We just did not have appropriate data collected in
this study to reach a meaningful conclusion on this question.
In sum, this paper reminded us that cultural variables affect materiality-threshold decisions.
It did not throw much light on the how's and why's. Future research in this area would be
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productive if it could trace the path from key cultural variables of interest, through their
impacts on risk preferences, incentive sensitivities, and other mediators, to the effects on
assessments of audit risks and decisions on materiality thresholds.
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1. Motivation
1.1. Introduction
Our study examined how culture affects auditors' materiality estimates. Our discussants
enumerate a list of factors that could affect an individual auditor's materiality estimates.
While the differences suggested by our discussants would make an interesting study, they are
not what this research examined. Although our sample includes 181 auditors from seven
Westem European countries, our focus was how the estimates from each country differed.
The reason for using this methodology is that only the average materiality estimates of each
country provide an insight into how cultural differences could influence the implementation
of intemational accounting and auditing standards such as materiality. Our research is
important because there is no research that indicates that the levels of audit precision are
similar among countries.
1.2. Individual versus country estimates
We agree with our discussants on their point concerning individual testing of Uncertainty
Avoidance and risk aversion. Another research design would have been to ask our participants
to respond to Hofstede's questions that make up the Uncertainty Avoidance construct and an
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assessment of their risk aversion. Had we asked these individual questions, we could have
compared their individual materiality estimates with their own uncertainty avoidance and
aversion to risk. Had we done this, we could have studied both individual and group
differences. This would have given us a data set of 181 rather than the 14 in this research
(i.e., two average materiality estimates per country— one high integrity and one low integrity).
The possibility of using individual testing provides an opportunity for future research.
1.3. Cognitive testing
With respect to cognitive testing, we began planning this study a year and a half prior to
gathering the data. As part of this process, we discussed the possibility of using the Defining
Issues Test (Rest, 1979), the Group Embedded Figures Test (Oltman, Raskin, &
Witkin, 1971), and the Locus of Control Test (Rotter, 1966).^ However, this type of testing
would have dramatically increased the difficulty of obtaining our targeted sample of
managers and partners. First, it takes between 45 and 50 min to administer these three tests
(Bemardi, 1994). Second, direct supervision of the tests is essential to ensure that no
problems occur. Additionally, the Group Embedded Figures Test is a timed test. Had we used
cognitive testing, our research would have tied up a substantial number of an office's
managers and partners for over 2 h to accomplish the tasks involved in this study. We were
able to successfiilly market this research by presenting it as a stand-alone package that
participants could work on during their slack time.
2. Theory and design
We also believe that the use of interactive terms would be appropriate as we indicated in
the "Possible Interactions" section of the analysis and shown in Fig. 2 of our study. However,
we did not have a sufficient number of data points because of our research design. As
previously noted, had we asked each auditor to fill out Hofstede's questionnaire, we would
have had 1 8 1 usable observations. Even with our current research design, interactive terms
would have been possible had the firms from both France and Germany been in the sample.
2.1. Uncertainty avoidance
Collins and Bloom (1997) and Gray (1988) suggest that cultural values can influence the
process that produces accounting values and systems. Salter and Niswander (1995) found that
only Hofstede's construct of Uncertainty Avoidance associates with the accounting values they
tested. Consequently, we do not believe that it is a significant "leap of faith" to assume that
systems and values that are affected by cultural constructs will influence measures such as
materiality. Using Jeurissen and van Luijk's (1998, p. 999) scores oj ethical business conduct.
These cognitive measures have been used extensively in audit judgment research.
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Fig.l. Probability of doing more work prior to signing-off for case 2 by individualism and consideration 2.
we find that, as Uncertainty Avoidance scores increase, perceptions of ethical business
behavior decrease in Western Europe. Jeurissen and van Luijlc's findings are supported by
Husted (1999) who studies a sample of 44 countries throughout the world that are (1) part of
Hofstede's (1980) sample and (2) are also part of intemafional studies on corruption. Husted
finds that, as Uncertainty Avoidance increases, perceptions of corrupdon also increase.
Arnold, Bemardi, and Neidermeyer (1999) found that Hofstede's Individualism construct
negatively associates with a willingness to do additional audit work to address a possible
audit problem. To test Hofstede's Individualism construct, Arnold et al. asked auditors to rate
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their beliefs about the statement "The importance of relying on auditing rules and not on
personal relationships" on a seven-point Likert scale. As shown in Fig. 1, the higher (lower)
the concern for auditing rules in a given country, the more (less) likely that the auditors from
that country would do the additional audit work. While the willingness of each country's
auditors to do the additional audit work is constant (i.e., the level on the vertical axis is
the same), the average country response to the statement could vary from one (i.e., little
concern for auditing rules) to seven (i.e., great concern for these rules). The fact that these
responses plot out in a nearly perpendicular pattern to that of Individualism versus probability
of doing more audit work is significant.
Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner's (1998; hereafter referred to as THT) study on culture
and its variables provide some insights into Hofstede's variables. While many question the
use of Hofstede's data because it represent the responses of 100,000 IBM managers,
managers make up 75% of THT's (1993, pp. 1-2) sample and the other 25% are typists,
stenographers, and secretaries. Arnold et al. (1999, p. 80) note that several of TNT's variables
significantly associate with the Uncertainty Avoidance scores of European countries.
Hofstede's uncertainty avoidance construct is related to THT's: "Whose fault was it"
(7?^=.24, p. 57); "Acting as suits you even if nothing is achieved" (i?^=.75, p. 108); and
"The reason for the organization" (i?''=.65, p. 173).
Consequently, the associations between Hofstede's (1980) and THT's (1998) constructs
indicate that Hofstede's data have been partially validated on a sample not working for a large
multinational corporation. We also examined the associations among Hofstede's cultural
constructs and Au's (1999) data for Western Europe. Our analysis indicates that Uncertainty
Avoidance associates with Au's pride in work.
Our discussants note that several of the countries appear to have questionable Uncertainty
Avoidance scores. However, none of the countries they cited are included in this study
(i.e., Pakistan, Thailand, Germany, and Taiwan). Had any of these countries been part of our
sample, their concern would be valid. However, we failed to see the relevance to a study
based solely in Westem Europe. Our discussants would have us believed that India and
Pakistan are two countries that are only separated by some arbitrary line on a map. While
India and Pakistan may have shared a common sociocultural heritage, a significant split
occurred when different religions were introduced into the region. Religious differences led to
conflicts throughout the intervening years extending to current nuclear threats. Pakistan has
only been part of India for a total of 71 1 years during three periods from 3000 B.C. to today.
Conversely, Pakistan ruled major portions of northern India for 380 years during the same
5000-year period. (Abdullah, 2001). Until 1947, India and Pakistan were under Bridsh
influence. A comprehensive study of Hofstede (1980, p. 12) shows that they would not be
candidates for cultural research given their association with Britain.
2.2. Litigation
Again, we find it curious that our discussants focus on countries that were not included in
the sample to make their point on litigation risk (i.e., Japan, Belgium, Mexico, and Brazil).
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Our discussants refer to anecdotal evidence twice in their discussion without any specifics
concerning the evidence or the source of their data. This information would have allowed us
to evaluate the impact of these pieces of anecdotal evidence on our findings.
Our discussants are skeptical about the use of the litigation variable because it has not been
validated by additional research. However, we were not the only authors at the conference
who used this litigation index. In addition to using the litigation index, Fargher, Taylor, and
Simon (in press) also used the same disclosure index that Wingates (1997) used. Fargher
et al.'s research found that these indices were significant for a sample of 20 countries of
which three were part of our sample. These authors found that, as the number of financial
statement disclosures increased, the probability of having a BigSix auditor also increased.
They also found that audit fees increased as the number of financial statement disclosures
(/*=.0002) and litigation (P=.0001) within a country increased.
Our discussants claim that, because out-of-court settlements are not included in the
computation of the litigation, the index is of questionable value. While it is true that the
magnitude (i.e., dollar value of the settlement) is not included in the litigation index by virtue
ofthe fact that these types of settlements are closed, the original filing ofthe lawsuit is included
in the calculation of the index. One could also argue that certain types of claims are settled out
of court as a matter of company policy and that the level of these out-of-court settlements
should also be a function of the level of litigation in the country. If out-of-court settlements are
proportional to the level of litigation in a country, then out-of-court settlements should not
significantly affect the litigation index as our discussants maintain.
Finally, our prediction for the litigation index was based on the statement that One might
expect that lower precision audit (i.e., higher materiality) has a higher likelihood offailure
and litigation than a more precise audit (i.e., lower materiality). This statement was the lead
sentence to the paragraph that described our logic pattern. Our argument is that, given a
choice of setting materiality at a lower or higher value, the lower the materiality (i.e., the finer
the filter), the less likely an error will escape detection. Since auditors do not disclose the
materiality level, they used on a specific audit, then litigation is based on what a prudent
person would assume auditors should have used (Harper & Fleming, 1956).
3. Analysis
3.1. Client integrity
Client integrity manipulations have a scattered history of success in research. For instance,
audit seniors who are told the evaluation of their client's integrity is low should detect a
material error at a higher rate than other seniors not given this insight. While this might appear
to be "somewhat obvious," Bemardi (1994) found that seniors who received this client rating
did not detect the embedded error at a higher rate. In fact, seniors who made the wrong
decision (i.e., the account was fairly stated) for the low-integrity client did not have higher
probability of fraud estimates even when given a series of cues that the auditing standards in
effect at the time indicated (should increase) the probability of fraud (Bemardi, 1997).
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Our discussants question the use of the client integrity variable. However, we found only
one study (Bemardi & Arnold, 1994) that demonstrates that auditors follow the guidelines
set forth in auditing standards as they relate to materiality and client integrity. However,
Bemardi and Arnold's research uses a sample of auditors from the United States and did not
ask an open-ended question on materiality. Since research incrementally extends the
knowledge base, we took an established case study and used it in a European audit
environment being careful to correct the limitations of the previous study. Replication
studies are difficult to justify because they are perceived as "adding little to the knowledge
base." Consequently, including a variable such as client integrity along with new variables
makes the replication a viable research option. The use of the integrity manipulation
provided us with (1) a check of whether the participants took the study seriously (i.e., did
not randomly answer the questionnaire) and (2) one additional data point for each country
(i.e., n = 14 rather than 7).
4. What did we actuaUy learn?
Finally, what did we actually learn from this research? To answer this question, we assume
that the United States wishes to accept the results of audits done by European auditors (i.e.,
mutual recognition). Consequently, we believe that the provisions in Auditing Standard No.
82 Consideration ofFraud in Financial Statements (American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants (AICPA), 1997, p. 37) provide an insight into the findings of this research:
Materiality levels include an overall level for each statement; however, because the
statements are interrelated, and for reasons of efficiency, the auditor ordinarily considers
materiality for planning purposes in terms of the smallest aggregate level of misstatements
that could be considered material to any one of the financial statements. For example, if the
auditor believes that misstatements aggregating approximately US$100,000 would have a
material effect on income but that such misstatements would have to aggregate approximately
US$200,000 to materially affect financial position, it would not be appropriate for him or her
to design audit procedures that would be expected to detect misstatements only if they
aggregate approximately US$200,000.
Because it would not be appropriatefor him or her to design audit procedures that would
be expected to detect misstatements using a higher materiality estimate, how does one explain
the difference in the average materiality estimates? This is an especially difficult question
since we provided the same data to all of the participants with respect to financial statement
data. Therefore, there should have been little or no difference in the average materiality
estimates among countries unless culture influenced the auditors' cognitive process.
It appears that countries with higher Uncertainty Avoidance scores are willing to be less
precise in their procedures when they believe the risk is not high (e.g., for a high-integrity
client). This follow explain our finding that Hofstede's Uncertainty Avoidance explained
about 4 1% of the variation in the average materiality estimates for the high-integrity client in
a univariate analysis. However, this willingness to accept uncertainty did not apply to the
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estimates for the low-integrity client. Overall, the average estimates suggest a degree of
precaution (Harper & Fleming, 1956). These average estimates reflect both the low-integrity
rating and the level of litigation in the various countries. The litigation index explained about
65% of the variation in the average materiality estimates for the low-integrity client in a
second univariate analysis. Consequently, we leamed that, even if Europe had a common set
of auditing standards, culture could influence the application of these auditing standards.
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Book review
Intangibles: Management, Measurement, and Reporting
by Baruch Lev, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2001, pp. viii+216
The intangibles of the modem business— intellectual property and knowledge assets, brands,
alliances, human and organizational capital— are frequently its most valuable assets. There is
evidence of the growing importance of intangibles in the soaring price-to-book ratio, which
has risen almost without interruption from its nadir of below one in the 1970s to in excess of
six by early 2000. So long as you believe that stocks are sensibly valued, and assuming the
economy is not getting less competitive, the price-to-book ratio reflects the proportion of off-
balance sheet (essentially intangible) assets to on-balance sheet (essentially tangible) assets in
the economy.
Baruch Lev is perhaps the leading accounting academic who is writing and researching on
intangibles. In this timely monograph. Lev explains what we mean by intangibles, presents
some explanations for their growing importance in the modem economy, and tackles the
difficult question of how intangibles should be accounted for.
Intangibles are clearly not a new phenomenon— the 19th century had plenty of brands,
patents, human capital. So why now? Lev attributes the growth in importance of
intangibles since the 1980s to two factors: the greatly intensified competitive environment
that has followed deregulation and globalization, and the facilitation provided by informa-
tion technology.
Corporations have now largely exhausted the potential for manufacturing economies of
scale, and excellence in manufacturing has been widely mimicked. So production has become
commoditized. Increasingly, the corporation must look to innovation rather than manufac-
turing for competitive advantage. Lev describes how companies such as Ford are busy
"deverticalizing" and pushing manufacturing and the ownership of manufacturing assets out
to third parties (pp. 10-14). Intensive use of IT permits Ford to manage these new
relationships efficiently. Of course, this leaves a nagging question in the mind of someone
still trying to figure out why the price-to-book has risen quite so high. Where are these
manufacturing assets going?
Lev notes the value-creating potential of the scalability of many intangibles— unlike
tangibles or financial assets, the use of an intangible at one place or time does not preclude its
use elsewhere— and of network effects: "... network effects are a hallmark of advanced
technology, information-based industries . . . [and] are increasingly characterized by product-
related intangibles (unique products and services protected by intellectual property) at the
core and alliance-related intangibles at the periphery" (p. 31). The downside is that
0020-7063/01/$ - see front matter © 2001 University of Illinois. All rights reserved.
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investments in intangibles are often far more risky than investments in tangibles, partly
because of the very winner-take-all nature of network economics. Also, intangibles are
bedeviled by fuzzy property rights and the difficulty of excluding outsiders from enjoyment
of the intangibles.
People are clearly the key to innovation, and CEOs unceasingly remind us that its people
are the corporation's most important asset. However, "human capital" raises in stark form a
central difficulty of the intangibles economy. Employees are making it increasingly clear that
they are not, in any meaningful sense, assets. They can walk. Lev quotes a striking finding:
that over 70% ofyoung, fast-growing companies were created by people simply replicating or
developing innovations from their previous employer (p. 35). In such a world it remains an
open question how much of the value created by the new economy will be left with
stockholders in public markets, and how much will be captured by key employees.
The growth of intangibles has exposed the limitations of the existing accounting model.
The question that is constantly asked by the innocent nonaccountant is: if intangibles are so
important, why aren't they on the balance sheet? This debate surfaced energetically over a
decade ago when a small number of leading branded goods firms in the UK and elsewhere
started to include a valuation of their brand equity in the balance sheet. The practice did not
become widespread, and recent accounting standards reflect the current consensus, which is
that internally generated intangibles cannot be usefully included in the balance sheet.
Intangibles do not meet accountants' tests for balance sheet recognition for several reasons.
Intangibles are frequently diffuse in nature and not readily separable from other assets or from
the business as a whole. The ftizzy property rights surrounding many intangibles mean that
the company may not exercise the "effective control" required of an asset. The paradox is
that it is the uniqueness of its intangibles that enables the firm to differentiate itself and helps
it to sustain competitive advantage. But, being unique, there is no active secondary market in
similar assets to which accountants can refer to get a market price. So the valuation of
intangibles necessarily involves subjective evaluations of future cash flows.
The debate about whether the firm should value its intangibles in the balance sheet is over.
The new challenge is disclosure. At present, firms have very little guidance on what
information they should usefully disclose to enable outsiders to evaluate their intangibles.
Throughout the book. Lev associates the creation of intangibles with the process of
innovation, and the "innovation value chain" provides the framework for Lev's template for
a new set of corporate disclosures (Chapter 5). Lev proposes a detailed series of disclosures
under three broad headings: learning activities and the discovery of new ideas, implementa-
tion, and commercialization. His proposals jibe with those of other writers who have been
calling for systematic disclosure of the way in which management targets and measures the
creation of shareholder value. A key element in this work will be the increasing alignment of
internal and external reporting.
There is a long way to go in developing an accounting model for the world of intangibles.
While templates such as Lev's are well articulated, there is a lot of research still needed before
we can define a parsimonious and robust set of metrics for, say, brand equity or human capital.
Observation of companies' current internal reporting systems suggests that they are using a
wide variety of metrics to measure the performance of these assets. If the appropriate metrics
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for intangibles is quite context-specific, it will be challenging to develop accounting rules that
bring forth more useful disclosure. The supply of information on intangibles will need to be
matched by demand. At present, both supply and demand are very weak. Unless equity
analysts and other outsiders can use the data that companies are producing, attempts to
improve disclosure will be frustrated. It is going to be fascinating to watch the debate proceed.
Chris Higson
London Business School
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Guide to International Standards on Auditing & Related Services, 2001 (includes
Practice Aids and CPE)
by Dan M. Guy and D.R. Carmichael, Fort Worth, Texas, Practitioners Publishing Company,
September 2000, second edition, paginated by section.
Global standard setting in auditing has truly come of age, and this Guide by Dan Guy and
Doug Carmichael, two respected authorities in auditing, is a very welcome addition to the
professional literature available to practitioners, academics, and students. As stated in the
preface, "This technical reference Guide presents the International Federation of Account-
ants' (IFAC) International Standards on Auditing (ISAs), International Standard on Assur-
ance Engagements (ISAE), and IFAC's Code ofEthics for Professional Accountants (Code)
in an easy-to-read, active-voice format. The Guide is designed to help auditors, accountants,
and financial executives across the world community understand, comply with, and apply
ISAs to audit and related services (review, agreed-upon procedure, and compilation)
engagements and the ISAE to assurance engagements. The Guide will also facilitate
comparison of IFAC's Code with the ethical requirements in individual countries" (p. vii).
To a large extent, the stated objectives of this Guide are achieved, and, being the only such
comprehensive work of which I am aware, the effort expended on producing such a resource
is commendable and noteworthy.
In the remainder of this book review, I will first summarize the significant contribu-
tions made by this Guide to the professional literature. I will then observe that the pace
and complexity of global standard-setting efforts in auditing has increased considerably;
the landscape has altered even in the short time since this Guide was written.
Consequently, there are several additional perspectives that the authors should consider
when preparing future editions of this work to make it even more relevant for
international auditing practitioners.
At the outset, I should reiterate that this Guide is unique simply by virtue of the fact that
it is probably the only such comprehensive resource on the ISAs promulgated by the
International Auditing Practices Committee (lAPC). It follows the sequence of IFAC's
Technical Pronouncements Handbook, and each pronouncement is presented in a separate
section. The sections are logically presented and contain the following parts: Introduction,
Definitions, Basic Principles and Essential Procedures, Public Sector Perspective, Explan-
ations and Illustrations (including, if applicable, small entity considerations), and Practice
Aids. Helpful interpretations of the Code (now being substantially revised— see comments
below) as well as a Glossary are also presented. The readily comprehensible and direct
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writing style of the authors will be found appealing by the busy practitioner, and it will
prove particularly important when preparing the planned Spanish edition of this work.
Overall, I am very pleased that we finally have a well-written Guide to accompany the
ISAs, which will likely become a trusted and reliable resource for practitioners, academics,
and students. The Practice Aids and self-study CPE sections are additional desirable
features of the Guide.
I now turn to a few significant perspectives that the authors should consider incorp-
orating in future editions of the Guide. These suggestions should not be construed as
criticisms; rather, they are meant to enhance the Guide's relevance and usefulness to
practitioners, academics, and students.
In the wake of the Asian economic and financial crisis, given IFAC's role with respect
to the development of international auditing, ethical, and quality assurance standards, the
International Forum on Accountancy Development (IFAD) was established with the
explicit goal of raising the quality of financial reporting and auditing worldwide. This
is a formidable challenge, requiring the cooperation of many, and will take time, as
described in the context of accounting standards by Nobes (2000, p. 3): "Convergence of
accounting standards will not be achieved without substantial co-operation between
government, the business community and the accountancy profession. Improvements in
accounting practice will also require the development of educational, professional and
regulatory infi'astructures. Adoption of new standards without adequate preparation may be
more detrimental than beneficial." These remarks are even more relevant to the
convergence of auditing standards that are sometimes enshrined in country-specific
statutes, laws, and regulations.
There is recognition that, as the auditing profession evolves over time, there may come
into being a standards-gap (public expectations that go beyond existing auditing and
accounting standards), a performance-gap (public perceptions that auditing performance
falls short of what is required by existing standards), and a communications-gap (inadequate
communication of the role and responsibility of the auditing profession in managing public
expectadons). As noted by Canada's Macdonald Commission (1988), these "gaps" may
individually or collectively create or exacerbate the "expectations gap," referring to the
public's expectations of audits and the public's perception of what audits actually provide.
Accordingly, the Big Five accounting firms and other international firms have worked hard to
rethink as well as enhance the infrastructure of global standard setting in auditing (partly
through an IFAC-contemplated restructuring of the lAPC), to assist with a project involving
substantial revision of the Code (an exposure draft of the Code is currently under
consideration), and to support the formation of the Transnational Auditors Committee
(TAC) to raise audit quality worldwide. These significant changes in the global infrastructure
and standard-setting apparatus, including the contemplated revision of the Code, deserve a
prefatory discussion in the Guide to provide the reader with useful background. Otherwise,
the reader may never fully appreciate the context in which global standard setting in auditing
is occurring.
Unlike the domain of accounting standards where the International Organization of
Securities Commissions (IOSCO) has endorsed a core set of International Accounting
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Standards (lASs), at the time of this writing, IOSCO has not yet similarly endorsed ISAs.
Nevertheless, just as a worldwide duopoly currently exists with respect to generally accepted
accounting principles (GAAP), viz., US GAAP and lASs, we have a parallel situation in the
domain of generally accepted auditing standards (GAAS), viz., US GAAS and ISAs.
Consequently, there is an unmet need for a detailed comparison between US GAAS and
ISAs (similar to what appears as Appendix B in the American Institute of Certified Public
Accountants' Codification (2001); but this comparison was completed as of 1998, and it
needs to be made a "two-way" comparison and updated).
A similar consideration would extend to independence/ethics issues, so that a concise
summary of the substantially revised Code, when available, would facilitate comparison with
the numerous national ethics/independence-related rules and regulations around the world.
Perhaps the authors could consider doing such a comparison for auditing standards as they
appear in US GAAS and ISAs and continue to furnish a concise summary and interpretation
of the revised Code. These materials could be invaluable if presented as an Appendix in a
future edition of this Guide, although that may substantially increase the scope of the authors'
work and require additional volumes.
Despite the promise to continuously update the Guide online at www.ppcnet.com (updates
planned within 30 days after the publication of a new standard), I must point out that the
second edition (as of September 2000) of the Guide is already out of date, considering that a
revised ISA 240: The Auditor's Responsibility to Consider Fraud and Error in an Audit of
Financial Statements, International Auditing Practices Statement (lAPS) 1012: Auditing
Derivative Financial Instruments have been issued. Furthermore, as noted above, a signific-
ant revision of the Code is in process. The reason for excluding lAPSs from the Guide's
coverage is rather surprising and is not clear to me. Fraud and derivatives auditing pose
significant contemporary international auditing practice issues, and, hence, their omission
fi-om the book-format of the current version of the Guide is regrettable. In retrospect, it
appears that a loose-leaf version of the Guide with the ability to accommodate such new
releases, in addition to the abovementioned online resource, would have been more
appropriate. Of course, the existence of the Web-based, online resource does substantially
alleviate the problem of continuous updates.
In conclusion, I would encourage audit practitioners to become conversant with ISAs by
using this helpful Guide, and, perhaps, by completing the self-study portions to deepen their
understanding while gaining CPE credit. I would like to add that university academicians,
who teach undergraduate and graduate auditing, should seriously consider using this Guide
as a supplement to existing courses on auditing. With international auditing harmonization
efforts under way, global standard setting in auditing has picked up momentum, and
practitioners, professors, and students must keep abreast of contemporary developments.
There could be no better way to gain familiarity with international standards than by
referring to this Guide when studying the contents of ISAs and IFAC's Code of Ethics for
Professional Accountants.
Sridhar Ramamoorti
Andersen LLP
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AIMS and SCOPE. The aims of The International Journal ofAccounting are to advance the academic
and professional understanding of accounting theory and practice from the international perspective and
viewpoint. The Journal recognizes that international accounting is influenced by a variety of forces, e.g.,
governmental, political and economic.
The Journal attempts to assist in the understanding of the present and potential ability of accounting to
aid in the recording and interpretation of international economic transactions. These transactions may be
within a profit or nonprofit environment. The Journal deliberately encourages a broad view of the origins
and development of accounting with an emphasis on its functions in an increasingly interdependent global
economy, and welcomes manuscripts that help explain current international accounting practices, with
related theoretical justifications, and identify criticisms of current practice. Other than occasional com-
missioned papers or special issues, all the manuscripts published in the Journal are selected by the editors
after the normal refereeing process.
1
.
Manuscripts should be submitted in triplicate to the Editor, Professor A. Rashad Abdel-Khalik, The
International Journal ofAccounting, University of Illinois, 320 Commerce West, 1206 S. Sixth Street,
Champaign, IL 61820, U.S.A.
2. All manuscripts must be typewritten or word processed, double spaced on one side only and num-
bered consecutively, including an abstract of approximately 100 words, and 6 key words for indexing.
Papers must either be neither previously published nor submitted elsewhere simultaneously. Authors
are responsible for obtaining permission from the copyright owner (usually the publisher) to use any
quotations, illustrations, or tables from another source.
3. The author's full name, affiliation, and when applicable, e-mail address should appear on the title page.
4. All tables, figures and illustrations should accompany the manuscript on separate sheets. Captions should
clearly identify all separate matter, and all figures must be submitted in camera ready copy. All should
be called out in text and indication given as to location. For example.
TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE.
5. Footnotes should be numbered consecutively throughout the manuscript with superscript Arabic
numerals. They should be collected in a separate file at the end of the text.
6. References should be cited in the text as follows:
Schweikart and O'Conner (1989) agree with this method. Other studies have found similar results
(Schweikart and O'Conner. 1989: Smith, 1991).
On a separate Reference page(s), each citing should appear, double-spaced, in alphabetical orders as
follows:
Journal Articles
Barth, M. E., Clinch, G. J., & Shibano, T. (1999). International accounting harmonization and
global equity markets. Journal ofAccounting and Economics, 26. 201-235.
Books
Neter, J.. Wasserman, W., & Whitmore, G. A. (1993). Applied Statistics (4'"^ ed.). Needham Heights,
MA: Allyn & Bacon.
Hofstede, G., & Schreuder. H. (1987). A joint reply to Montagna. In: B. Gushing (Ed.), Accounting
and culture (pp. 29-30). Sarasota, FL: American Accounting Association.
7. Upon acceptance the author is to submit one copy of the approved manuscript on a spellchecked IBM
compatible, program specific disk to the editor. The accuracy of the disk and proofs is the responsi-
bility of the author. Macintosh submissions are limited to high density disks.
BOOK REVIEW SECTION. The book review section is interested in works published in any language,
as long as they are comparative or international in character. The author or publisher of such works should
furnish the book review editor with two (2) copies of the work, including information about its price and
the address where readers may write for copies. Reviews will be assigned by the book review editor. No
unsolicited reviews will be accepted. Suggestions of works that might be reviewed are welcomed.
Professor Stephen A. Zeff Rice University - MS 531, R O. Box 1892, Houston, TX 77251-1892;
Tel: +1-713-348-6066; Fax: +1-713-348-5251; E-Mail: sazeff@rice.edu.
Q.
S
^
CO n*
CO ?^
33 2 ^
CD 2 H)
^
r'n 3
ii ^
> <.
CD -T
03
O
cd"
o
CD
5"
o
o =
oo
o
ON
C4»nc
C3CX) 3>H
> 2<:
zsmm
> V073
<DOU)
rm H
*^:v ISO
o >
33
-<rH r
mo2
CO
o
o
CO
>0
00
o
00
lU
I
o
fD IT
il PRSR
U.S.
POPA
z =-. a ^ ^
? i?
O H C/3
> H
[:^ < o o
(yi H m




